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part of the grass by the side of the line; but it was proved 
that several of the heaps were burnt by the fire. Two of the 
company's servants were proved to have been closed to the spot 
when the fire broke out, and to have given the alarm; but they 
were not called by either side. 
At the close of the plaintiff's case the counsel for the 
defendants submitted that there was no case to go to the jury. 
At the suggestion of the judge, and by a consent, a verdict was 
taken for the plaintiff for £30, subject to leave reserved to 
the defendants to move to set it aside, and instead thereof to 
enter a verdict for them, on the ground that there was no 
evidence to go to the jury of any liability on the part of the 
defendants.... 
The defendants applied for and obtained a rule pursuant to the 
leave reserved, which, after argument, was discharged
42
, and 
from the judgment so given the present appeal was brought. 
Kingdom, Q.C. (Murch with him), for the defendants. There is no 
evidence that the trimmings were the cause of the fire. It was 
42
. 
L.R 5 C.P. 98. 

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176 
proved that they were partially consumed by it, but not that it 
originated in them. Nor was there any evidence that the fire was 
caused by sparks coming from the engine. There were many other 
ways in which it may have begun which are equally consistent 
with the evidence. Thus, a fusee may have been thrown from a 
window of one of the carriages of the train, or one of their 
workmen on the line may have dropped a spark from his pipe. 
Where the evidence is equally consistent with the view that the 
defendants were liable, and that they were not, there is no 
evidence to go to the jury. 
[CHANNELL, B. But here the two causes of the fire that are 
suggested, viz., the engine and the pipe or cigar, are not of 
equal probability, and there was evidence for the jury, 
therefore, that the fire was caused by the more probable of the 
two alleged causes.] 
The company would not be responsible for the sparks unless they 
acted negligently. The spark may have set fire to the dry 
grass, and then spread to the trimmings; and if the banks were 
properly kept, the fire would not, in that view, have been 
caused by the defendants' negligence, nor would the defendants 
be responsible. 
[BLACKBURN, J. I understand Keating, J., to say that the 
trimmings increased the fierceness of the fire, if they did not 
originate, it, and so made it spread.] 

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There is nothing in the evidence to shew what was the character 
of the fire before it got into the stubble-field. 
[KELLY, C.B. Surely it would be for the jury to say whether it 
was more probable that the trimmings or the grass first 
ignited?] 
Even if there be evidence that the heaps of trimmings 
contributed to the fire, there is no evidence that they 
contributed to the final result. The defendants are not 
answerable for any exceptional state of circumstances which they 
could not reasonably expect.... 
Cole, Q.C., for plaintiff. The season when this fire occurred 
had been a very dry one, and it was the duty of the defendants 
to take special care of their banks. Probably for that reason 
they did send men to cut the rummage, as it was called, and trim 
the hedges; but, instead of taking it away, they left the litter 
all along the line for a fortnight, to get dryer; and on the day 
in question it had been raked together in small heaps. It was 
clearly negligent, under the circumstances, to leave such 
inflammable matter lying all along the line.... 
KELLY, C.B.... There is some doubt how the fire originated; but 
there was ample evidence for the jury, which would have been 
rightly left to them, that it originated from sparks from the 

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engine falling on the dry heaps of trimmings, and thence 
extending to the hedge and stubble-field. If that was so, the 
question arises whether there was any negligence in the 
defendants. Now it can scarcely be doubted that the defendants 
were bound in such a summer, knowing that trains were passing 
from which sparks might fall upon them, to remove these heaps of 
trimmings. And, at any rate, it was a question for the jury 
whether it was not negligent of them not to do so. I think, 
therefore, there was a case for the jury on which they might 
reasonably have found that the defendants were negligent in not 
removing the trimmings as soon as possible, and that this was 
the cause of the injury. 
Then comes the question raised by Brett, J., to which at first I 
was inclined to give weight. He puts it thus: "I quite agree 
that the defendants ought to have anticipated that sparks might 
be emitted from their engines, notwithstanding that they were of 
the best construction, and were worked without negligence, and 
that they might reasonably have anticipated that the rummage and 
hedge trimmings allowed to accumulate might be thereby set on 
fire. But I am of opinion that no reasonable man would have 
foreseen that the fire would consume the hedge and pass across a 
stubble-field, and so get to the plaintiff's cottage at the 
distance of 200 yards from the railway, crossing a road in its 
passage." It is because I thought, and still think, the 
proposition is true that any reasonable man might well have 
failed to anticipate such a concurrence of circumstances as is 

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here described that I felt pressed at first by this view of the 
question; but on consideration I do not feel that is a true test 
of the liability of the defendants in this case. It may be that 
they did not anticipate, and were not bound to anticipate, that 
the plaintiff's cottage would be burnt as a result of their 
negligence; but I think the law is, that if they were aware that 
these heaps were lying by the side of the rails, and that it was 
a hot season, and that therefore by being left there the heaps 
were likely to catch fire, the defendants were bound to provide 
against all circumstances which might result from this, and were 
responsible for all the natural consequences of it.... 
BLACKBURN, J.... It is clear that when the company were 
planning the railway they could not expect that the hedge would 
become so dry, and therefore were not negligent in putting a 
hedge instead of a stone wall; and though the drought had lasted 
some weeks, I can hardly think it was negligent in them not to 
remove the hedge. I do not say that there is not much in what 
is said with respect to the trimmings being the cause of the 
injury, and not the state of the hedge, but I doubt on this 
point, and, therefore, doubt if there was evidence of 
negligence. If the negligence were once established, it would 
be no answer that it did much more damage than was expected. If 
a man fires a gun across a road where he may reasonably 
anticipate that persons will be passing, and hits some one, he 
is guilty of negligence, and liable for the injury he has 
caused. But if he fires in his own wood, where he cannot 

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reasonably anticipate that any one will be, he is not liable to 
any one whom he shoots; which shews that what a person may 
reasonably anticipate is important in considering whether he has 
been negligent. Yet if a person fires across a road when it is 
dangerous to do so and kills a man who is in the receipt of a 
large income, he will be liable for the whole damage, however 
great, that may have resulted to his family, and cannot set up 
that he could not have reasonably expected to have injured any 
one but a labourer. 
LUSH, J.... The more likely the hedge was to take fire, the 
more incumbent it was upon the company to take care that no 
inflammable material remained near to it. 
Judgment affirmed. 
[EDITOR'S NOTE. See Sir Frederick Pollock's remarks on this 
case; Torts, pp. 474-476. 
A good contrast to Smith v. L.S.W. Ry. Co. is afforded by Blyth