Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Solvency – 1AC – Congress

Contention ___ is solvency:
Congress solves – debates over inherently governmental functions can be resolved with legislation.
Elsea 9 (“Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues” Jennifer K. Legislative Attorney December 22, , http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/135010.pdf)KM

There has been debate about the extent to which private security functions are “inherently governmental” in nature and therefore ought to be performed by public officials.59 Congress defined “inherently governmental function” in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 199860 to mean a function that is “so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees.”61 Under the FAIR Act, the term “includes activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions for the Federal Government....” It involves functions that can “determine, protect, and advance United States economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or criminal justice proceedings,” contract management, and functions that can “significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons....”62 Infrequently, Congress has provided by statute that a function is “inherently governmental.”63 Congress may also directly forbid or limit the use of contractors for certain functions64 or forbid the contracting of certain kinds of employees,65 where the functions or employment may be considered inherently unsuitable for association with the government. In the case of defense contractors in areas of combat operations, Congress expressed its sense in the FY2009 NDAA that private security contractors should not perform certain functions, such as security protection of resources, in high-threat operational environments, and that DOD regulations “should ensure that private security contractors are not authorized to perform inherently governmental functions in an area of combat operations.”66
Legislation solves – forces transparency and professionalism.
Nance 7 (Malcolm, September 22, , Small Wars Journal, “All Hands On Deck – Radically Reorienting Private Security in Iraq” http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/09/all-hands-on-deck-radically-re/)KM

8. Make PSCs An Integral Part of the Strategy … Legally. Congress needs to introduce legislation that would essentially force professionalism and transparency on PSCs. It would also place them in a legally binding framework and protect them under the Geneva Conventions. It should also serve as a reminder that they are being paid to represent the interests of the ultimate paying client, the American people. As for the Department of State, CIA and others? Here contracting has gotten out of control – the PSC forces they contract should be commissioned as officers in those agencies. If PSCs can act as Diplomatic Security officers, CIA interrogators or even clandestine collection officers then those contractors should be directly deputized into the organization. It will save an enormous quantity of money and may even improve their own in-house security operations. Some may see such a PSC regulating law and heavy-handed contracting sensibility as a reason to leave the business … and good riddance. Those that would remain will reap the benefits of an integral and enduring relationship with lower overhead costs. If there is any reluctance, the simple answer is to break their contracts and competitively bid to find companies that are more cooperative.

Solvency – Congress

More regulation is needed- Britain proves

Kwok 6 (James, Sr Editor @ Harvard Review, Spring 6, Soviet Legacies vol 28) ET

South Africa’s tighter control is just one type of regulation. Another type of regulation concerns employees within a PMC itself. Licenses for its members and more thorough background checks for its employees are necessary to ensure that those serving in Iraq will behave responsibly. In a recent interview with PBS, Peter Singer, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, provided an example of the dangers of not looking carefully at whom the US is hiring for services in Iraq: “[a British PMC employee] had been thrown out of the British Army and put in jail for cooperating with Irish terrorists. The British Army was certainly not happy to find out that he was in Iraq working as a contractor, carrying a submachine gun on the ground.” Stricter US legislation regarding PMC employee background checks will go far in ensuring that incidents like those at Abu Ghraib will not reoccur.

Congress solves – it can redefine “inherently governmental functions” to exclude PMC’s.
Luckey, Grasso and Manuel 10 (“Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress” John R. Legislative Attorney Valerie Bailey Specialist in Defense Acquisition Kate M. Legislative Attorney February 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40641.pdf)KM

Another option, not widely discussed, would be to define terms within the existing definition of inherently governmental functions. The existing definition of inherently governmental functions could, perhaps, be made clearer by establishing the meaning of key terms under it. Statutes could prescribe what it means for a function to be “intimately related to the public interest” or “performed by the federal government,” for example. Defining “performance by the federal government,” in particular, could potentially help remove the distinction between performing and assisting with inherently governmental functions that characterizes GAO opinions and executive branch discussions of inherently governmental functions.182 For example, in its consideration of the IRS’s proposed private debt collection program—which was one of the most prominent non- DOD examples of an agency contracting out allegedly inherently governmental functions—GAO distinguished between collection of taxes, which is inherently governmental, and assisting in collecting taxes by locating and contacting taxpayers to remind them of their tax liability and suggest payment methods, which is not inherently governmental.183
Congressional action solves – it can prohibit certain actions from being contracted out.
Luckey, Grasso and Manuel 10 (“Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress” John R. Legislative Attorney Valerie Bailey Specialist in Defense Acquisition Kate M. Legislative Attorney February 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40641.pdf)KM

Prohibiting agencies from contracting out specific functions, or from using appropriated funds to contract out specific functions, would also serve to ensure that certain allegedly inherently governmental functions are not contracted out. Section 730 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008, for example, specifies that ...[n]one of the funds made available in this Act may be used to study, complete a study of, or enter into a contract with a private party to carry out, without specific authorization in a subsequent Act of Congress, a competitive sourcing activity of the Secretary of Agriculture, including support personnel of the Department of Agriculture, relating to rural development or farm loan programs.193 Such approaches do not require any changes in the definition of inherently governmental functions, and they remove all possible questions about whether the executive branch will categorize a function as Congress might wish. These approaches are probably best utilized as tailored responses to specific concerns, however, because they are reactive and potentially timelimited. Congress generally uses these approaches on an ad hoc basis in response to agencies’ contracting out, or proposed contracting out, of specific functions. Moreover, if included in an appropriations bill, such prohibitions could be limited to specific agencies or time periods. Prohibitions in a DOD appropriations bill would not necessarily apply to the Department of State, for example, and prohibitions could be limited to funds covered by the appropriation, or automatically carried over to future appropriations bills long after the situation prompting the prohibition has otherwise been resolved.