The republic of uganda in the supreme court of uganda at kampala

22. That because of the said heavy deployment of PPU and LDUs in the whole District of Rukungiri and the resultant tension, I was forced to cut out rallies organized for me at Bwambara and Bubangari in Rujumbwa County In order to get to the main campaign rally at Rukungiri Town early.

23. That I arrived at the main rally in Rukungiri Town at about 17.00 hours and in my address to the people I informed them that I was aware of the state of terror created by the PPU soldiers and that for that sake / had to be very brief so that they could return home before dark, and I appealed to all my supporters to refrain from violence even in the face of extreme provocation.

24. That the main Rally in Rukungiri Town ended at about 18.10 hours and the people moved out of the play ground venue of the Rally peacefully.

25. That I then went back home to collect my luggage and proceed to Kampala and shortly after getting home I heard gun-shots from the direction of Rukungiri Town Centre, which continued for about 20 minutes; and then I saw some people running from town to my home for safety.

26. That I went back to town at about 19OO hours and we found the Town absolutely deserted, except for the PPU soldiers and a few people wearing campaign T-Shirts of the Pt Respondent and I saw next to Ejumo Hotel a white truck surrounded by about 10 to 12 PPU soldiers who were throwing people on to this white truck.

27. That then I stopped by Mr. Charles Chakuru’s residence where I found people having taken refuge in his compound, left for Mbarara where we spent the night.

28. That when I reached Mbarara Town I telephoned Mr. Charles Makuru to find out the Situation In Rukungiri Town and he told me that the situation was still tense and that he tried to get in touch with the Regional Police Commander and discovered that he had been called to Police Headquarters early that afternoon. That I subsequently went back to Rukungiri and I was shown the grave of Berondera who had been shot dead in that incident.

29. That I now know one person died, 15 were seriously Injured and were hospitalized and many others sustained minor injuries as a result of the attack by the PPU soldiers on that day in Rukungiri Town and all this was reported in the Sunday Monitor of 4th March, 2001, a copy of which Is attached and marked “P12” and all this time when Presidential Protection Unit soldiers were deployed in Rukungiri District, President Museveni was not physically present In that District.
30. That on 19th February, 2001, while on my way from Bundibugyo, I received a telephone call from Hon. Okwir Rwaboni the Chairperson of our Youth and Students Committee, who informed me that his life was in danger, and that he had tried to seek protection from the U. S. Embassy unsuccessfully. I advised him that I was on my way to Kampala and that he should look for a place to stay safely until I would arrive in Kampala and we discuss the details.
31. 1 got to my home in Kampala at about 19.00 hours that evening and Hon. Okwir was at my home with his wife Solonge and Ms. Anne Mugisha. He narrated to me the story of how he had been for two days intimidated and even threatened with death by Major General David Tinyefuza and Lt. Colonel Noble Mayombo He informed me that on the morning of February, 2001, Lt. Col. Noble Mayombo, Acting Chief of Military Intelligence went to his house and took him to the International Conference Centre where he found other Senior Military Officers including Major General D. Tinyefuza, the Special Presidential Advisor and Col Kasirye Gwanga Campaign agent of lit Respondent in Mubende District and was told that for his own safety he had to sign a document to the effect that he had resigned from our task force and that we were getting funds from Countries hostile to Uganda.
32. He told me that he signed the document, after which he was taken to Nile Hotel for lunch where he was joined by his wife. He said that after lunch he requested to take a sick child to a clinic and then return to join the officers in Nile Hotel. He left with his wife and headed for the American Embassy to seek for protection because he left that his life was in danger following the threats he had been given and thereafter he actually signed the documents.
33. After discussing with Hon. Okwir, it was agreed that he should inform the public through the press about what had happened and that we should continue with our campaigns normally. We invited Pressmen and gave them his story. We decided that he should spend a night at my residence.
34. The following day on 20th February, 2001, I was scheduled to address a rally in Adjumani and Moyo Districts. I had planned to travel by a chartered Aircraft from Entebbe Airport at 09.30 hours together with some members of my Task Force including Hon. Okwir. We arrived at Entebbe VIP Lounge at 09.30 hours. As we proceeded to the Aircraft at about 10.00 hours, an official of the Airport informed us that the Aircraft had been refused clearance to take off, and that we should return to the lounge while the clearance problem was being sorted out.
35. As we arrived back in the lounge, an official of Civil Aviation named B. Monday came where I was seated with Hon. Okwir and others and informed him that he had instructions to take Hon. Okwir. Hon. Okwir told Mr. Manday that he could not go with him as he had no authority in law to do what he was trying to do. Mr. Monday left, but shortly afterwards, an officer from the known to me as Captain Rwakirate Moses came with some armed men who were putting on civilian clothes, and they instructed Hon. Okwir to get up and go with them. Hon. Okwir refused to comply informing them that they were not authorized under the law to arrest him.
36. About 15.00 hours, Col. Kasirye Gwanga arrived and at the same time a large group of armed soldiers arrived and forcefully arrested Hon. 0kwir and dumped him on a Pick-up truck and armed soldiers sat on his head, on his chest and on his legs. The vehicle drove off as other soldiers were kicking him.
37. I have since talked to him on telephone and listened to him speak on radio programmes where he has described what happened to him since the violent arrest at Entebbe. He told me that he was taken to offices of Military intelligence on Kikante Road and interrogated for eight hours. He was only asked questions about our campaigns and the statement he had made to the press the previous evening while at my home. He also informed me that President Museveni telephoned and talked to him while he was at the headquarters of Military Intelligence and asked him what led him to support me, and what he thought of the team I was within the campaigns.
38. That President Museveni then proposed to Hon. Okwir that he would offer a job to him at the Uganda High Commission in London and sponsor him to take further studies provided he cooperated and left my campaign immediately and continued to cooperate with him. Major Okwir informed me that he accepted this offer as a way to safety, and was then required to write a statement disassociating himself from my campaign team and reaffirming the earlier statement which he had signed at the International Conference Centre. He said he was taken to Parliament where he read out the statement then driven to his residence where he stayed under close guard while arrangements to move him and his wife to London were being finalized. He rang me while at his house to give me the above story, and I have also talked to him since his arrival in London.
39. That I verily believe Hon. Qkwir was particularly tortured by my opponents because Hon. Okwir was heading the Youth Task Force and it was well known that I enjoyed tremendous popular support among the youth and students countrywide.
40. That the 1st Respondent had made repeated statements justifying the actions of the Military including PPU including the Presidential Election Process.
41. Following all these events, I cancelled my schedule campaign trip to Adjumani and other Districts in West Nile and I lost 3 days of campaign and meanwhile I sought audience with the Electoral Commission to complain about the escalating level of violence, intimidation and harassment of my agents and supporters and I did so when I met the Electoral Commission on 22nd February, 2001.
42. That following this meeting with the Electoral Commission, the Electoral Commission reported to the 1st Respondent Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces appealing to him to restrain the army from interfering with the Presidential Election process and not to deploy the PPU where the President of Uganda Is not persona fly present. A copy of this letter is dated 24th February 2001, is herewith attached and marked “P. 13.”
43. That before this, on 20th February 2001, Deputy Chairperson of the Electoral Commission wrote to the Army Commander and the Inspector General of Police appealing to them to ensure that candidates’ campaigns continue without unnecessary interference. A copy of this letter is attached and marked “P.14.”
44. That contrary to the pleas of the Electoral commission the Army Commander addressed a press conference and issued a press statement 0n firming the Army’s involvement in the security of the Presidential Election process. A copy of this press statement dated 9th March, 2001, is herewith attached and marked “R 15.” Involvement in the security of the Presidential Election process. A copy of this press statement dated 9” March, 2002, is herewith attached and marked “R16.”
45. That the beginning of March 2001, the Inspector General of Police assured the public of security during and after the Presidential Election and this was reported in the Monitor News paper of 2nd March 2001, a copy of which is attached and marked “R 16.”
46. That on 7th March, 2001, 4 Presidential Candidates, Including myself wrote to the 2nd Respondent complaining about flaws In the Presidential Election process and this letter IS attached and marked, “P.1 7, and the 2nd Respondent’s reply dated 9th March, 2001, is attached and marked “R 18.” On March 9th 2001, the candidates again wrote to the 2nd Respondent and this letter is attached and marked “R 19.”
In reply to the 1st Respondent’s affidavit, the Petitioner said in his affidavit in reply dated 5-4-2001:
“18. In reply to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Respondent’s affidavit, the 1st Respondent used the Presidential Protection Unit a facility attached to and utilized by his office as the President to assault, intimidate, threaten, and to consedisharmdry on a breach of the peace throughout the campaign period in the entire Rukungiri District and thereby interfere with my campaign and electioneering activities in the District of Rukungiri to the prejudice of my candidature. The 1st Respondent during the Presidential campaigns retained the use of security facilities including attached to the President as per Statutory Instrument dated 29-12-2000 herewith attached as
19. That in Rukungiri my home district where I had massive supports the armed Presidential Protection Unit was deployed there by the 1st Respondent during the campaign period to unduly influence my supporters through intimidation, force and threats of force of violence to support and vote for the l’ Respondent against me, resulting in one incident, in the death of one Baronda Johnson my supporter and injuring up to 15 of my supporters and many others injured over the campaign periods a copy of the Death Certificate is herewith attached and marked “P.29.)
The paragraphs of the Petitioner’s affidavit I have just reproduced relate to the role of the army and the PPU in the Presidential Election under consideration. The affidavit relates to other matters as well, which I shall defer for the moment for consideration later in this judgment.
The Petitioner’s affidavit is based on his knowledge information, and belief. Where deponed on information he disclosed the source of his Information, and where it is based on belief, he gave the grounds of his belief, otherwise most of what he said was based on knowledge. I find the affidavit admissible.
The Chart indicates that the Petitioner’s affidavit is rebutted by the affidavits of several witnesses, filed in opposition to the Petition. Some of the rebuttal affidavits relate to the role of the Army and PPU. Others relate to other matters; while others partly concern the Army and PPU and partly concern other matters. For now, I shall first consider those rebutting parts of the Petitioner’s affidavit concerned with the Army and PPU.
In his affidavit supporting his Answer to the Petition, the 1st Respondent denied all the allegations made against him in the Petition. His affidavit then went on to say:

“3. That I instructed my campaign agents to mobilize for my election on the basis of my election manifesto entitled “Consolidating the Achievements of the Movement” only and I have no knowledge of their having acted contrary to the law, conduct I did not consent to or approve of on the part of any person.

4. That because the Police were inadequate and the security situation so required, the Government decided to and did deploy, security forces throughout the Country to keep peace and order, but I have no personal knowledge of, nor did I, in my capacity as President of the Republic of Uganda, receive any reports of intimidation of voters by soldiers and paramilitary personnel at Polling Stations.
5. The elections were conducted under conditions of freedom and fairness and under secure conditions as a result of sufficient deployment of security forces throughout the Country by the Government.
9. That the deployment of security forces was done by the Government for the purposes of securing law and order throughout the Country. I did not appoint any military officers to take charge of security of the Presidential Election process as stated in paragraph 3(2) (c) of the Petition. I know that Government deployed security forces throughout the Country for security and preservation of law and order.
10. That I did not directly or indirectly organize groups of persons under the Presidential Protection Unit or Major Kakooza Mutale with his Kalangala Action Plan personnel and whatever such persons are stated to have done in paragraph 3(2)(d) of the Petition was without my knowledge and consent or approval
11. That I never threatened to put the Petitioner six feet deep as stated in paragraph 3(2)(e) of the Petition, prior to the election process in my capacity as President and Commander In Chief, I warned that any person who interfered with the army would be put six feet deep.
12. That I made this statement at the National Conference of the Movement on the 27^th November, 2000, and I made It for security, good governance and order of the Country and to deter subversion in the army. I did not make this statement for the purposes stated in paragraph 3(2) (e) of the Petition.
13. That no illegal practices or offences were committed by myself personally or through my agents and sympathizers or through any person whatsoever with my knowledge and consent or approval.
14. That concerning Hon. Major (Rtd.) Okwir Rwaboni M.P, I state that 1 have perused and understand the affidavit of Hon. Major (Rtd.) Okwir Rwaboni dated 23rd March 2001, in support of the Petition. It is not true that on 21st February, 2001, I had a telephone conversation with Hon. Major (Rtd.) Okwir Rwaboni where I tried to convince him to leave “that wrong group.”
15. That on 21st February, 2001, I had a telephone conversation with Hon. Major (Rtd.) Okwir Rwaboni where I asked him whether it was Major General Tinyefuza or Hon. (Rtd) Okwir Rwaboni himself who was telling the truth about the voluntariness of the statement he had signed stating that he had withdrawn from the Petitioner’s Task Force.
16. That Hon. Major (Rtd) Okwir Rwaboni told me that the Monitor News Papers report which alleged that he had stated he was forced to withdraw from the Petitioner’s Task Force was false. I asked him what he intended to do and he replied that he wanted to go abroad for medical treatment and rest. I asked him how he would be able to maintain himself abroad as a Member of Parliament of Uganda. I advised him to notify the Speaker of Parliament so that he continues to draw his salary until he returned home.”
I have already reproduced paragraphs 5 to 11 of Rwaboni’s affidavit in connection with denial of his right to vote. The whole of the affidavit is, in fact, relevant to denial of his right to vote and to the role of the military and PPU in the elections under consideration. It will be recalled that the affidavit, was made as a Statutory Declaration in London, to which Rwaboni had fled. The remaining part of his affidavit reads:
“1. I was illegally arrested, detained, tortured and intimidated during the Presidential campaigns in Uganda that ran from the 8th January 2001, and 12th March, 2001 and at this time I was In the National Campaign Team.
2. That on 19th January 2001, I was confronted by members of the Presidential Protection Unit in Rukungiri District, (Kanungu Trading Centre) and prevented from consulting with our supporters. I was there to meet the supporters of the Presidential Candidate Dr. Kizza Besigye between 10.00 a.m. and 12.00 noon. I was surrounded together with my colleagues and our supporters. We were then held hostage by members of the Presidential Protection Unit (PPU) who were under the command of one Captain Ndahura. I managed to leave the scene but the PPU and Police kept the people hostage for the next two hours. They later followed me to the venue of my next meeting — Rugyeyo Sub-County, Kinkizi County, Rukungiri District.
3. That on the same day members of the said force — PPU surrounded me and other supporters of Col. (Rtd.) Dr. Kizza Besigye In Rugyeyo Sub County, Kinkizi County, Rukungiri District immediately. About 12 soldiers ruled out their guns, cocked them ready to shoot, pointed them at me and ordered me to leave the District. The same soldiers under the command of the said Capt. Ndahura assaulted Dr. Besigye’s supporters and arrested others as they forcefully dispersed the gathering.
4. On l9th of February 2001, I was made against my will to sign a document announcing my withdrawal from the Elect Besigye Task Force (EBTF). I was made to sign this document by two Senior UPDF Officers, Maj. General David Tinyefuza and Lt. Col. Noble Mayombo at Nile Hotel, Kampala.”
The affidavit of Hon. Winnie Byanyima M.R shows that Rwaboni informed her that he had been coerced to withdraw from the Petitioner’s Task Force. It also corroborates the Petitioner’s account of how Rwaboni was arrested at Entebbe Airport. The affidavit is also relevant to allegations of harassment and intimidation of the Petitioner’s supporters by supporters of the 1 Respondent and UPDF soldiers. She starts by saying what she was informed, giving sources of her information. She said in her affidavit dated 23-03-2001:
“3. That in my travels through the Country I encountered reports from our agents of harassment and intimidation by Resident District Commissioners, District Internal Security Officers, UPDF soldiers, para-military personnel and other armed personnel organized by candidate Museveni and his agents and that in particular:
a) I was informed by Mr. Wagyega, Mbale District Task Force Chairman that two days prior to our campaign in Mbale Municipality candidate Besigye Kiiza’s posters were torn down by gangs organized and led by the Resident District Commissioner and Hon. James Wapakhabulo and further that several of our supporters were beaten up and intimidated by Major kakooza Mutale and his band of armed men and by the time of the rally the entire municipality was gripped by fear.
b) I was informed by Dr. Ekure one of candidate Besigye’s supporters that Haji Okodel the L.C 5 Chairman and agent of candidate Museveni moved around Kumi Town intimidating people not to attend candidate Besigye’s rally.
c) I was informed by one of our agents that Hon. Grace Akello together with L. C. Ill officials of Amuria accompanied by armed personnel tore down all candidate Besigye’s posters before our rally in Amuria and at the time of the rally I did not see a single poster in Amuria Town.
d) In Kiboga Town I arrived to find the Town gripped by fear and witnessed a heavy presence of UPDF soldiers and this had the effect of scaring away some voters from attending our campaign rally and instead they miserably watched us from the shop verandas.
e) In Sembabule candidate Besigye’s campaign agents informed me about the intimidation and threats meted out to them by the Resident District Commissioner Ms. Margaret Baryehuki together with the District Internal Security Officer.
f) In Kyenjonjo, I was informed by candidate Kizza Besigye ‘s campaign coordinator for Toro Region Mr. Sam Kawamara that there was heavy shooting at night by UPDF soldiers to scare people and that in the morning a pick-up with candidate Museveni’s posters went ahead warning people not to attend candidate Besigye’s rally. I saw the pick-up moving around the Town after we had arrived.
g) In Kamwenge, I and other task force members who had gone to address a rally were confronted by a crowd of people who shouted at us and tried to block our way. I was told by the Kamwenge team that this was the work of Hon. Capt. Byaruhanga.
h) When I addressed a women meeting in Kabale Municipality, the women confided in me that they feared for their lives as they had been intimidated by the Resident District Commissioner and requested me to have the R.D.C. transferred.
i) At Ishongoro, our local teams told me that the night before the rally Hon. Capt. Guma Gumisiriza led a gang of people who tore down candidate Besigye’s posters and warned people of trouble if they dared to attend Besigye’s rally the following day.
4. That sometime on 18th February, 2001, I received a telephone call from Hon. Major Okwir Rwaboni, the Chairman of the National Youth Desk of the elect Besigye Task Force requesting me to provide him with transport to come from Kampala and meet candidate Besigye in Fort Portal.
5. That I told Major Okwir to waft in Kampala since I and candidate Besigye were traveling back to Kampala the next day but he insisted that the issues he wanted to discuss were very urgent and I promised to send him a vehicle but failed to do so.
6. The following day (19 February 2001), 1 was shocked to receive reports that Major Okwir Rwaboni had resigned from the Elect Kizza Task Force.
7. That very day in the evening Hon. Major Okwir turned up at our home in Port Bell, Kampala where he narrated how he had been pressurized and coerced by Maj. Gen. Tinyefuza, Lt. Col. Mayombo, Col. Kasirye Gwanga and other Senior army Officers to make a statement of withdrawal from EBTF but he stated that since he had escaped from them he was back into the EBTF although he feared for his life.
8. The following day (20th February, 2001), candidate Besigye, Hon. Major Rwaboni, myself and other members of EBTF went to Entebbe International Airport to board a plane to Adjumani where we were scheduled to address a campaign rally.
9. That while at Entebbe International Airport Hon. Major Rwaboni Okwir was in my presence forcefully abducted from the VIP by a big number of soldiers. I noticed that Capt. Moses Rwakitarate of the PPU seemed to be in charge of the whole operation which lasted about 5 hours.
10. That Hon. Major Rwaboni Okwir was never charged with any offence or produced in any Court but has since fled into exile. I have talked to him several times since.”
The affidavit of Maj. Gen. Odong (Jeje), the Army Commander is indicated in the Chart to have rebutted the Petitioner’s affidavit. He deponed in his affidavit dated 28-03-2001 that as the Army Commander, his duty included overall command and direction of the UPDF. As such he is a member of the National Security Council (NSC), which is enjoined by the Constitution to oversee and advise the President on matters relating to National security.
Sometime in January, 2001, at one of its routine meetings, the NSC noted that there were indications that election related crimes were on the increase. Intelligence Reports he received from various parts of the Country pointed to the same trend. On that basis, he briefed the Commander in Chief (President of the Country) and indicated to him the need to put a mechanism to handle the situation. About the same time, the Minister of Internal Affairs pointed out to him the inadequacies of the Police Force in relation to the task ahead and requested that Police be augmented by the UPDF. He further briefed the Commander — in — Chief and suggested the formation of a joint security task force to oversee, handle, and ensure peace and security during the electoral process.
Such a joint task force was formed, comprising of the Police, the Army, the LDUs and the Intelligence agencies under the Chairmanship of the Army Commander, deputised by the Inspector General of Police and the Director General of Internal Security Organization. The joint security task force constituted a joint command structure whereby in each District, the District Police Commander was the overall in charge of security in the District, and armed forces were put on alert for assistance as and when need arose. The formation of such a joint security task force was not a new phenomena in this Country as the same course of action had always been resorted to whenever need arose. For examples, are the 1987, currency exchange exercise; the 1989 expansion of the NRC elections; the 1992 Local Council elections; the 1996 Presidential elections; the 200 Referendum exercise; and the visit of the United States President, Bill Clinton.
For the foregoing reasons, Maj. Gen. Odong said, it was not true to state in paragraph 3(20(c) of the Petition that the 1st Respondent appointed the deponent and other Senior Officers to take charge of the election process for partisan purposes. It was also not true that the army was deployed all over the country and that such deployment resulted into many voters voting the 1st Respondent under coercion or fear or that abstained from voting. To the best of his knowledge, save where they were registered to vote, members of the Armed Forces never went to any Polling Station for the alleged purposes or at all. It was not true that the 1st Respondent organized groups under the PPU to use force or violence against the Petitioner as alleged fl paragraph 3(2) of the Petition. He wished to state that members of the PPU which was a specialised unit for the protection of the President were deployed in Rukungiri in advance to his visit to the area sometime in January 2001 and their stay was necessitated by his planned return to the area, having taken into consideration the safety of the person of the President and the general peace and security in the area. The allegations about members of the PPU harassing, intimidating, or in any way misbehaving against the Petitioner and/or his supporters contained in paragraphs 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29 and 40 of the Petitioner’s affidavit are not true.
In response to paragraphs 18 — 29 of the Petitioner’s affidavit, Jeje stated that there was a clash between groups of people in Rukungiri after the Petitioner had addressed a public rally and in the process, some members of the groups pelted stones, bottles and sticks at the soldiers and in the process of self- defence, one person was fatally wounded by a stray bullet.
Jeje further deponed that is not true that he or any other official of the UPDF was partisan or that he or any official of the UPDF carried out their duties in such a manner as to promote the candidature of the 1st Respondent as alleged or at all. Regarding Rwaboni’s affidavit Jeje said that it was not true that Rwaboni had ever been forced by anybody to make or write any statement denouncing the Petitioner in his presence.
Without saying so, the affidavit of John Kisembo dated 28-03-2001, in effect, rebutted the Petitioner’s affidavit. His affidavit is similar to that of Odongo Jeje in matters concerning the Joint Security Task Force. Repetition of what he said is, therefore, unnecessary except, what he said differently.
He said that it was the requirement of the law that the Electoral Commission ensured that the Police and other relevant organs of the State provided adequate security for the conduct of the elections and the protection of the candidates. Given the magnitude of the electoral process of the Presidential Elections of 2001, it was found that the Uganda Police which comprises about 15,000 personnel were not going to be adequate to Police about 18,000 Polling Stations and the related election activities in addition to its ordinary day to day duties.
Although there was a joint security task force at District level under the command of the District Police Commander, policing of the Polling Stations and tallying Centres during the electoral process was only under the Uganda Police, save for the army barracks for which the Electoral Commission had made other arrangements. It was not true that the Uganda Police abdicated its duties or that the policing of the electoral process was taken over by the UPDF.
There were no security related incidents reported during the whole period of the electoral process save for a few electoral malpractices which are under investigations or in the courts of law and he has not received any reports involving the 1st Respondent.
The affidavit of Major Gen. David Tinyefuza dated 4-4-2001, rebuts the affidavits of the Petitioner, Rwaboni and Hon. Winnie Byanyima, M.R, about Rwaboni’s arrest in considerable detail. This is what he said:
“1. THAT I am a male adult Ugandan of sound mind serving at the rank of Major General in the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces.

2. THAT I am a Senior Advisor to the Commander — in —Chief of the Uganda Armed Forces.

3. THAT I have perused the petition of Col. (Rtd.) Dr. Kizza Besigye and the Affidavits of Hon. “Major (Rtd.)” Okwir Rwabwoni and of Hon. Winnie Byanyima both dated 23d March 2001 in support of the said Petition and I wish to reply thereto as hereunder.

4. THAT it is not true as stated in the Petition, paragraph 4 of the affidavit Hon. “Major (Rtd)” Okwir Rwabwoni (hereinafter called “Hon. Okwir”) and paragraph 7 of Hon. Winnie Byanyima, that on the 19th February 2001, he was made by Lt. Col. Noble Mayombo and myself to sign a document at Nile Hotel, Kampala announcing his withdrawal from the Elect Besigye Task Force (hereinafter referred to as “EBTF”)

5. THAT it is not true that on 21st February, 2001, Hon. Okwir was forced to make a statement disassociating himself from EBTF in my presence as stated in paragraph 8 of the said affidavit of Hon. Okwir.

6. THAT in the ordinary course of my duties as Senior Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, I detail and receive from various persons acting under lawful covert circumstances, reports concerning security matters within Uganda.

7. THAT on numerous occasions Hon. Okwir was assigned by me the task of covertly gathering information and reporting to me matters of highly sensitive nature relating to the security of and in Uganda.

8. THAT on numerous occasions Hon. Okwir did report to me on matters of a highly sensitive nature relating to the security of and in Uganda.