Q. & A. 711 to 1707 with solved Papers css 1971 to date

Metaphysics
Like Kant, Ibn Khaldun believes metaphysics to be an impossibility. The force of his arguments against the possibility of metaphysics lies in bringing the possibility of human knowledge, and this he does in a number of ways. The knowledge, of the phenomenal world in the last analysis is based on the perceptual world in the last analysis is based on the perceptual experiences, but the knowledge of a percipient is limited by the number and capacity of his senseorgans. The blind man has no idea of the visual experiences nor the deaf of the auditory ones. Should they deny the reality f these experiences, we would simply feel pity for them. But we should learn to feel humble regarding our own knowledge of the phenomenal world, for after all the number and the range of our own perceptual experiences are also much limited.27 There may be beings in the universe better equipped for the knowledge of things, both in range and quality than we are.
The possibility for the existence of such beings Ibn Khaldun suggests by alluding to the process of biological evolution of which he gives a clear and detailed account. There is a gradual but continuous evolution from minerals to plants, from plants of lower grade to those of a higher grade, from the latter to the lower animals, from the lower animals to higher animals, and from the lower animals to higher animals, and from the higher animals, the highest of which is the ape, to man. But this is only what we know of the process of evolution as it works on this planet. There may be beings of an order higher than we are. And as there are grades of beings, may be analogous to the knowledge of the animals, as compared to ours. Would that the philosophers recognized the limitations of their knowledge and had the realization that human reason is incapable of comprehending all the deep-lying mysteries of the universe.
’ Muqaddimah. PP 15-M
Muiiaildimah. PP 1738. see also p 154

892
Political mid Cultural History of Islam

Ibn Khal’dun describes reasoning as a faculty through which \ve form concept out of a number of percepts and consequently move from the less gen eral concepts to the more general ones. It is through the processes off analysis and synthesis that we form a general concept from the particular percepts; through the same process we move from the I ess general concepts to the more the idea of the species to that off the genus. But the more general a concept, is the simpler it is for a s the denotation of a term increases, its connotation decreases. Finality, we reach the most general and simplest of the concepts, viz, beimg, essence or substance. Here human reason comes to its limits; it cannot go beyond these ultimate concepts nor can it explain their mysitery.
At another place Ibn Khaldun remarks that reasoning is a faculty through wvhich v\e find the causal connection between things and trace a chaim of the causes and effects. The more intelligent a person is, the greater the number of things or events that he connects through a causal nexus. The whole universe is an architectonic whole and the things ar«e bound together through the chain of causes and effects. As we ru n through this entire gamut of causal connections, we come ultimately to the notion of the first cause, for the series of causes cannot go «on regressing infinitely. But one fails to understand the nature of the first cause; here reason comes to its limited once again. Philosophers identify the first cause with God and so far so good; but their incompetence becomes apparent when they try to explain the nature and attributes of God. To do this through reason is an impossible task; it is like trying to weight a whole mountain with the help of a gold smith’s pair of scales. Would that the philosophers knew that they could not know everything through reason.
Although the cycle is represented by Ibn Khaldun as endless, the age of the state and the stages through which it passes are carefully worked out. The ”natural” age of the state is equivalent to three generations of forty years each. The first generation is marked by the frugality of the nomadic life and the ardor of the spirit of solidarity of the monarch. The second is marked by the weakening of that spirit, in consequence of the transition to a civilized mode of life, and the unw illingncss to share in monarchical authority. The third is marked b^ the complete loss of the spirit of solidarity and with it the loss of” the militant spirit which was the rampart of the state. When this happens, the death of the state is imminent and is finalK sealed by a timely decree of God.
Eminent Scliolnrs of Medieval Islnin 893
More specifically, we may distinguish five stages in the process of the growth and decay of the state:
1. The stage of consolidation, during which monarchical authority is established on a solid democratic base of popular support.
2. The stage of tyranny, during which the monarch resorts to the gradual monopoly of political power. The tribal bonds between him and his subjects are weakened and his dependence on foreign elements is intensified.
3. The stage of exploitation of the privileges of authority by accumulating wealth, levying taxes, and engaging in the construction of public buildings or monuments in an attempt to vie with other monarchs.
4. The stage of pacification, attended by the endeavour to continue the traditions and institutions of the ancestors.
5. The stage of dissolution and decay. During this stage the monarch squanders the public treasure in the gratification of his pleasures and those of his retainers. As a result decay sets in throughout the state, and the ground is prepared for a new wave of nomadic invasion.
This analysis of the ecological and historical laws that govern the growth, development, and decay of human institutions has an obvious natural or positive basis which is partly geographic, partly economic, and partly sociological. It is a mistake to assume however that the historical or ecological determinism is complete. Ibn Khaldun’s philosophy of his story and the state has an important extra-natural, extrarational component, bound up’with what we may call his concept of the divine plan for the world. The two distinct lines of determinism work in conjunction. The will of God is always for him the decisive factor in bringing about the cyclical changes in the process of history. Even the age of the state, computed in multiples of forty years, is not arrived at through abstract analysis or deduction. It is derived instead from a Quranic passage that equates the prime ofrthe individual with this figure and is also related to the forty-year Israelite sojourn in the Sinai desert, according to the traditions of Islam. What this dual determinism involved for this partly modern, partly traditionist philosopher of history is essentially the recognition of the fact that the historical process serves at best as the stage upon which the grand designs of the Almighty are realized in the world.

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