Law Enforcement on Israeli Civilians in the Occupied Territories

A. Powers and Authority

Shortly after the Six Day War, the regional IDF commander issued an order regulating the powers of the police in the Territories.¹ Under the order, the police were granted the same powers soldiers had under the Security Provisions Order. The order also reaffirmed the powers granted to the police in the Territories on June 7, 1967, under the laws prevailing in the region on that day.

The responsibilities of the police in the Territories include the investigation of crimes committed against Palestinians by Israelis. The police must, therefore, accept and act on complaints from the public, locate and question suspects, detain them for further interrogation if necessary, and collect evidence to enable the State Attorney’s Office to prosecute the case in court.

Undoubtedly, the police face onerous working conditions in the Territories. Settlers who are suspects or witnesses in a case rarely cooperate in investigations. Indeed, a source in the State Attorney’s Office told Ha’aretz that investigations are often impeded because police are sympathetic to Jewish offenders:

In some cases, policemen giving evidence in court about an event in which a Jew fired on Arabs who were disturbing the peace will prefer to give an account that is almost totally inaccurate in order to help the defendant. They do this either because they identify ideologically with the action and do not want the shooter to be punished, or because they know the defendant and consider themselves on his side. I can understand them, because it is very unpleasant to help convict a Jew, especially if they know him.²

In addition, Palestinians, who mistrust the authorities, also frequently refuse to cooperate with the police, even in cases of crimes committed by Israelis against Palestinians.

The police contend that their main problem in the Territories is that they are underequipped and undermanned. This contention was the main point of a letter that was sent on April 7, 1984 (the day on which the Karp Commission Report was published) by the then head of the Israel Police Investigations Division, Maj. Gen. Y. Karti, to the police Inspector General. On November 22, 1993, Police Minister Moshe Shahal told the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Commission:

With the number of policemen operating in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, it is impossible to enforce the law among the Palestinian or Israeli residents.³

B. The Karp Commission Report

On April 29, 1981, a commission was established in the Ministry of Justice “to ensure, as far as possible, that suspicions about offenses committed by Israelis in the Judea and Samaria Region against Arab residents of that region be investigated speedily, substantively, and efficiently.”¹ Headed by Deputy Attorney General Yehudit Karp, the commission was established in response to a petition submitted by the Attorney General’s Office by members of the law faculties of the Hebrew University and Tel Aviv University. Referring to incidents in which settlers had broken the law and attacked Palestinians, the petitioners noted:

In many of these cases, no police investigation at all was conducted, or cases were closed in the initial stages of the investigation, for reasons related to - so the signatories fear - local lobbying by settlers of the police and the Military Government, or at a higher level.²

By coincidence, on the day the commission was established, the High Court of Justice heard a petition regarding an incident that had occurred at Beit Hadassah in Hebron, a site inhabited by Jewish settlers. The court was severely critical of police negligence in investigating complaints from Palestinians in connection with the incident.³ In response to the criticism, the state undertook in court to act vigorously to prevent criminal offenses and disturbances, and to investigate thoroughly complaints and suspicions as regards handling of complaints from Palestinians.

The Karp Commission monitored some seventy cases that were reported during the period, including killing, armed threats, trespassing, assaults, property damage, and public disturbance. In fifteen of the cases, the investigation resulted in findings with a recommendation to prosecute, which were transmitted to the public prosecutor. In all the other cases, the investigation was unproductive. Cases were closed for various reasons: offender unknown, lack of evidence, or because there were no findings. In some cases, an investigation was conducted only in response to the commission’s request.

The Karp Commission Report cites examples in which cases were closed although the offender could have been found,⁴ and others in which the Hebron Military Governor ordered the local police commander not to investigate.⁵ In some instances, the investigation was not pursued on the Sabbath to enable the settlers to enjoy their day of rest,⁶ or the police did nothing when settlers summoned for questioning on suspicion of manslaughter failed to appear.⁷ One case was closed with the explanation: “Since everyone accepts the act because of its background (relations between an Arab man and a Jewish woman), no thread of evidence has been obtained that could lead to the identification of the assailants.”⁸

The commission’s conclusions (which received wide media coverage and had a considerable impact on public opinion when they were published in 1984) were unequivocal. The police had failed to honor their pledge to the High Court of Justice in the Beit Hadassah case to act with vigilance regarding events in sensitive locales, and to prevent unlawful acts.⁹ As for the investigations, the commission stated that the number of cases closed on grounds of “offender unknown” was inordinately high, that the police were lenient with settlers who refused to cooperate when interrogated,¹⁰ and in some cases, apparently, no action whatsoever had been taken.¹¹

Based in the results of the police investigations, the commission formed the impression that the police in the Territories were ambivalent in their investigations; eyewitnesses were rarely questioned, and the investigations clearly were not impartial.¹² In its summary, the commission stated that the performance of the police was clearly deficient, and called for an urgent solution to prevent deterioration and undermining of the foundations of the rule of law.¹³

Surveys and studies conducted since the Karp Commission Report suggest that the police have not changed the manner in which they handle settler acts against Palestinians in the Territories, and that the police did not implement the recommendations of the commission. For example, a report published in 1985 by the Palestinian Human Rights Information Center [PHRIC] on settler violence from 1980 to 1984 indicates that settlers were suspected in the death of twenty three Palestinians. According to the report, however, only one settler had been tried, and he was acquitted.¹⁴ PHRIC found that in many cases no serious investigation was conducted as regards the circumstances of death and that eyewitness, both Israelis and Palestinians, had not been questioned.¹⁵

A similar picture arose from a sample study carried out by the chairman of the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, MK Dedi Zucker. Zucker scrutinized forty police investigations of offenses commissioned by Israeli civilians against Palestinians from 1989-1992.¹⁶ Replying to a parliamentary query by MK Zucker, Police Minister Moshe Shahal stated on July 11, 1993, that suspects had been tried in only five of the forty cases, three cases were still being investigated, and two others were being examined by the Judea Samaria legal adviser or by the State Attorney’s Office. However, twenty six files had been closed (sixteen for the reason of “offender unknown” and ten for insufficient evidence). The police could not locate the other four files.

A number of interviews with Israeli officials in the Territories, in which they admitted the impotence of the police investigations, have been published in recent years. For example, in July 1988, Brig. Gen. Shaike Erez, then head of the Civil Administration in the Territories, told members of the Knesset that, in effect, no police force existed in the Territories; the police lacked the capability to enforce law and order in the West Bank.¹⁷ In November, 1992, Ha’aretz reported that police officers, referring to a Palestinian study on the rising crime rate in the Territories, admitted that because of Intifada related constraints, many offenses had not been investigated.¹⁸

In the same month, MK Zucker asked Deputy Attorney General Yehudit Karp to reexamine how the police dealt with offenses committed by Israeli civilians against Palestinians in the Territories. “My fear,” Zucker wrote, “is that the picture this time is even more serious than the findings resulting from your last comprehensive study, since violence in the Territories has risen since the Intifada, while the police have been greatly weakened.”¹⁹