Introduction: The Myth of Human Language
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An updated English version is also available at saso.zivanovic@guest.arnes.si. 1 I’ll explain what I mean by ‘range’ in section 1.3, but a warning to analytic philosophers: it is not quite the same thing as the extension of the predicate; I take an extension to have a fixed membership but a range to be open and underdetermined. I should also point out that Baker claims that in saying ‘Jones is bald” we make the meaning of ‘bald’ more precise, but this doesn’t seem right to me. Even if Jones is safely bald the edges are still unfixed. (I will say more about this in section 1.3). 2 Of course on this view one presumably needs some absolute sense of ‘hair’, which I think would be difficult to spell out. Is one cell of hair DNA in a hair follicle a hair? 3 See Endicott (2000) for discussion. 4 This would be the case, for example, on Kripke’s (1982) interpretation of Wittgenstein’s (1956, 1958) rule following argument. 5 See Neale (1992). 6 Thanks to Dan Sperber for very helpful discussion here. 7 Thanks to Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson for discussion of this point. 8 As King and Stanley (2005) persuasively show, even in familiar cases the question is very subtle. 9 For a good general introduction to this type of phenomena, see Stewart (1998); thanks to Noam Chomsky (p.c.) for the pointer. 10 Thanks to Paul Pietroski for discussion here. 11 I owe this observation to Rebecca Mason. 12 See Lewis (1972). Thanks to Ernie Lepore for discussion here. 13 I am indebted to Chris Gauker for discussion here. For a similar point, see Gauker (2002) 14 More recently there have been efforts to afford natural language processing systems with this sort of interactive ability. See Purver (2004) for and excellent survey and an introduction to his very interesting program CLARIE, which dialogues with users in order to clarify intended meanings. I believe the strategy remains a minority strategy, however. 15 See Brennan (1988) for additional discussion of this data. 16 Possibly debates like this that involve ranking individuals are a way of establishing a scalar meaning of ‘good’ as applied to some relevant class – in this case baseball players. For a very interesting discussion on how word meanings typically incorporate context sensitive scales (meaning the ordering on the scale changes according to context), see Barsalou (1987). 17 See also Endicott (2000) on this point. 18 The passage specifically talks about definitions or, if you will, explicifications, but clearly underlying this is the question of how the word should be modulated. 19 John Hawthorne suggested to me that maybe the relevant Sorites scale is along another dimension: “maybe if Secretariat were a bit more human.” Suppose Secretariat could talk like Mr. Ed, do basic math, run on two legs, etc. Would this change minds? I think not. 20 There are technical issues that I am avoiding here, not least of which is the logic of underspecification. How do inferences work when meanings are incomplete or underspecified? For a sample of work on this topic see van Deemter and Peters (1997). I will examine this issue in more detail in Chapter 5. 21 This section was inspired by comments by Henry Jackman. 22 Translation from Strogatz (2003). 23 Interestingly, the theory of coupled oscillators has been applied in metrical phonology. See Barbosa (2002) and O’Dell et. al. (1999). 24 Similar experiments have been conducted by Skyrms (2004, 2010). 25 It’s easy to see why the intermediate conventions emerged at the borders. They were exposed to conflicting dominant strategies. 26 I actually believe that Searle’s criticism misses the mark, since it trades on his view that rule following must be conscious in principle. For reasons given in Ludlow (2010; Chapter 4) I don’t agree with this. 27 Not all of the notation is critical for us, but some is. The colons (:) within a word indicate a lengthening of a vowel. Underlining indicates stress. Capital letters indicate volume. The material lined up by square brackets (as in lines 3 and 4) indicate overlap. Numbers in parentheses (as in line 12) indicate length of pause in seconds. 28 Sidnell (2010) seems to think the speaker Jim has misunderstood the word as ‘green’ but I don’t see any evidence for this. In any case Al and Roger take him to be offering a serious question and they respond in kind, so we still get a good sense of how these meaning clarifications can work. This particular fragment is also discussed in Sacks (1995) and Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). 29 It’s interesting how not clued in he is. It is almost as though Kathy and Frieda are having a private conversation – as though he isn’t a participant in the microlanguage at all. 30 See Epstein (2001). 31 See Ajdukiewicz (1974), Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992). Eemeren et. al (1996), Eemeren (2002) and Budzynska (2006) for examples. 32 See Mason (2013) for more detailed discussion of this topic. 33 Thanks to Keith DeRose for this reference. 34 Sometimes the doctrine goes by the name ‘textualism’. 35 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1383879/posts. Last accessed, Aug. 24, 2012. 36 The hedge ‘possibly’ is necessary because if the meaning of ‘underdetermined’ is underdetermined then there must be cases of lexical items wherein we have not determined if they are underdetermined. Perhaps we will determine that some of them aren’t. 37 A similar point is made by Arana and Mancosu (2012) in the context of the relation between plane and solid geometry. 38 They use the term ‘vagueness’ but use it in a broad enough way so that it approximates what I mean by underdetermination. Their point carries over directly to underdetermination. 39 Paul Pietroski has suggested to me that it might be possible to challenge this assumption. Given that the characterization of the property/extension/function in each case involves the use of the underdetermined term ‘flat’, one might wonder if these are precise objects after all. It is hard to work through this. Would the idea be that properties are underdetermined objects? There is room to maneuver with properties, but what about the set {x: x is flat}. Does it make sense to talk about an underdetermined set (or function for that matter)? Note we don’t want to confuse this with the idea of a fuzzy set in the sense of Zadeh (1965) which is, it its own way, a fully determinate object. 40 It is, however, as they point out, only approximately true that what we say is approximately true. 41 However Braun and Sider believe Lewis (1993; 29) is hedging in the following passage (their emphasis): “Super-truth, with respect to a language interpreted in an imperfectly decisive way, replaces truth simpliciter as the goal of a cooperative speaker attempting to impart information.” I’m unclear on what the force of this point is supposed to be, given that super-truth can do all the work that truth was supposed to do. 42 Teller (2012; p. 8) provides an example. There is something I want to emphasize: I do not advocate giving up the familiar framework that includes presuppositions 1) [that semantic values, in particular propositions, are precise] and 2) [that for a statement to be true is for the statement to express a true proposition]. The mystique of Kuhnian paradigm shifts to the contrary, science does not generally discard frameworks that have proven broadly fruitful… [T]he framework of formal semantics will continue to provide the best way of understanding many important features of language. 43 Clearly this fragment not only ignores plenty of structure (like the structure of NP and VP but also takes certain liberties in, for example, classifying ‘is flat’ as a VP when it is probably better classified as an adjective phrase (AP). This won’t matter for our purposes. More robust fragments can be found in Larson and Segal (1995). 44 For this you might retain a traditional model-theoretic semantics for that purpose, or you could run your theory of entailment off of the syntax as, for example, in Ludlow (1996, 2002). 45 See Evans (1978) for an argument against vague objects and Van Inwagen, (1990) and Lewis (1988) for discussion. 46 I am indebted to Ted Sider (p.c.) for this point. 47 Although, I should note that Davidson’s position on underdetermination is equivocal. Ernie Lepore (p.c.) has a reading of Davidson (1967) in which Davidson was proposing that we could lift not only ambiguity but meaning underdetermination (in my sense) into the metalanguage. I’m not able to form a strong view about Davidson’s position here. 48 Woodger’s (1937, 1939) project for biology would be a notable rare exception. Yüklə 0,49 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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