Gardner Chimp Vocabulary
What the individual knows about the other
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- The self in relation to the other
- The cultural world
- Symbolic Interaction
What the individual knows about the other Members of a social species have developed ways of interacting one another. In the apes there are categories of individuals, male/female, child(& infant)/adult, dominant/subordinate, ally/rival, friend/friend and playmate/playmate. [These relationships need to be revisited in the section on culture.] Identifying the other Words used to identify the other can be classed into three groups, pronouns, names and roles. Because roles play an important part in institutional development, they are discussed in the section on culture. Pronouns
In sentences involving pronouns, we find frequent instances of sentences of the type YOU GIVE and GIVE ME. Terrace (1979) reported that the pronoun YOU immediately followed Nim’s learning of the first person pronoun ME. In addition this vocabulary includes the possessive pronouns MINE and YOURS. People All of these chimpanzees learned a large number of words for their care givers and for fellow apes. In addition, these chimpanzees have no difficulty in recognizing the difference between male and female, in both humans and their own species (BOY, GIRL, WOMAN). Only Koko uses the word APE, and it appears that no chimpanzee uses the word for human. Because of cross fostering, it is likely that there was a conscious effort not to emphasize the difference between chimpanzee and human. This may explain why Washoe thought she was human and referred to chimpanzees when she first saw them as BLACK BUGS. Friendship is common among chimps and is also used to express a sexual attachment. Understanding the other In feral apes, intersubjective knowledge of the other comes from visual observation (and inference). From conversations with the other (using words in sentences) comes an real increase of intersubjectivity including knowledge of the other. In addition, effective communication requires that one take the other’s perspective in order to best package the message. There is no evidence to show that this actually happens in signing apes, but there is evidence to show that signing chimpanzees have a greater ability to take the perspective of the other.
What the other knows Both feral and captive apes have shown that they can understand the situation in which the other is in, especially when food or danger is involved. The examples from the bonobo Panbanisha concern situations in which she is aware of something the other does not know and is able and interested in telling the other about it. Fouts (2000) reported that Washoe knew that Hillary was Roger and Debbi’s daughter (ROGER DEBBI BABY). Can translate for nonsigning chimpanzees Washoe saving chimp from drowning Washoe saving Booee from snake.
What the other does not know
What the other does not know (Education) Education involves the recognition that the other is lacking important information which the self possesses and the supplying of that information because the self cares about the welfare of the other. [Education is thus a subtype of helping others.]
The evidence from signing apes, both Chimpanzees (Washoe) and Bonobos (Panbanisha and Nyota), is substantial The only example of teaching involves Washoe teaching Loulis to make the sign for food by molding his hand in the desired shape. Feral chimpanzees have not been observed to teach, rather feral children learn to build nest, fish for termites, make tools, etc by imitating their mothers. Washoe disciplining Loulis Washoe molding Loulis’ hand to make sign. Panbanisha reminds Bill that he needs to take blankets and juice to an orangutan named Mari (Savage-Rumbaugh et al n.d). Feelings Empathy Providing comfort begins with the ability to detect distress in others. Young adults continue to run to their mothers when in need of comfort (Gxx) and chimpanzees often seek comfort after a fight or a run in with another chimpanzee. Although Chimpanzees can provide comfort and help to others, they can also be cruel and mean, especially to others who appear weak and vulnerable. When alpha males go into a rage, they are capable of destroying anything and anyone in their path. One such example (G153) involved Goblin who was in Mike’s path. In this case, Goblin’s mother, Flo, entered into Mike’s path and distracted Mike long enough for Goblin to escape, although Flo suffered a number of injuries. Fouts provides two examples of captive chimpanzees being fiercely attacked by the group because they lacked “the necessary social skills.” After Fouts had broken his arm and return to his laboratory, “instead of the raucous pant-hoot greeting they typically let loose upon seeing me, they all sat very still and watched me intently.” Washoe signed "THERE" and pointed to my arm” ... She gently put her fingers through the wire and groomed my arm gently, making a soft clicking noise with her tongue. Tatu, in turn, signed "HURT" and gently touched me as well” (Fouts 2000).
But chimpanzees also provide comfort to others using the affiliational activities described above. To provide comfort one has to recognize the need in others. Fouts (151) notes that “even before she had learned American Sign Language, she “could read the moods of others (2).
In contrast, Cheney and Seyfarth suggest that feral chimpanzees do not do this, while “chimpanzees feel grief (237) they show little empathy for each other (254) even though Goodall gives a number of examples of providing comfort. DeWaal also provides examples of feral and captive chimpanzees giving comfort to one another after a fight.. Silk et al (2006) who worked with captive chimpanzees in a food-sharing experiment also concludes that chimpanzees do not have compassion for other chimpanzees, though this experiment involved pairs of unrelated chimpanzees.9 However, in contrast to this view, Goodall and DeWaal provide a number of observations in which comfort is given. First there is the example of Huxley holding Goblin until his mother, Melissa, returns. And de Waal reports an instance of an unrelated feral male adopting an orphan and that it is common chimpanzees do look out for injured companions. DeWaal also provides numerous Fouts reports that even before she had learned American Sign Language, she “could read the moods of others (Fouts:151) and that "When Lucy sensed that someone was distressed she would put her arm around them and kiss them” (151). In addition to providing comfort, there are numerous examples of chimpanzees coming to the aid of others. For example, Goodall reports (1986:153) that Huxley, a male, held Goblin when the alpha pale Mike was on a rampage until his mother, Melissa, returns. And de Waal reports an instance of an unrelated male adopting an orphan and that it is common chimpanzees do look out for injured companions. De Waal also mentions that it was common for feral chimps to protect an ailing troop member and gives an example of captive chimpanzees caring for a member that was frequently disoriented. In some cases this help is collective such as the protection of Roosje (7) and of Washoe (9). In some cases, the situation involves an assessment of a real danger to the other and in the case of Washoe, risking her own life.
In feral apes, intentions are often announced by facial, bodily, and vocal gestures, and often involve a combination, such as a whimper being accompanied by a pout. Nonthreatening gestures include a smile or a hand out. A male threatening anger involves standing with hair bristling. A gaze at something means interest in the object which will attract the interest of others. [I need a wider range of examples]… Thus feral apes can read the intentions of others. Beyond requests, there are other words that can express intentions like BITE, HUG, WANT, QUIET, and HELP-MYSELF in which the speaker expresses to the other what (s) he wants to do.
The self in relation to the other Privacy As the self becomes aware that the other is aware and interested in its actions, the self begins to partition between a public and a private self. In this regard, the private self withholds information about its intentions, feelings and knowledge, while the public self offers information, sometimes false, to enhance its situation. One aspect of this enhancement is facework (Goffman) which consists of activities designed to promote a positive public self. [A positive public self is important in negotiations because in order to get an agreement, the negotiator needs to be seen as trustworthy and reliable].
The concept of face developed by Goffman (1963) is based on the distinction between the public and private self and that the public self is the one that the private self wants to present to others. To build up one’s positive face, one engages in ‘facework.’ Following up on Goffman’s work, Brown and Levinson (1987) show that politeness is a way of recognizing and showing that one has imposed on the others face. They characterize two types of face, positive and negative. Positive face has to do with one’s public image, while negative face has to do with one’s wish not to be imposed on. Thus the word PLEASE (A) overtly recognizes the imposition on the other caused by a request, for example. The word SORRY (W) is more complicated because it has two meanings which I call ‘sorry-sympathy’ and ‘sorry-apology.’ In the first meaning, one expresses sympathy as in I am sorry that you are hurt), even though the speaker wasn’t responsible. While not as common in American usage, this meaning is the primary meaning in the English of Cameroon and Nigeria. Nevertheless, this meaning does express sympathy for the other. The second meaning of SORRY is an apology. It adds to the first meaning (1) a recognition of personal responsibility for the injury to the other and (2) a regret that it happened and (3) an apology (I am sorry that I hurt you). As in the case of PLEASE, the speaker lowers his positive face in the process of the apology.10 In very young human children, the word SORRY initially means that this is what one has to say to get my parents to stop pestering me, but over time the child understands that it involves the recognition of personal fault. Fouts gives an example of Washoe signing SORRY SORRY, when her son Loulis was injured while playing with another juvenile. I take this to be an instance of the first meaning, that I am sorry you are hurt, for she follows this up with HUG HUG, which is an expression of offering comfort.11 Fouts (1997:63) also reported an episode that when he was working with Washoe in Nevada, he and his coworker Greg would test Washoe’s understanding of social relationships. For example, when Roger told Washoe that GREG HURT ME, she “would drop her dolls and swagger on two legs over to Greg” and “would chase Greg around and around the garage until he acknowledged his crime and apologized to me by signing SORRY, … until Washoe was satisfied.” This episode shows not only an awareness of social relationships, but a desire to resolve them. It also shows that she is aware of who the transgressor is and is willing to punish him. Finally, we see that the issue is not resolved until an apology is given. I can find nothing in Goodall of the behavior described in the second example. JL Austin (1962), the author of How to do things with words, introduced the concept of the speech act, something that can be done only through the use of words. An apologetic SORRY clearly qualifies as a speech act, because it is something that can only be accomplished through words. GOOD and BAD
SHAME is closely related to the concept of SORRY. Patterson reports that Koko had a word that meant both PINK and SHAME, though I can find no examples of its usage. I consider SHAME to arise with the recognition that one has done something to injure one’s public face. Public face is only possible when we recognize that others are evaluating us on our actions and that these actions have standards.
Secrecy In the case of knowing something, we may expect that this may lead to either continued secrecy because it provides an advantage or to informing the other of this knowledge (teaching). Subjective knowledge has to do with understanding the other subject’s perspective. Empathy is a form of subjective knowledge which has to do with understanding the feelings of the other. Subjective knowledge can also involve understanding the position the other is in, bor example if s/he is in danger.
For example, Washoe signs quiet to herself when sneaking up on someone reminiscent of feral chimps out on a hunt. Signing also allows users to move beyond deception to downright lying (10, 15, 17) and allows Sue to arrange with Panbanisha to play a trick on Liz. The word QUIET (W) is a social word because it recognizes that making noise would inform the other that one is nearby. Thus, this word represents a form of secrecy, the withholding information from the other in order to control the actions of the other. Goodall mentions that chimpanzees when patrolling their perimeter would make every effort to not make noise and would encourage their youngsters to do the same. Fouts also notes that Washoe would often sign QUIET when sneaking up on someone.
Evidence for the reflective self Recalling that at this stage, the self is aware that the other has a mind as complex as its own and is evaluating the self with respect to intentions, emotions and knowledge. Evidence to support this level includes the following: The cultural world I define the cultural world as one consisting of formal institutions. List properties. I also propose that institutions develop from agreements in which the responsibilities of individual parties are generalized into roles.
One of the central features of a human institution is the presence of complementary roles, such as parent-child, teacher-student and friend-friend. These complementary roles are situated within an institution such as the family, the school or friendship. These roles are generic as opposed to specific meaning that a role consists not of what my father does, but what fathers do. Words offer the potential to identify and label and hence to speak of roles. Ape vocabulary has two words that suggest the possibility of representing roles. BABY and FRIEND.12 Each however is suspect. The word BABY occurs in the context of toys, but Washoe and others engage in things like cuddling a baby doll and washing it, reflecting the fact that female apes have a strong mothering urge. However, the word baby lacks the complementary role word of mother, and for this reason, it does not appear to be a word representing an institutional role. In the example cited above, Tatu uses the word, FRIEND when looking at handsome human men in magazines. She points to the picture and says THAT TATU FRIEND. Because there appears to be little more than sexual attractiveness, and because no other instances of the word friend appear, this word too must be dismissed as representing an institutional role. I have included the word FRIEND which Tatu used when looking at pictures of men. She would point to a picture of a man and say TATU FRIEND. I take this to mean that Tatu was attracted to the male. Patterson reports that Koko learned the word frown. Friendships The concept of friendship covers both general friendship and sexual attraction. For example, Roger and Washoe were friends in a general way, but Washoe had a strong crush on Fouts’ thirteen-year old son Joshua (Fouts 1997:273).13 Tatu, “loved to find photos of men’s faces and sign to them, THAT FRIEND TATU, which would be followed by many variations on this romantic theme” (Fouts 1997:268). Goodall reports both types of relationships in Gombe. Related to the concept of friendship are the friendship and alliance building activities of hugging, kissing and grooming, all of which are part of the activities of feral apes. Play Play is a common feature in the young of most mammals and the apes are no exception. Play is generally seen as a way of preparing the young for the demands of adult life. Play is of interest to the development of institutional life because it involves roles suggesting that play might be an incipient institution. The nine words associated with play involve an interaction with the other. The word PLAY (WN) play is one of the few generic terms that appears in this composite vocabulary and includes the feral chimpanzee activities of WRESTLE (W), SPIN (W), CATCH (WK), CHASE (WK), and SWING (W). PEEKABOO (W) and BLINDFOLD (W) were games that Washoe picked up along with hide-and-seek, for which there appears to be no word. Reciprocal TICKLE-ing (A) is also used as a relation-building activity. The concept smile too has its roots in feral chimpanzee behavior, but is used as a sign of nonaggression or submission.14 For example when two young chimpanzees are fighting and it requires an intervention of a mother (usually the mother of the younger chimpanzee), often the elder chimpanzee will smile to show that they were just playing. Institutions The word BABY (A) is used to mean both a doll and a real infant. Feral chimpanzee mothers are very attentive to their young and sisters at a fairly early age show an interest in child care. This helps to explain why socialized female chimpanzees love to play with dolls. But the word BABY also means a real infant. Washoe knew a baby was growing in her womb and in that of one of the research assistants named Kat. Both women experienced tragedy with these pregnancies. Washoe’s baby died shortly after birth and Kat had a miscarriage. When Washoe learned of Kat’s misfortune she signed cry (the index finger toughing the eye) and insisted on comforting Kat with hugs. Symbolic Interaction Objectivation Objectivation, following Berger and Luckmann (1967), 15 simply means the making of objects, but in the context of symbolic interactionism, we understand words as objects, so here objectivation means putting one’s thoughts, feelings and intentions into words and hence into objects for others to apprehend. Even a single sign, like HUG, HURRY or COME, can do this because its use shows that the individual wants to hug (or to be hugged), to hurry, or the other to come. A paratactic (two-word) grammar makes this objectivations even clearer: WANT BOOK; TIME EAT; OPEN DOOR. Even though feral chimpanzees can show anger, joy, unhappiness, and nonaggression, they can do so in a way far more limited than their signing counterparts. For example they can point to an object and whimper to show that they want something, but they cannot say WANT and then the name of the object they desire. They cannot say ME GOOD to convey that they are not the transgressor in a play fight that got out of control.
Intersubjectivity Intersubjectivity describes the state of shared understanding between two or more individuals. Feral chimpanzees do develop a measure of intersubjectivity through shared experiences and face-to-face interactions and this may be further enhanced through whimpering, laughing, pointing, and limping (whether intentional or not). However, the degree of intersubjectivity pales when compared to the amount that can be developed through symbolic interaction, that is through the use of words and sentences. WANT EAT makes it quite clear what is being requested, more so than a dog rattling his bowl. And as the ability to interact using symbolically increases, one becomes aware of knowledge that one doesn’t share and knowledge one does.16 Conflict resolution In addition to making contracts, conflicts can be managed through symbolic interaction. Feral chimpanzees have the ability to show that they are hurt or unhappy by whimpering, an act that is often responded to by hugging, kissing and grooming. Or one chimpanzee may offer his rear end to a more dominant chimpanzee to show that he is submissive and non-threatening.17 However, with a battery of words like: CRY (W), HURT/WOUND (WN), FUNNY (W), LAUGH (W), FROWN (K), BITE (A), HAPPY (N), and ANGRY (N), the nature of the conflict can be more objectified. Finally, a word like SORRY allows the conveyance of an apology which shows to the other that one publically recognizes one's transgression, something that is impossible without symbolic interaction. Direction of attention By issuing a sign, we can direct others attention to the same item. This gives some control over the thoughts of others. For example, suppose I say, “Look at that dog.” It is likely that those listening will focus their attention on the dog and perhaps wonder why I called their attention to it. Nevertheless, we find that this act has drawn several different individuals to focus on the same thing. This marks an important first step in the development of intersubjectivity, the sharing of common understandings. Having noted that vervets have the ability to issue danger calls, we must recognize that these beings have also embarked on this first stage of intersubjectivity. Discourse Conversation Fouts (2000) reports that Moja and Tatu reading magazines, holding them in their feet and sign to each other about what they see. This clearly shows that chimpanzees can objectivize things that they are thinking. The word CHAT (W) is interesting because it is the only word in this collection that specifically involves symbolic interaction. Requests Most words of intent have to do with requests. The classification of many of the events as intentions has to do with the fact that in many cases, the vocabulary is simply listed and not given context. Requests also include questions which ask for information. While it is highly likely that nonsigning apes have questions about what something is, there is no point of asking if there were no factual words to provide an answer. Requests rest on the assumption that the other has the capacity to provide the self with a need, be it material (GIVE), emotional (HUG), informational (WHO, WHAT, WHEN), or assistance (HELP, COME, HURRY, OPEN). Although the word (ASK) appeared in Koko’s vocabulary list, I have no examples of how Koko used this word, so it is not clear whether it is used as a request, which seems likely, or a description, e.g. ASK KOKO. Question words constitute an important subclass of requests that recognize that the other has knowledge not possessed by the self and invite the other to provide this information. WHO and WHAT distinguish between animate (including humans and apes) and inanimate. The word WHEN invites information on anticipated events which signing chimpanzees have a solid understanding of. Greetings Goffman in his classic article on facework (1963)18 explains the use of greetings and leave takings as a means of determining whether the status of one’s relationship with the other has changed since last contact. Greetings are widespread and not unique to apes, but given that chimpanzee social relationships are complex, Goodall says that it is not surprising that feral chimpanzees have “such a wide range of greeting gestures” (1979:120). “We’re used to chimpanzees greeting each other, which they do after long absences, by either kissing and embracing (chimps) or some sexual frottage (bonobos)” (De Waal 2005:34). The word HELLO is reported only for Nim, though I suspect that it is used by Washoe who uses GOODBYE (WN). Although it is common for nonsigning apes to greet, saying farewell is quite unusual. (De Waal 2005:34) observes that Kuif, a female, nonsigning chimpanzee, “was the first ape I have ever seen do good-bye (we call it “saying good-bye,” but obviously an ape can only “do good-bye.” Leave-taking is seen as a face-threatening (Brown and Levinson 1978). This is why so one finds that such words in human languages contain either a blessing (farewell, adios, good-bye) or a promise to meet again (hasta la vista, aufwidersehen, see you later).
Without symbolic interactions, negotiations are severely limited and rely heavily in guess work. Nevertheless, alliances do develop in feral chimpanzee communities. Such alliances are often strengthened by social enhancing activities like grooming and hugging. However, with the addition of words like YES and NO, one can clearly state being for or against a particular agreement. Furthermore, with a sentence like WHAT YOU WANT, as Fouts asked Washoe, a contract can be initiated. Most of these agreements involve a human keeper and an ape and rarely, if ever between two apes. The most common of agreement takes the form of a deal, rather than alliance. If you do X, I will do Y. Examples
1. Roger and Washoe negotiate Roger: YOU ME GO HOME NOW. (It is getting late and Roger wants Washoe to return home.) Washoe (defiant), NO. (Washoe states her intention not to go) Roger WHAT YOU WANT? (Roger is desperate and proposes to negotiate.) Washoe CANDY. Roger OK OK. YOU CAN HAVE CANDY AT HOME. Washoe: YOU ME HURRY GO. 2. Fouts bribes chimpanzees to get into the boat. 3. Kanzi is outraged at Sue for breaking a promise of bringing a birthday gift until Sue apologizes (Savage-Rumbaugh et al n.d). 4. Washoe threatening to eat grapes to get her own way. 5. Tatu has to cleaning room before lunch.
Cheney and Seyfarth (1990), report that no uses of negatives appear in any of their studies of feral primates. In fact, there are no references to negotiations in any of the chimpanzee literature. Nevertheless they do manage to do make alliances, but they do so tacitly and necessarily remain unclear about the details of the negotiation. Whatever stability that is achieved is done so using reciprocal affiliative activities. (When two males increase their affiliative activities with one another, it usually means that they are in the process of building an alliance.) The use of these negative words, along with the word YES, make it possible to be clear about whether the agreement is accepted or not. In the above example, Washoe makes it clear that Fouts’s offer is unacceptable and that Fouts has to put more on the table, which he does and the agreement is made.
Manipulation is a form of negotiation.
Conclusion What chimps can do This examination of this composite vocabulary reveals that these apes are capable of developing concepts on a variety of topics and assigning signifiers to them. This includes not only empirical objects, but abstract concepts as well. Using a framework derived from Austin (1962), almost of all of these words can be classified as having either a locutionary function (expressing facts), or a perlocutionary function (expressing emotions) or an illocutionary function (expressing intent). By using this framework, it is clear that these apes are consciously aware of their feelings and intentions and that they express these feelings both to themselves and to others. In addition, while parallel functions sometimes exist in the gestures and actions of nonsigning apes, the ability to express these functions using a rich variety of signs enables a clearer specification of what the individual knows, feels and intends. This ability increases the level of intersubjectivity of the interlocutors and consequently the knowledge of the other and an interest of the other. The use of words also increases the ability to draw the attention of the other things, especially other times and places, and further widens the intersubjective world. The use of words also increases the ability to make agreements. I will argue in another paper, that cultural institutions arise from such agreements when the parties involved are transformed from individuals into roles. An ability to inform the other requires that one cares.
What symbolic interaction enables My second research question has to do with the use of these words had any impact on the behavior of these apes. Here, the hypothesis of (Mead 1934 and Cassirer 1944) proposed that symbolic interactionism (the use of words, aka symbols) because of their ability to objectivize one’s subjectivity and to increase the level of intersubjectivity (Berger and Luckmann 1967) provide a point of entry. The concept of intersubjectivity, the awareness of knowledge shared with the other, fit very nicely with Dennett’s (1987) logical progression of the mind. Briefly Dennett proposed that the mind begins with the awareness by the self that it has knowledge that it can use. Dennett’s second step has to do with the awareness that the other possesses knowledge, either shared with or different from that of the self. In other words, this second step, which I call the mindful other, has to do with the increasing interest and knowledge of the other. The next step has to do with the awareness that the other has a similar interest in the self and what the self knows. This last step leads to self-consciousness and reflectiveness in the self. While Dennett does not, to my knowledge, discuss the role of language in this progression, Mead’s hypothesis proposes that symbolic interaction, the use of words, does. This progression, in theory at least, applies to both the ontogeny of humans, and the phylogeny of hominoids. In addition, although Dennett does not discuss it, this progression should not be viewed as a step by step sequence, but one in which these three areas, self-awareness, awareness of the other and reflectiveness are gradually developed as the self acquires more knowledge through the use of symbolic interaction.
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Terrace, H., 1979. Nim. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Davies, Jim. 1998. Review of Miles, L. W. & S. E. Harper (1994) "Ape language" studies and the study of human language origins. in Hominid Culture in Primate Perspective, by Quiatt, D. D. & J. Itani (eds). University Press of Colorado. 253-278. http://www.jimdavies.org/summaries/miles1994.html Gardner, Gardner & van Cantfort (1989) do provide a list of sentences that Washoe had used. 1 See Dwyer (1986 and ms1) for a discussion of the grammatical abilities of signing apes. 2 Because of these disputes over the meaning of language, in this paper I use the concept of ‘symbolic interaction’ developed by Mead (1934). 3 Meddin (1979:101) notes that Sara, a chimpanzee who was taught to work symbolically with plastic chips by Premack (1971) paralleled cross-fostered, signing chimpanzees in their ability to “think in terms of classes of objects,” and categorically comprehending relationships as well” based on her appropriate use of “tokens for operations such as: "same," "different," "give," "take," "insert," "name of," "not name of," and "it-then," and she appropriately generalized these operations to dissimilar situations.” 4 “Soon other ethologists began reporting even more variations in the chimpanzee gestural system that appeared to be culturally transmitted. In William McGrew and Carolyn Tutin (1978) observed that two chimpanzee communities, which were only eighty kilometers apart in Tanzania, used slightly different gestures in order to ask for grooming. The chimps at Gombe each raised one arm straight into the air, but the chimps in the Mahale mountains would each raise one arm over the head and then grasp each other’s wrist” (86). 5 “As a result of these transcendences, language is capable of 'making present' a variety of objects that are spatially, temporally and socially absent from the 'here and now'” (Berger and Luckmann 39). 6 GOOD and BAD are revisited in the social section, because these were frequently used to describe social behavior. 7 The rule that one should not laugh at one’s own jokes may derive from the analogy to tickling. 8 Koko also had the possessive pronoun MINE. 9 The Silk et all experiment involved sharing food. This may not have been the best choice for understanding empathy. 10 It may be useful to bring in Brown’s positive and negative face. Namely that an apology involves building up the other’s face at the expense of one’s own. Holmes, Janet (1990) 'Apologies in New Zealand English', Language in Society 19 155-99. 11 It is also possible that Washoe was sorry that she had not been more vigilant in protecting Loulis. 12 In human culture, the role of friend is egalitarian and reciprocal so that the complement to the role of friend is another friend. Thus, unlike the potential role of BABY, one cannot look for a different complementary role. 13 I find it interesting that female chimps had no difficulty in developing a sexual attraction for human males. 14 De Wall points out that “the human smile derives from an appeasement signal, which is why women generally smile more than men” (2005:82). 15 The common objectivations of everyday life are maintained primarily by linguistic signification. Everyday life is, above all, life with and by means of the language I share with my fellow men (1967:36). 16 As we discover our commonalities we begin to see these others as our equals in contrast to other others with whom we share very little common knowledge. 17 The dominant/submissive relationship does resolve the conflict, though not in an egalitarian way. 18 Goffman, Erving. 1963. "On Face-Work." Interaction Ritual New York: Anchor Books.19 Dwyer, D. 2008. Paratax and the evolution of the cultural self. Manuscript. Yüklə 178,44 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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