The Arabic Language

part do not use or even understand the higher levels of Standard Arabic; on the 
other hand, they cannot simply switch to colloquial language, since this would be 
regarded as an insult to their audience.
Nasser was certainly not unique in using this oratory style, nor was he the 
last to use this liguistic device. In fact, modern Islamist politicans use a similar 
style: in their speeches Arab nationalism has been replaced by the 
daʿwa 
to true 
Islam, but the way they convey this message is similar. El Houri (2012: 77–113) 
explicitly mentions the similarity between Nasser’s speeches and those of Hezbol
-
lah’s leader Nasrallah (b. 1960) in the way the latter mixes Standard Arabic with, 
in his case, Lebanese Arabic. In some respects, Nasser’s linguistic rhetoric looks 
similar to the style of radio programmes of the Lebanese channel LBCI that was 
mentioned above (p. 248).
This brings us to the political associations connected with the choice of varieties. 
Since the standard language is regarded by most Arabs as the most significant 
unifying factor of the Arab world, it also serves as a symbol of Arab unity. Most 
political parties in the Arab world at least officially propagate this unity, so that 
politicians are under severe pressure to use standard language, even though their 
constituents do not understand it. We have seen above (p. 224) that from the 
end of the nineteenth century the Arabic language played a central role in the 
emergent nationalist movement in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
After independence, each country officially declared its adherence to pan-Arab 
nationalism (
qawmiyya
), with the Arabic language as the national language of all 
Arabs. From this point of view, the use of dialect stands for regionalism (
ʾiqlīmiyya
), 

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Diglossia 
251
which is regarded as detrimental to the unity of the Arab world. On the other 
hand, in some countries the vernacular came to be valued as an important ingre
-
dient of the national identity (
waṭaniyya
).
Not surprisingly, of all Arab countries, Egypt is the one with the most marked 
tendency towards the use of the dialect. Egypt has always been characterised by 
a large degree of regional nationalism aimed at the establishment of an Egyptian 
identity, and the Egyptian dialect is certainly an important component of this 
identity. Speeches in the Egyptian parliament are often given in something 
approaching the colloquial language, which would be unheard of in other Arab 
countries. An interesting example is the last speech given by the late Presi
-
dent Sadat (1918–1981) in parliament in 1981. The day after his assassination, it 
appeared in the newspapers in a colloquial version, with a note by the publisher 
that there had been no time to ‘translate’ it into standard language. Nasser’s 
speeches have been mentioned above; it is remarkable that the pattern described 
there does not occur in any of the speeches which he gave abroad. The reason 
is obvious: any suggestion of Egyptian nationalism would have endangered the 
already tense relations with Syria in the United Arab Republic.
There is one domain that has always been regarded as the exclusive domain of 
Classical Arabic, that of religiosity, at least as far as the public domain is concerned. 
In private situations religion does have an upgrading effect on language choice, 
but, at least in Egypt, even religious scholars find it perfectly acceptable to speak 
in colloquial language about religious matters. Increasingly, inroads are being 
made into this exclusive use of Classical Arabic. In religious instruction in the 
form of public sermons, colloquial language is often used to clarify and explain 
the text of the