Study manual

Turbervill v. Stamp
40
. And put the case of a chemist making 
experiments with ingredients, singly innocent, but when 
combined, liable to ignite; if he leaves them together, and 
injury is thereby occasioned to the property of his neighbour, 
can any one doubt that an action on the case would lie? 
It is contended, however, that the learned judge was wrong in 
leaving this to the jury as a case of gross negligence; and that 
the question of negligence was so mixed up with reference to 
what would be the conduct of a man of ordinary prudence that the 
jury might have thought the latter the rule by which they were 
to decide; that such a rule would be too uncertain to act upon; 
and that the question ought to have been whether the defendant 
had acted honestly and bona fide to the best of his own 
judgment. That, however, would leave so vague a line as to 
afford no rule at all, the degree of judgment belonging to each 
individual being infinitely various. And though it has been 
urged that the care which a prudent man would take is not a 
intelligible proposition as a rule of law, yet such has always 
been the rule adopted in cases of bailment, as laid down in 
Coggs v. Bernard
41
. ...The care taken by a prudent man has 
40
. 1 
Salk. 
13. 
41
. 
Ld. Raym. 909. 

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always been the rule laid down; and as to the supposed 
difficulty of applying it, a jury has always been able to say, 
whether, taking that rule as their guide, there has been 
negligence on the occasion in question. 
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence 
should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, 
which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each 
individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires 
in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary 
prudence would observe. That was in substance the criterion 
presented to the jury in this case, and therefore the present 
rule must be discharged. 
VAUGHAN, J. The principle on which this action proceeds, is by 
no means new. It has been urged that the defendant in such a 
case takes no duty on himself. But I do not agree in that 
position: every one takes upon himself the duty of so dealing 
with his own property as not to injure the property of others.
It was, if anything, too favourable to the defendant to leave it 
to the jury whether he had been guilty of gross negligence; for 
when the defendant upon being warned as to the consequences 
likely to ensue from the condition of the rick, said, "he would 
chance it", it was manifestly adverted to his interest in the 
Insurance Office. The conduct of a prudent man has always been 
the criterion (for the jury) in such cases: but it is by no 
means confined to them. In insurance cases, where a captain has 

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sold his vessel after damage too extensive for repairs, the 
question has always been, whether he has pursued the course 
which a prudent man would have pursued under the same 
circumstances. Here, there was not a single witness whose 
testimony did not go to establish gross negligence in the 
defendant. He had repeated warnings of what was likely to 
occur, and the whole calamity was occasioned by his 
procrastination. 
Rule discharged. 
Read also Filliter V. Phippard, Court of QUEEN'S Bench. 
1847 11 Q.B. 347. 
[EDITOR'S NOTE. Sir F. Pollock says (43 Revised Reports, p. 
v.): "Vaughan v. Menlove finally settled the rule of what Chief 
Justice Holmes of Massachusetts has aptly called `the external 
standard' - that due care and caution do not consist in acting 
to the best of one's own judgment, but in acting with not less 
judgment than a man of ordinary sense and prudence may be 
expected to shew. The reasonable man of the law is a man of 
fair average understanding as well as good intentions." In the 
case of Commonwealth v. Pierce (138 Massachusetts at p. 176), 
Holmes, J., had said:- "So far as civil liability, at least, is 
concerned, it is very clear that what I have called `the 
external standard' would be applied; so that, if a man's conduct 
is such as would be reckless in a man of ordinary prudence, it 
is reckless in him. ... The law deliberately leaves his 

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idiosyncrasies out of account, and peremptorily assumes that he 
has as much capacity to judge and to foresee consequences as a 
man of ordinary prudence would have in the same situation."] 

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