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have less confines to their Avills, and less amity to their neigh-

bours, than in time past hath been accustomed.

Titus Vetiu-ius Calvinus, and Spurius Posthumus, being

consuls of Rome, happened with both their armies to arrive

in aTally called Caudina, where their enemies, the Samnitcs,

stopped the straights in such sort, as Livy writeth, that

the Romans, lamenting their misfortune, said, Ne Jerrum

quklem ad bene moriendnm ohlaturus est hosth : sedens

bellum conjiciebat. In which case the Samnites, astonied

with their unhoped fortune, wist not what counsil to use.

Wherfore Caius Herennius, their captain, sent home to his

father, Herennius Pontius, an aged wise man, to hear his

opinion : who understanding the case, answered, they should

freely let the Romans go, without offending them in any

thing. Which advice the Sanmltes liked not, and therefore

sent to him again : then he bad cut them al to pieces, and let

not one escape. These two answers, so contrary, made them

believe he doted, by reason of his age. Wherfore they sent

for him, and being come, asked what he meant. Mary,

OF ORIGINALS. 371

quoth he, if ye do the first, your hberality shal estabhsh a

perfect peace and amity with a people more puissant tlian

your self. And if ye do the second, destroying these two

armies, ye abase their power, so that in many years they

shal not again be hable to annoy you. Other council, quoth

he, I know none. And being then demaunded, what he

thought of a mean between these two extremities, in letting

them go upon such covenants as are wont to be taken of men

overcome ; he answered. So shall ye neither purchase friends,

nor rid you of enemies : for ye preserve them that ye have 63

offended ; yea, and further provoke them with shame. And

it proved true indeed : for it had been better for the Sam-

nites at that time to have been discomfited of the Romans in

battail, than to have let them go as they did, ^vith so shame-

ful a peace, as by the proces of the history it appeareth.
In effect, it fareth with princes in this case, as in expences

it fareth with the prodigal man : who of his treasure gather-

eth but thanks, and perchance scorn ; and when he hath al

spent, his most gain is miserable pity. Wherfore the wise

prince loseth neither his time nor advantage ; as K. Ed-

ward III. when he had lieu a year before Calais, and was

challenged by the French King to fight, answered, " No ;

" I have lien here these twelve montiis to my great charges :

" and if I should now put that in adventure that I am sure

" of, I sliould commit a great folly." Which answer pro-

ceded not of cowardise : for before that time he refused not

the fiffht at Vironfosse, nor the battails of Cane, Blanche-

take, nor Cressy ; but he would loose neither the time he had

spent there, nor the advantage of winning the town, which

within few days after was yielded vuito him. And albeit

that he varied from his nature to refuse any fight, yet be-

cause the time required so, it was rather honorable than

otlierwise.

Loose therfore neither advantage noi* time, the winning

wherof is accounted the greatest matter among princes ; like

as the loss is by example proved to be of no less moment.

And let him not think to prosper in this world, that wil not

vary in his procedings according to the time : for as there
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372 A REPOSITORY

is nothing more pleasant than the concord of niusick,nor

nothing more displeasant than the discord therof ; so when

doings and time agree, there is nothing more happy, nor

when they disagree, nothing more unhappy; having in them

much more variation than tunes in music have.

s.
A second discourse made by the same person, for the King's

use; whether it he better Jor a commonzcealth, that the

pozver be in the nobility or in the commonalty.

Cott. Libr. THE people of every monarchy, or realm, is divided in
Vespasian, ^ * . •'
D. 18. two parts: th''one nobility, and the other commonalty. In

whom be two repugnant desires : the one to rule, and the

other not to be ruled. And because the desire of them pre-

vaileth in whom the power consisteth ; therfore our ques-

tion is, to whom the power is most convenient for tlie com-

monwealth.

Upon which question dependeth this other ; whether is

more prejudicial to the commonwealth, the nobleman that

64 seeketh to maintain his estate, or the unnoble that seeketh

to attain nobility. Or whose desire is the greater, his that

hath already, and feareth to loose, or his that hath not, and

coveteth to gajn.

In effect, it hath been proved, that the desire of both is

equal : for he that hath, thinketh he cannot safely enjoy his

own, if he get no more ; and he that hath not, must of neces-

sity seek to have. And tho this desire be equal in its self,

yet are the effects therof unequal : for he that hath, may

gain with ease ; wheras he that hath not, cannot wel gain

without travail. In which travail consisteth the ground of

al civil policy.

For if the needy might attain their things without travail-

ing for them, or the wealthy find none ease in the riches that

they have travailed for, then should the world become bar-

barous for lack of travail.

OF ORIGINALS. 373

Wherfore like as it is necessary to constrain the needful

to travail, even so it is requisite to maintain him that by tra-

A'ail hath deserved rest, in power to rest : for of diligence

and travail nobility is grown. And as long as either the

nobleman or the unnoble seeketh to maintain or attain by

due means, so long is neither of them noisome to the com-

monwealth. But whensoever either of them seeketh his

purpose by power, and so grow into parties ; then is the party

of the commons the more dangerous, for three especial causes,

that is to wit, their inconstancy, peril, and ignorance.

First, That the multitude is most inconstant, it is evident :

for among many men are many opinions; which breedeth

confusion. And tho by persuasion or necessity they may

agree, yet is it impossible their agreement should long con-

tinue. As for example.
In the bemnnino; of the third book of the third decad of

Titus Livius, I read, that after the battail of Trasimene,

when Annibal came before Capua, the commons of that city

had their senators and magistrats in such contempt, that the

best of the town feared to be slain, and so the city to be

yielded unto Annibal. Of which matter Livy beginneth on

thiswise: Inde Capuam jleciit iter, luxu7'iantem Ion ga feli-

citate atque indtdgentia Jhrtunce ; maxime tamen inter cor-

rupta omnia licentia plehis, sine modo lihertatem eocercentis.

Insomuch that Pacuvius Calavius, one of the nobility there,

to save both the senate and the city, and to win the people,

devised this subtilty. First he persuaded the senators to

be ordered by him, and so locked them up togithers in the

senate house. Then he called the commons unto him,

making an oration to this effect, that he knew the just hate

they bear against their rulers, which moved him to procure

a mean, how they might without their own peril be avenged

on them. Wherfore by his own policy he had made them

sure in the senate, and would bring them forth to be pu-

nished at the peoples judgment, according to their demerits :

wherof the people wonderfully rejoiced. But then he per-

suaded them it was necessary to do two things at once : one,

to dispatch the old senate, and the other, to choose a new se-
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374 A REPOSITORY

nator or ever they executed the old. Wherupon he caused

the senators names to be put into a pot, and so taken out

by one and one at adventure.

o5 Tlic first senator, whose name hap})ened to be drawn, was

brought forth, and with an open cry of the people con-

demned. Now, quoth Pacuvius, ye have judged him,

choose one in his place. Of which election Livy writeth

thus : Primo, sUentium erat inopia jwtioris suhjkiundl.

De'indc, cum aUquis, omissa verecundia, qiie}npiam nomi-

nasset, midto major extemplo clamor oriehafur, cum alii ne-

garent nosse, alii nunc probi-a, nunc humilitatcm, sordidam-

que inopiam, et pudendcB artis aid qu(Estus genus ohjicerent.

Hoc multo magis in secundo ac tertio senatore factum est.

So that at length, for want of better, they were contented to

keep their old, and to stand to Pacuvius his discretion.

And to this effect infinite examples may be alledged, that

nothing' is more inconstant than the inultitude.
Then for the peril, none is to be compared to the frenzy

of the people : for like as if a mad man get the sword in his

hand, he is like not only to mischief other, l)ut also himself;

even so fareth it by the commons. If they once attain the

power, they destroy both the nobility and themselves. Ex-

ample of the Jacpierie that sprang in Beauvoisine and other

countries of France, the year 1358; of whom Froisard, in

the 182 chapter of his first volume, saith these words :

" These mischievous people, thus assembled without capitain

" or armure, robbed, brent, and slew al gentlemen that

" they could lay hands on, and forced and ravished ladies

" and damoisels, and did such shameful deeds that no hu-

" mane creature ought to think on any such. Which rage,

*' if they had prevailed in, they would at length have con-

" verted upon themselves, when the gentlemen had been

" utterly destroyed." I might bring a number of examples,

as wel of our own nation as of others, to this effect, but none

more cruel than the Jaquerie.

Thirdly, for ignorance ; the multitude utterly knoweth

nothing. And tho some examples of good succes may be

aJledged for the popular estates ; yet, if they be wel sought.

OF ORIGINALS. 375

it shall appear they never preceded of wisdom, but of ne-

cessity. And then comparing th'inconveniences that hap-

pened before the necessity to the successes that have fol-

lowed, it shal be found that the wisdom, learned of necessity?

is dearly bought. Even the Swizzers, that destroyed their

gentlemen in a day, and that now glory most in their popu-

larity, both have had of late years, and must needs have

shortly, the like ill fortune that hath happened unto Athens,

Florence, and such other.
Wherfore I determine, it is impossible any estate should

long prosper, where the power is in the commonalty. For

like as it becometh neither the man to be governed of the

woman, nor the master of the servant, even so in al other

regiments it is not convenient the inferior should have power

to direct the superior ; because that of power procedeth

commandment, and of commandment execution.
It may be said, it hath been often seen by experience,

that through the covetousnes of the nobility the commons

have been oppressed ; so that for the disordinate appetites

of a few, the multitude hath suffered : which seemeth a

greater evil than that the few should suffei- for the multi-

tude. Wherfore, if the power were in the commonalty, the

magistrates would always be the more careful to bridle the 66

excesses of the nobility, and to advance the public wealth :

which argument indeed were very good, in case they would

always maintain their civil laws, and the orders of their ma-

gistrats inviolate. But what popular estate can be read that

hath thirty years together eschewed sects, sedition, and

commotions, in such sort as once within thirty years the

whole estate hath not been in danger of subversion ? And

then must I ask, Avhether is more pestilent to the common-

wealth, the tyranny of a few, or the subversion of the

estate ?
I must confess there be two notable evils that in manner

grow of ordinary in the nobility : with the one wherof the

commons are offended, and with the other grieved. The

first is ambition, and the second tyranny, which are both so

united, that lightly thone followeth thother.
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376 A REPOSITORY

Whensoever the nobleman or magistrate useth the place

of his calling for himself, without regard to the inferior sort,

then waxeth he ambitious : the maintenance wherof ingen-

dreth tyranny ; that is to say, practise of unlawful gain, or

cruel handling of his inferiors.
Wherfore Macchiavegli, in his discourses of the liberty

of a commonwealth, determineth that in cases of extremity,

where the magistrats or nobility use this tyranny, the com-

motions of the people are necessary, to mitigate the excess

of the great mens ambitions.
And in the greatest extremities, indeed, it seemeth to have

some reason ; as in the necessity of the poor Athenians, when

Solon was made praetor ; or the like of the Romans, when

they rebelled, and went to the Holy Hil, where Menenius

Agrij)pa appeased them. But otherwise the ambition and

tyranny of the nobility were much more tolerable than the

insolence, inconstancy, peril, and ignorance of the multitude.

For these faults of the nobility are nothing comparable to

those of the commons ; and especially in that the estate re-

maineth with them always inviolate. Wheras if the multi-

tude prevail once in power, al goeth to confusion : the estate

is subverted, every mans property, his possession and goods

are altered, and they themselves never return to order, but

by necessity.

In the monarchy or estate of a prince, if the prince be

good, like as he keepeth his commons void of power, even so

he preservcth them from the tyranny of the nobility ; for he

is the same bridle in power over his nobility, that the nobility

is over the connnons, and tcndeth as wel to the rule of the

one, as to the preservation of the other.

And tho he were a tyrant, yet I say his tyranny is more

tolerable than the tyranny of the nobility of the estate of

optimates ; where, instead of one, there be many tyrants :

for the property of a tyrant is, not to suffer within his power

any mo tyrants than liimself. And if the tyranny of the

nobility, as I have said before, be more tolerable than th' in-

solence of the multitude, much more tolerable then is the

princes tyranny than the commons power.

OF ORIGINALS. 377

Wherfore I conclude, that it is better for the common- 6/

wealth the power be in the nobility, than in the commonalty.

Neither do I mean, that for the dangers rehearsed, the

commons should be so kept doAvn, as the wretched commons

of some other countries be. But I Avould their disciplin and

education should be such, that the only name of their prince

should make them to tremble. Which they should never re-

gard, if either the power Avere in them, or that they feared

not a superior power. For if they have but so much liberty

as to talk of the princes causes, and of the reason of laws, at

once they shew their desire not to be ruled : wherof groweth

contempt, and consequently disobedience, the mother of al

errors.

T.
A third political discourse made by William Thomas, esq.

for the Kings study ; entitled, What princes amity is
best.
AMITY, or friendship, (as Cicero defineth it,) is the per- Cotton

feet concord of al divine and humane things with benevo- ve'^sp^a'Jian,

lence and charity. And he saith, that, wisdome excepted, heD. is.

knoweth not whether the immortal gods have given unto

man any better thing : for it maketh the prosperous things

more resplendent, and adversities the more easy. And if it

were possible for the princes of these days to use that amity

that some princes have don, as we read of Massinissa and

Scipio, and of other, then it were no need to talk of other

amity, than of that sweet private amity that Cicero so wel

hath described. And without further question, that princes

amity were best, in whose heart those rules were written.

But the perverse nature of men in this time doth scarcely

permit any perfect amity. Wherfore to treat of the politic

amity, that is to say, the accustomable amity that may be

had ; it is first to be considered, to what end the amity of

foreign princes doth serve, and what need one prince hath

of the others amity.

Truly, if it be wel considered, tho there be many causes

378 A REPOSITORY

to be alledged, why it behovetli princes to have amity,

yet al should tend but to one end, that is to say, to main-

tain their own : for the fruit of the foreign princes amity

consisteth in two points.

One, in giving- aid to resist an enemy, id sine injuria hi

pace vivatur ; and tlie other in relieving his friends coun-

try with those commodities that it v.anteth. Both which, as

I have said, tend to that end that is rchersed before. And

because few princes are of themselves liable to maintain

their own, if they want friendship of other princes, therfore

it followeth, this friendship to be very necessary. For it

liath been often seen, that princes and other estates have

been often brought to that point for lack of friends, that

having to do with such as were more puissant than them-

selves, they neither could maintain peace nor sustain wai".

68 In which case either they must throw themselves into their

laps that shal help them, or must become a prey to those

that do assault them.

And this happeneth through lack of foresight; when the

prince or estate hath not mesured their forces with their do-

ings. As Livy writeth of the Latins in the eighth book of

his first decad ; jam latio is status erat rerum, ut neque pa-

cem neque helium pati possent. By reason that through lack

of friends to aid them, the amity and the inimity of the Ro-

mans was indifferent unto them. For if they had peace,

their conditions were intolerable ; and their impotency in

the war made them at length fal into thraldome.
But leaving the examples of people that had no prince,

we may read, as wel of oiu' own histories as of others, what

inconveniences have happened to them that have wanted

foreign friendship.

How often did the Danes in Kino; Egberts time invade

this realm, spoil it, and ransomc it ? How many doubtful

and bloudy battails were foughten between our nation and

them in the fift year of Alurcds reign ? What made King

Etheldred flee into Normandy, leaving his crown to the

possession of Suono, or Suanus, a Dane .'' And had William

Duke of Normandy been hable to expulse Harold King of

OF ORIGINALS. 379

England, and to enjoy tlie crown, if Harold had any

strange friend ? If I should follow on with like examples,

where the estates been utterly subverted and altered from

one nation to another, (much through the lack of friend-

ship,) I should be over tedious. But this I find, that tho

there be many causes to be alledged in the subversion or

alteration of estates ; yet one of the greatest is the lack of

princes amity.

Wherfore determining, that, among the great cares that

princes ought to have for the preservation of themselves

and their estates, this amity, spoken of before, should not

be the least ; we must now examine what princes amity is

best. In which behalf four things are worthy of considera-

tion ; the propinquity, the antienty of friendship, the reli-

gion, and the nature of the prince, whose amity is sought.
First, for propinquity. Albeit that it is both profitable

and commendable to have the amity of al princes ; yet it is

evident that the neighbours amity is to be preferred before

the strangers. And herein lyeth a question, whose amity is

the better : his that may most annoy, or his that may most

assist. For a mean prince that is a neighbour, may annoy

more than a puissant prince that dwelleth far off. And such

a puissant prince again may by contrary means assist more

than the mean neighbour prince.
In effect, it hath been ever proved, that th' amity of him

which may most annoy is to be preferred. For by this

amity ye do not only advoid the daunger of that annoyance

that he may do, but ye also may have his aid to joyn with

yours ; which, though it were but mean in respect of the

far princes power, must nevertheles be such an help as may

serve the turn more readily. And the amity of far-princes

hath ever been proved so uncertain, that a smal power of

the neighbour hath been most commonly preferred before

it. Wherfore, like as th' amity of a private neighbour is unto

every private man, for his domestick affairs, more necessary

than th" amity of a stranger; even so in estate, th"* amity of 69

the neerest prince is more convenient than of him that is

distant.

380 A REPOSITORY

For proof wlicrof, in tlie last wars between the Emperor

and French King, Barbarossa, the Turks admiral, with an

army of 8000 Turks, landed in Provence; being sent at the

French Kings request from the Turk to aid him against

the Emperor. As for the Turks puissance, I need not to

reherse it. And the French Kings folly in this behalf de-

clared itself. For when he thought the Emperor too strong

for him, he made account, that matching himself Avith one

of more puissance, he should the rather suppress his enemy.

But because he considered not, that a strange prince upon

an uncertain hope would be loth to adventure any great

power of his so far from him, that their return should be

either desperate or doubtful, therfore he failed in his ima-

gination. For the Turks sent him but a smal power, more

for a continuance of amity than for amity indeed. That

army travailed far, put the French King to great charges,

discovered his country, and did him no service. So that it

was mag-is nomen quaiii prcEs'idium.

The contrary wherof proved with the Emperor, who

through the amity of his neighbour, the King of England,