Gardner Chimp Vocabulary
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- Introduction
- The analytical framework
- What the individual knows
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Chapter 11 An analysis of ape vocabulary David Dwyer, Michigan State University February 3, 2011
This essay has two threads. One is looking at the interactive aspect and the other is concerned with the nature of inventory. On the other hand, this may not be possible. For the time being, the essay will discuss concepts in both senses. Introduction It was once thought that the ability to communicate symbolically beyond the capacity of chimpanzees. All this changed when Washoe, a chimpanzee raised by humans at the University of Nevada learned to produce and understand words using the hand gestures of American Sign Language. Subsequent studies have shown that other apes, chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas, have this capacity as well. After having demonstrated that apes can use words, scholarly attention then focused on whether ape sentences are syntactic.1 As a result, scholars have overlooked the question of what words have been learned and what they can tell us about ape cognition and it is this question that this essay addresses.2 Sources The table below based on Miles and Harper (1994) via Davis (1998) shows the estimates for vocabulary used by the various ape language projects. Interestingly, all the ape species show about the same ability to acquire vocabulary.
Each of these studies reported on the number of vocabulary items learned, but with the exception of Koko (Patterson 1978), there are no published reports listing the vocabulary acquired for any of these signing apes. In order to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the signs learned by these apes I would need a vocabulary from each of these sources to determine how much variation there is from ape to ape, for it was possible that what was learned reflected the learning environment as opposed to the cognitive capacity of the ape. Interestingly, it turned out that these vocabulary lists were remarkably coherent, as can be seen by examining appendix A. Patterson’s reports on Koko’s activities has been considered suspect by some scholars because she published her findings in popular rather than academic papers, thus avoiding peer review. However, Koko’s learned vocabulary is strikingly similar to those of the other apes. The process of constructing a vocabulary involved gleaning the published work on both Washoe Gardener & Gardner and Fouts) and Nim (Terrace) for instances of vocabulary use. I am in the process of constructing the vocabulary for the University of Georgia project. The assembly of a comprehensive listing of vocabulary is difficult for several reasons, and this may help explain why so few vocabulary lists are available at this time. First, there is the question of how to determine whether a given word has actually been learned. Gardner and Gardner and Terrace established criteria based on word use, though it has been noted that apes also possess a passive vocabulary, that is words that are understood but not used. For example, Savage-Rumbaugh et al N.S.) the bonobo Nyota used the words YESTERDAY and TOMORROW, his companions X and Y did not, though they understood them. Fouts notes that he and his assistants would announce SURPRISE when something special was about to happen, but does not report that that the apes under his supervision ever used the word. Second, is the question of keeping track of words that have not been taught. Kanzi, a bonobo learned is an informal environment, in fact, at first, his observers were not aware that he was learning at all (SSR). Fourth, many of the words reported were provided because they were part of an exchange illustrating a point the author was making. A third difficult has to do with determining what the word means, for example the word SORRY used by (Lucy?) could mean ‘I am sorry you are hurt’ or I am sorry I hurt you. Fouts (1997:151) reports that Washoe learned the word for GUILT, which is not defined or contextualized. Thus, the accuracy of these vocabulary lists (Appendix A) has to be understood in the context of these limitations.
Following Saussure (19xx), a word is a sigh with a concept (signified) attached to a signifier, which in the case of these apes is a sign language gesture. Thus the process of learning a word involves the attachment of a sign to the concept. This means that to learn a word, one must be able to grasp the concept to which it is attached. Thus, the analysis of ape vocabulary is at the same time an analysis of the concepts that apes are able to grasp, either because they have an innate grasp of these concepts or have a capacity to learn these concept. The first part of the paper deals with identifying and classifying the types of words that have been learned; the second part of the paper addresses the question of whether these concepts are innate or learned. In order to learn a word, whether using ASL, graphic or vocal signs, one has to do three things: 1) identify the concept to be learned (Saussure’s signified), 2) learn the sign to represent the concept (Saussure’s signifier) and 3) make the link between the signified and the signifier. Thus each learned sign indicates that the learner has grasped the concept behind it. It is difficult to say whether a given concept existed prior to the learning of the sign or whether the concept was acquired as part of the process of learning the sign (or represent a combination of the two). I suspect that hardest part of learning a new sign is not learning the concept, but the linking of it to the signifier.
In this essay, following Cassirer (1944), I distinguish between words (also called referential signs) and gestures. The basis of this distinction is found in the relationship between the signifier and the signified. In the gesture, the linkage is predetermined, whereas in the word, it is not. This means that as long as we have new signifiers we can attach them to new concepts to make new words. It has been reported (de Waal 19xx)4 that there are regional variations in different populations of chimpanzees in the way they make a given gesture. For example, some populations make a request by putting the hand out with the palm up, and others do so with the hand. However, each of these variations (only 2 have been reported) connects to the same signified - a request for food. It is not possible for chimpanzees to reassign this gesture to a different signified, such as a dog, or a sign of anger. In contrast, because referential signs do not have this requirement, it is possible for a given signifier to represent any possible concept. Symbolic interaction Once words are learned, they can be used in conversations with humans and other apes. This is what GH Mead termed symbolic interaction, which involves the process of objectivation, the expressing of one’s subjectivity, and enables increased intersubjectivity (shared understanding) and negotiation. Following an analysis of the types of words learned we address the question of the consequences of symbolic interaction. Semantic domains The semantic framework we choose will determine the nature of the semantic analysis of vocabulary. The framework used here is based on two important dimensions of social communication. The first has to do with the social and the development of the self. Following Dennett, I use the progression from what the individual knows, to what the individual knows about the other to what the individual knows that the other knows about the self. The second has to do. The second has to do with communication. According to JL Austin, an utterance contains three components. One component concerns the factual information that the speaker wishes to convey. The sky is blue. There is a bug in your beer. Austin calls this the locutionary dimension. Illocutionary dimension concerns how the speaker intends that the sentence is to be understood, as a request, an order, an apology, a warning … And the perlocutionary dimension concerns how the speaker feels about the message being conveyed.
What the individual knows Facts Most of the vocabulary that has been acquired by signing apes consists of words that describe things and events found in the physical world. Many of these words that have referents in the natural world: animals and plants (21), inanimate things (40), and body parts (16). Others have to do with food, including food items (42), food utensils (10) and food-related activities (9). Fouts (1997:301) comments that “when they discussed their favorite food, it wasn’t to get the food (there were no humans present, after all) but just to comment on it.” Being cross fostered, raised like human children, explains why we have terms for clothing (20) and hygiene (21). Parts of speech In many cases a word may be used to represent both the object and the action. . For example in Washoe’s lexicon one sign represents the thing and the activity: pen/to write, chair/to sit, bath/to bathe, brush/to brush, potty/to go potty, grooming/to groom and toothbrush/to brush teeth. Other examples include (PEN-WRITE (KW); SLEEP/BED (WK); EAT-FOOD (A); and KNIFE/CUT (WK). This should not be taken to mean that these apes do not distinguish between object and action, for these distinctions are clearly made when communicating. This phenomenon is commonly found in human language as the English words: stop, table, run, beverage, look, etc. are both nouns and verbs. I argue in Dwyer (ms) that parts of speech are a unique property of syntactic Learning
Sensory referents
The English word pairs: hear/listen and see/look, show an opposition between recognition of sensory input and the analysis of the sensory input. There are no ‘taste’, ‘touch,’ or ‘smell’ counterparts. Chimpanzees seem to have no difficulty in discerning the hear/listen distinction. Displacement words Displacement words, which represent different places and time, allow the-here-and-now to be linked to other events and places. I do not want to suggest that nonsigning apes live completely in the here and now, because there are several reports that show the ability to plan for future events, as in the case of Figan and Goliath. Nevertheless, words of displacement do expand one’s intersubjective world to include knowledge of events and places beyond the here and now because of the capacity to draw the attention of others to this expanded world (Cassirer, 1944:53-55 and Meddin 1979:100).5 This new symbolic capacity, according to Cassirer (1944:38), “makes it possible for an organism to isolate relationships abstractly and to "hold on to them mentally” (Mead, 1934:83, 121). Location Location words express a special relationship between two entities, one of which is often the speaker. Four of the nine location words are oppositional sets (UP/DOWN; IN/OUT). The word IN also represents the action ENTER. The word OPEN (A) is most commonly used as an action; and HOME (W) can also mean ‘go home.’ All the chimpanzees have a generalized deictic (pointing) word THIS/THAT/THERE (A), but there is no evidence that apes can separate this concept into a ‘this’ (near the speaker) and ‘that’ (away from speaker). This may have to do with the inability to see things from the perspective of the other. The other location words are: AROUND (K) and ON (K). (SSR mentions I think, that chimps know the words for several locations in their outdoor environment.) Time The concept of time involves the sequencing of events and the planning of future events.
Signing apes know the order of events. Fouts (19907:301) reports that Tatu knew the order of events such as after Thanksgiving it is time to prepare for Christmas (CANDY TREE) and that after Debbi’s birthday it was Dar’s. This use of time enables one to point to, and direct the attention of others to, future events as well as past events. In the social world, as Berger and Luckmann (1967:27) point out, involves having to wait for others. “My organism and my society impose upon me, and upon my inner time, certain sequences of events that involve waiting." For captive and signing apes, this commonly involved having to wait for meals. As lunchtime neared, Tatu would often sign TIME EAT? (F301). Once, Tatu was told that she couldn’t eat until she cleaned her room, she signed HURRY HURRY. CLEAN ROOM. The word HURRY was also often used immediately after a promise of a treat. As intersubjectivity increases, the necessity of waiting, and hence the awareness of time increases. Savage-Rumbaugh et al (n.d. xxx) note that the Bonobo, Nyota, used the words TODAY and TOMORROW, but that the bonobos Kanzi and Panbanisha understood their meaning.
A question of awareness of death Two issues concern the topic of death. The first is the awareness of the meaning of death and the second is the awareness of one’s own mortality. Feral apes go into a deep depression at the loss of their mother and mothers often do the same at the loss of their child. Washoe understood not only the loss of her own baby but of Kat’s as well. There are no examples of apes in any of these categories being aware of their own demise. “Kat Beach, a research assistant, had a miscarriage. When she finally came back Washoe greeted her warmly but then moved away and let Kat know she was upset that she’d been gone. Kat decided to tell the truth. MY BABY DIED, Kat signed to her. Washoe looked down to the ground. Then she looked into Kat’s eyes and signed CRY touching her cheek just below her eye. That single word, CRY, Kat later said, told her more about Washoe than all of her longer, more grammatically perfect sentences. When Kat had to leave that day, Washoe wouldn’t let her go. PLEASE PERSON HUG, she signed (Fouts 291). But she signed this not to herself, but to Kat to show that she was sharing her sorrow. Both Goodall and Fouts note that young chimps who have lost their mothers fall into a depression from which some never recover.
Extracted properties
Six of the nine descriptors are oppositional pairs: GOOD (WK)/BAD6 (KN); SAME (WK)/DIFFERENT (WK); BIG (K)/SMALL (K). In addition, there were several quantitative descriptors: ONE (W), TWO (W), ALL (K), ENOUGH (W), MORE (A). The last two words, MORE and ENOUGH are used as requests rather than descriptors. Generic terms constitute a second type of extracted property. To qualify as a generic term, such as fruit, it has to have constituents, e.g., apple(A), banana(A), berry(A), pear(N), … The composite ape vocabulary shows very few examples of generic terms. Savage-Rumbaugh (1994:81) reports that the chimpanzees, Sherman and Austin, were able to categorize various tools as members of the category tool. SSR’s discussion of Sherman and Austin show that they could learn to recognize the category tool. It is also possible to label concepts not found in the natural world such as abstract concepts like gravity and things that do not exist at all like god and heaven. None of the vocabulary listed here shows that ability.
Most of the words expressing emotions have analogs in the gestures of nonsigning chimpanzees as in the case of the words for HUNGRY and THIRSTY. However, the ability to willfully produce these words demonstrates that these apes not only respond to hunger and thirst, but are conscious that have hunger and thirst. The same can be said for words like HURT/WOUND, CRY, ANGRY (including BITE) and happy. For example, Lucy signed to Fouts ME CRY. CRY ME. HURT HURT. (Fouts 155) when she had been ignored by her foster mother. However, she did not instinctively whimper as a nonsigning ape would do, but she articulated this feeling, mainly to herself, showing that she was conscious of the pain, which in this case was not a physical pain, but an emotional one. Terrace (1979) reports that Nim signed BITE when he was ANGRY and the effect of overtly signing reduced his anger. The feral SMILE is a sign of nonaggression.
Although, it is likely that the concepts for these feeling exist in both signing and nonsigning, the import of the capacity to convert these concepts into referential signs shows:
This is even clearer in the word SORRY, a word that could be a personal regret as I am sorry I lost the game, or even a regret about the other, I am sorry you got hurt, but it can also mean that I am sorry for you that you got hurt. De Waal describes affiliation as activities that build interpersonal solidarities. Male chimpanzees, for example groom more frequently when they are building an alliance. Affiliation is also used to give comfort to those who have been physically abused or emotionally offended. Affiliational behavior in both signing and nonsigning apes includes reciprocal grooming, hugging, tickling and kissing. Surprisingly to many of us, chimpanzees and bonobos KISS, even French kiss. There appear to be no gestures for these concepts in nonsigning apes, though their acquisition and use is common in signing apes. What this ability shows is an awareness of these concepts and an ability to request that others engage in this activity.
Apes clearly can read feelings in others. In humans, humor, like tickling, causes laughter; so does embarrassment, though the connection is not clear. It is possible that humans tell jokes in order to hear the other laugh. It is not clear what to do with the episode about several chimpanzees escaping and shitting in Lemmon’s bed ( F142) but it does have to do with a sense of retribution that I haven’t yet discussed.
Sees language users as equals and others not Washoe and Lucy thought they were human Washoe called other chimpanzees “BLACK BUGS.” Sees self as individual Can recognize self in the mirror Moja(?) signing at pictures in magazine: “THAT FRIEND TATU.”
Another area concerning the self has to do with adornment. Fouts reports that several of the female chimpanzees enjoyed dressing up and being complemented for their beauty. Adornment is something that does for the other in order to make the self more attractive.
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