Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

PMC’s Bad – Vulnerability

PMC’s leave power projection at the hands of a small number of private individuals
Singer 2 (P.W. Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security International Security 26.3 186-220 TBC 6/26/10)

As PMFs become increasingly popular, so too does the danger of their clients becoming overly dependent on their services. Reliance on a private firm means that an integral part of one's strategic success is vulnerable to changes in market costs and incentives. This dependence can result in two potential risks to the security of the client: (1) the agent (the firm) might leave its principal (the client) in the lurch, or (2) the agent might gain dominance over the principal. A PMF may have no compunction about suspending its contract if a situation becomes too risky in either financial or physical terms. Because they are typically based elsewhere, and in the absence of applicable international laws to enforce compliance, PMFs face no real risk of punishment if they or their employees defect from their contractual obligations. Industry advocates dismiss these claims by noting that firms failing to fulfill the terms of their contracts [End Page 205] would sully their reputation, thus hurting their chances of obtaining future contracts. Nevertheless, there are a number of situations in which short-term considerations could prevail over long-term market punishment. In game-theoretic terms, each interaction with a private actor is sui generis. Exchanges in the international security market may take the form of one-shot games rather than guaranteed repeated plays. 45 Sierra Leone faced such a situation in 1994, when the type 1 firm that it had hired (the Gurkha Security Guards, made up primarily of Nepalese soldiers) lost its commander in a rebel ambush. Reports suggest that the commander was later cannibalized. The firm decided to break its contract, and its employees fled the country, leaving its client without an effective military option until it was able to hire another firm. 46 The loss of direct control as a result of privatization carries risks even for strong states. For U.S. military commanders, an added worry of terrorist targeting or the potential use of weapons of mass destruction is that their forces are more reliant than ever on the surge capacity of type 3 support firms. The employees of these firms, however, cannot be forced to stay at their posts in the face of these or other dangers. 47 Because entire functions such as weapons maintenance and supply have become completely privatized, the entire military machine would break down if even a modest number of PMF employees chose to leave.

PMC’s Bad – Don’t Solve

PMCs don’t solve manpower
Isoldi 4 (Brooks 28 Oct http://www.mail-archive.com/[e-mail]/msg01078.html TBC 6/27/10)

A new study has ruled out use of private military contractors as a major element in any international effort to stabilize an Arab or developed state. The International Institute for Strategic Studies said the war in Iraq has demonstrated the failure of PMCs to replace military troops or security forces. The London-based institute said despite the profusion of PMCs, private contractors have been unable to resolve manpower shortages facing the U.S.-led coalition. "They could not provide the answer to the manpower problem," the report said.
PMCs can’t solve – no training
Isoldi 4 (Brooks 28 Oct http://www.mail-archive.com/[e-mail]/msg01078.html TBC 6/27/10)

The institute, which released its annual military balance on Oct. 19, cited such difficulties as the lack of military supervision over PMCs. The key example cited in the report was the abuse of detainees at Abu Gharib prison north of Iraq in late 2003, an incident that involved private contractors. The report said PMCs were not sufficiently trained or capable of replacing combat troops in Iraq or in any other country wracked by insurgency. The institute warned that any counter-insurgency operation would depend far more on trained manpower than on technology. "Governments need to realize that such operations are manpower-intensive, as the human component replaces the weapon system as the key enabler to success," the report said. The report said the key lessons in the insurgency war in Iraq included a realization that post-conflict and peacekeeping operations required extra skills to those deployed in the warfighting phase. Militaries would also require the capability to move from a combat posture to operations that support civilians. "Secondly: the use of partially trained reservists, or reservists with the wrong skills, is no substitute for fully trained soldiers, as the U.S. learned to its cost in the Iraq prison scandal," the report said.

A2: PMC’s Good

Even if PMC’s give short term flex they constrain long term options
Avant 7 (Deborah Avant Professor, Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, “Contracting to Train Foreign Security Forces: Benefits, Risks and Implications for US Efforts in Iraq” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070425–avant.pdf)KM

The private option also enables US government officials to forgo investment in (or reorganization of) military forces for new problems – using PSCs one time make it more likely that they will be used in the future.25 While the private option provides flexibility in the short run, then, it is harder to control and frequently more costly than its public alternative and reduces incentives to reorganize the force.26 This is dramatically illustrated by the US use of DynCorp for fielding international civilian police. Initially DynCorp allowed the US to field a force of international civilian police in Haiti that it had no other way of fielding. Over the long term, however, the DynCorp option has allowed the US government to avoid the creation of an international civilian police capacity – despite the fact that such forces have been routinely sent abroad over the last 10 years and much evidence that these forces lack the requisite strategic vision for effective action.27
The violations by contractors of the security contract result in a 100% turnover rate, undermining any possible change

Schulman 9 (Daniel, assistant editor at Columbia Journalism Review, Sep 1-9, Mother jones) ET

Underscoring the scope of the problems within ArmorGroup's Afghanistan operation, POGO says that nearly a tenth of the company's 450-man embassy security force contacted the watchdog group to "express concerns about and provide evidence of a pattern of blatant, longstanding violations of the security contract, and of a pervasive breakdown in the chain of command and guard force discipline and morale." In the letter to Clinton, POGO executive director Danielle Brian writes: This environment has resulted in chronic turnover by U.S./ex-pat guards. According to the State Department, "nearly 90% of the incumbent US/Expats left within the first six months of contract performance." According to POGO sources, the U.S./ex-pat guard turnover may be as high as 100 percent annually. This untenable turnover prevents the guard force from developing team cohesion, and requires constant training for new replacement recruits. The guards have come to POGO because they say they believe strongly in the mission, but are concerned that many good guards are quitting out of frustration or being fired for refusing to participate in the misconduct, and that those responsible for the misconduct are not being held accountable
No impact to reputation
Chesterman and Lehnardt 7 (Simon and Chia, Prof. of Law at Univ. of Singapore, consultant at Institute for International Law and Jusstic, From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companie, pp. 9-10) GAT

The fourth and last part turns on the role of market mechanisms in regulation. The commercial military sector falls short of being a fully developed market in several areas. Chapter ten, by Deborah Avant, examines the emergence of this market, focusing on the peculiarities of the industry — in particular the lack of competition and transparency, and the tendency of individuals to move easily between firms — and the limitations of market mechanisms when applied to extreme situations where the security of a state is threatened. The lack of other regulatory tools has increased the importance of the market, but this potential tool is too weak to maintain specific standards, since clients tend to disagree about the relevant benchmarks. The diversity of interests among PMC clients therefore significantly diminishes the importance of reputational costs of the industry.