Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – PMC’s = Exec

PMC’s destroy balance of power by eliminating legislative oversight and falling exclusively under executive power.
Thurer and Maclaren 7 (DANIEL THÜRER & MALCOLM MACLAREN* Military Outsourcing as a Case Study in the Accountability and Responsibility of Power”, The Law of International Relations - Liber Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold, p 353, http://www.ivr.uzh.ch/lstthuerer/forschung/FSNeuholdt.pdf)KM

undermines democratic processes in Western countries.20 More specifi cally, civilian political control of PMC’s is lacking to the extent that PMC’s are not integrated into the regular armed forces. The widespread contracting between government authorities and PMC’s and the recourse to outsourcing of security functions by the executive have rendered legislative oversight impossible.21 These trends disturb the legitimacy of PMC’s’ activities and upset checks and balances in government. 22 Public participation in elementary questions of war and peace is an aspect of the freedom of citizens of Western countries or, more specifi cally, of their right as taxpayers and soldiers to have a voice in decisions that concern them. One cannot help but suspect that governments may profi t from – and are therefore not unhappy with or even deliberately exploit – the currently opaque process of diminished public oversight. Governments can thereby pursue geopolitical interests without deploying own troops, exercising power in a sensitive area with little need for explanation. Finally, in situations where a government considers going to war, PMC’s could try to infl uence that decision in their favor.23 PMC’s might have a particular interest in raising demand for their services that runs counter to the general interest.
PMC’s allow for the executive to fight a secret, private war

Valero 8 (Rafael Enrique National Journal January 9 http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0108/010908nj1.htm TBC 6/25/10)

Another problem, Avant says, is that contractor missions "accrue mainly to the executive branch," and although this "new tool" allows for flexibility, contractors are subject to little, if any, government oversight. She writes in The Market for Force that the licensing process for private security contractors, which is run by the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls, is opaque and that Congress is notified of contracts only if one exceeds $50 million. And, she says, there is "no formal process" to ensure that contractors delivered as promised. As the nation grows accustomed to seeing contractors working, and even fighting, in the blurry asymmetrical wars of the future, how long will it be before a president decides to "go off the books" and hire a small private army to fight a war. It wouldn't be hard to do. "The big risk is not what the companies are going to do in and of themselves," Avant said. "The big risks are what the consumers are going to ask them to do."

PMC’s increase executive power at the expense of legislative power

Petersohn 8 (Ulrich, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs @ Harvard, June 24, http://tinyurl.com/268qklp)JFS

In military situations, political control refers to who “gets to decide about the deployment of arms and services” (Avant 2005, 6). Employing private military companies (PMC’s) has two effects on the decision-making process. One is that it might change the balance of control between executive and legislative powers. The decision to hire PMC’s is taken by the state’s leadership and is difficult to oversee by its parliament. Thus, the executive gains an advantage in relation to the legislative branch (Ibid., 128). In the following I do not focus on issues of political decision making, but rather on the role of the military commander in the theater. The increasing use of PMC’s might, secondly, constrain a commander’s leeway in making decisions regarding the use of force (Leander 2006, 75). More specifically, it might restrict his ability to decide if, when, where, and how force is used—which is not to say that the commander had absolutely freedom beforehand. A commander’s course of action is always influenced, to some extent, by enemy actions, weather, terrain, and equipment. But since the commander’s principal role is to manage the uncertainties on the battlefield, he strives to unite the efforts of all parts of the armed forces toward a commonly recognized objective. This requires a unity of command, which means a single commander has the authority to direct theefforts of his subordinate troops and continually adapt the actions when necessary (Department of the Army 1993, 2–5; BMVg 2004, 5.2.1 and 8.2). Contractors pose difficulties in this matter. Although they are part of the broader force that is necessary to support the forces in achieving their objective, they are not a part of the armed forces, and their efforts cannot be synchronized by direct command and control. Depending on the contractor’s relationship to the armed forces, its utility as a tool at the commander’s disposal is distinct.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – PMC’s = Exec

PMC’s are the "private army" of the executive – there is no power check
Armstrong 6 (Matt, December 5, 2006, http://mountainrunner.us/pmc/)KFC

There are multiple levels of control and accountability, not just criminal, that this article only hints at and I'm sure other Post and NYT authors will start to catch on to. The third aspect of this story, completely absent, is who pays for the contractors. With most of the security contractors under subcontract, awareness and control become increasingly unclear. The impact contractors have on our mission ranges from the daily drives to the guys taken down in Fallujah in 2004 that, as Thomas Ricks points out, weren't aware of changing conditions and tactics. But who pays for the contractors? Department of State? Department of Defense? Department of the Interior? All of it from budgets controlled by the executive branch, but funded by Congress? The Custer Battles trial showed that some monies were effectively "hidden" through the now defunct Coalition Provisional Authority, to what affect? One of the arguments in favor of contractors is the bang for the buck. How many bucks for what kind of bang is impossible to measure without transparency. The fourth issue is the most important and completely ignored in the article: the complete absence of these numbers being represented in either General Pace's or Jim Baker's study groups. Besides the expected virtual acknowledgement that we can't go to our allies for help, our paid friends in the country are ignored. More importantly, we apparently have 100,000 additional forces (not all are shooters) supplementing our mission in Iraq, but coordination is poor and the fact we are just getting a handle on them indicates an incredible lack of strategic vision. But that's no surprise. These contractors could be helping us, if it weren't for reconstruction failures and their held to a larger strategic task beyond getting from Point A to B and protecting each of those points. Last point to reiterate the control and accountability issue. American democracy relies, in part, on a democratic control of force. The Founding Fathers were intimately aware of the power of the military and gave us a Constitution that created a shared control of the armed forces between two masters, the legislative and the executive branches of government. Congress was empowered to “raise and support” the armed forces of the new nation and given the power “To declare War,” and the President was given the power to conduct the war. Further, of the 18 Congressional powers enumerated in the US Constitution 11 relate to security. (for more on this part, see Charlie Stevenson's book) The contractors in Iraq are generally, if not completely, outside the control and oversight of Congress. This "private army" of the executive branch isn't held to the same two-master standard as the military. Hence recent GAO and CRS reports on contractors. There's more to this issue than the numbers, although they indicate a problem more significant and severe than most are aware.
PMC’s bypass the political capital of the executive
Armstrong 6 (Matt, October 10, 2006, http://mountainrunner.us/pmc/)KFC

This isn't to say all contractors or their companies are corrupt. There are good men with good intentions working hard and giving their lives in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, contractors, whether they are the "bad apples" or good guys doing good, shape the perceptions of America and our mission in troubled areas of the world. The reasons the Executive Branch turns to contractors in lieu of US Government resources varies from a lack of political or economic capital or expediency or political favoritism. Whatever the reason, private contractors are agents of the United States.

PMC’s are used to undermine congressional authority- causing an over powered executive

Khan 2 (Mafruza, Associate Director of Corporate Research Project ,Good Jobs First, 17 Dec) ET

The increased use of PMCs also raises the issue of the relationship between Congress and the executive branch. Critics contend that privatizing military functions undermines national security and by proxy, foreign policy, by circumventing accountability and information to Congress by giving more power to executive agencies. An October 13, 2002 New York Times article quotes a Vietnam veteran, “These new mercenaries work for the Defense and State Department and Congress looks the other way. It allows us to get into fights where we would be reluctant to send the Defense Department or the C.I.A.” By using for-profit soldiers, the executive branch can evade Congressional limits on troop strength. Experts have pointed out that the consequence of outsourcing strategic military training and advice has the consequence of the U.S government losing a foreign-policy tool to private companies whose central motive is profit, i.e., when a PMC provides a service to a foreign government, it is the company, and not the U.S. government, that establishes a direct relationship with that foreign government.