Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Solvency – USFG

PMC’s want a small definition of inherently governmental.

Isenberg 10 (David, Author, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq April 15, “To Be, or Not to Be, Inherent: That is the Question” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/to-be-or-not-to-be-inhere_b_539933.html)KM

There are two words which strike fear in the hearts of all those who follow the private contracting issue. And by private contractors I just don't mean those carrying out security or military function. Rather I mean any task that at some point was considered the domain of someone in the public sector. Those two words are inherently governmental. Far stronger men than I have cowered in fear when asked to define what an inherently governmental task is. Trying to define the term is like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall; only nailing Jell-O is easier. Yet the stakes are enormous. Obviously private sector companies would like the definition to be crafted as narrowly as possible as it potentially means more work for them. Years ago it was reported that the use of private contractors as interrogators at Abu Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq violated an Army policy that requires such jobs to be filled by government employees because of the "risk to national security." An Army policy directive published in 2000 classifies any job that involves "the gathering and analysis" of tactical intelligence as "an inherently governmental function barred from private sector performance." The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) lists the following functions as inherently governmental: interpreting and executing laws; ordering military or diplomatic action on behalf of the United States; conducting civil or criminal judicial proceedings; performing actions that significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons; and collecting, controlling, or disbursing appropriated and other federal funds.
The USFG should move to standards where PMC’s must be unarmed – status quo policy is failing.

Singer 5 (“Outsourcing War” Peter W., Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative, Foreign Affairs http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2005/0301usdepartmentofdefense_singer.aspx)KM

To start changing matters, clients—namely, governments that hire PMFs—must exercise their rights and undertake a comprehensive survey to discern the full scope of what they have outsourced and what have been the results. Washington should also require that, like most other government documents, all current and future contracts involving nonclassified activities be made available to the public on request. Each contract should also include "contractor visibility" measures that list the number of employees involved and what they are to be paid, thus limiting the possibility of financial abuse. The U.S. military must also take a step back and reconsider, from a national security perspective, just what roles and functions should be kept in government hands. Outsourcing can be greatly beneficial, but only to the point where it begins to challenge core functions. According to the old military doctrine on contracting, if a function was "mission-critical" or "emergency-essential"—that is, if it could affect the very success or failure of an operation—it was kept within the military itself. The rule also held that civilians were to be armed only under extraordinary circumstances and then only for self-protection. The United States should either return to these standards or create new ones; the present ad-hoc process is yielding poor results.
And, restricting contractors from military actions would solve

Soder 10 (Brenda, June 18, Media Relations Director Joined Human Rights First, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/usls/2010/alert/624/index.htm , Human Rights First) ET

In an effort to address these problems, Human Rights First today outlined a series of key steps the U.S. government could take to minimize the likelihood that security contractors will be drawn into hostilities, as well as to ensure appropriate accountability and oversight of these contractors. Among the recommendations were the following key steps: Clarify private security contractors' functions and conduct: Restrictions on what functions private security contractors are asked to fulfill and on when they are permitted to use force are essential to maintaining the important distinction between combatants, who are legitimate military targets, and civilians who are not engaged in combat and so are not legitimate targets of war. Current U.S. policy on what functions and conduct private security contractors are allowed to engage in threatens to blur the essential international humanitarian law (IHL) distinctions between civilians and combatants, and jeopardize other civilians performing important roles in theater.

Solvency – USFG

Specifically, government management is key to avoiding perpetual war – the US is missing from key policy discussions.

Avant 6 (“Private Military Companies and the Future of War” Institute for Global and International Studies at George Washington University, Deborah April, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200604.military.avant.privatemilitarycompanies.html)KM

How does all this bode for the future of war? There are two views. The worst-case scenario sees the use of PSCs as an unleashing of the dogs of war that will undermine democratic control of force and security as a public good. Security will become a private good leading to less public order and more anarchy. This vision of the future is similar to the portrait Martin Van Creveld painted in The Transformation of War. The best-case scenario, though, suggests that PSCs may be the beginnings of a class of global private professionals. PSCs will be a tool for spreading order and the potential for stability and economic growth to less ordered parts of the world. There are, of course, many possibilities in between these two scenarios, but I contend what will determine which path private security lead toward is how private security is managed. PSCs respond to market incentives. A purely free market is most likely to lead to a “race to the bottom” like the worst case scenario predicts. States may be tempted to use PSCs to enhance their security vis-à-vis others, but in a global market individual state action cannot solve risks on its own. Individual state policy will only have influence if the state is also a consumer and unilateral reliance on PSCs may tempt states to take actions that their citizens view as illegitimate. The path toward international private professionals will require some level of cooperation among consumers (states, private companies, NGOs, etc.) at the global level. This kind of cooperation will be most likely to generate professional, ethical, and legal standards that both inform PSCs of proper behavior and reward those that behave properly. Many in the private-security industry claim to welcome such standards and suggest that they can enhance the legitimacy of reputable firms, reduce risk, and ease the operational inefficiencies associated with a market of multiple standards. There are some efforts to move forward on discussions about this kind of framework. At present, however, the U.S. (the single largest consumer) is missing from there discussions, partly due to U.S. government worries that global standards may impinge on the flexibility that PSCs can offer to the U.S. Other states, international organizations and NGOs also refuse to engage in such discussions, citing moral or ethical reasons.
The government has to limit the function of PMCs

Kidwell 5 (Deborah, September 13, , http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf, date accessed: 6/26/2010) AJK
Although the previous discussion is somewhat speculative, it raises important questions for further study. A few certainties, however, emerge from the discussion. Political and military leaders must clearly define the role of contractors—the nature of the work they are allowed to perform and the legal and geographical limitations of civilians on the battlefield—and the core competencies of the military services. The legal status of contractor employees as noncombatants must be firm, and the US government must resolve the ambiguity of contractual and criminal jurisdiction when American taxpayers foot the bill. Strategy, not politics, must determine the resources provided to the military and adequate policies put into place to assure accountability of both the military service commands and contractors. Reforms and competition must truly guide competitive sourcing if the goal of cost-efficiency is to be reached; but there will also be an inherent cost to society if the US continues on its present course. Officials 58 must address the impact of the current system on civil-military relations, particularly those identified by Singer as negative influences. Leaders must carefully consider the psychological limits of endurance of frequent combat and repeated deployments, and weigh the costs of military experience and education against the potential benefits. Military effectiveness is really the bottom line, and the evidence indicates that this is where several factors intersect: ideologies of the cost-effectiveness of privatization, a factionalized political process, but perhaps most of all, a nation that believes it can go to war without full mobilization of its citizens and economy. In this respect, the ghosts of the past still haunt us; from Korea, Vietnam, DESERT STORM, and the end of the Cold War, Americans learned to rely heavily on foreign labor, conduct limited war as inexpensively as possible, and that PMCs could serve certain political objectives.