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[22] Radley and Bramail V. The London AND NORTH WESTERN RY. CO. 
HOUSE OF LORDS. 1876. L.R. 1 A.C. 754. 
The plaintiff's own negligence affords no defence unless it 
formed part - not of the inducing causes but - of the 
proximate cause of the damage. 
APPEAL against a decision of the Court of Exchequer Chamber. 
The appellants were the plaintiffs in an action brought in the 
Court of Exchequer, in which they claimed to recover damages for 
the destruction of a bridge occasioned, as they alleged, by the 
negligence of the defendant's servants.... 
[The material facts were stated by Bramwell, B., in the Court of 
Exchequer as follows:- 
The plaintiffs are colliery owners, who have sidings out of and 
on one of the defendants' lines; over these sidings is a bridge 
belonging to the plaintiffs with a headway of eight feet. It 
has been the course of business between the plaintiffs and 
defendants for the defendants to take from these sidings the 
plaintiffs' waggons loaded with coals and deliver or leave them 
at their destination; also to collect the plaintiffs' waggons 
when empty, and bring them to the sidings, and then leave them. 
When the waggons were so left on the sidings the plaintiffs 

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dealt with them as they thought fit; i.e. took them to the pit 
to be loaded in such order and at such times as they pleased, or 
took them to their workshops if they needed repair. On a 
certain Saturday, after working hours, when the men were gone 
and the plaintiffs could only move them as they might on a 
Sunday, (i.e. by some special engagement of workmen), the 
defendants brought and left on one of the plaintiffs' sidings 
some empty waggons of the plaintiffs, and a waggon empty except 
that it had on it a waggon of the plaintiffs which had broken 
down and could not travel, and had to be brought in this way to 
the plaintiffs. The waggon so loaded was, with its load, eleven 
feet high, and therefore could not pass under the bridge. It 
remained where so left. On the next Sunday night, after dark, 
the defendants brought in a very long train of the plaintiffs' 
empty waggons, and pushed it on the siding where this waggon 
loaded with the disabled waggons was. It was pushed as far as 
the bridge. Had it been empty it would have passed underneath. 
(Probably the defendants had often pushed waggons in this way 
under the bridge; though there was evidence to shew they had 
been requested not to push things on the siding beyond a public 
highway, which was some distance before getting to the bridge in 
the direction from which the defendants brought the train of 
empty waggons. This is, perhaps, of no moment.) But the waggon 
so loaded coming to the bridge, and being unable to pass 
underneath, the train stopped. Those who had charge of it, 
without looking to ascertain the cause of the stoppage, gave 
momentum to the engine to such an extent that the waggon with 

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its load knocked the bridge down.] 
... At the trial, Mr. Justice Brett told the jury that "You must 
be satisfied that the plaintiffs' servants did not do anything 
which persons of ordinary care, under the circumstances, would 
not do, or that they omitted to do something which persons of 
ordinary care would do.... It is for you to say entirely as to 
both points. But the law is this, the plaintiffs must have 
satisfied you that this happened by the negligence of the 
defendants' servants, and without any contributory negligence of 
their own; in other words, that it was solely by the negligence 
of the defendants' servants. If you think it was, then your 
verdict will be for the plaintiffs. If you think it was not 
solely by the negligence of the defendants' servants, your 
verdict must be for the defendants
65
." The jurors having, on 
this direction, stated that they thought there was contributory 
negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, the learned judge 
directed that the verdict should be entered for the defendants, 
but reserved leave for the plaintiffs to move. 
A rule having been obtained for a new trial, it was, after 
argument before Barons Bramwell and Amphlett, made absolute
66
.
On appeal to the Exchequer Chamber the decision was, by Justices 
Blackburn, Mellor, Lush, Brett, and Archibald (diss. Justice 
65
. 
Printed papers in the case. 
66
. 
L.R. 9 Ex. 71. 

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Denman), reversed
67
. This appeal was then brought. 
LORD PENZANCE.... The law in these cases of negligence is, as 
was said in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, perfectly well 
settled and beyond dispute. 
The first proposition is a general one, to this effect, that the 
plaintiff in an action for negligence cannot succeed if it is 
found by the jury that he has himself been guilty of any 
negligence or want of ordinary care which contributed to cause 
the accident. 
But there is another proposition equally well established, and 
it is a qualification upon the first, namely, that though the 
plaintiff may have been guilty of negligence, and although that 
negligence may, in fact, have contributed to the accident, yet 
if the defendant could in the result, by the exercise of 
ordinary care and diligence, have avoided the mischief which 
happened, the plaintiff's negligence will not excuse him. This 
proposition, as one of law, cannot be questioned. It was 
decided in the case of Davies v. Mann
68
, supported in that of 
Tuff v. Warman
69
and other cases, and has been universally 
applied in cases of this character without question. 
67
. 
L.R. 10 Ex. 100. 37-2. 
68
. 
10 M. & W. 546; cf. p. 576, supra. 
69
. 
Supra, p. 575. 

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The only point for consideration, therefore, is whether the 
learned judge properly presented it to the mind of the jury. 
It seems impossible to say that he did so. At the beginning of 
his summing-up he laid down the following as the propositions of 
law which governed the case: It is for the plaintiffs to satisfy 
you that this accident happened through the negligence of the 
defendants' servants; and as between them and the defendants, 
that it was solely through the negligence of the defendants' 
servants. They must satisfy you that it was solely by the 
negligence of the defendants' servants, or, in other words, that 
there was no negligence on the part of their servants 
contributing to the accident; so that, if you think that both 
sides were negligent, so as to contribute to the accident, then 
the plaintiffs cannot recover. 
This language is perfectly plain and perfectly unqualified, and 
in case the jurors thought there was any contributory negligence 
on the part of the plaintiffs' servants, they could not, without 
disregarding the direction of the learned judge, have found in 
the plaintiffs' favour, however negligent the defendants had 
been, or however easily they might with ordinary care have 
avoided any accident at all. 
... It is true that in part of his summing-up the learned judge 
pointed attention to the conduct of the engine-driver, in 
determining to force his way by violence through the 

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obstruction, as fit to be considered by the jury on the question 
of negligence; but he failed to add that if they thought the 
engine-driver might at this stage of the matter by ordinary care 
have avoided all accident, any previous negligence of the 
plaintiffs would not preclude them from recovering. 
In point of fact the evidence was strong to shew that this was 
the immediate cause of the accident, and the jury might well 
think that ordinary care and diligence on the part of the engine 
driver would, notwithstanding any previous negligence of the 
plaintiffs in leaving the loaded-up truck on the line, have made 
the accident impossible. This substantial defect of the learned 
judge's charge is that question was never put to the jury. 
New trial ordered. 

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