Middle east development

Terrorism: Djibouti
There have been no significant terrorist attacks in Djibouti[ever?], and the country does not face an jihadist threat from within. Given its proximity to countries known to harbor terrorists, however, Djibouti does face significant security issues. Militant Islamist groups are active in Northern Africa, Sudan and Somalia. Because of its [rough, mountainous?] terrain and the fact that Djibouti lacks the military manpower to strictly control its borders, it is possible that terrorists are hiding in certain inaccessible areas of the country. There are certainly plenty of targets for them to hit. Both the United States (with about 2,000 special operations personnel) and France (with nearly 3,000 soldiers, including a special operations component) have significant military bases in the country. The port of Djibouti is a major hub of trade for the region, and the country’s location along the strategic Strait of Bab el Mandeb offers terrorists the opportunity to strike ships, which they did in 2002 in the Gulf of Aden in an attack against the Limburg, a French oil tanker.
In addition to being a terrorist target, foreign militaries also bring a certain level of stability to the region. Their bases ensure that security is tight not only inside the wire but also in the surrounding areas. For example, a French counterterrorism and hostage-rescue team was stationed at the[is there only one French base?] French base in April 2008 as a result of pirate attacks against French ships in the port of Aden.

Terrorists could certainly pose a significant threat to the bridge project -- during and after construction -- and to the planned urban development on either end. The bridge would be a major symbol [of what?], and since it would carry oil pipelines, it would also be a significant component of the region’s energy infrastructure. Al Qaeda has struck at both of these kinds of targets numerous times. Terrorist attacks could delay construction of the bridge or, at the very least, require a burdensome[how so?] security presence to prevent attacks. Not only could the bridge be targeted, but so could the legion of laborers, engineers and managers stationed at either end. Once construction is complete and the bridge is open for traffic, it also could become an important transit and smuggling route for militants.

However, the fact that the bridge has the backing of[would be built by a company founded by?] Tarek bin Laden, the half brother of Osama bin Laden, could give it some protection against Islamist militant attacks. Although Tarek bin Laden has no direct links to his half brother or the al Qaeda organization, [Korena says in her section above that he does have ‘links to terrorist activity’] his name alone may prevent any major attack. If the bridge could be portrayed as a domestic project and not the work of foreign companies, it would not draw the ire that previous foreign activities (such as oil extraction) have. The region is very poor and local people would most likely welcome investment in the area so long as it provided jobs and an increased standard of living. If the project is viewed in this light, then attacking the bridge may not be in the long-term strategic interests of al Qaeda.

This does not mean that the bridge would not be targeted. Especially on the Yemen side, there are many al Qaeda “franchise” groups that carry the al Qaeda flag but are not under the centralized command and control of al Qaeda “prime.” The prospect of attacking such a prominent target would attract many al Qaeda imitators, but these groups do not pose as much of a threat as al Qaeda prime does. Franchise groups typically do not have the training, discipline or materials to carry out serious, coordinated attacks. They are usually intercepted by police before they can launch their attacks or their attacks are ineffective. In Yemen, al Qaeda has been responsible for many attacks but few deaths. The same can be said for tribal factions. So far, neither has shown a high level of martial sophistication. Security around the bridge site is key to successful project completion, but if the project is seen as largely benefiting the region and the people who live there, terrorists will have less of an incentive to attack it.

The threat of terrorism in Djibouti is medium.²
Crime: Yemen
Crime in Yemen poses more of a threat to the bridge project than terrorism does. Kidnapping for ransom, political kidnapping, drug trafficking, police corruption and the proliferation of weapons all make Yemen an unstable environment. Kidnappings are common in the country and most are not reported to police. The bridge project as well as urban development on either end would involve thousands of workers, many of whom would likely be foreigners, and many of whom would be based in a largely uninhabited corner of Yemen. Their presence and paychecks would surely attract criminals seeking to profit by the project in more nefarious ways.
One significant threat would be illicit drugs. In [when?], UAE officials assisted Yemenis in intercepting a shipment of 1,700 kilograms of hashish in the eastern Hadramout region, a popular area for distributing drugs throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Corrupt police in Yemen either turn a blind eye to the drug traffic or actively assist drug smugglers.
Weapons are also smuggled into Yemen and are readily available. Hand grenades sell for as little at $7.50 each and can be bought with no questions asked. For those with more money, assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and mortars are also available. The arms markets supply terrorists and criminals as well as the wider Yemeni population. There are an estimated three guns for every one Yemeni. The Yemeni government recently announced measures to restrict people from carrying guns in public and launched a campaign to close down weapons bazaars. Guns are indeed rare in cities now but are still quite common outside metropolitan areas.

The threat of crime in Yemen high.³

Crime: Djibouti
Crime is also widespread in Djibouti. Poverty, unequal distribution of wealth, high unemployment and nearly 25,000 refugees from Somalia and Ethiopia contribute to the country’s high crime rate. Petty crime is most common and most prevalent around transportation terminals such as bus stations, train stations, airports and seaports.[there are more than one airport and more than one seaport in Djibouti, correct?] Intermittent power outages encourage theft in these areas. Driving can be especially dangerous. In addition to the high accident rate on Djibouti highways, bandits set up blockades on roads and steal from motorists after they come to a stop. In many cases, perpetrators might start out asking for water, food or a ride into the next town then demand money or other valuables. Djibouti’s national police force does not have the resources to deal with crime outside of the major cities. Like Yemen, most of Djibouti is very rural and hard to reach or patrol on a regular basis. The risk of transporting people and goods in Djibouti is high.

As in Yemen, the infusion of cash and construction workers on the Djibouti end of the bridge project would be a powerful magnet for crime in the area. Expensive equipment and personal possessions on and around the construction sites would attract local criminals. Workers with incomes and not much to do in Djibouti’s desolate corners would also be tempted by drugs.

Road traffic in Djibouti also is very dangerous, and any supplies coming in to construction sites by road would be vulnerable to hijacking. Security measures should be taken to prevent such activity.
The threat of crime in Djibouti is high.³
War and Insurgency: Yemen
In northwestern Yemen, near the town of Sa’dah, an insurgent group referred to as the al-Houthi rebels is fighting the government over the government’s ties to the United States and Israel. The founding leader of the rebel group, Shiite cleric Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, was killed in 2004 but sporadic violence continues. An estimated 700 people have died in the fighting so far. Most recently, two mosque bombings in Sadaa[Sa’dah?] and a small-arms attack[where?] killed 52 people and injured over 100. There is little reason to believe that this violence will end anytime soon, but it also seems to remain contained to the northwestern corner of the country, around Sadaa[Sa’dah?]. The violence is unlikely to affect the bridge project since it shows little sign of spreading to southwestern Yemen.
The threat of war and insurgency in Yemen is medium.⁴


War and Insurgency: Djibouti
Djibouti gained independence peacefully from France in 1977 and, for the most part, the two countries have maintained good relations ever since. Land-locked Ethiopia, Djibouti’s largest neighbor, is a peaceful ally since it depends on Djibouti’s port for nearly all of its external trade.
Relations are not so good with neighboring Eritrea to the north. Djibutian officials blame Eritrean forces for a border incursion in the Ras Doumeira region on April 16, 2008. In response, Djibouti sent troops north to seal the border. Both sides have essentially been in a standoff since April 16, with no major developments until June 10, when Eritrean forces fired upon deserters who were fleeing to the Djibutian side. Low-level conflict has ensued since then, leaving at least a nine Djibutian soldiers dead as of June 18. The Eritreans have begun to move across the border and even set up temporary camps on what Djibouti considers its territory. The patch of land in question is small, desolate and contentious mainly because a proper border was never fully established by the two countries’ colonial occupiers (Italy for Eritrea and France for Djibouti). The contested area lies very close to the area in which the bridge would be built, along with related urban development (Ras Doumeira is approximately 20 miles from Fagal).

It is not clear what Eritrea hopes to gain in this latest incursion. Tensions have flared up several times in the past over this same stretch of land. In 1996, Djibouti accused Eritrea of shelling the border area and in 1999 Djibouti accused Eritrea of stirring up ethnic tensions. Eritrea also is engaged in a border dispute with its neighbor to the west, Ethiopia, from which Eritrea gained independence in 1993. As a relatively new country, Eritrea could be asserting itself and using military actions to consolidate domestic power. In any event, all-out war between Eritrea and Djibouti is in neither country’s best interests; if it conducted any serious incursion, Eritrea could be easily defeated by the U.S. and French military forces stationed in Djibouti, and Djibouti does not have the military means to defeat Eritrea by itself.

Political instability and shifting alliances caused by wars and insurgencies could disrupt the proposed bridge project -- especially in Djibouti, where a border dispute is dangerously close to the expected construction site. The situation along the Eritrean/Djibouti border is volatile and should be watched closely.

The threat of war and insurgency in Djibouti is medium.⁴

Political Instability: Yemen
Yemen faces threats of political instability in the form of militant Islamist influence in government and calls for secession in the south, around the port of Aden. President Saleh depends on a significant faction of ultra-conservative Salafists for political support and protests in the south are the vestiges of a socialist movement supposedly put down in 1994.
During the Cold War, Yemen created a conservative Islamic education system with Saudi assistance to counter the threat of socialism in the country. At the time, Yemen was split north and south, with the south receiving overt Soviet assistance. The support and cultivation of elite Islamic schools resulted in the birth of a Salafist-jihadist tendency within Yemeni society that played a key role in the defeat of the southern socialists in the 1994 civil war. Later, these Salafist-jihadist elements attained influence over key institutions of the unified Yemeni state, especially the country’s intelligence and military establishments. President Saleh -- who has ruled the country since 1978, first as president of the northern Yemen Arab Republic and, since 1990, as president of the unified Republic of Yemen -- has relied heavily over the years on the Salafist-jihadists to maintain his regime. This dependence has become a major political vulnerability for the president. Increasingly under pressure from the United States since 9/11 to rein in al Qaeda in his country, Saleh has tried to balance Washington’s desires with those of his jihadist supporters.
However, he has failed to satisfy U.S. demands, and by succumbing to pressure to the Salafists-jihadists at home, he is weakening not only his government but the state itself. Meanwhile, the al-Houthi insurgency in the north and the unrest in the south have intensified. If not checked, the growing chaos could cripple the central government.
Saleh did act to check the power of the Salafist-jihadists in the intelligence establishment after 9/11 by creating of a new intelligence service headed by a close ally, Ali al-Anisi. He also reshuffled his cabinet to include more pro-government ministers. But these changes at the top will take time to work their way down. Until they do, the new organizations will be no match for the institutions dominated by the Salafist-jihadists.
The problem of rival commands extends to the military as well. Saleh depends heavily on one key commander, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who is in charge of northern and western Yemen. Al-Ahmar ignited the problem with the al-Houthis, though this group’s threat to Saleh pales in comparison to the jihadist menace. Al-Ahmar, a member of the president’s tribe who studied in Saudi Arabia, is dogmatic even for a Salafist. He led the fight against the Communists[socialists?] in Yemen’s 1994 civil war. He is also the main rival of the president’s son, Ahmed Ali Saleh. There is a major competition between the two, though at present the president’s son needs time to strengthen his position.
These underlying structural problems have allowed the jihadists to revive their activity in the country. For now, Saleh is defying the United States for fear of losing the support of those elements that provide him with regime security. Al Qaeda is taking full advantage of this, and it knows that Saleh could buckle under external pressure. The recent attacks are thus meant to let the president know the jihadists can hit him hard if he decides to turn on them.
The situation in Yemen is quite volatile, and Saleh is quite vulnerable -- which explains his inability to accede to U.S. demands. A key factor keeping him in power is the absence of an alternative leadership, which suggests that Saleh’s collapse would probably spark chaos rather than result in a rival taking over. A weakened Yemeni state unable to reassert its hold over the country could lead to a situation like the one in neighboring Somalia, where large parts of the country are lawless expanses lending themselves to exploitation by militant and criminal elements. Under the right conditions, the chaos that thrives in the Horn of Africa could cross the Red Sea and spread onto the Arabian Peninsula.
Obviously, political collapse in Yemen would negatively affect the construction and operation of the bridge and related real estate developments. If the construction of the bridge is not approved of by a broad consensus in Yemen, the risk of a political opposition gaining power and reneging on previous construction agreements would be high, as would the threat of violence and logistical disruption. Protests by leftists calling for better employment in the south further complicates the security and political environment for President Saleh. The port of Aden is a major import/export hub for Yemen and is approximately 100 miles from the bridge construction site on the Yemen side.
The threat of political instability in Yemen is critical.⁵

Political Instability: Djibouti
Djibouti’s political arrangement is based on an ethnic split between the majority Issa tribe and the minority Afar tribe. Tribal conflict erupted in 1991 and the country did not begin to resolve it until 1994. The conflict was between the Issa-dominated government and civil services and a predominantly Afar militant separatist group called the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD). The Issa government, with assistance from France, regained control of the north and west (where the FRUD operated) and appointed several FRUD leaders to the president’s cabinet. Issa tribal territory overlaps Djibouti and the western Somalia province of Somaliland while the Afar tribal area overlaps northern Djibouti and parts of Eritrea. During the civil war, Djibouti accused Eritrea of assisting and supplying FRUD.
The tribes’ territorial overlaps lead to entanglements in other regional disagreements. Eritrea’s main enemy is Ethiopia, from which it won independence in 1993. Because of its political support for Ethiopia and status as an outlet for Ethiopian trade, Djibouti has become one of Eritrea’s targets in its struggles against Ethiopia. Afar movements are gaining momentum again in northern Djibouti and they could become convenient political tools for Eritrea. Another civil war is unlikely (Eritrea is no match for foreign forces stationed in Djibouti), but if Eritrea could disrupt the political/tribal balance in Djibouti and perhaps even the flow of goods to and from Ethiopia, it would strengthen its hand immensely.
Bridge construction on the Djibouti side of the Strait of Bab el Mandeb would be in Afar territory, and the ramifications of this should be noted. It is possible that negotiations with the Issa-dominated Djiboutian government may not hold authority in some parts of Afar territory. In addition, Eritrean influence may further complicate the situation on the construction site. The amount of investment expected in this project is enough to alter relations between Eritrea and Djibouti and could very well be a reason for Eritrea encroaching upon Djiboutian border territory. Eritrea may be trying to position itself so that it could extract concessions from Djibouti were the project to be approved and construction begun.

The threat of political instability in Djibouti is medium.⁵

Miscellaneous Threats: Yemen and Djibouti
[Ben, I think it would be fine to leave the piracy stuff here as long as we include some info on weather, health care, traffic, natural disasters, etc., the usual ‘miscellaneous’ stuff]

Piracy poses a significant threat to both Yemen and Djibouti. Pirates from Somalia and Yemen operate in the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Bab el Mandeb. They attack everything from private yachts to fishing boats to supertankers. The U.N. has recently lowered the threshold for engagement with pirates in this area. High-profile cases of piracy that involve supertankers, such as the Takayama incident on April 21, when [can we include some specifics here?], regularly attract international attention, but smaller shakedowns of indigenous fishermen and traders are much more common and most go unreported. Foreign governments want to protect their assets in the Gulf of Aden and will defend against brazen attacks on supertankers but rarely have the incentive or ability to intervene in smaller-scale activities.

Pirates have a large selection of maritime vessels to choose from; all traffic traveling between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean must travel through the Gulf of Aden via the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. Pirate attacks on ships moving materials to any construction sites on either side should certainly be a threat to consider. In fact, increased traffic to the construction areas without increased security would most certainly attract more pirate attacks.

The miscellaneous threat level both in Yemen and Djibouti is medium[?].⁶

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1. 
   Business environment. Threat level low: Environment characterized by established rule of law, government transparency, regulatory and tax system not designed to restrict free enterprise or private ownership, sufficiently developed infrastructure, adequate workforce, physical security and economy conducive to business investment. Medium: Some of those characteristics lacking. High: Most of those characteristics lacking. Critical: Virtually all of those characteristics lacking.
   

2. 
   Terrorism. Low: No known credible threat. Medium: Potential but unsubstantiated threats by capable indigenous or transnational actors. High: Demonstrable history and continued potential for militant attacks against generalized targets. Foreigners and/or foreign facilities are not specifically targeted. Critical: Demonstrable history and continued likelihood of militant attacks. Foreigners and/or foreign facilities are specifically targeted.
   

3. 
   Crime. Low: Relatively low crime rate, mainly property or petty crime. Medium: Generally high crime rate with incidents of property crime that specifically targets foreigners, low potential for violence. High: Generally high crime rate with incidents of property crime that specifically targets foreigners, probability of violence and moderate risk of physical crime. Critical: Extensive criminal activity targeting foreigners with a high possibility of physical crime, including violence and kidnapping; heavily armed criminal elements abundant.
   

4. 
   War and Insurgency. Low: No or relatively low threat of violent insurgency. Medium: Nearby insurgency with the potential of affecting city, region, country or transportation network. High: Insurgency within the city, region or country but with little direct effect on foreigners. Critical: Insurgency within the city, region or country directly threatening foreigners.
   

5. 
   Political Instability. Low: No or minimal visible activity directed against the government. Medium: Sporadic street demonstrations, largely peaceful. High: Routine large-scale demonstrations, often affecting traffic and having the potential for violence. Critical: Endemic strikes, protests and street demonstrations almost always affecting traffic with a high probability of associated violence.
   

6. 
   Miscellaneous. Low: Little or no known threats posed by disease, weather, natural disasters, transportation hazards or other dangers. Medium: Moderate level of risk posed by some or all of these threats. High: Considerable danger posed by some or all of these threats. Critical: Extremely high level of danger posed by some or all of these threats.
   

© 2008 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.