Ottoman State System and their Decline 847
the assignment of fiefs proportionate in size to each officer’s importance. All of these officers of the local government had a sufficient staff of lieutenants, treasurers, book-keepers and clerks. The beylerbey of Rumeli (Balkans) resided at Constantinople. The beylerbey of Anatolia seems to have spent most of his time in the dominions, although undoubtedly he was often at the capital since he had his regular place in the diwan or parliament.
In time of war this official scheme, detached from its function of local government, drew together the feudal sipahis, section by section, into a perfectly organised territorial army for each of these two regions. The enrolled feudal troops of Europe numbered about 50,000 and those of Asia, including Anatolia, 30,000. In each case the number should be doubled or tripled to allow for the additional horsemen which all the sipahis were required to bring. A considerable number of the feudal troops, sometimes estimated at one-half, remained on duty at home in time of war to protect the provinces. Decline of the Ottomans The keynote of Ottoman administration,” writes Gibb, ”was conservatism and all the institutions of government were directed to the maintenance of the status quo. Since the Kanuns of Saleem and Sulayman were regarded as the embodiment of the highest political wisdom, amelioration could have no meaning except the removal of subsequent abuses. The exercise of public spirit and initiative on the part of governors of lesser officials was thus not so much discounted as maimed and circumscribed, and a vast network of vested interests created by the conquests placed an all but insurmountable obstacle in the way of the would be reformer.
The Ottoman society was based on Medieval conceptions of status. It was neither harsh nor unjust and in many ways it was more progressive than contemporary feudal societies. So far from overburdening their subjects the Sultans realised that light taxation and simple forms of direct administration were in the interests both of the treasury and the population. Yet, the society lacked mobility and the individual as individual had no place in it. The Sultans accepted the traditional and recognized division of mankind into a variety of social orders: ”men of the sword,” ”men of pen,” merchants, artisans, cultivators, dhimmis and slaves. To each order were assigned its functions, and regulations were drawn up to ensure
848
Political and Cultural History of Islam
the proper carrying out of those functions, and that none should interfere with or infringe the functions and rights of others.6
The ruling idea in the administration was distrust-fear of treachery or of unregulated ambition on the part of the officers of the empire - and its methods were directed to centralization and the balance of forces. The provinces were divided into vilayets, theoretically self-governing under its Pasha. Though the latter united in himself both the supreme civil and military authority and was responsible for public order and security, for the collection of taxes and remittance of stipulated annual tribute, his tenure of office was precarious and by the eighteenth century was renewable from year to year. Even within his province, his capacity for effective control was weakened by a variety of contrivances designed to prevent him from exercising any form of direct administration. The accounts of the pashalik were kept by the dafterdar who held his office independently by firman from Istambul. His judicial powers were again limited by the appointment of Qazis and other religious officers who had the right of sending protests and memorials direct to Istambul.
The armed forces were also not fully under his control. At each headquarters a body of Janissaries and other troops was established as a permanent resident garrison. His authority over them was restricted in various ways : by Qanuns which attached specific duties and rights to particular officers and above all by the provision that the garrison of citadels should be formed of imperial troops under the command of the special officers nominated by the Sultan. In Egypt a further restriction was imposed by the institution of a diwan or council of officers, the principal military officers and religious dignitaries which met four times a week to decide matters relating to public administration. Although the final power rested with the Pasha, he was not allowed to attend the diwan in person.
A radical weakness of the Ottoman system was that it lacked any real consideration for the welfare of the subjects. The officers of the administration were led insensibly to adopt a cynical view of their functions and responsibilities. Their world was divided into hukkam (governors) and ri’ayah (subjects), the latter of whom existed to supply the needs of the former. The practical outcome of this view was the universal substitution of monetary standards for the
’ Gibb, Vol I, Part I, P.200