Manasi Mahanty, Ph d Scholar, Department of Social Science
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- INDIA’S ROLE IN SPACE WEAPONISATION AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIAL PROGRESS
- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
- Indo-US Cooperation for Civilian Nuclear and Space Technology: An Assessment
- Technological and Budgetary Difficulties due to Failures in India’s Satellite Launching Program
- Commercialization of Indian Space Program: An Analysis of Space Investment
- Issue of space weaponisation
- United Nations’ role in the regulation of Outer Space Treaty
- Impact on India’s Development Process and Social Progress
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Manasi Mahanty , Ph.d Scholar , Department of Social Science , Fakir Mohan University , Balasore ,State : Orissa (India), E-mail id : manashi_mohanty2003@yahoo.co.in Mobile : +919437511501 Address : Manasi Mahanty, D/o Mr.Bipinabihari Mahanty , Gandhinagar-2nd Lane , Post- Berhampur, Dist- Ganjam , State-Orissa ,Country-India , Pin-760001 INDIA’S ROLE IN SPACE WEAPONISATION AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIAL PROGRESS The history of Indian Missile Program illustrates the close connectivity between space launch and missile technology. 1 The history of Indian rocketry is based on space launch vehicle technology which developed along with peaceful scientific development. It has been the basis for the Indian ICBM. 2 The path to India’s ICBM capability spans over more than four decades. It is largely based on space-launch vehicle technology obtained from foreign sources. 3 India’s biggest nuclear capable missile is a product of international collaboration. Under the mantle of peaceful space cooperation, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Russia and France helped to create the most advanced nuclear missiles in South Asia. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND India’s space program has passed through two stages of development- a twenty year initial stage devoted to acquiring basic infrastructure and experimenting with low-capacity systems, and a second stage devoted to building and flight-testing higher capability systems.4 The first stage of space program of India, which began in the 1960s, involved the setting up of an administrative framework and the gaining of experience with elementary rocket operations.5 The second phase of the first stage of India’s space program allowed Indian scientists to gain experience in the construction and operation of satellites and launch vehicles.6 The second stage of India’s space program focused on more capable, mission-specific systems. This stage commenced in the mid-1980s and involved building the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and its successor, the Geo-synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), which were designed to launch the developed Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite and a metrology and telecommunications “Indian National Satellite (INSAT) respectively.7 With the PSLV commencing operational launches in 1997 after three demonstration tests, and the GSLV project nearing its first flight test, India’s space program now stands poised to join the ranks of the world’s five advanced space agencies.8 The Indian space program has a number of launch vehicles, which were developed as both a scientific necessity for a large nation and for acquiring reliable means of delivering of their nuclear pay loads to target sites.9 Although the Indian government maintains that its space program is for purely peaceful purposes, the rockets have the potential to be used for military purposes. 10 All satellite launch vehicles (SLVS) have the potential to be used as missiles.11 Critics don’t agree with the statement of ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization) that Indian space effort evolved as a purely civilian nuclear program, with the objective of using modern space technology towards accelerating the nation’s socio-economic development. They observe that the US provision of civilian nuclear and space technology would facilitate India further in developing nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them with more precision having qualitative and quantitative edge.12 Critics argue that India world exploded an atomic bomb made from materials imported for peaceful purposes. 13 India made the bomb with plutonium extracted from spent reactor fuel. Canada supplied the reactor and the US provided the heavy water for non military purposes only. As a result, it insisted on calling its bomb a peaceful nuclear device. 14 According to the Risk Report of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, India has consistently used foreign help to convert its space rockets to nuclear capable missiles.15 Imports, some overt, some clandestine, have nourished India’s nuclear and rocket efforts from the start.16 India built the medium-range Agni missile by taking a first-stage rocket from a small space launcher and combining it with guidance technology developed by the German agency.17 In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, Germany helped India with three indispensable missile technologies: guidance, rocket-testing, and composite materials. Though earmarked for the space program, all these were useful for building missiles.18 Space satellites are an integral component of missile defence systems. India also has some satellite potential to complement its missile defence efforts.19 There can be used for early warning to detect a ballistic missile from its launch, its approximate flight course etc. 20 ISRO has been developing defence support program satellites and their space-based infrared system.21 The Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) series of satellite are in orbit, 22which can be used for missile defence purposes. India’s likely missile defences choices are, not clear. Although the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and leading Indian defence technocrats have repeatedly asserted that the country has the capacity to build missile defences, 23 these claims need to be treated with caution. India’s initiative to acquire a truly indigenous Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) is likely to fuel costly a nuclear arms race. Even a technologically advanced state like the US has discovered that developing and integrating missile defence systems present unique challenges. In the past, India’s indigenous missile defence program such as the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA); the Trishul short-range SAM; and the Nag anti-tank guide missile program 24 have faced critical snags or lagged far behind schedule. Development of such complicated technologies 25 requires high degree of expertise through decades of research and training. Since BMD systems cost billions of dollars, the social and economic development of India would be affected. However, there are a lot of other related issues that confront India as far as deployment of missile defences is concerned. There is some opposition within India against the wisdom of going for missile defence. Even if India managed to deploy missile defences, there is question mark about its effectiveness against a ballistic missile attack. 26Moreover, the Indian government would have to explain to the public its decision to acquire missile defence systems. Whatever the shape and size of Indian missile defence system, its purpose seems to be neutralization of a first strike by the adversary and having an assured second strike capability.
US-India bilateral co-operation for civilian space activities, civilian nuclear programs and high technology trade along with expansion of discussions on missile defense constitute the corner stone of the New Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) launched in 2004.27 This agreement initiated three major steps: removal of ISRO from the Department of Commerce Entity List, removal of export license requirements from items subject to Export Administration Regulations EAR99, and establishment a presumption of approval for all items not controlled for nuclear proliferation reasons.28 The US government, by offering the ‘Trinity’ of cooperation, is in fact creating a situation that could lead to more proliferation. . If India improves ICBM capabilities and proceeds to complete its development, the increased tensions within Asia can’t be avoided. Such consequences can be expected to create confusion and anger on the part of India’s friends in Europe and the United States. A backlash against India will hinder further cooperation in a number of areas. In so far as US strategic cooperation with India is concerned, nuclear and space launch cooperation are not the only kinds of assistance that India can use.29 It has a greater use for conventional military assistance, development aid and access to economic markets.30 Moreover nonproliferation has a strategic value at least as great as that of an Indian partnership.31 A little proliferation goes a long way.32 It encourages other nations (such as Pakistan, Brazil, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) to consider similar programe.As a result, the US cooperation encourages other suppliers.33 India is reportedly developing multiple nuclear warheads for its long-range missiles. The acquired satellite technologies can help in building ICBM, to develop countermeasures to penetrate US missile defenses and develop anti ballistic missile system to be used against Pakistan, China and even USA.34 After seeing India’s interest in an ICBM over decades and US’s help to strengthen India’s capability of ICBM, there should be no illusion that India’s ICBM will be derived from its space launch vehicle technology. 35The apprehension still continues that India will keep its civilian space launch program for its long range missiles/military program. In the process of becoming strategic partners that US and India may become each other’s strategic targets. There may be theoretical possibility of ‘high tech aggression’ among the nuclear-warheads capable countries. It may provoke other counties to enter the process.36 Technological and Budgetary Difficulties due to Failures in India’s Satellite Launching Program A number of failures in satellite launching and missile testing programs have led to technological and budgetary difficulties faced by India’s space-establishment , civilian and military , in the last seven years.37 ISRO’s failure in the US $ 50 million GSLV with communications satellite is not forgivable. Similarly, a new intermediate range ballistic missile, “AGNI III”, built with the specific purpose of delivering a nuclear warhead, crashed down during test firing.38The Agni III crash highlights serious, structural problems within the DRDO, and its chronic inability to overcome them. This is not the first time that the test of an Agni series missile has failed. In the past, some of the tests of the shorter range Agni II also proved unsuccessful.39 The causes of the failure of the test flight are not clear. Whatever the causes, the failure is a major setback to Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP). 40It remains a direct loss of Rs. 20,000 billion dollars.41 The missile’s cost, which is probably of the same order as the GSLV-FO2’s plus the costs of development, redesign, and additional personnel etc .42 The DRDO has shown enough willingness or ability to learn from its past mistakes.43 This is true not just of its missile program, but all of its major weapons systems. The Agency has a budget of US $ 670 million, which is of the same order as the annual expenditure of the Department of Atomic Energy which is responsible for India’s civilian and military nuclear program.44None of the three major projects assigned to the DRDO has been completed on time or without huge cost-overtunes.45 These include the development of a Main Battle Tank (MBT),a nuclear plant for submarine, and an advanced Light Combat Aircraft(LCA),all involving expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars. 46 The DRDO, like all of India’s defense and nuclear service establishments, is not just subject to normal processes of audit.47 It has used ‘security’ as a smokescreen or shield and refused to be held to account.48 Reliability is all important in missiles, especially those carrying nuclear warheads. The causes of the crash are not yet known.49 The situation becomes disturbing when the average misses of scientists and technologists are more than the average hits.50 It is definitely not a matter to rejoice on both in technological field as well as in the areas of warfare.51 Billion of rupees are being spent on the missile program. In a way, DRDO is cavalier about such matter. 52 Commercialization of Indian Space Program: An Analysis of Space Investment South Asia’s biggest airshow opened at Bengaluru in2009 with firms from 25 countries showcasing their latest hardware in a chase for multibillion dollar contracts with the Indian military.53 Despite the global economic downturn, nearly 600 armament and aerospace companies -half of the overseas took part in tae event. Leading the pack of countries sending 303 international firms to the event were Germany and France with 31 firms each.54 Twenty-six British, 24 Russian and 22 US firms were also present, along with 289 Indian defence companies. 55 India has emerged as an attractive market and a key outsourcing hub for global aerospace firms due to low-cost. US defence firm Raytheon, which signed deals with eight local firms to develop military electronics, has offered its Airborne Stanford Radar systems to help India reinforce its coastline defences.55 The missile offers to India from the US military-industrial complex in recent period have been many, and they have been received well in the corporate-controlled media and military-linked think-tanks.56 The defence budget accounts for 2.5 percent of GDP and India has imported military hardware worth 28 billon dollars since 2000.57 In order to undertake marketing of space products and services developed by ISRO in global markets and also to foster the role of Indian industries in commercialization of space activities, the Government in 1992 approved formation of Antrix Corporation as a commercial arm under the Department of Space.58Structured as a private limited company, Antrix is managed by a Board chaired by the chairperson of ISRO and participated by key leaders of ISRO’s centers responsible for satellites, launch vehicles and applications and a few eminent leaders of industry in private sector.59 The business portfolio of Antrix is developed based on the heritage and track record of ISRO in different branches of space activity. ISRO’s fleet of remote sensing satellites has established a lead in the world in terms of service capabilities at competitive cost.60 Antrix chose to establish an alliance with one of the global leaders namely EOSAT Corporation of USA, which later was transformed into Space Imaging Inc. for globally market remote sensing data.61 This cooperation brought about a synergy of complementary capabilities available from purchase of products and services.62 But like the 2G scam, the S-band spectrum sale was also made without competitive bidding. In this case, ISRO scientists became salesmen and suppliers to their organization and took it for a ride.63Apart from causing a huge financial loss, the Antrix-Devas deal would have robbed many Indian public organizations of access to spectrum, including the defense services, paramilitary forces, the Coast Guard and Indian Railways,allof which had pitched for spectrum with the S-band for various purposes, including strategic communications and tracking trains. 64ISRO compounded its malfeasance by trying to bury the report of a one-man Department of Space Committee which inquired into the Devas-Antrix deal. ISRO overruled the committee’s mid 2010 recommendation to annul the contract and airbrushed the various irregularities revealed.65 Space programs in all space-faring nations are either in the public sector or in the private sector with government financial support.66 The objectives of space programs include not only achieving and maintaining technical excellence in the exploration and use of outer space and creating a strong industrial base in space- related activities but also ensuring a country’s independence in this area and maintaining national security.67 Investments in space activities are lumpy, involve long gestation periods and are risky.68 As investments in space program grew, it becomes necessary to justify the budgetary requirements in terms of economic returns and social benefits .69 The initial decades of space era, which was enveloped by the cold war atmosphere triggered large expenditures in space systems by rival powers for establishing military superiority or enhancing national prestige or strategic independence.70 This enabled private industries in countries such as USA to undertake contracts for the governments to develop and produce systems, which were spun off for commercial uses.71 It is also noteworthy that integration between space and aircraft industries has also brought about optimization of resource use.72The further evolution of commercial space in the post cold war period is heavily influenced by government policies.73 It witnessed a drive towards privatization of intergovernmental systems which provide services from space and opening of markets for services by the private sector.74
Space "weaponization" refers to the placement in orbit of devices that have a destructive capacity.79 Therefore, while satellites may be used for aggressive measures, such as GPS navigation for fighter jets or precision guided missile delivery, satellites themselves have no destructive capacity and their support of military operations is not considered weaponization.80 A space weapon would use either directed energy (in the form of a laser, radio frequency or other exotic technology) or directed mass (kinetic force of impact or a conventional explosive) to destroy its target. 81That target could be space-based (as in a ballistic missile at mid-phase) or ground, sea, or air based. The Canadian government assumes that a weapon is space based if it "orbits the earth at least once, or has or will acquire a stable station at some point beyond earth orbit." 82 Any legal mechanism to prohibit weapons in space must consider the possible development of unanticipated technologies.83
Early on, the UN General Assembly recognized the threat from uncontrolled military expansion into space and in 1962 adopted the "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space." 84This resolution became the basis of negotiations for a multilateral mechanism regulating the use of space , the Outer Space Treaty (OST), which entered into force in October 1967. It established the principle that outer space is a global commons, not open to national appropriation, and codified the phrase, "peaceful use of outer space," thus banning the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and the establishment of military bases in space.85The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 banned nuclear weapons testing in outer space, and subsequent treaties and declarations have sought to regulate exploration and military activity in space.86 In 1981 a UN General Assembly resolution, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), tasked the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with negotiating a treaty to ban all space weapons.87 The CD made some progress on a draft treaty until disagreement between China and the US in 1995 prevented consensus on the creation of the ad hoc committee to continue negotiations. China insisted that it would only support final negotiations on a Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) if PAROS was considered at the same time.88 The US has consistently opposed PAROS, arguing that there is no space race. China's insistence on linking the items and the US opposition to PAROS blocked approval of a work program and the CD has remained effectively paralyzed since 1995.89 Despite the stalemate in the CD, the UN General Assembly continues to support the PAROS mandate.90 At the 2002 session the vote was 156 in favor of PAROS, zero against, with Israel and the US abstaining. For 20 consecutive years the General Assembly has supported efforts to ban weapons from space.91 The Third United Nations Conference on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space was held at Vienna in 1999.92It focused on the militarization of outer space and expressed concern that military related expenditure accounted for substantial amounts of all space resources.93 Spokespersons of developing countries exchanged their views in this conference. 94Y. M Tiwari of India, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 developing countries and China, urged that space projects should contribute to developing countries’ potential and resources.95 He also called for increased focus on the problem of potential management of emergencies that could be created when nuclear power sources employed in space systems accidentally re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere and impact on its surface.96 Developing countries were also concerned about the high cost of remote sensing, which had valuable applications such as weather forecasting and assessment of water resources.97 The Group urged the international community to elaborate adequate strategies and long term planning to deal with such phenomena which might endanger the sustainable development of space activities.98 Another area of interest for the group has been the utilization of the communication network opened up through space technologies.99 It emphasized the need to study the feasibility of international and regional co-operative systems for satellite based broadcasting and communication for developing countries, especially taking into account their particular needs in the area of education and training.100 The Group also emphasized the need to provide assistance to developing countries in assessing how space technology could help to meet the information and communication needs.101 In promoting international co-operation on space activities priority should be given to projects that effectively contribute to develop the economic, technological and human resource potentiality of different countries.102 Impact on India’s Development Process and Social Progress Emile Benoit, in his work “Defence and Economic growth in Developing Countries (1973) viewed the defence sector as a positive influence on the economy and on economic growth.103 This was because the creation of defence and defence related industries represented a form of capacity-enhancing import-substituting industrialization. 104Such type of industries could generate certain constraints on the economy.105 As opposed to the argument that defence promotes economic development, many commentators, activists and organizations contend that such spending is a wasteful use of scarce economic resources. Development cannot take place while huge national and local resources are diverted towards defence establishments. It is thus argued that military spending diverts scarce foreign exchange and limited government resources into unproductive activities. The conditions became worse if such spending is sustained through reliance upon foreign assistance, as the debt which is acquired is not channelized into fostering productivity improvements. Moreover, it is argued that defence spending “crowds out” the social spending necessary to foster development. The overall defence expenditure does little to improve the education and health of people.105 Development is a holistic concept. It is an integrated, value-loaded and cultural process. It encompasses the natural environment, social relations, education, production, consumption and well being. Such type of development needs to be pursued not in terms of growth per se, but in terms of the increasing capacity to meet human needs and improve the quality of human life . Defence and defence-related production programs increase dependence on the owners of the technology.106 During the transfer of the technology, it politicizes the trading relationship between the source of the technologies and the developing country. The infrastructural development brought about by the development of such defence industrial sector may be inappropriate for civilian purposes.107 It only prioritizes military goals at the expense of development needs. Moreover, human capital formation can be distorted by an excessive degree of militarilization of an economy, as public and private educational processes develop with military rather than civilian objectives. Thus, it can constitute a ‘determining factor in the continuation of uneven development and underdevelopment. 108 Large defence budgets create militarization of economies, but not economic well being of people. At the same time, western companies and governments have become increasingly aggressive in promoting the sales of modern weapons system as a means of offsetting the cycles of economic activity. 109
Nevertheless, the race for the conquest of space has recently assumed asymmetrical proportions. We are witnessing unprecedented efforts of space applications for commercial markets.114 We are facing a planetary neo-colonialism due to the the massive systematic involvement of state and private entities into this new arena of global market. The extreme parasitical nature of globalized capitalism nurtures policies that create satanic weaponization of space to establish dominance. The earth, the oceans, the atmosphere and space are interconnected. These policies not only determine priorities of budgetary allocations in weapons system but also their expansion into space to target planet earth, and for use in oceans and the seabed. Attempt should be made to evaluate private industries involvement with its high level of investment in the global space industries. The Space environment is more and more a subject of concern, due to continuous generation of space debris. Space pollution is becoming a problem due to the growing number of space activities and the production of human made debris associated with it. Due consideration must be given to preserving space environment by avoiding the generation of the space debris by future space activities. Outer space has been proclaimed to be the heritage of humankind. Thus there is a need to protect and preserve outer space from pollution, alteration, exploitation, and destruction. The introduction of missile defence by India in the South Asian region would meet with challenges. China and Pakistan will respond and reassess their minimum deterrence requirements. Pursuit of missile defences will create an unnecessary and expensive arms race. In an already conflict prone region, missile defences will only create more insecurity and instability in the entire region. The net effect would weaken support for nonproliferation efforts in the region. In a region that has high rate of poverty and underdevelopment, increased spending on offensive and defensive weapons would further retard development and social progress. In addition, socio economic development might be adversely affected if funding Further, funding for space related missile defence program would worsened the situation. Owing to India’s poverty level and inadequate state of social infrastructure India needs many other forms of economic and social cooperation more than nuclear and space technology. The Indo-Us technology cooperation and collaboration do not contribute to fight against the menace of of poverty, control over HIV AIDS, and pursuit of the welfare measures and maintenance of peace and stability in the region. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the goals of space faring nations were dominance in space, national prestige and technological prowess. Economic and social benefits were given less importance on decisions relating to size and composition of space investments. Among the different components of nation’s space program, the launch vehicle program is the most difficult one to evaluate in terms of costs and social benefits. But difficulty arises because of the “nexus between military and civil program” goals such as dominance in space and national prestige, and various distortions in the launch market. Scientists and technologists emphasized that space technology is an important tool of socio-economic development in vital areas such as communications, meteorology, and natural resources management. In spite of this emphasis, decision makers should be careful in driving innovation and designing the space based program for civilian uses. The government of India should ensure that scientific and technological research would be directed towards raising the quality of life of the people, utilization of natural resources in a sustainable manner and protection of environment. It should carefully monitor and evaluate private companies’ entry into user segments like telecom and broadcasting along with certain segments of remote sensing and meteorology sectors. There is a need to bring transparency and public accountability in spending on space program by the government. The government should substantially reduce defence related expenses so that it can have resources to tackle issues like poverty, illiteracy, poor health facilities, inadequate safe drinking water supply and other forms of social injustice. Such efforts would help to establish peace and ensure social progress. End Notes 1 M.Zulfikar Khan Niazi his article “ US Israel Coperation with India in Space & Missile Technology”, The Dialogue , available at http://zlivebeat.info/2011/3-m-zulfiqar-eiza/ , Jan 01 2011 2 Dr. Richard Speierin his article “India’s ICBM – On a “Glide Path” to Trouble?”, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center , Washington , February 7 , 2006. 3 Ibid 4 M.Zulfikar Khan Niazi his article “US Israel Cooperation with India in Space & Missile Technology”, The Dialogue, opcit 5 Ibid 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Ibid 9 Ibid 10 Stuart Auerbach , “Peaceful Indian Program Has Military Potential “ , Washington Post , p. C5 , 4 December , 1981. 11. Ibid 12 M.Zulfikar Khan Niazi his article “US Israel Cooperation with India in Space & Missile Technology”, opcit 13 Ibid 14 Ibid 15 The Risk Report, “Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Vol. 1,January / February 1995 , pp. 3 , 5 , < http: // www.wisconsinproject.org /H 16 Ibid 117 “India: Missile Helpers” , The Risk Report , Volume 1 Number1 (January-February 1995) P.8 Available at :http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/India/India-missile-helpers.html 18 Ibid 19 Rajesh M. Basrur , “ Missile Defence : An Indian Perspective” , http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/SABMDBasrur.pdf 20 Ibid 21 Ibid 22 Indian Remote Sensing satellite were launched in 1988 , 1991 , 1995 , and 1997.For details see the website of India’s National Remote Sensing Agency , http;//www.nrsa.gov.in/engnrsa/satellites/satellites.html 23 Rajesh Rajagopalan , “ Missile Defences in South Asia : Much Ado About Nothing” , South Asian Survey , Vol .11 , No.2 , 2004 , p.213 24 Ibid 25To be reliable, BMD has to accomplish four distinct missions : to detect attacking missiles ; to track missiles and, where relevant , re-entry vehicles/warheads ; to discriminate between warheads and decoys ; to destroy attacking missiles and/or warheads. Each of these mission requirements presents particular technological and military challenges.Rebeca Johnson , “Issues on Missile Defence and Alternatives” , submission to Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs , Simons Center for Peace and Disarmament Studies , May 2003 , p’11 , also available on website :http://www.lligi.cfhosting.ca/admin/information 72/030604issues__defenses.pdf 26 “Patriot Advanced Capability -3 (PAC)” , http://missilethreat.com/systems/patriot_pac-3_usa.html 27 “Indo-US Space Cooperation : Poised for Take-Off” , The Nonproliferation Review , Vol.12 ,No.1,March 2005,available at taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/K366012388318X11.pdf. 28 Ibid 29 .Zulfikar Khan Niazi his article “US Israel Cooperation with India in Space & Missile Technology”, opcit 30 Ibid 31 Ibid 32 Ibid 33 Ibid 34 Dr.Speierin “ India’s ICBM- On a “ Glide Path” to Trouble?” , opcit 35 Ibid 36 Ibid 37 Praful Bidwai ‘s article “ India exposed by missile failure” ,Asia Times ,July 2 ,2006, available at www.atimes.com 38 Ibid 39 Ibid 40 Praful Bidwai’s article “Indian Missile Programme : A History Of Failure ,Asia Times Online ,June 15 ,2010, available at Tehelka .com 41 Ibid 42 Ibid 43 Ibid 44 Ibid 45 Praful Bidwai ‘s article “After Agni-III Crash” ‘July 16 ,2006 ,guardian.co. uk 46 Ibid 47 Ibid 48 Ibid 49 Praful Bidwai’s article “Indian Missile Programme : A History Of Failure ,Asia Times Online,opcit 50 Ibid 51 Ibid 52 Ibid 53 Ibid 54 Asian Nuclear, Missile & Space Digest ,A Weekly Newsletter from the Indian Pugwash Society ,Vol.1 , No. 1 , February 2009. 55 Ibid 56 Ibid 57 Ibid 58 K.R. Sidahartha Murthi , U.Shankar and H.N. Madhusudhan ,article “Organizational systems , commercialization and cost-benefit analysis of Indian space programme, Special section :Indian Space Programme , Current Science , Vol. 93 ,No.12 , 25 December , 2007 59 Ibid 
60 Ibid 61 Ibid 62 Ibid 63 Praful Bidwai “s Article “ Another scam in India” , 21st February , 2011available at Columnspk.com 64 Ibid 65 Ibid 67 Ibid 68 Ibid 69 Ibid 70 K.R. Sidahartha Murthi , U.Shankar and H.N. Madhusudhan ,article “Organizational systems , commercialization and cost-benefit analysis of Indian space programme, Special section :Indian Space Programme, opcit 71 Ibid 9 72 Ibid 73 Ibid 74 Ibid 75 Sarah Estabrooks ,her article “Options for Preventing the Weaponization of Space , July-sept , 2003 ,available at peacemagazine.com 76 Ibid 77 Ibid 78 Ibid 79 Ibid 80 Ibid 81 Ibid 82 Ibid 83 Ibid 84 Ibid 85 Ibid 86 Ibid 87 Ibid 88Ibid 89 Ibid 90 Ibid 91 Ibid 92 Third united nations conference on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space,SPACE/V/2,19 july 1999. http://www.un.org/events/unispace3/pressrel/e19pm.htm 93 Ibid 94 Ibid 95 Ibid 96 Ibid 97 Ibid 98 Ibid 99 Ibid 100 Ibid 101 Ibid 102 Ibid
Ibid
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