Study manual

257 
[23] Mills V. Armstrong. THE "BERNINA" HOUSE OF LORDS. 1888. 
L.R. 13 A.C. 1. 
Contributory negligence on the part of the persons 
navigating a ship is not to be treated as contributory 
negligence in the passengers themselves. 
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeal, reported as The 
Bernina (No. 2) in L.R. 12 P.D. 58. The facts appeared in a 
special case stated for the opinion of the court in three 
actions in personam brought in the Admiralty Division against 
the owners of the steamship Bernina; who were the appellants in 
this appeal. 
In September, 1884, a collision occurred between the Bernina and 
the steamship Bushire, the result of which was that J.H. 
Armstrong, first engineer of the Bushire, T.T. Owen, second 
officer of the Bushire, and M.A. Toeg, a passenger on board the 
Bushire, were drowned. The collision was caused by the fault or 
default of the master and crew of the Bernina, and by the fault 
or default of the master and crew of the Bushire. Armstrong and 
Toeg had nothing to do with the negligent navigation of the 
Bushire; but Owen was in charge of her at the time and was 
directly responsible for it. The three actions were brought by 
the personal representatives of Armstrong, Owen, and Toeg 

---

258 
respectively, to recover damages for their respective deaths. 
The questions for the opinion of the court were (1) where the 
defendants were liable for the damages sustained in each case; 
and (2) if liable, whether they were liable to pay the whole of 
such damages, or only a moiety in each case. Butt, J., on the 
authority of Thorogood v. Bryan
70
, pronounced that the 
defendants were not liable in any of the actions
71
. The Court 
of Appeal reversed this decision so far as it concerned the 
actions by the representatives of Armstrong and Toeg, and 
pronounced that the defendants were liable in those two actions 
for the damages proceeded for, and referred the amount to the 
registrar; being of opinion that Thorogood v. Bryan was wrongly 
decided; and that actions under Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 
Vict. c. 93) were not admiralty actions; and therefore that the 
admiralty rule as to half damages did not apply to them
72
. 
Before the Court of Appeal the claim on behalf of Owen's 
representatives was given up; and the respondents in the appeal 
to this House consisted only of the representatives of Armstrong 
and Toeg respectively. The question as to damages was mentioned 
by the appellants' counsel but was not argued before this House. 
Phillimore, for the appellants.... The principle of Thorogood v. 
70
. 
8 C.B. 115. 
71
. 
L.R. 11 P.D. 31. 
72
. 
L.R. 12 P.D. 58. 

---

259 
Bryan is sound.... It is admitted that a plaintiff cannot sue 
when his driver is his own servant and is guilty of contributory 
negligence. The same result should follow whenever a plaintiff 
delegates [to any one, though not a servant], the control of a 
carriage or a vessel. The principle is sound in the case of 
goods; why not in the case of passengers?... 
LORD HERSCHELL.... The appellants having, as they admit, been 
guilty of negligence from which the respondents have suffered 
loss, a prima facie case of liability is made out against them. 
How do they defend themselves? They do not allege that those 
whom the respondents represent were personally guilty of 
negligence which contributed to the accident. Nor again do they 
allege that there was contributory negligence on the part of any 
third person standing in such a legal relation towards the 
deceased men as to cause the acts of that third person to be 
regarded as their acts; e.g. the relation of master and servant 
or employer and agent. But they rest their defence solely upon 
the ground that those who were navigating the vessel in which 
the deceased men were being carried were guilty of negligence 
without which the disaster would not have occurred. 
They rely upon the case of Thorogood v. Bryan
73
, which 
undoubtedly does support their contention. This case was 
decided as long ago as 1849, and has been followed in some other 
cases; but it was early subjected to adverse criticism. It has 
73
. 
8 C. B. 115. 

---

260 
never come for revision before a court of appeal until the 
present occasion. The action was one brought, under Lord 
Campbell's Act, against the owner of an omnibus by which the 
deceased man was run over and killed. The omnibus in which he 
had been carried had set him down in the middle of the road 
instead of drawing up to the kerb; and before he could get out 
of the way he was run over by the defendant's omnibus, which was 
coming along at too rapid a pace to be able to pull up. The 
learned judge directed the jury that "If they were of opinion 
that want of care on the part of the driver of the deceased's 
omnibus in not drawing up to the kerb to put the deceased down, 
or any want of care on the part of the deceased himself, had 
been conducive to the injury, in either of those cases - 
notwithstanding that the defendant, by her servant, had been 
guilty of negligence - their verdict must be for the defendant". 
The jury gave a verdict for the defendant. The question was 
then raised, on a rule for a new trial on the ground of 
misdirection, whether the ruling of the learned judge was right. 
The court held that it was. 
It is necessary to examine carefully the reasoning by which this 
result was arrived at. Coltman, J., said: "The passenger has 
so far identified himself with the carriage in which he was 
travelling that want of care in the driver will be a defence to 
the driver of the carriage which directly caused the injury."
Maule, J., and Vaughan Williams, J., also dwelt upon this view 
of the "identification" of the passenger with the driver of the 

---

261 
vehicle in which he is being carried. 
With the utmost respect for these eminent judges, I must say 
that I am unable to comprehend this doctrine of Identification 
upon which they lay so much stress. In what sense is the 
passenger by a public stage-coach, because he avails himself of 
the accommodation afforded by it, identified with the driver?
The learned judges manifestly do not mean to suggest (though 
some of the language used would seem to bear that construction) 
that the passenger is so far identified with the driver that the 
negligence of the latter would render the former liable to third 
persons injured by it. I presume that they did not even mean 
that the identification is so complete as to prevent the 
passenger from recovering against the driver's master; (though 
if "negligence of the owner's servants is to be considered 
negligence of the passenger". it is not easy to see why it 
should not be a bar to such an action). In short, as far as I 
can see, the "identification" appears to be effective only to 
the extent of enabling another person whose servants have been 
guilty of negligence to defend himself by the allegation of 
contributory negligence on the part of the person injured.... 
But the relation between the passenger in a public vehicle and 
the driver of it certainly is not such as to fall within any of 
the recognised categories in which the act of one man is treated 
in law as the act of another.... 
LORD WATSON. Thorogood v. Bryan has not met with general 

---

262 
acceptance, and it cannot be represented as an authority upon 
which persons guilty of contributory negligence are entitled to 
rely. 
When the combined negligence of two or more individuals, who are 
not acting in concert, results in personal injury to one of 
them, he cannot recover compensation from the others; for the 
obvious reason that but for his own neglect he would have 
sustained no harm. Upon the same principle individuals who are 
injured, without being personally negligent, are nevertheless 
disabled from recovering damages if at the time they stood in 
such a relation to any one of the actual wrongdoers as to imply 
their responsibility for his act or default. That any 
constructive fault which implies the liability of those to whom 
it is imputable to make reparation to an innocent sufferer, must 
also have the effect of barring all claims at their instance 
against others who are in pari delicto, is a proposition at once 
intelligible and reasonable. If they are within the incidence 
of the maxim "qui facit per alium facit per se," there can be no 
reason why it should apply in question between them and the 
outside public and not in questions between them and their 
fellow-wrongdoers. But the facts which were before the court in