Language management in south africa: lessons to learn
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- The state of LM in SA
- Flow-through rate
- The distribution of wealth
- So: what to do
- Two issues that need to be resolved for effective LM in SA
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language management in South Africa: what is going wrong? Vic Webb, CentRePoL, Univ of Pretoria
Generally speaking, language management (Mwaniki, 2005; language policy development, implementation planning and implementation practice) has not been effective in Africa. Despite numerous declarations by African governments in support of the promotion of the indigenous languages of the continent, almost nothing has changed (Webb 2004). In South Africa, too, despite significant language policy development and a strong statutory commitment to the promotion of African languages, these languages are, arguably, worse off than before 1994. So: what is wrong with LM in SA and Africa? How should it be handled to make it effective, that is: to effect linguistic transformation? The purpose of this paper is to take a critical look at LM in SA in order to determine what the reasons are for the country’s inadequate performance in language management. Given the similarities in the language politics of SA and other sub-Saharan African countries, it is possible that LM elsewhere on the continent can benefit from a critical discussion of the problems being experienced in SA.
Language policy practice in education is in an equally poor state. Despite the liberal, democratic LiEP of 1997, theoretically allowing learners a choice of MoI from the 11 official languages, ESL is the MoI for the majority of black learners in SA in spite of their generally wholly inadequate academic proficiency in it3, whilst the Bantu languages are not used in this function. There are several reasons for this situation. First of all, parents see English as the most important (maybe only) instrument for getting a job and for occupational mobility, for getting access to quality education, success, social status, openness, modernity, progressiveness and access to international recreation (books, music, films and television), and they thus exert enormous pressure on teachers to teach in English (Prinsloo, 2004:40), arguing that their children must acquire proficiency in English and that the only way to do this is by exposing them to English as MoI. Secondly, the Bantu languages are not seen as appropriate for education inter alia because they are associated with apartheid and its policy of mother-tongue education (Kamwangamalu 2002:6), and, also, with inferior education. Thirdly, the national Department of Education seems to have decided that ESL as MoI should be policy practice: in January of this year the current Minister of Education declared that she was happy with a situation in which (black) learners received 3 years MTE, followed by a switch to English as MoI, adding, however, that this practice should be linked to improved EL teaching.
The incremental increase in the use of English in public life and ineffective LM in SA is (at least co-) responsible for inequalities in the country: unequal economic and educational development, unequal social opportunities, the inadequate development of democracy and the restriction of cultural liberty (i.e. the freedom to be whom one wants to be). The all-powerful status of English facilitates the promotion of an Anglo-American view of life, is a threat to linguistic and cultural diversity, is a powerful factor in discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion, and can lead to the use of language for political control and mobilisation,4 and as an instrument of political conflict. Ineffective language management places minorities at risk. Ultimately, the language political situation in the country will lead to a continuation of the unacceptable gap in the distribution of wealth in the country and the further continuation of the disadvantaging of an extremely large group of people in South Africa. As an indication of the poor state of educational and economic development in SA5, the following information can be considered: Literacy Functional literacy (Grade 7 level) of people aged 20 and older by race, 20026
Source: SA Institute of Race Relations. 2003/4 Flow-through rate In 2001, only 19.3% of learners who started school in 1990, entered Grade 12, and only 4.7% passed well-enough to qualify for entry to tertiary study. Formal qualifications Qualification profile of the SA population: Highest level of education among those aged 20 and older by race, %, 2001 (proportions)
Source: SA Institute of Race Relations. 2003/4 Poverty 7.1% of the SA population has less than $1.08 available per day for all living expenses, and 23.8% less than $2.15 a day, and 48.5% of the SA population lives below the national poverty line (UNDP report 2004:5). The distribution of wealth The richest 20% of the SA population control 66.5% of the total SA consumption and the bottom 20% 2%. (UNDP report 2004:5).
The clear discrepancy between the ideology of multilingualism (ML) and multiculturalism (MC) and the pragmatics of ML and MC (strongly signalled by the Minister of Arts and Culture’s apparent lack of urgency in placing the proposed SA Languages Bill on the parliamentary agenda)7 needs serious consideration, especially (as mentioned above) in the context of the very powerful role that official discourse practice and the discourses of the powerful have in influencing what languages are used in high-function formal contexts, that is, which are to be regarded as superior, centralised languages, and which are to be regarded as marginal and inferior, along with their speakers. (See also Rassool’s remark about the effect of the linguistic market and power relations on linguistic behaviour.) It is, of course, not really possible to determine exactly why the SA government allows the non-implementation of the country’s constitutional language stipulations in official domains. In the absence of reliable and verified information, one can only speculate. Following Mwaniki (2005: 72-3) we can distinguish four types of reasons for poor LM in SA, viz. political, economic, sociolinguistic and theoretical, and then add one more: the cultural factor.
I’d like to mention three political factors. The first refers to Pool’s discussion of the interrelationship between what he calls political regimes and linguistic regimes (the language actually used by a government for official functions), more specifically to his argument that language regimes are constrained by political regimes, or, alternatively: that the “wrong” language regimes may constrain political regimes (Pool, 1987). Pool points out that “Political elites manipulate the language regime to promote their political purposes”. He distinguishes three types of political regimes: democratic regimes, leftist regimes and centralised regimes. Genuinely democratic regimes produce pluralist language regimes, leftist governments (egalitarian) promote populist language regimes (providing rewards for the use of the languages of the peasants and workers), and centralised regimes, which produce single-language regimes, usually select the language of power. Centralised regimes are, of course, directed at central control, at retaining authority and preserving their power and prestige. They argue that, to regulate the activities of provincial and local governments, the language used for conducting official business must be the same. Such political regimes, which Pool also calls “productionist political regimes”, are thus generally directed at assimilationist language regimes, see linguistic diversity as a barrier, an obstruction, and want to be make the whole nation competent in one language (p. 246).8,9 Language policy practice in SA clearly reflects a centralist political regime, a government directed at efficiency and central control. Political and bureaucratic leaders in SA probably believe that the government will perform its task more effectively if only one language is used,10 believing that the use of a single language will lead to more effective public administration, will facilitate effective central control, and will be cheaper and more practical, and that, on the other hand, an official policy of ML will act as an obstacle to communication with the public, will facilitate division and hinder national integration, thus endangering the state and leading to conflict and retarded development. National integration, they probably argue, can only be achieved through the construction of linguistic and cultural homogeneity 11, 12. The second factor is that, though it is possibly true that some members of the SA cabinet have an ideological commitment to ML and even to the value of cultural diversity, it is unlikely that the majority of them regard the language issue as something that needs serious practical attention. It is probable, rather, that they believe that LM is only about linguistic and cultural rights and that language is therefore not a national priority.13 The third political factor that obstructs the effective implementation of ML in SA and thus leads to ineffective LM, is globalisation. As Labrie (2003:6) points out, globalisation, with its free movement of goods, people and information, and decreased social control over people, leads to the “emergence of new communication communities, new ways of communication and new types of discourse”, and it will therefore be difficult to effect “multilingual” behaviour, if the proposed new way is in contradiction with existing practice. Public language practice is determined by “the wielders of political power (and) the media” (Labrie 2003: 6). A fourth possible factor, suggests Julia de Kadt in an upcoming LSSA conference paper, is the relative absence of linguistically clearly defined ethnic identities in African language communities. She argues “that the key explanatory variable (in the non-development of African languages) is the political salience of a linguistically defined ethnic identity. Language development is unlikely to be successful unless it is an issue on which the survival of the government depends. The Apartheid government’s use of African ethnic identities to further segregation and discrimination have delegitimized the use of these identities as a political tool in post-Apartheid South Africa. While this has been valuable in securing political stability and avoiding inter-ethnic tension in modern South Africa, it has also meant that the political value of the successful development of any indigenous African language is extremely limited.”
Besides the obvious, but unfounded, factor that ML is costly and unaffordable, two further factors can be mentioned. The first goes along with the political ideology of central political control, namely the belief that there is a correlation between linguistic and cultural diversity and economic development. Pool states: “development-oriented elites in multilingual countries typically perceive a conflict between linguistic pluralism and modernisation, and typically propose to solve this conflict by promoting linguistic assimilation”, generally the use of a foreign language (1987: 251). However, these “development-oriented elites seem to forget that there are multilingual countries that are economically highly developed and monolingual countries that are economically poorly developed. Furthermore, Pool points out that there is, in fact, no causal relation between the two issues: there is no data which suggests that linguistic assimilation will lead to political and economic development; and the data upon which such views are based reflect static associations, which one should avoid as a basis when investigating cause and effect (251). In fact, he says it is possible that “the adoption of a language belonging to a rich and powerful foreign country creates economic, political and cultural dependence and strangles the channels of professional access and interclass mobility” (252). The second factor is, once again, globalisation (the production, distribution and consumption of goods and information and the migration of workers subject to free market forces and competitiveness), which obviously facilitates linguistic and cultural assimilation to the dominant language of globalisation, English. In such a situation it could seem obvious to policy decision-makers that a ML regime is not sensible.
Three sociolinguistic factors have lead to ineffective LM in SA The central factor is the a-symmetric power relations between the languages of the country: the hegemonic strength of English14 on the one hand, and the negative social meaning of the Bantu languages (and Afrikaans, in some communities) on the other. The Bantu languages are generally perceived as inappropriate for use in high-function formal contexts and have consequently also not developed the capacity to be used in such contexts. Secondly, several key language political concepts that were central in the time of apartheid, such as mother-tongue instruction and ethnicity, have also had a negative impact on the implementation of a meaningful policy of ML. Finally, there is the role of SA’s history of the use of language for political control, for example the racial division of SA on the basis of language, the appropriation of Afrikaans and the invention of African languages (Makoni, 2003; Webb 2005).
Mwaniki (2005) argues that LM in SA is not adequately grounded theoretically15 and suggests that a LM theory should be developed and applied which is grounded in social theory, systems theory (all relevant factors regarded as related, inter-connected, so that the nature of a component in a system can only be understood if the larger whole is understood and considered),16 critical theory (directed at enhancing human freedom and emancipation), public management (which focuses on management functions: planning, organising, commanding, co-ordinating, controlling),17 phenomenology and human development theory. 3.5 Cultural factors [This section is investigative, presented for discussion; and no hypothesis is being proposed.] As pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the SA constitution embodies a pluralist approach, and ascribes to a liberal democracy, directed at the values of individual freedom, equality and human rights. A liberal democracy is, per definition, grounded on the notions of equity and individualism and may, arguably, be inherently contradictory with the cultural character of the majority of South Africans. The question one needs to consider is whether the cultural character of the SA people may not have contributed towards the non-implementation of the policy of ML. Using three of the four dimensions identified by the Dutch cultural scholar, Hofstede (2003), for characterising communities’ cultural character, the larger South African society can be characterised, I suspect, as:
The questions I’d like to pose is whether societies with these cultural characteristics can be successful in implementing a language policy directed at linguistic equity and parity of esteem for all the languages and with the emphasis on individuality and equity? Will such societies not tend to prefer powerful languages and language behaviour which will benefit the powerful, the elite?
Accepting that the above reasons have some validity as explanations for what has gone wrong (and is going wrong) with LM in SA, one obviously has to ask what can be done to address these shortcomings. As language management specialists there is, it seems, very little we can do. We have almost no authority and generally have poor marketing skills. So what can our role, our contribution be to facilitate linguistic transformation? The following are possible considerations:
In closing I wish to refer briefly to one particular area of research (in support of the doctoral: that research needs to be done on LM frameworks. In this regard note must be taken of the work of Donnacha (2000: 11-35), who provides what he calls an integrated language planning model. Donnacha’s proposal is, I think, a more coherent and systematic framework for LM than the earlier frameworks of Haugen (19XX), Cooper (1989) and Haarman (1996). To mention just two of the features of Donmnacha’s proposed framework:
Donnacha developed his proposal on the basis of his work on the promotion of Irish, and his framework will, obviously, have to be adapted for the language political situation of African countries. We therefore need to undertake research on how Donnacha’s framework needs to be adapted to African conditions. Adaptations could include:
To conclude the discussion, I would like to raise two matters which relate to language management in SA and Africa in general, but are problematical and need to be debated, namely (a) the moral justification for LM, and (b) the difficult issue of language rights. 5.1 The justification of LM in SA In addition to the shortcomings overviewed in par. 3 above, LM in SA has also been criticised for seemingly adopting a social engineering approach, wanting to construct a new reality on the people of the country without proper consultation with them. De Klerk (2003) states that LP proposals in SA do not adequately take note of the wants of SA citizens and is too ideological, Makoni (2003) argues that the constitutional language stipulations reinforce a language political reality constructed by European colonial thinking and Du Plessis (2004) characterises LP proposals as “normative”. All three criticisms imply that LM in SA functions as an instrument of socio-political control and constitutes an attempt at maintaining domination and engineering changes to the social character of the country. As regards the first criticism, not giving due consideration to the wants of the SA citizens (probably their preference for English), the counter questions are, of course, what it is, language politically speaking, that South Africans want, and what one does if the wants of citizens are not in line with their justifiable and reasonable needs? As regards the first question, there is considerable data that indicates that it is the elite who “want” English, and that the majority of black South Africans prefer a situation in which their languages are given some public role (see PanSALB 2000). As regards the second: What do you do if what they want will demonstrably lead to an increase in the marginalisation and disadvantaging of the already marginalised and disadvantaged, through, for example, allowing the use of English as MoI in SA despite the predictable consequences of Westernisation, poor education development, discrimination, exclusion and domination, increased poverty and an increasing gap between rich and poor? Makoni’s argument (2003: 132-151) is based on the view that the African languages have been invented along European lines. He points out, quoting Romaine, that “the very notion of language as discrete units, or “boxes”, is a product of European positivism reinforced by literacy and standardisation” and “the discourse that constructs African languages as separate categories has its genesis in colonial thinking, namely in an ideology of “linguistic fixity” that disregards the sociohistorical contexts in which they were invented” (134); the Nguni and Sotho languages in SA were codified as different languages because of missionary politics (135), and linguistics was utilised “to serve the interests and politics of missionaries and colonial administrators” (136). Giving a language a name and standardising it is an outcome of formal Western education (136).19 Makoni then proposes an approach of “disinvention” which seeks “to break, to rupture, the present from the overwhelming hold of the past” (144) Such disinvention, he says, does not mean “a return to the arcane forms of African language(s)”. It is a serious effort to capture current language practices, which are generally pan-ethnic in nature – hence which “cut across conceptualizations about the language/society/ethnicity affiliation implicit in the South African Constitution”. Makoni’s remarks about the genesis of present-day Bantu languages in SA are quite probably valid (see also Herbert, 1992, quoted in Webb, 2002 and 2005). However, one can also argue that, despite the fact that the Bantu languages in SA are the products of social and political engineering, they have become realities with present-day speakers of these languages having accepted them as indices of at least their linguistic identities. Secondly, their standardisation, though still in the process of development, can also be justified on the basis of the needs for formal education and effective communication between state and citizen. Thirdly, language standardisation does not necessarily imply the non-recognition or rejection of vernacular varieties, whether urban or rural (or what he calls “current language practices”). In fact, language planning must include measures and strategies which give recognition to the meaningfulness of vernacular varieties.20 Finally, one can ask: What, exactly, is meant by what Makoni calls “current language practices”, and how can their reinvention contribute to combating poor education, inequality, marginalisation and poverty? As regards the criticism that LM in SA is “normative” and “ideological”, one needs to take note of the meaning of these terms. Thompson 1984 (quoted by Alan Davies, 488) links the “critical concept of ideology” with “the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power – that is, to the process of maintaining domination”. If one adopts this meaning of the term ideological then there is no way in which current LM proposals in SA can be seen as ideological. On the contrary: these proposals are, precisely, directed at combating a-symmetrical power relations, domination and the imposition of a particular system of beliefs and values, and are, furthermore, guided by the internal and external realities of the language political situation in SA. In my view, the major LP proposals for SA, including the proposed SA Languages Bill”
South Africa has a history of extreme ethnolinguistic conflict, with wars between indigenous tribes, between colonists and the indigenous population, and between Afrikaners and the English. Recently, the 1976 protests against the language policy of the former National Party government led to more than a 100 deaths across the country. Even today, in post-apartheid South Africa, many white Afrikaans-speaking persons feel that the government is conducting an active anti-Afrikaans campaign (see the court, and civil, actions being taken by members of the Afrikaans-speaking community to ensure the retention of single-medium Afrikaans schools), some have attempted to persuade the government to accommodate them in a separate political structure (the so-called volkstaat), and a(n extremist) group of them were arrested a few years ago for alleged terrorist activities against the state. Other signs of ethnolinguistic-related tension and unhappiness in South Africa are the ANC actions in changing the names of towns, cities and streets in the country, the large number of complaints submitted to PanSALB about the perceived violation of language rights (of which 80% are directed against state departments), the establishment of a Committee for Marginalised Languages, and the movement among the KhoiSan communities to revive their cultural distinctiveness (as “First People”). Language rights is an important issue, especially since they are “fundamental constituent elements of personal identity” (Dunbar 2001: 345), are important for recognising “equality of respect and recognition”, and place emphasis on the “dignity, integrity of (a) person and the individuals fundamental right to autonomy, self-determination and self-development”. SA has signed and ratified all but one of the major human rights treatises, and the country is committed to promoting the values that underlie “an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom” (Liebenberg, quoted by Prinsloo, 2005: 13). The issue of language rights is thus a serious matter. It is, however, also a complicated matter, and there are several issues which need greater clarity. For instance, one should be clear on questions such as: What should be understood by “language rights”? Should they be recognised as individual or as collective rights? And what measures should be taken to ensure their meaningful recognition and implementation? What are language rights? Two types are distinguished: direct linguistic human rights and indirect linguistic rights. Direct linguistic human rights in the Bill include: the right to human dignity, equality and freedom (7)(1), the prohibition of unfair discrimination against anyone on the basis of … language (9)(3), freedom of expression (16)(1), the right to education in the official language of a learner’s choice (29)(2), the right to the use of the language of one’s choice in official domains (30), the right to form, join and maintain … linguistic associations (31)(1) and (2), the right to be tried in a language the accused person understands (35)(3)(k), the right to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and the right of South African communities sharing a common cultural and language heritage to self-determination. Indirect linguistic rights refer to situations where language is an obstacle to citizens’ access to their human rights, for example the right to a fair trial and the right to education (its availability, accessibility and acceptability). Clearly, therefore, human rights are interrelated and interdependent. Minority rights can also not be divorced from their socio-economic context - civil and political rights interrelate with economic, social and cultural rights. How should language rights be handled? Henrard (2002) points out that the UN initially presumed that minority rights could be adequately protected by the principle of respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, and the prohibition of discrimination, but soon realised that these measures were not enough to guarantee substantive equality and that the protection and promotion of the separate identity of groups is an added basic necessity. Only in this way, it was argued, can the need for formal and substantive equality be realised. Henrard, however, argues that even more is required, and that three categories of interlinked rights are involved:
The interlinking of these three categories of rights and using them in an interrelated way, she says, is essential for the establishment of an adequate system of minority protection. However, the issue of defining linguistic and cultural groups is a complicated matter. Most modern communities, particularly in urban contexts, are linguistically and culturally in no way homogeneous nor clearly demarcated, and, in SA, in a cultural sense, there is no such thing as “the Afrikaans-speaking group” or “the Zulu-speaking group”. So how should “group rights” be defined and linguistic human rights be implemented? SA handles language rights as individual rights. The view is that minority rights are not group rights, but rights granted to individuals “by virtue of their membership of a minority community” (Reddi 2002: 345). However, section 31(1) of the Bill of Human Rights states that “Persons belonging to … linguistic communities have the right to use their language.” This presupposes and mandates the existence of linguistic groups. But does it imply the recognition of collective rights, as Henrard proposes? Human rights are protected in SA in the constitution, which makes provision for the necessary basic institutions: a Bill of Rights, a public protector, a Human Rights Commission, the Pan South African Language Board, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, and the constitutional court.
LM is an important issue, needing the serious attention of political and bureaucratic leaders. If African governments wish to address the many inequalities in African societies and the marginalisation of communities, it is essential that the sociolinguistic capacities of African languages be expanded meaningfully. African languages need to be given audibility and visibility and their economic, educational, psychological and socio-cultural value need to be increased. They must become symbols of respect for human dignity, symbols of a sense of self-worth, symbols of self-confidence and domains of emotional security. African languages have to continue to be intellectualised, and their capacities must be developed in order for them to be used in high-function formal contexts. They need to become fully-fledged languages of print, with scientific texts and literature of aesthetic value. Simultaneously, a culture of reading and of owning books needs to be developed, particularly in rural communities. The development of African languages is essential for the liberation of African societies. References Alexander Annamalai Davies De Klerk
Dunbar Du Plessis Herbert Henrard
Kamwangamalu 2002 Kaplan & Baldauf Khubchandani Jansen and Taylor Labrie Makoni
Moodie Moosa
Mwaniki Pan SALB 2000 Pool Prinsloo
Rassool Reddi
SAIRR Scotton
UNDP Webb 2002 Webb 2004 Webb 2005 1 The constitution has been criticised for including too many conditions, tentative wordings, excessive concern for state finances and unenforceability, which, it is said, make the language stipulations unreliable bases. See Webb 2002: 55-60; Makoni, 2003:138-140. 2 To illustrate this fact one can consider the lack of interest in studying these languages at tertiary level. Despite the fact that 35.4 million of its 45 million people are speakers of the Bantu languages, student numbers in departments of African Languages at universities have dropped alarmingly: According to a report by Gill Moodie in the Sunday Times (25/4/04): “students studying African languages (at the University of the Western Cape) have fallen from 1900 a decade ago to fewer than 100 today”. At Unisa (Prof. Louis Louwrens, p.c.), the 1300 to 1600 first-language students who were registered for the study of Northern Sotho 12 to 13 years ago, have dropped to 9 in 2004, and their 511 post-graduate students in 1997 dropped to 53 in 2001. At the University of Pretoria, the post-graduate enrolment dropped from 177 in 1995 to 87 in 2003, and on the Soweto and East Rand campuses of the former Vista University, no students enrolled for these languages at undergraduate levels in 2004. The poor situation is also reflected in the publishing industry: of the 40 057 books published in South Africa in the period 1990-1998, only 4 359 appeared in the 9 Bantu languages (Rall and Warricker, 2000:21). On the positive side, however, two recent developments may signal the beginnings of changed thinking: the government recently appointed a commission to report on the role of the Bantu languages in tertiary education in SA, and the University of KwaZulu/Natal decided to promote isiZulu as a language of science. 3 A PanSALB survey (2000, 2160 respondents, 16 years and older, drawn from all social categories, rural and urban) provides the following information about South Africans’ proficiency in English: % who could understand government speeches and statements in English: Fully: 22%; As much as is needed: 27%; Often do not understand: 30%; Seldom understood: 19%; and Other answers: 2%; language groups among whom more than 60% often do not or seldom understand: Setswana: 63%; isiNdebele: 67%; Tshivenda: 83%; socio-economic groups among whom more than 60% often do not or seldom understand: Grade 5 and lower: 76%; Grade 7 and lower: 64%; Rural occupations: 76%; Semi-skilled and unskilled: 60% (pp 8-9). 4 Alexander (2001) points out that proficiency in the language of power provides cultural capital for the select few individuals who break through the constraints of poverty and lack of opportunity, adding that post-colonial elites of Africa “deliberately use their knowledge of the dominant European languages in order to oppress and exploit their people.” 5 Jansen and Taylor (2003: 4, 8), two SA educationists, regard “basic education in SA (as) one of the most inefficient and ineffective in Africa. 6 According to the MLA measurement, the literacy rate (word recognition, detail content, writing skills, spelling and grammar, information retrieval, information provision) in 1999 in SA was 48.1%, and the numeracy rate (number and numeration, measurement, geometry/shapes, everyday stats) was 30%. 7 In some quarters there is a belief that the SA government has a hidden agenda to promote English as the only official language of SA. As supporting evidence reference is made to public statements by the spokesperson for President Mbeki, the Minister of Education, Naledi Pandor, the unexplained delays in ratifying the proposed SA Languages Bill by the Minister of Arts and Culture, Dr. Pallo Jordan, and spokespersons in the judicial system (such as the Chief Justice, who is in favour of using only English as language of court records). 8 Scotton also argues that governments that want to maintain elitist political regimes establish foreign language regimes, that is, in former British colonies: English. (See also Alexander, fn. 4, above.) 9 Political, bureaucratic and corporate leaders in such political regimes also tend to believe, says Pool (1987: 243): (a) that a national political regime is impossible without the existence of a nation and that a nation is impossible without a language which the members of the community all know and use exclusively with one another; and (b) that development means modernisation and that means higher GNP and economic growth, which means that advanced societies need to be emulated, but this can only occur with a modernist language regime. 10 It would be interesting to determine how members of parliament and the top management of state departments understand the term “official language”. Maybe they interpret it as meaning only that it is “an important language, recognised officially”, rather than seeing it as the language actually used for official business. 11 Political leaders need to remember that pluralism is the central idiom of modern political philosophy, and that citizens must be allowed full cultural expression and freedom of choice of identity; cultural freedom has become an important developmental end in itself (UNDP 2004, Mwaniki, 2005: 205-207). 12 The latest UNDP report calls the view that there is a trade-off between effective state administration and ethnic identities a myth (2004: 2) 13 Politicians have not come to realise that LM should be part of a national resource development planning framework (Mwaniki 111; Kaplan & Baldauf 1997:6). See also UNDP, 2004. 14 A distinction must be made between hegemony and dominance. Hegemony (defined by Thompson, 1984, quoted by Davies as: directed at persuading the ruled community to “accept the system of beliefs of the ruling class and share their social, moral and cultural values”) is a negative force, destroying communities’ way of life, their self-esteem, their belief in themselves and their self-confidence. 15 Mwaniki argues that LM in SA has been handled in a positivistic way (that is, as if linguistic transformation is a regular, predictable, a-historic process) and that it is practised in the service of modernisation (which defines development only as economic growth and efficient state administration, and wants to replace traditional modes of existence and production with “modernised ones”, adopting, thus, the ex-colonial languages and neglecting the indigenous languages). His justification of this evaluation of LM in SA is inadequate in my view. 16 Blommaert (Mwaniki, 19) also points out that LP often overdevelops linguistic aspects and underemphasizes the role of political, economic and social factors. The point is: languages as such cannot really function effectively in an “agentive role”. 17 More specifically, LM must specify what measures and strategies need to be put in place to obtain the support of public managers, it must involve all sectors of the state administration, must specify the models, constructs, strategies and methodologies required to realise ML LP, and what role government departments, departments of education, courts, public service providers (hospitals, banks, post office) and media, sport and recreational agencies must perform. 18 Societies with a High Power index are generally said to have a history of colonialism and imperialism. 19 Makoni could also have referred to the use of language to construct a political reality (the Bantustans) in the time of Apartheid. 20 As the Indian sociolinguist, Lachman Khubchandani, points out, vernaculars have a fundamental, functional role in speech communities, being used to express social meaning, signal the purpose of an interaction, and manage role relationships. Verbal communication, he argues, is characterised by “multidirectional, interactive, participatory processes … (S)peech variation in everyday settings in a pluralistic society … is … an instrument of an ongoing redefinition of relationships, merely accentuating one’s identity to a particular group, criss-crossed by the imperatives of context and purpose … The verbal repertoire among many communities is characterised by its relation to identity and purpose of interaction” (1984: 169, 188). Yüklə 84,05 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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