Premier Debate 2016 September/October ld brief

NEG—A2 US Aff

A2 US Modeling

US isn’t modeled-key developing countries chart their own course and the US loses influence in the NSG

Squassoni 13 [Sharon (2013) The limited national security implications of civilian nuclear decline, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:2, 22-33, DOI: 10.1177/0096340213477997] [Premier]

Just as other countries continued to pursue nuclear power through the US Òdark agesÓ when no new nuclear plants were ordered, some countries will chart their own course on nuclear energy, regardless of what happens in the United States. China and India will continue to build and possibly export nuclear power plant technology, and South Korea is likely to do the same. If nuclear power makes a slow exit in the United States, the country may face major challenges in maintaining coherence within the Nuclear Suppliers Group and among new nuclear technology suppliers in support of the nonproliferation objectives that the United States has worked so assiduously to promote.

Inherency

Nuclear power unlikely to be built in US.

Broder 11 [John; New York Times Reporter; 2014; "The Year Of Peril And Promise In Energy Production"; Nytimes.Com; Accessed August 8 2016; http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/business/energy-environment/the-year-of-peril-and-promise-in-energy-production.html] [Premier]

Even before Fukushima, the future of nuclear energy in the United States was already shaky because of the high cost of building and insuring nuclear plants there, and because — unlike Germany and other European countries — the United States has not moved aggressively toward requiring renewable, noncarbon-emitting power generation.

“Two things have happened in the last year, both affecting nuclear power negatively,” said Jason Grumet, president of the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, a nonpartisan research organization. “First Fukushima, and then the rising supplies and falling prices of natural gas have fundamentally changed the economics of nuclear power.” Utilities find it far cheaper to turn to natural gas for supplemental power generation and see no value in investing in new nuclear generating plants, which can cost $10 billion or more, he said.

US market will phase out nuclear power – current exists prove

Bradford 13 [Peter; prof @ Vermont Law School, former NRC member; March/April 2013; “How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists vol. 69 no. 2 12-21; http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/2/12.full; [PREMIER]]

The United States is on course to all but exit the commercial nuclear power industry even if the country awakens to the dangers of climate change and adopts measures to favor low-carbon energy sources. Nuclear power had been in economic decline for more than three decades when the Bush administration launched a program that aimed to spark a nuclear power renaissance through subsidies and a reformed reactor licensing process. But Wall Street was already leery of the historically high costs of nuclear power. An abundance of natural gas, lower energy demand induced by the 2008 recession, increased energy-efficiency measures, nuclear’s rising cost estimates, and the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station further diminished prospects for private investment in new US nuclear plants. Without additional and significant governmental preferences for new nuclear construction, market forces will all but phase out the US nuclear fleet by midcentury. Here’s what the US government must do to bring about a gradual phase-out of almost all US nuclear power plants: absolutely nothing. The United States is more or less on course to exit the commercial nuclear power industry, even if the country awakens to the dangers of climate change and adopts broad-based measures to favor low-carbon energy sources. Only a massive, government-driven infusion of taxpayer or customer dollars, targeted specifically to new nuclear reactors, will produce a different result. Dominion Resources Inc. recently announced that it will close the Kewaunee Power Station in Carlton, Wisconsin in 2013. The decision, said Dominion CEO Thomas Farrell, “was based purely on economics” (Dominion Resources, 2012). With that announcement, the 30-year struggle between pronuclear prophets and market realities in the United States appears to be entering a new phase, one in which market forces challenge the economic viability even of existing nuclear plants, while making new reactors hopelessly unattractive as investments. The Kewaunee shutdown is not an anomaly. Duke Energy has announced that it will not restart the Crystal River unit in Florida, closed since 2009 by construction errors. In late 2012, both the Exelon Corporation and Xcel Energy Inc. canceled plans to expand existing nuclear units, citing declining forecasts of demand for electricity and long-term forecasts of low natural gas prices (Meredith and Benedetto, 2012). In January 2013, industry analysts speculated that several other units might also close in the near future for economic reasons (Maloney et al., 2013). How could this possibly happen to an industry that was trumpeting a “nuclear renaissance” as recently as five years ago? Well, the nuclear renaissance was always ballyhoo; it was based on the number of reactors for which federal or state governments (or both) would conscript the necessary capital from captive taxpayers or customers, not the number that customers needed or that markets would fund. Absent an extremely large injection of government funding or further life extensions, the reactors currently operating are going to end their licensed lifetimes between now and the late 2050s. They will become part of an economics-driven US nuclear phase-out a couple of decades behind the government-led nuclear exit in Germany.

It's politically dead-parochial interest lobbies vote down the siting proposals

Cohen 11 [Steven; Executive Director, Columbia’s Earth Institute; 3-21-2011, "," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-cohen/the-political-demise-of-n_b_838291.html] [Premier]

While there may be good reasons for nuclear power to be used as a bridge fuel to a renewable energy future, I am confident that nuclear power is politically dead in the United States. This makes the research and development of alternative energy and carbon capture and storage that much more important and urgent. It also means that environmentalists who have either reluctantly or enthusiastically embraced nuclear power as a form of carbon free energy should move on to other solutions. The catastrophe in Japan will not soon be forgotten, and it will shape the politics of nuclear power plant siting for decades. This analysis is based on a few fundamental facts of American political structure. Despite the strength of our national government, this remains a federal system of divided power. States retain sovereignty, and we have a deeply rooted tradition of local control of land use. Our national elected leaders pay a great deal of attention to geography and to opinion leaders at the community level. Presidents are elected by an Electoral College, with members selected by states. Presidents are not elected by a majority vote of the American public (ask Al Gore about that). Our legislators must pay a great deal of attention to the parochial interests of their constituents. Take for example the issue of nuclear waste. Despite billions of federal dollars spent to develop and complete a nuclear waste repository in Yucca Mountain, Nevada, the Nevada delegation to the U.S. Congress, especially Senate Majority leader Harry Reid, have effectively vetoed its operation. The “Not-in-my Backyard” (NIMBY) syndrome is not a passing fad in American politics; it is a central element of land use politics in communities throughout this country. While it is true that the definition of a noxious facility varies from place to place, no one doubts the ability of an American locality to veto a land use they do not like. In New York City we have an extreme version of NIMBY where we even have trouble siting big box retailers. Most places are happy to allow Wal-Mart, but even before last week, few communities were interested in hosting a nuclear power plant. The images of destruction and danger from the nuclear disaster in Japan will dominate the local politics of nuclear power plant siting for a generation. The images of earthquake and tsunami damage will be combined with the nuclear accident and form a single image in the public’s mindset about nuclear power. While I accepted the argument that nuclear power might be necessary and could be made less risky, I have always been troubled by the extreme toxicity of nuclear fuel and waste. As a student of organizational management, I tend to assume “Murphy’s Law” when it comes to human beings running complex organizations or technologies: if it can go wrong it will go wrong. But my view of the future of U.S. nuclear politics has nothing to do with my personal concerns about nuclear power. The fundamental problem with nuclear power is that after the recent events in Japan, no community in the United States will permit a nuclear plant to be built nearby. Additionally, some of the nuclear power plants already in operation will be under increasing pressure to close. The strength of anti-nuclear power politics should not be underestimated. Here in New York, people on Long Island are still paying off $3.3 billion in debt for a nuclear power plant called Shoreham that, like the Yucca Mountain repository, was completed but never opened. Governor Andrew Cuomo has already started to move against re-licensing the nuclear power plant at Indian Point, located about 30 miles north of New York City. With the demise of nuclear power in the United States, we exacerbate the problem of meeting our growing energy needs while reducing the release of greenhouse gasses into the environment. How can we solve these problems without nuclear power? My suggestion is that we focus on the development of distributed, rather than centralized, generation of electricity and of smart grid technology to make better use of the energy we generate. Increased energy efficiency in our buildings and technology, carbon capture and storage, and solar R & D will all be needed. I think that we need to move away from our reliance on large, centralized energy generation facilities. We need to focus federal funding on energy R & D rather than on subsidizing politically infeasible nuclear power. Some might argue that nuclear technology is here now and these other technologies are still under development. That is true, and we need to figure out a way to develop and commercialize decentralized electric power generation. Perhaps we should look to other models of technological development and diffusion that we have seen in recent years. The best example I can think of is the cell phone. According to the International Telecommunication Union, there are over five billion cell phones in the world. Twenty years ago, this technology was barely in use. Most kids today cannot imagine life without the internet and cell phones. These very decentralized technological tools are now in everyone’s pocket and have changed the way we live. They demonstrate how quickly new technologies can take root in the modern interconnected global economy. Of equal importance, they rely on networks that could serve as a technical and business model for the distribution of electricity in the not too distant future. Since I’m a political scientist, I have a lot more confidence in my political analysis than in my ability to forecast technological development. I am quite certain that until and unless we start shutting off lights all over America, we will not see any new nuclear power plants sited in this country. On the other hand, I don’t really know if alternative energy technologies will be developed and if they will be able to compete with fossil fuels. But if our goal is to be pragmatic and develop a carbon-free energy system, it is time to drop nuclear power from the equation.

Large operator just closed a major plant-indicates lack of confidence in the industry

Squassoni 13 [Sharon (2013) The limited national security implications of civilian nuclear decline, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:2, 22-33, DOI: 10.1177/0096340213477997] [Premier]

Kewaunee had just received a license extension to operate until 2033 (Wald, 2012). ÒThe situation Dominion faces at Kewaunee is the result of circumstances unique to the station and do not reflect the nuclear industry in general,Ó said Thomas Farrell, DominionÕs chief executive and chairman. ÒThe nation will be hard pressed to meet its energy needs, let alone do so in a secure and affordable manner, without a robust and growing nuclear energy programÓ (Dominion Resources, 2012). Actually, Kewaunee may not be unique; it could be the first in a series of early retirements of aging US nuclear power plants. The fact that Dominion, with a $30 billion market capitalization, prefers to pay $281 million in decommissioning fees and other closing costs rather than operate the plant for another 20 years signals a generally grim Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69(2) 22–33 ! The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0096340213477997 http://thebulletin.sagepub.com Downloaded by [University of Minnesota Libraries, Twin Cities] at 16:47 08 August 2016 economic outlook for nuclear energy in the United States.

Civilian nuclear decline coming now-it’s economically unjustifiable

Squassoni 13 [Sharon (2013) The limited national security implications of civilian nuclear decline, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:2, 22-33, DOI: 10.1177/0096340213477997] [Premier]

A nuclear exit for the United StatesÑthe first country to commercialize nuclear power, and the country with the most nuclear energy capacity in the worldÑis almost inconceivable. Or is it? The US government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the last decade alone on programs and policies intended to jump-start a next generation of nuclear power plants. But those efforts haven’t resulted in much new construction. Nuclear supporters have given many reasons for the lack of power plant starts: The federal government doesnÕt have a comprehensive energy policy or system for putting a price on carbon dioxide emissions. Its loan guarantees and export support are insufficient. Nuclear regulation and licensing are inefficient and costly. And so on. But the real threat to both new and existing plants in the United States has been low natural gas prices coupled with stable or declining electricity demand. General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt puts it this way: ÒItÕs just hard to justify nuclear, really hard. Gas is so cheap, and at some point, really, economics rule. So I think some combination of gas and either wind or solar ...thatÕs where we see most countries around the world goingÓ (Clark, 2012).

No nuclear renaissance-financial markets hate it

Mecklin 13 [John; (2013) Introduction: US nuclear exit?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:2, 9-11, DOI: 10.1177/0096340213478937] [Premier]

The Southern Company is indeed building two new units at its Vogtle nuclear power plant in Georgia, but the administrationÕs rosy energy report omitted some key context: Those reactors, which likely wouldnÕt be financed without a federal loan guarantee, are rare sunbeams in a dismal nuclear power landscape. Because of the nuclear industryÕs long history of permitting problems, cost overruns, and construction delays, financial markets have been wary of backing new nuclear construction for decades. The supposed Ònuclear renaissanceÓ ballyhooed in the first decade of this century never really materialized.

Market forces mean gas, wind, and other renewables competition gut the nuclear energy market-no incentive to renew or build plants.

Lovins 13 [Amory; (2013) The economics of a US civilian nuclear phase-out, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:2, 44-65, DOI: 10.1177/0096340213478000] [Premier]

The 104 nuclear power plants operating in the United States totaling 102 gigawatts of capacity and long assumed to run so cheaply that they could always make economic sense now face competitive risks less obvious than those bedeviling new plants, but no less real. The most recent reliably operating US nuclear plant to be written off as uneconomic the 38-yearold, small (566-megawatt), single-unit Kewaunee pressurized water reactor in Wisconsin, which has been relicensed to operate until 2033 will instead close in 2013, because its owner could neither sell it nor make it compete with natural gas-fired electricity (DiSavino, 2012; Dominion, 2012). Once closed, the plant is extremely unlikely to reopen even if gas prices rise again. But gas isnÕt nuclear powerÕs only competitive threat. With the benefit of the production tax credit, a federal subsidy for wind and other renewable energy installations, new wind farms in the High Plains wind belt are highly competitive with both wholesale power prices (Wiser and Bolinger, 2012)2 and typical nuclear operating costs, and wind power’s costs continue to fall. The tax credit, which partly offsets nonrenewable generatorsÕ permanent and generally larger subsidies (Koplow, 2011), is set to expire for wind farms whose construction doesnÕt start by the end of 2013. But even after the credit’s ultimate expiration the wind industry has proposed a sixyear phase-down to zero (Trabish, 2012)windÕs very low generating cost (Wiser and Bolinger, 2012) will still beat the best nuclear plantsÕ generating cost, despite continuing nuclear operating subsidies3 and despite costs for grid integration to address wind powerÕs distinctive operating characteristics.4

Civilian nuclear production is unprofitable-expensive labour, high maintenance, regulations and decommissioning costs

Lovins 13 [Amory; (2013) The economics of a US civilian nuclear phase-out, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:2, 44-65, DOI: 10.1177/0096340213478000] [Premier]

This first group sustains, and scales directly with, the plants day-to-day operation. While one can argue that few costs in a nuclear plant are truly variable its skilled staff, for example, can hardly be furloughed in a skill-short market and then rehired these costs nonetheless are treated as variable because they approximate the plants marginal cost of sending out electricity over time. The operators 2010 reports to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on its required Form FERC-1 show that 46 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69(2) Downloaded by [University of Minnesota Libraries, Twin Cities] at 21:17 08 August 2016 operating costs averaged $266 per megawatt-hour of output to the grid, including about $17 for routine operation and maintenance,7 $1 for the statutory federal nuclear-waste-management fee, and almost $7 for fuel,8 plus an unreported and highly discounted cost of operation9 nearly $1 to cover future decommissioning, for which operators must book a reserve fund on their balance sheet.

Massive and unpredictable maintenance and upgrade costs-high plant capacity doesn’t compensate

Lovins 13 [Amory; (2013) The economics of a US civilian nuclear phase-out, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:2, 44-65, DOI: 10.1177/0096340213478000] [Premier]

The second group comprises two kinds of post-construction capital investments (so big and durable that they’re capitalized rather than expensed) that may overlap: major capital maintenance and upgrading to address issues of aging and reliability, and equipping a plant, with Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval, to produce more power than its original license allowed.10 Net capital additions averaged $4.2 per megawatt hour in 1993,11 when last assessed by government analysts, but have more than doubled since,12 and are highly erratic and unpredictable. Adding $26 per megawatt-hour for operating costs to at least $4 per megawatt-hour for net capital additions yields a total generating cost that averaged at least $30 per megawatt-hour in 2010. In comparison, and in the same 2010 dollars, US wholesale electric energy prices in 2011 averaged $36 per megawatt-hour and normally13 ranged from around $24 to $45. If an industry value (below) were used for today’s typical net capital additions, the average 2010 nuclear generating cost would match the grid’s $36 average 2011 wholesale price. Moreover, that price fell even further in 2012 (DOE/EIA, 2013b) than the year before (DOE/EIA, 2012f), so competition against 2010Õs average nuclear generating costs is tightening. Even though each nuclear plant is unique, this parity of average costs suggests that the industry should be experiencing heightened competitive pressures, to which operators must and will respond. But the full picture is more complex. The wholesale electricity price range varies widely, both across the country and over time (Wald, 2012b). Wholesale prices also reflect the existing generating mix, and could shift whether higher or lower is unclear with less or no nuclear generation. And it is fair to include capacity prices as well as energy prices. Nuclear plants’ high average capacity factor (around 90 percent) and relatively low variability earn bigger capacity credits than such competitors as gas, solar, and wind power. This nuclear advantage can range from zero (in markets that pay no capacity credit) to about $4 per megawatt-hour14Ñuseful for operators, but {are} still not enough to put many nuclear plants safely clear of the lower end of the average wholesale energy-price band. In fact, that $4 equals the real increase in average operating costs from 2010 to 2011 (EUCG, 2012), the biggest annual rise in a decade. The implication is profound: Nuclear power plants, long thought to be very cheap to run once constructed, are under increasing competitive pressure more immediately for some reactors than others, as new industry data reveal next.

History proves-nuclear “renaissance” cycles get good PR, then inevitably bust.

Lovins 13 [Amory; (2013) The economics of a US civilian nuclear phase-out, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:2, 44-65, DOI: 10.1177/0096340213478000] [Premier]

New nuclear plants face daunting economic and financial challenges rooted in recurrent history. From the early 1960s to 1978, when the first US nuclear boom stalled before the 1979 Three Mile Island accident,18 US utilities ordered 253 reactors. Three-fifths were abandoned or prematurely closed as lemons (Lochbaum, 2008). The completed units averaged threefold construction-cost overruns (Koomey and Hultman, 2007), due mainly to evolving safety regulations, unstandardized and unstable designs, challenges in managing big, complex projects, and deteriorating finances as demand growth slackened and costs soared (MoodyÕs Investor Service, 2009).19 Owners, paying hundreds of billions more than expected, averaged four-notch downgrades on 40 of 48 debt issuances (MoodyÕs Investor Service, 2009). Then in the 2000s, proposed next-generation US reactors suffered even steeper cost escalation (Lovins and RMI, 2011).

Elections—Rollback

Impact rolls back the aff – Trump loves nuclear; Clinton solves it

Follett 16

Andrew, energy and environment reporter, The Daily Caller, “Here’s Where The 2016 Candidates Stand On Nuclear Power” http://dailycaller.com/2016/02/20/heres-where-the-2016-candidates-stand-on-nuclear-power/#ixzz4GrlBAENQ [Premier]

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: The former Secretary of State claimed to be “agnostic about nuclear power” in the 2007 YouTube Democratic Primary debate. As a result, she rarely directly discusses nuclear energy, though one of her campaign fact sheet claims she favors “advanced nuclear,” which requires “expand[ing] successful innovation initiatives, like ARPA-e, and cut those that fail to deliver results.” Sen. Bernie Sanders: The Vermont senator vehemently opposes nuclear power. He opposes the construction of new nuclear reactors “when we do not know how we get rid of the toxic waste from the ones that already exist.” Sanders’ campaign website states “Bernie has called for a moratorium on nuclear power plant license renewals in the United States.” Donald Trump: The real estate mogul has made strong public statements supporting nuclear power, but tends to favor further development of natural gas. In the aftermath of the 2011 Japan Fukushima nuclear disaster, Trump told Fox News “nuclear is a way we get what we have to get, which is energy.” “I’m in favor of nuclear energy, very strongly in favor of nuclear energy,” Trump said. “If a plane goes down people keep flying. If you get into an auto crash people keep driving.”

Solvency—Peak Uranium

U.S. has tons of uranium but peak is long passed

Pedraza 12

Jorge Morales Pedraza, consultant on international affairs, ambassador to the IAEA for 26 yrs, degree in math and economy sciences, former professor, Energy Science, Engineering and Technology : Nuclear Power: Current and Future Role in the World Electricity Generation : Current and Future Role in the World Electricity Generation, New York. [Premier]

The USA ranks fourth in the world for known uranium resources, with reserves of 342 000 tU (reasonably assured plus inferred resources certified in 2005). Exploration expenditure reached US$50.3 million in 2007, which is more than doubled the 2006 level. The peak production was 16,800 tU reached in 1980, when there were over 250 uranium mines in operation in the country. This number abruptly dropped to 50 in 1984 when 5 700 tU was produced, and then there was steady decline until 2003, with most US uranium requirements for the operation of its nuclear power reactors being imported. By 2003, there were only two small mines in operations in the country producing a total of less than 1,000 tons of uranium per year. Most US production has been from New Mexico and Wyoming. Known resources are 167 000 tons of U-3O8 in Wyoming, 155,000 tons in New Mexico, 2,000 tons in Texas and around 50,000 tons in Utah, Colorado and Arizona, all to US$50/lb. [99]

States CP

Pre-emption only applies if compliance with the policies is mutually exclusive or state action is antithetical to federal goals – neither of which is satisfied here

Henderson 80 [George B. II, lawyer, The Nuclear Choice: Are Health and Safety Issues Pre-empted? 8 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 821 (1980), lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol8/iss4/5 [Premier]
Pre-emption cases can be generally classified as falling into either of two categories.78 First, the Court will hold the state law invalid where there is an actual conflict with federal law.80 If the conflict is obvious, as where compliance with both laws is a physical impossibility, "a holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design. "81 Where the conflict is more subtle, however, the Court must decide whether the state law stands as an obstacle to the objectives of the federallaw.81 Cases of this type generally turn on how the Court interprets the statutes. In some instances minor conflicts have been upheld where other considerations weigh in favor of upholding the state law. This has been especially true in areas traditionally controlled by the states, such as health and safety, criminal law, and contract law.83

Henderson concludes neg

Henderson 80

George B. II, lawyer, The Nuclear Choice: Are Health and Safety Issues Pre-empted? 8 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 821 (1980), lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol8/iss4/5 [Premier]

When Congress passed the Act in 1954, it was not its intent to involve the federal government in the logistics of comparing one type of technology to another, or one location to another, and deciding which is best. Instead, both Congress and the NRC have expressed their understanding that the decisions with respect to the environmental acceptability of the plant and the need for the power remain within the traditional powers of the states. A comparative assessment of the health and safety impacts of a power plant is too closely related to these other decisions to be logically segregated from the state decision-making process. It follows that a state decision based on a comparative health and safety analysis should not be viewed as regulating "for purposes . . . [of] protection against radiation hazards," so as to invoke the sanctions of the pre-emption doctrine. Numerous manifestations of congressional intent and traditional notions of federalism suggest that the preemptive areas of NRC jurisdiction is limited to those licensing and other regulatory areas that the Atomic Energy Act delegates to NRC control, i.e., plant design, construction, operation, and other technical matters. Viewed in its proper perspective the comparative health and safety evaluation falls outside of the ambit of federal authority, and takes on the broader purpose of regulating in order to choose the most acceptable method of generating electricity.