Resolution resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance. Violations

RESOLUTION

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance.

VIOLATIONS

COMMON CRIMINAL SURVEILLANCE NOT TOPICAL

T – NOT DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

A. COMMON CRIMES ARE NOT MATTERS OF DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

1. DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE IS INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

The modifers "foreign" and "domestic" distinguish the type of security threat, not the geographic location of the surveillance

Small 8 MATTHEW L. SMALL. United States Air Force Academy 2008 Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, Presidential Fellows Program paper "His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis" http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf

Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept. This paper’s analysis, in terms of President Bush’s policies, focuses on electronic surveillance; specifically, wiretapping phone lines and obtaining caller information from phone companies. Section f of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines electronic surveillance as:

2. DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE IS DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY CRIME

Pfeiffer 4 Constance Pfeiffer, Juris Doctor candidate, The University of Texas School of Law, May 2004

The Review of Litigation Winter, 2004 23 Rev. Litig. 209 NOTE: Feeling Insecure?: United States v. Bin Laden and the Merits of a Foreign-Intelligence Exception For Searches Abroad lexis

Courts regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases. Certainly courts can recognize that domestic surveillance involves different considerations from the surveillance of "ordinary crime." If the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there is probable cause for surveillance. n141
3. THE NATURE OF THE SURVEILLANCE IS DIFFERENT

Bazan 7 Elizabeth B. Bazan, Congressional Research Service Legislative Attorney, American Law Division

CRS Report The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review Decisions

Updated February 15, 2007 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL30465.pdf

Investigations for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence give rise to a tension between the Government’s legitimate national security interests and the protection of privacy interests.6 The stage was set for legislation to address these competing concerns in part by Supreme Court decisions on related issues. In Katz v. United States

, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court held that the protections of the Fourth Amendment extended to circumstances involving electronic surveillance of oral communications without physical intrusion.7 The Katz Court stated, however, that its holding did not extend to cases involving national security.8 In United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (the Keith case), the Court regarded Katz as “implicitly recogniz[ing] that the broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards.”9 Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Keith Court, framed the matter before the Court as follows:

The issue before us is an important one for the people of our country and their Government. It involves the delicate question of the President’s power, acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial approval. Successive Presidents for more than one-quarter of a century have authorized such surveillance in varying degrees, without guidance from the Congress or a definitive decision of this Court. This case brings the issue here for the first time. Its resolution is a matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity both to the Government’s right to protect itself from unlawful subversion and attack and to the citizen’s right to be secure in his privacy against unreasonable Government intrusion.10

The Court held that, in the case of intelligence gathering involving domestic security surveillance, prior judicial approval was required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.11 Justice Powell emphasized that the case before it “require[d] no judgment on the scope of the President’s surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign

powers, within or without the country.”12 The Court expressed no opinion as to “the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.”13 However, the guidance which the Court provided in

Keith with respect to national security surveillance in a domestic context to some degree presaged the approach Congress was to take in foreign intelligence surveillance. The Keith Court observed in part:

...We recognize that domestic surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of “ordinary crime.” The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many types of crime specified in Title III [of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.]. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government’s preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crimes. Given these potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances and those involving domestic security, Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.... It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the application and affidavit showing probable cause need not follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but should allege other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security cases; that the request for prior court authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a specially designated court...; and that the time and reporting requirements need not be so strict as those in § 2518. The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to guide the congressional judgment but rather to delineate the present scope of our own opinion. We do not attempt to detail the precise standards for domestic security warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal surveillances which now constitute Title III. We do hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required for the type of domestic surveillance involved in this case and that such approval may be made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe. 14

B. THE AFFIRMATIVE INTERPRETATION IS BAD FOR DEBATE

Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and their interpretation makes the topic too big. Including surveillance of common crimes adds an entirely different legal regime with different laws, judicial standards, and other issues for THOUSANDS of different crimes.

C. T IS A VOTER because the opportunity to prepare promotes better debating

BORDER SURVEILLANCE NOT TOPICAL

T – NOT DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

A. DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE IS SURVEILLANCE OF US PERSONS

Small 8 MATTHEW L. SMALL. United States Air Force Academy 2008 Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, Presidential Fellows Program paper "His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis" http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf

Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept. This paper’s analysis, in terms of President Bush’s policies, focuses on electronic surveillance; specifically, wiretapping phone lines and obtaining caller information from phone companies. Section f of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines electronic surveillance as:

B. UNDOCUMENTED PERSONS ARE NOT US PERSONS

Jackson et al 9 Brian A. Jackson, Darcy Noricks, and Benjamin W. Goldsmith, RAND Corporation

The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society RAND 2009 BRIAN A. JACKSON, EDITOR

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG804.pdf

3 Federal law and executive order define a U.S. person as “a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an unincorporated association with a substantial number of members who are citizens of the U.S. or are aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation that is incorporated in the U.S.” (NSA, undated). Although this definition would therefore allow information to be gathered on U.S. persons located abroad, our objective was to examine the creation of a domestic intelligence organization that would focus on—and whose activities would center around—individuals and organizations located inside the United States . Though such an agency might receive information about U.S. persons that was collected abroad by other intelligence agencies, it would not collect that information itself.

C. THE AFFIRMATIVE INTERPRETATION IS BAD FOR DEBATE

Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and their interpretation makes the topic too big. Immigration is a huge area, big enough to be a topic itself, and all the issues are completely different.

D. T IS A VOTER because the opportunity to prepare promotes better debating

COMMUNICATION NOT WHOLLY IN THE US IS NOT TOPICAL

T – NOT DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

A. COMMUNICATION NOT EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE US IS NOT DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

1. COMMUNICATION MUST BE INSIDE THE US

HRC 14 Human Rights Council 2014 IMUNC2014 https://imunc.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/hrc-study-guide.pdf

Domestic surveillance: Involves the monitoring, interception, collection, analysis, use, preservation, retention of, interference with, or access to information that includes, reflects, or arises from or a person’s communications in the past, present or future with or without their consent or choice, existing or occurring inside a particular country.

2. ANY FOREIGN ELEMENT IS NOT DOMESTIC

Olberman 6 Countdown with Keith Olberman, msnbc.com updated 1/26/2006 7:05:00 PM ET White House defines 'domestic' spying http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11048359/ns/msnbc-countdown_with_keith_olbermann/t/white-house-defines-domestic-spying/#.VU1lZJOYF2A

The White House is trying to sell this so hard that it actually issued an official press release titled, “Setting the Record Straight, Charges of Domestic Spying.”

Look, your tax dollars in action. Word wealth, SAT training class. As a public service, COUNTDOWN will now review, and, where applicable, provide translations of the White House take on what “domestic” means versus what “international” means, and then we‘ll add a few bonus examples of our own.

Quoting, “Deputy Director Of National Intelligence General Michael Hayden,” semicolon; “One End Of Any Call Targeted Under This Program Is Always Outside The United States.”

This is the glass-is-half-full view of warrantless eavesdropping, much as if a U.S. soldier, who, like the average human male, has about 12 pints of blood in his body, would lose six of those pints.

Critics of the NSA terrorist surveillance program would say, That soldier is half empty. The White House would remind you that that soldier is half full.

Anyway, the press release actually gives several examples of the differences between the meanings of these two words. “Definition, Domestic Versus International. Domestic Calls are calls inside the United States. International Calls are calls either to or from the United States.”

And don‘t forget to deposit $2 for the first five minutes, and an extra $2 to cover the cost of the guy listening in at the NSA.

“Domestic Flights,” the White House reminds us, “are flights from one American city to another. International Flights are flights to or from the United States.”

So what happens if I call a domestic airline about a flight to Europe, but they‘ve outsourced their reservation agents to India? Is that a domestic call about an international flight, or an international call about a domestic flight?

Wait, there‘s more. “Domestic Mail consists of letters and packages sent within the United States,” the press release reads. “International Mail consists of letters and packages sent to or from the United States.”

And don‘t forget, we can not only open either kind, kind if we damn well feel like it, but if you‘re using an international stamp and we need it for our collection, we‘re keeping it.

One more item from the press release, “Domestic Commerce involves business within the United States. International Commerce involves business between the United States and other countries.”

International commerce. You know, the kind of stuff Jack Abramoff did for the -- Huh, leave Abramoff out of it? Gotcha, sorry.

3. NSA TERRORISM SURVEILLANCE IS NSA NOT DOMESTIC

Casey 7 LEE A. CASEY, PARTNER, BAKER HOSTETLER, TESTIMONY House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, House Committee on the Judiciary, June 7, 2007 hearings "Constitutional Limitations on Domestic Surveillance" page 43 http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/ result/pqpresultpage.gispdfhitspanel.pdflink/ http%3A$2f$2fprod.cosmos.dc4.bowker-dmz.com$2fapp-bin$2fgis-hearing$2f3$2f7$2f2$2f7$2fhrg-2007-hjh-0042_from_1_to_156.pdf/entitlementkeys=1234|app-gis|hearing|hrg-2007-hjh-0042

Mr. CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to discuss the constitutional limitations on domestic surveillance.

Ironically, the most controversial surveillance over the past several years has not been domestic at all, but rather the international surveillance involved in the NSA's Terrorist Surveillance Program. It is to the legal issues surrounding that program that I will address my remarks.

I should make clear that I am speaking here on my own behalf.

Let me begin by stating that I believe President Bush was fully within his constitutional and statutory authority when he authorized the TSP. The President's critics have variously described this program as widespread, domestic and illegal. Based upon the published accounts, it is none of these things. Rather, it is a targeted program on the international communications of individuals engaged in an armed conflict with the United States and is fully consistent with FISA.

In assessing the Administration's actions here, it is important to highlight how narrow is the actual dispute over the NSA program. Few of the President's critics claim that he should not have ordered the interception of al-Qaida's global communications or that he needed the FISA Court's permission to intercept al-Qaida commu- nications abroad. It is only with respect to communications actually intercepted inside the United States or where the target is a United States person in the United States, that FISA is relevant at all to this national discussion.

Since this program involves only international communications, where at least one party is an al-Qaida operative, it is not clear that any of these intercepts would properly fall within FISA's terms. This is not the pervasive dragnet of American domestic communications about which so many of the President's critics have fantasized.

B. THE AFFIRMATIVE INTERPRETATION IS BAD FOR DEBATE

Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and their interpretation makes the topic too big. Including communications going outside or coming into the US expands the topic too much.

C. T IS A VOTER because the opportunity to prepare promotes better debating

FOREIGN SECURITY THREATS TO THE US NOT TOPICAL

T – NOT DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

A. DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE DEALS WITH DOMESTIC SECURITY THREATS

1. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC DISTINGUISHES THE THREATS, NOT THE LOCATION OF THE SURVEILLANCE

Cardy 8 Emily Arthur Cardy, law student Fall, 2008 Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 171 NOTE: THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT OF 2007 lexis

1. Foreign Intelligence Defined

The definition of "foreign intelligence" is critical to the constitutional analysis of the Protect America Act. The Act does not provide a different definition of "foreign intelligence" from the one provided in FISA; thus in interpreting the Protect America Act, FISA's definition of "foreign intelligence" applies. n84 In FISA's definition, "foreign" applies to the content of the information gathered, and not to the location in (or from) which the information is gathered, or the nationality of the sources from which it is gathered. n85 Instead, "foreign intelligence" means "information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against ... " harms or clandestine operations against the United States. n86 The definition [*184] does not contain any language limiting the country from which the information may be collected. n87 Thus, while the Act's asserted purpose is to collect foreign intelligence, the Act's definition of foreign intelligence does not provide inherent protection against domestic surveillance - domestic surveillance is not precluded from the definition of foreign surveillance. How an act defines its terms, rather than the terms themselves out of context, dictates the Act's application; this is a critical point in understanding the Protect America Act's far-reaching implications.

2. SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGN AGENTS IS NOT DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE, EVEN IF IN THE US

McCarthy 6 Andrew C. McCarthy former assistant U.S. attorney, now contributing editor of National Review and a senior fellow at the National Review Institute. May 15, 2006 National Review It’s Not “Domestic Spying”; It’s Foreign Intelligence Collection http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/122556/its-not-domestic-spying-its-foreign-intelligence-collection-andrew-c-mccarthy

Eggen also continues the mainstream media’s propagandistic use of the term “domestic surveillance [or 'spying'] program.” In actuality, the electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing — i.e., eavesdropping on content of conversations — is not “domestic.” A call is not considered “domestic” just because one party to it happens to be inside the U.S., just as an investigation is not “domestic” just because some of the subjects of interest happen to reside inside our country. Mohammed Atta was an agent of a foreign power, al Qaeda. Surveilling him — had we done it — would not have been “domestic spying.”

The calls NSA eavesdrops on are “international,” not “domestic.” If that were not plain enough on its face, the Supreme Court made it explicit in the Keith case (1972). There, even though it held that judicial warrants were required for wiretapping purely domestic terror organizations, the Court excluded investigations of threats posed by foreign organizations and their agents operating both within and without the U.S.

That is, the Court understood what most Americans understand but what the media, civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to acknowledge: if we are investigating the activities of agents of foreign powers inside the United States, that is not DOMESTIC surveillance. It is FOREIGN counter-intelligence.

That, in part, is why the statute regulating wiretaps on foreign powers operating within the U.S. — the one the media has suddenly decided it loves after bad-mouthing it for years as a rubber-stamp — is called the FOREIGN Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The United States has never needed court permission to conduct wiretapping outside U.S. territory; the wiretapping it does inside U.S. territory for national security purposes is FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, not “domestic surveillance.”

B. THE AFFIRMATIVE INTERPRETATION IS BAD FOR DEBATE

Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and their interpretation makes the topic too big. They make the domestic limit meaningless. All surveillance becomes topical by their standards

C. T IS A VOTER because the opportunity to prepare promotes better debating

BANNING DRONES NOT TOPICAL

T – NOT CURTAIL SURVEILLANCE

A. INTERPRETATION

The topic requires the affirmative to reduce surveillance itself, not to just limit the methods of surveillance

1. CURTAIL MEANS DECREASE

Burton's 7 Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 4E. Copyright © 2007 by William C. Burton. Used with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/curtail

curtail verb abate, abbreviate, abridge, clip, coartare, cut, cut down, cut short, decrease, diminish, halt, lessen, lop, make smaller, minuere, pare, pare down, retrench, shorten, subtract, trim See also: abate, abridge, allay, arrest, attenuate, bowdlerize, commute, condense, decrease, diminish, discount, lessen, minimize, palliate, reduce, restrain, retrench, stop
2. SURVEILLANCE IS PROCESS OF GATHERING INFORMATION, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE TECHNIQUES OF GATHERING

Webster's New World Law 10 Webster's New World Law Dictionary Copyright © 2010 by Wiley Publishing, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey. Used by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons, Inc. http://www.yourdictionary.com/surveillance

surveillance - Legal Definition n

A legal investigative process entailing a close observing or listening to a person in effort to gather evidentiary information about the commission of a crime, or lesser improper behavior (as with surveillance of wayward spouse in domestic relations proceedings). Wiretapping, eavesdropping, shadowing, tailing, and electronic observation are all examples of this law-enforcement technique.

B. PLAN VIOLATES

Limiting use of drones restricts the techniques for surveillance, but not the process itself. Nothing under the plan stops gathering information in other ways

C. THE AFFIRMATIVE INTERPRETATION IS BAD FOR DEBATE

Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and their interpretation makes the topic too big. Permitting limits on methods of surveillance, but not surveillance itself, permits the affirmative to avoid the issues of less surveillance and forces the negative to debate a huge number of different techniques

Constitution Committee 9 Constitution Committee, House of Lords, Parliament, UK 2009, Session 2008-09 Publications on the internet, Constitution Committee - Second Report, Surveillance: Citizens and the State Chapter 2 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/1804.htm

18. The term "surveillance" is used in different ways. A literal definition of surveillance as "watching over" indicates monitoring the behaviour of persons, objects, or systems. However surveillance is not only a visual process which involves looking at people and things. Surveillance can be undertaken in a wide range of ways involving a variety of technologies. The instruments of surveillance include closed-circuit television (CCTV), the interception of telecommunications ("wiretapping"), covert activities by human agents, heat-seeking and other sensing devices, body scans, technology for tracking movement, and many others.

D. T IS A VOTER because the opportunity to prepare promotes better debating

REGULATIONS / STANDARDS NOT TOPICAL

T – NOT CURTAIL

A. CURTAIL REQUIRES THAT THE PLAN, ON FACE, REDUCES SURVEILLANCE

Webster's 10 Webster's New World College Dictionary Copyright © 2010 by Wiley Publishing, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio. Used by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons, Inc. http://www.yourdictionary.com/curtail#websters

Curtail transitive verb

to cut short; reduce; abridge

B. THE PLAN DOES NOT CURTAIL ON FACE

The plan itself does not cut short. Merely looking at the plan does not indicate a reduction. All surveillance could continue if it meets the regulatory standards. It could even increase. At most, there might be a decrease by effects, But not by the plan itself. Curtail goes beyond regulation

BusinessWorld 14 BusinessWorld June 18, 2014 Wednesday Gov't agencies told to comment on petition vs higher traffic fines lexis

Ximex Delivery Express, Inc. (XDE) said the transportation agencies went beyond their mandate as the order does not regulate but instead "curtails" an individual's right to earn a living.

"[The new rules] deprive the owners of the fleets ... from pursuing what could be the only means of livelihood that they know," XDE said..

C. THE AFFIRMATIVE INTERPRETATION IS BAD FOR DEBATE

Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and their interpretation makes the topic too big. Permitting reduction by effect is unlimiting. All sorts of things affect surveillance. For example, the economy affects government spending and budgeting for surveillance, and just about everything affects the economy.

D. T IS A VOTER because the opportunity to prepare promotes better debating

NOT SUBSTANTIALLY NOT TOPICAL

T – SUBSTANTIALLY

A. SUBSTANTIALLY REQUIRES AT LEAST A 2% REDUCTION --- THIS IS THE SMALLEST PERCENTAGE WE COULD FIND

Word and Phrases 1960

 'Substantial" means "of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable." Bequest to charitable institution, making 1/48 of expenditures in state, held exempt from taxation; such expenditures constituting "substantial" part of its activities. Tax Commission of Ohio v. American Humane Education Soc., 181 N.E. 557, 42 Ohio App.

B. PLAN VIOLATES

It isn't even 2% of the billions of instances of surveillance that occur daily

Stray 13 Jonathan Stray, Special to ProPublica, Aug. 5, 2013, 3:20 p.m. FAQ: What You Need to Know About the NSA’s Surveillance Programs http://www.propublica.org/article/nsa-data-collection-faq

Massive amounts of raw Internet traffic The NSA intercepts huge amounts of raw data, and stores billions of communication records per day in its databases. Using the NSA’s XKEYSCORE software, analysts can see “nearly everything a user does on the Internet” including emails, social media posts, web sites you visit, addresses typed into Google Maps, files sent, and more. Currently the NSA is only authorized to intercept Internet communications with at least one end outside the U.S., though the domestic collection program used to be broader. But because there is no fully reliable automatic way to separate domestic from international communications, this program also captures some amount of U.S. citizens’ purely domestic Internet activity, such as emails, social media posts, instant messages, the sites you visit and online purchases you make.

C. THE AFFIRMATIVE MUST DEFEND AN INTERPRETATION

They cannot just quibble with our deinition. They have to counter-define and defend the limits of their definition. Substantially must be given meaning

CJS 83 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1983 , 765.

“Substantially. A relative and elastic term which should be interpreted in accordance with the context in which it isused. While it must be employed with care and discrimination, it must, nevertheless, be given effect.” 48

D. THE AFFIRMATIVE INTERPRETATION IS BAD FOR DEBATE

Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and their interpretation makes the topic too big. Permitting minor changes like the plan permits a huge number of cases.

E. T IS A VOTER because the opportunity to prepare promotes better debating