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Internet doesn’t spur Democracy- extensions



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Internet doesn’t spur Democracy- extensions


(___)

(__) Internet freedom does not spur democracy, the best empirical data proves that expansion of access to the web does not create democracy.


Geelmuyden and Weidmann, both professors in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at University of Konstanz, 2015.
(Espen and Nils B "Empowering activists or autocrats? The Internet in authoritarian regimes." Journal of Peace Research 52.3 (2015): 338-351.)

In doing so, we distinguish regimes that worry about public opinion and those that do so to a lesser extent. If the former are more likely to expand, this should be due to the fact that modern communication technology, in particular the Internet, is not immune to government interference. Rather, as illustrated in the examples above, autocratic regimes benefit from these technologies through ample opportunities to censor and influence public opinion and to track members of the opposition. Our first empirical analysis confirms this suspicion: regimes that are concerned about public opinion – and go to great lengths to censor it – are more likely to expand the Internet. In our second analysis, we turn to the question of how Internet expansion affects changes towards democracy. Here, we fail to find any evidence that the Internet is linked to positive changes in democracy scores. When looking more closely at democratic and autocratic changes from 2006 to 2010, the data indicate that movements toward democracy are more frequent in countries with low Internet penetration. No country in the low penetration group experienced autocratic change in this period, while six countries in the high penetration group did. Our findings shed considerable doubt on the frequently held assumption that the Internet universally, and unconditionally, fosters freedom and democracy. Autocrats are likely aware of the tremendous potential this technology has for creating and maintaining a tightly controlled sphere of public opinion. Looking back at mankind’s first two decades of experience with Internet technology, our results suggest that in the wrong hands, Internet, cell phones, and other modern means of communication can serve evil purposes.


Internet doesn’t spur Democracy - exentsions

(__) The internet does not create democracy.


Morozov, senior editor at The New Republic, 2009
(Evgeny, “How dictators watch us on the web,” 11-18-09. http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/how-dictators-watch-us-on-the-web)

Yet while the internet may take the power away from an authoritarian (or any other) state or institution, that power is not necessarily transferred to pro-democracy groups. Instead it often flows to groups who, if anything, are nastier than the regime. Social media’s greatest assets—anonymity, “virality,” interconnectedness—are also its main weaknesses.


(__) No evidence that the internet actually spurs democratization


Aday et al., associate professor of media and public affairs and international affairs at The George Washington University, 2010
(Sean, “Blogs And Bullets: new media in contentious politics”, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/pw65.pdf)

New media, such as blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, have played a major role in episodes of contentious political action. They are often described as important tools for activists seeking to replace authoritarian regimes and to promote freedom and democracy, and they have been lauded for their democratizing potential. Despite the prominence of “Twitter revolutions,” “color revolutions,” and the like in public debate, policymakers and scholars know very little about whether and how new media affect contentious politics. Journalistic accounts are inevitably based on anecdotes rather than rigorously designed research. Although data on new media have been sketchy, new tools are emerging that measure linkage patterns and content as well as track memes across media outlets and thus might offer fresh insights into new media. The impact of new media can be better understood through a framework that considers five levels of analysis: individual transformation, intergroup relations, collective action, regime policies, and external attention. New media have the potential to change how citizens think or act, mitigate or exacerbate group conflict, facilitate collective action, spur a backlash among regimes, and garner international attention toward a given country. Evidence from the protests after the Iranian presidential election in June 2009 suggests the utility of examining the role of new media at each of these five levels. Although there is reason to believe the Iranian case exposes the potential benefits of new media, other evidence—such as the Iranian regime’s use of the same social network tools to harass, identify, and imprison protesters—suggests that, like any media, the Internet is not a “magic bullet.” At best, it may be a “rusty bullet.” Indeed, it is plausible that traditional media sources were equally if not more important. Scholars and policymakers should adopt a more nuanced view of new media’s role in democratization and social change, one that recognizes that new media can have both positive and negative effects.

Profit motive - extensions


(___)

(__) Internet Freedom is not free, the American push for governance of the internet is about profits, not human rights.


Powers and Jablonski, Assistant Professor of Communication and a Fellow at Georgia State University, 2015
(Shawn and Michael, “Introduction: Geopolitics and the Internet ” The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of Internet Freedom. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2015. Project MUSE. Web.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of Google’s role in the internet freedom movement. While the company routinely espouses the economic and political benefits of a free flow of information between people and countries, there is little evidence that this is the reason it pursues greater global connectivity. Numerous examples of Google’s compliance with law enforcement agencies in both democratic and authoritarian countries suggest that its desire for freedom of expression is certainly not driving its global business strategy. Instead, a more compelling explanation for Google’s interest in internet freedom and connectivity is the simple fact that its survival (in the political economy sense of the word) depends on getting more and more people online to use its complimentary services. Connecting commodification and structuration, chapter 4 focuses on the economics of internet connectivity and the fight over which international institutions are responsible for the regulation of digital information flows. We suggest that, at a basic level, U.S. internet policy can be boiled down to getting as many people using the network of networks as possible, while protecting the status quo legal, institutional, and economic arrangements governing connectivity and exchanges online. From the global infrastructure facilitating exchanges of data to the creation of unique content and services online, American companies are dominant, extraordinarily profitable, and, in most cases, well ahead of foreign competition. Building on chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 traces how economic logic continues to drive U.S. policy as well as U.S. negotiating strategy in the international arena. From this perspective the real cyber war is not over offensive capabilities or cybersecurity but rather about legitimizing existing institutions and norms governing internet industries in order to assure their continued market dominance and profitability.

(__) “Internet freedom” is about the expansion of American economic power, not human rights.


Kiggins, Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Oklahoma, 2012
(Ryan D. "US Identity, Security, and Governance of the Internet." Cyberspaces and Global Affairs eds: Jake Perry, Professor Sean S Costigan p 189.)

My study is able to demonstrate how agents shape structures through ideas. I am also able to show how ideas held by U.S. policy-makers concerning the appropriate normative structure for global politics and the global economy were shaped by concerns over the economic performance of the U.S. economy and especially over the relative position of U.S. high-technology companies in the emerging digital economy of the twenty-first century. Foremost on the minds of U.S. policymakers was spurring job creation for U.S. high-technology workers. Job creation, preserving the relative dominance of U.S. high-technology companies, and positioning the Internet as a platform for the global expansion of commerce and freedom are important cogs in broader U.S. national security policy. Policy-makers within the U.S. government engaged in a well-planned and executed strategy to discursively construct the Internet as the lynchpin for future global and domestic economic growth. Within that discourse, the idea of freedom played the starring role.



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