Premier Debate 2016 September/October ld brief

AFF—A2 Spec

Decommissioning

There’s no unique or preferable approach to decommissioning

Pedraza 12

Jorge Morales Pedraza, consultant on international affairs, ambassador to the IAEA for 26 yrs, degree in math and economy sciences, former professor, Energy Science, Engineering and Technology : Nuclear Power: Current and Future Role in the World Electricity Generation : Current and Future Role in the World Electricity Generation, New York. [Premier]

Decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities are the responsibility of the operator and must be conducted under license. A separate license is often required for decommissioning. The key points in decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities are: the purpose of decommissioning and dismantling is to allow the removal of some or all of the regulatory controls that apply to a nuclear site; there is no unique or preferable approach to decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities; techniques for decommissioning and dismantling are available and experience is being fed back to plant design and decommissioning plans; many nuclear facilities have been successfully decommissioned and dismantled in Germany, Belgium, France and the UK; current institutional arrangements for decommissioning and dismantling (policy, legislation and standards) a re sufficient for today‘s needs; current systems for the protection of the safety of workers, the public and the environment are satisfactory for implementation and regulation of decommissioning and dismantling; arrangements are in place for the funding of decommissioning and dismantling, but evaluation of costs requires further attention; local communities are increasingly demanding involvement in the planning for decommissioning and dismantling.

AFF—A2 Subs DA

Nuclear subs create a gap in the US military—kills hegemony

Heinrich 4/14

[--Torsten, military historian from Germany, currently living in Switzerland. “Why the US Needs Conventional Submarines,” Apr 14 2016, The Diplomat] [Premier]

The U.S. Armed Forces operate a wide array of sophisticated weaponry, in many cases superior to anything else in the world. But while the new destroyers, carriers, or the F-22 might have no equal, the U.S. Armed Forces face a significant gap in their capabilities: the total lack of any conventional submarines. The United States hasn’t produced any conventional submarines since the Barbel-class in the late 1950s; every submarine class since then has been nuclear powered. This might have made sense in the context of the Cold War, where Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines had to be shadowed, but times have changed. While previously conventional submarines had to snorkel roughly at least every two days of time under water to recharge their batteries, air-independent propulsion (AIP) has changed the game. German Type 212 submarines can stay under water without snorkeling for up to three weeks, traveling 1,500 miles (2,400 kilometers) or more. Without emitting heat and with no need for constant cooling due to the lack of a nuclear reactor, these German submarines and comparable designs are more than a match for nuclear-powered submarines in terms of stealthiness. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Whereas the Soviet Union had submarines cruising the globe’s waters, the next big naval challenge for the United States isn’t a revitalized Russian navy, but the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s subs and ships lurking in the South China Sea and East China Sea. These submarines could play a key role in trying to enforce China’s A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategy against a superior USN, with the goal of preventing the United States from intervening in any conflict involving the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Senkaku Islands, and Taiwan. With the PLAN’s mostly conventional submarine force, the USN’s superior anti-submarine warfare capabilities will continue to severely hinder any Chinese submarine operations outside the first island chain and outside of China’s land-based air cover. This limits the theater of operations to a high degree and puts it well into range for conventional submarines using only their AIP based in Okinawa, Singapore, Subic Bay, Guam, or possibly Zuoying Naval Base on Taiwan. Whereas China can and will create a bigger subsurface fleet than the USN by mixing conventional submarines with nuclear powered ones, the financial burden of matching hull with hull is practically impossible for the United States, at least as long as it limits the USN to SSNs. Conventional submarines might change this. While one Virginia-class submarine costs roughly $2.7 billion per unit, the same money could buy six to seven conventional submarines of the German Type 212 class. While U.S. nuclear-attack submarines are superb, many examples have shown that sophisticated conventional submarines aren’t just a match for surface fleets but also for older SSNs under the right circumstances. In case of a conflict with China, the majority of naval combat will happen well within the first island chain, where a purely nuclear-powered fleet seems like a waste of assets. Neither their range nor their speed will be needed in most cases. As conventional submarines will be able to handle most tasks, the dramatically more expensive SSNs could stay out of the first island chain concentration on shadowing the PLAN’s SSBNs and SSNs outside this area, while keeping enough in reserve and out of harm’s way to maintain a credible deterrence against Russia at the same time. Additional conventional subs would also prevent the projected sub shortfall starting in 2021. But going back into the business of building conventional submarines for the USN wouldn’t just make sense from an fiscal point of view for a navy that has limited resources. It would also offer various economic and political options for the United States. President George W. Bush promised Taiwan eight conventional subs in 2001, which were never delivered. If the United States were to start building conventional submarines again, the pledge to Taiwan could finally be fulfilled. Moreover, the market for conventional submarines is gigantic. Most Asian nations are looking to establish, increase, or modernize their submarine fleets; Germany and France have both enjoyed particular success marketing their submarines to countries like South Korea, Indonesia, India, and Malaysia. Many of these nations are close U.S. allies or friends. The market for modern conventional submarines built in the United States would probably amount to several dozen hulls within the next two decades. Built in the U.S., employing U.S. workers, and spreading the development costs over ever more hulls, Washington could seriously consider subsidizing some of those submarines for navies which are direly in need for a naval deterrence against an ever more aggressive China. If the United States doesn’t want to hand Asia over to China on China’s terms, a price might have to be paid in the end. It’ll be either money or blood. Subsidized submarines for the Philippines and Taiwan might just be what it takes to show the steadfast commitment for the status quo and the support for those two nations, which are under heavy pressure from the Middle Kingdom. Conventional submarines with AIP wouldn’t just bolster the USN’s capabilities in this crucial theater for a comparative bargain, they would also allow the U.S. to enter a sizable weapons market while giving it the power to supply precious allies with exactly those tools they need for deterrence. The technology transfer necessary for building subs like the Type 212 could very easily be attained by a joint venture or even licensing the German subs from a company desperately looking for sales like Howaldwerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW).

Turn—US presence in the SCS causes accidents

Broder 6/22

[--writes about defense and foreign policy for Newsweek from Washington. He's been covering national security issues for more than two decades, including 12 years as a writer and senior editor at Congressional Quarterly. Before moving to Washington, Broder spent 20 years as an award-winning foreign correspondent in the Middle East, South Asia, China and East Asia for the Chicago Tribune and the Associated Press. Broder’s writing also has appeared in The New York Times Magazine, The Washington; “The ‘Inevitable’ War Between US and China,” June 22 2016, Newsweek] [Premier]

But once that gathering is over, the dispute could become much more volatile. U.S. officials are particularly worried about a Chinese plan to send submarines armed with nuclear missiles into the South China Sea for the first time. Chinese military officials argue the submarine patrols are needed to respond to two major U.S. military moves: plans to station a defense system in South Korea that can intercept missiles fired from both North Korea and China, and the Pentagon’s development of ballistic missiles with new hypersonic warheads that can strike targets anywhere in the world in less than an hour. Taken together, Chinese military officials say, these American weapons threaten to neutralize China’s land-based nuclear arsenal, leaving Beijing no choice but to turn to its submarines to retaliate for any nuclear attack. The implications would be enormous. Until now, China’s nuclear deterrent has centered on its land-based missiles, which are kept without fuel and remain separate from their nuclear warheads. That means the country’s political leadership must give several orders before the missiles are fueled, armed and ready to launch, giving everyone time to reconsider. Nuclear missiles on a submarine are always armed and ready. U.S. and Chinese warships operate in uncomfortably close proximity in the South China Sea. Add submarine operations to the mix, and the chances of an accident multiply despite protocols meant to minimize the risk of collisions. Submarines are stealthy vessels, and China is unlikely to provide their locations to the Americans. That means the U.S. Navy will send more spy ships into the South China Sea in an effort to track the subs. “With the U.S. Navy sailing more and more in the area, there’s a high possibility there will be an accident,” says a high-ranking Chinese officer, who spoke anonymously to address sensitive security issues. War between a rising China and a ruling U.S. isn’t inevitable—provided each side is prepared to make painful adjustments. Xi said as much during his visit to the United States last fall. But in a warning to Americans (which could apply to China’s fighter pilots as well), he added: “Should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they could create such traps for themselves."

Can’t threaten US supremacy

Mizokami 15

[Kyle Mizokami writes on defense and security issues in Asia, particularly Japan. He is the founder and editor for the blogs Japan Security Watch and Asia Security Watch. Contributor at The Daily Beast, The Atlantic.com, Salon, The Japan Times and The Diplomat; “America can still destroy the world,” The Week, Oct 26 2015] [Premier]

At the same time, potential adversaries China and Russia have pushed on with a new generation of conventional weapons suitable for so-called "big wars," with almost monthly announcements of new fighters, surface ships, bombers, and tanks. After 14 years of guerrilla warfare, the question is: Is the United States in danger of losing its commanding "big war" technological edge? While the U.S. government, Pentagon, and industry have been fixated on Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia and the People's Republic of China have not stood still. A growing economy in both countries and a desire to provide an alternative to American hegemony prompted both to invest in a generation of new weapons. Progress has been rapid, and over the past five years the People's Republic of China and Russia have announced one new weapon system after another. China has acquired its first aircraft carrier and is developing a new heavy airlifter, two fifth generation stealth fighters, new destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and submarines. Russia is developing the PAK-FA fifth generation fighter and the "Armata" family of heavy combat vehicles, including a brand-new tank. A new Russian nuclear submarine, armed with strategic nuclear weapons, has taken up residence with the Russian Pacific Fleet. Despite this new foreign arsenal, all is not as it seems. In July 2013, as fighter planes took off and landed from a Chinese aircraft carrier for the first time. At the same time, half a world away the United States Navy was doing the exact same thing…except the plane wasn't manned. The experimental X-47B Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle performed flawless takeoff and landing tests on the carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. China has built up a fleet of unmanned planes, but is nowhere close to the sophistication necessary to operating a drone from an aircraft carrier. Russia is even farther behind, with its drone program lagging considerably. The United States has also made great strides in directed energy weapons. The U.S. Navy's first laser weapon, LaWS, deployed in 2014 to the Persian Gulf. The Pentagon is now looking into adding lasers to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, AC-130 gunship, and Army ground vehicles. Next year, the Navy will take its new railgun to sea. Powered by electricity, the railgun can reportedly hurl a 23-pound projectile at speeds exceeding Mach 7 to ranges of up to 100 miles. Meanwhile, there is little to no news of comparable progress on directed energy weapons from China and Russia. In the skies, the United States has a decisive lead in fifth generation aircraft. The F-22 Raptor air superiority fighter has been in service since 2005. A second design, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has had a troubled history but appears to have solved most technical problems, with all three versions set to be operational by 2020. Meanwhile in China, the Chengdu J-20 "Soaring Dragon" and J-31 "Gyrfalcon" are still in development, thanks to the Chinese aviation industry's uneven technological progress. In Russia, the PAK-FA fifth generation fighter has been beset by technical problems. None of the three planes have firm delivery dates. Finally, Russia recently moved the Yuri Dolgorukiy, a brand-new ballistic missile submarine, to its new home with the Russian Pacific Fleet. Displacing 14,500 tons and armed with 20 Bulava ballistic missiles, Yuri Dolgorukiy could singlehandedly devastate the U.S. West Coast with nuclear weapons. At the same time, China has deployed four submarines of the Jin class. As important as both of these programs are — providing a key retaliatory capability for both countries — both classes of submarine have had serious shortcomings. The Bulava missile failed in nine out of 23 test launches, a seemingly inconceivable problem for a country like Russia with so much experience with rockets. The Jin class is noisy, a very undesirable trait for a submarine, and the U.S. Department of Naval Intelligence recently rated the Jin subs as noisier than Soviet submarines produced 40 years ago.