Barrier 2: Uptake of SLM impeded by knowledge/capacity and finance issues
Uptake of SLM practices is limited. Previous individual initiatives to demonstrate SLM practices and identify best-bet land uses in different socio-economic scenarios include those carried out with the UNDP GEF project on the Caatinga “Demonstrations of Integrated Ecosystem and Watershed Management in the Caatinga” Many practices were identified in the first and second National Meetings on Confronting Desertification (ENED) in Juazeiro, Bahia, in 2010 and in Campina Grande, Paraíba, in 2013. Irrigation techniques are well-known, but many other SLM techniques have not been tried, tested and diffused. Wide variety of possibilities are listed in Annex V.2 of Section VII however, most of these practices remain at a small scale and few have been tested on the ground in SAS. Promising practices include rotation of pastures, redistributing the herd among different parcels according to their productivity (Voisin), integrated crop-livestock systems, silvopastoral agro-forestry, use of foliage as fodder (lowering and thinning), free-range poultry, raising goats and sheep, fish farming, beekeeping for honey and byproducts, rainwater catchment and storage for consumption and for production, electric fences and ecological stoves, among others. Practices from other regions that favor maintenance of forest cover instead of clearing that leads to land degradation include sustainable use of native fruits (like umbu, licuri, mangaba, caju, murici and maracujá boi), nuts and fibers, as well as medicinal plants, wildlife management, ecotourism and handicrafts with wood. However, most of these practices remain at a small scale and few have been tested on the ground in SAS. The Semiarid Association (ASA) "One land and two waters" (P1+2) project works with various types of rainwater catchment and storage, including: 1) cisterns with "sidewalks", 2) underground dams, 3) trench tanks, 4) stone tanks or caldrons, 5) popular water pumps, 6) diversion of road water. These can be use for "productive backyards." Some technologies are for families and others are for communities.
The seeds that are the mainstay of family farming are disappearing because of replacement of native seeds by commercial seeds that need to be purchased or acquired through government programs. Delays in acquisition prevent planting during the rainy season and jeopardize productivity. Recently, social movements and non-governmental institutions have set up their own agrobiodiversity seed banks in settlements and rural communities. Such local seed banks can restore and conserve landraces and traditional varieties and genetic heritage adapted to semiarid conditions.
Knowledge technical and economical feasible and works well in local conditions in Sergipe at the present time is limited. The main lack of knowledge is with regard to costs and the return on investment, which considerations are critical for poor smallholders, on the one hand, and for lenders of credit, on the other. Limited uptake of SLM practices is in part due to the limited technical and operational capacity of state-level extension services, which are the responsibility of EMDAGRO and non-profit organizations under government contract, while needs are growing constantly. The state agency must compete for federal funds of the Ministry of Agrarian Development. The national system of rural extension, extinguished in 1991, is only now being reestablished. Most of the government staff have received training in conventional Green Revolution agronomy or forestry and lack experience in areas such as agro-ecological principles and small-farmer business promotion. They are now older and less willing to go deep into the field. New training is not well organized or formalized. Although the National Semiarid Institute (INSA) and various other federal institutes (IFs) provide training for sons and daughters of small farmers, access is limited. As a result, SLM practices receive little emphasis in mainstream extension services. Furthermore, lack of analysis of economic feasibility, effectiveness and sensitivity of the various practices makes uptake by farmers, technical assistance by extensionists and approval of credit by banks more difficult.
Financial incentives to promote uptake of SLM are limited, both because many of the financial instruments do not specifically target such actions and because many stakeholders lack capacity to access existing instruments. Funds available from different agencies such as MDS and MDA are not integrated and channeled to combat desertification. Substantial amounts of funding are available, for example through programs associated with the Brazil Without Misery plan and the Citizenship Territory of Alto Sertão, but SLM criteria are not integrated into the process of accessing the funds. The Constitutional Fund of the Northeast (FNE) and loans from the national development bank (BNDES) are mostly for big business. The Bank of the Northeast (BNB) has a micro-credit program called Credi-Amigo for urban and rural areas, but in the SAS it only has branches in Gararu and Nossa Senhora da Glória. One of the nine specific subprograms of the Climate Fund is for Combating Desertification. Some of the existing funds can be used to support projects that are not adapted to the different Caatinga ecosystems and to the levels of land degradation and that may even facilitate land conversion for unsustainable agriculture, animal husbandry and other practices. Such funding and other financial instruments that could be used for SLM activities in Sergipe are underutilized as access is complex and costly, and project proposal quality is low. This is due to institutional weakness in project development and also to low project preparation capacity within civil society and farmer organizations (see Part IV, Annex V.1 on sources of credit and funding).
Availability of credit is also constrained by budget restrictions related to Brazil's current macroeconomic situation, with many competing demands for limited government funds. The margin to maneuver with regard to use of credit is limited by controls of the Central Bank and the National Monetary Council. Some kinds of project do not fit into existing sectoral divisions of credit institutions. The banks are not prepared to carry out the required technical analysis of some kinds of innovative projects because they lack the parameters for evaluation following existing rules and regulations. The investments are costly and can take time to pay back the initial costs. Many small farmers resist taking out loans because they are reluctant to become indebted. Furthermore, it is often difficult to provide collateral and guarantees. Many co-signers on loans have themselves become ineligible for new credit because of previous default.
Environmental licensing is increasingly becoming a barrier to access to credit. As mentioned, the process in the federal environment agency (IBAMA) and the state environmental agency (ADEMA) is slow as regards both preparation and processing. It is clear that there are insufficient staff and qualifications, while demand has mushroomed. Collective arrangements are difficult to establish. Post-licensing monitoring is practically inexistent. Recently the process has become more complicated because of requirements for CAR and PRA, which are idealistic, but difficult to put into practice by smallholders.
Access to markets is also a significant barrier. There are few structure value chains for small farmers to market conventional products or products of sustainable use of biodiversity. In Sergipe, there has been practically no investment in agro-industries to process products of sustainable use of biodiversity like umbu, as has been done in parts of Bahia, or in organization of value chains and local productive clusters. This limits the marketing and sale of smallholder products from sustainable land use management.
Stakeholder Analysis
The analysis of stakeholders and their relevant roles are presented in Table 9.
