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Japan DA

The US Japan alliance is strong now.

Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart February 9, 2016 Congressional Research Service “The U.S.-Japan Alliance” The U.S.-Japan Alliance Emma Chanlett-Avery Specialist in Asian Affairs Ian E. Rinehart Analyst in Asian Affairs https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf

The asymmetric arrangement of the U.S.-Japan alliance has moved toward a more balanced security partnership in the 21st century. Unlike 25 years ago, the SDF is now active in overseas missions, including efforts in the 2000s to support U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and the reconstruction of Iraq. Japanese military contributions to global operations like counter- piracy patrols relieve some of the burden on the U.S. military to manage every security challenge. Advances in SDF capabilities give Japan a potent deterrent force that complements the capabilities of U.S. forces, for example in anti-submarine warfare. Due to the co-location of U.S. and Japanese command facilities in recent years, coordination and communication have become more integrated. The United States and Japan have been steadily enhancing bilateral cooperation in many aspects of the alliance, such as ballistic missile defense, cybersecurity, and military use of space. As Japan sheds its self-imposed restrictions on the use of military force (in particular the constraints on collective self-defense) and the two countries implement their revised bilateral defense guidelines, the opportunities for the U.S. and Japanese militaries to operate as a combined force will grow. Alongside these alliance improvements, Japan continues to pay nearly $2 billion per year to defray the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan. In 2015, Japan and the United States agreed to maintain Japan’s host nation support at approximately the same level for the next five years.

Japan does not like US cooperation with China on climate because it fears Chinese assertiveness

Funabashi 2016, Yoichi, chairman of the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation and former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun., 6-10-2016, "The gap in 'China policies'," Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/10/commentary/japan-commentary/gap-china-policies/#.V4ezVxUrK02

Within the U.S. government, there are two schools of thought on the proper approach to China. On one hand, the Pentagon and the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) are pushing for a stronger and clearer response to China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, the White House would like to stabilize relations with China across all areas, including cybersecurity and the global environment. Many in the U.S. government have come to believe that deepening cooperation with China on global issues such as climate change will directly benefit their management of other regional geopolitical challenges. Apparently Secretary of State John Kerry still belongs to this school of thought. Japan, however, believes that even if these sets of issues could be linked, it is doubtful that it would encourage China to exercise restraint in the geopolitical sphere. Indeed, Japan acutely feels nakedly exposed to China’s assertiveness and is concerned that this unease is not sufficiently shared by the Obama administration. The Abe administration’s approach to China is similar to that of the Pentagon and PACOM, while the White House feels hemmed in by the Pentagon-Japan alliance. The fact that the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) and Japan’s National Security Secretariat (NSS) are not working well together at present is a reflection of this state of affairs.

US-China cooperation on economic policy undermines the Alliance.

Funabashi 2016, Yoichi, chairman of the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation and former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun., 6-10-2016, "The gap in 'China policies'," Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/10/commentary/japan-commentary/gap-china-policies/#.V4ezVxUrK02

The U.S. and China seem to have begun coordinating on macroeconomic policy. Were that to be the case, a U.S.-China G-2 currency system could form that would cause deep concern in Japan. Specifically, it is quite possible that Federal Reserve Board Chairwoman Janet Yellen and People’s Bank of China Gov. Zhou Xiaochuan have agreed to avoid significantly raising interest rates or drastically devaluing the Chinese yuan, respectively — at least through the U.S. presidential election in November. Any such arrangement would limit Japanese attempts at further quantitative easing, and as a byproduct, constrain the yen’s depreciation. Within this context, the challenge for Japan will be to refrain from jumping to the conclusion — or giving the impression — that a “new Cold War” is underway between Japan and China, or between China and the U.S. The Obama administration has taken the two-pronged approach to China of “engagement and balance.” When the U.S. and Chinese heads of state met alongside the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, the substance of their meeting was the exchange of a sort of “war-renouncing oath,” as they agreed that “the U.S. and China will avoid military confrontation.” Japan equally has no choice but to pursue a policy of “engagement and balance” with China. Meanwhile, the challenge facing the U.S. is to ensure that the next administration will not reduce its involvement in the Asia-Pacific region in order to ingratiate itself to protectionist and isolationist forces in domestic politics. And for both the U.S. and Japan, the ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership by Congress and the Diet must serve as the opening act to the full-scale development of their rebalancing strategy. China has always been the thorn in the side of the Japan-U.S. relationship. In the 20th century, the prewar Manchurian Incident of 1931 and President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China in the postwar period shook Japan-U.S. relations to the core. If China does set out to decisively upend the regional order and balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, a shared perspective on China, and a shared approach, will be a matter of life and death for both Japan and the U.S.

Lack of confidence is US security guarantees causes Japanese proliferation.

Fitzpatrick, 16, Mark Executive Director, The International Institute For Strategic Studies-Americas, previously US Department of State Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Routledge, 2/12/2016. http://www.cpdnp.jp/pdf/disarmament/WS%20flyer-2016.02.12.pdf.

The single-most important variable affecting Japan’s continued non-nuclear posture is the credibility of the US extended deterrence. Credibility is a highly subjective criterion, depending on perceptions more than reality. Over the years, US credibility in the eyes of some Japanese variously has been threatened by US loss in Vietnam, force reductions in the region, the Guam Doctrine, withdrawal from the Philippines, inability to prevent China from becoming nuclear-armed and failure to stop North Korea’s nuclear programme. Polls in 1969, 1971 and 1996 found that fewer than half of Japanese respondents believed the US would come to Japan’s defence if it were exposed to extreme danger.140 Most recently, the credibility of the nuclear umbrella has come under question due to US defence budget austerity, a reduced emphasis on nuclear deterrence, the failure to stop Russian aggression in Ukraine and Obama’s decision not to employ military force against Syria after it ignored his red line on chemical weapons use. Japanese strategists understand that the Ukraine and Syria cases did not involve US security commitments. More analogous to Japan’s situation would be US failure to come to the assistance of a defence partner, such as if China threatened Taiwan. The concerning scenario need not involve conflict. If Washington were to cut Taiwan adrift in deference to greater US national interests, as some American pundits have argued (see Chapter Three), it would give the Japanese reason to question the durability of the US commitment in their own case. The fact that the US does not have a treaty commitment to defend Taiwan, as distinct from the commitment to Japan, would probably be lost in terms of perceptions. China’s ever-growing dominance as a US trade partner already gives rise to nightmares in Japan that the US might someday choose China over Japan.

Impact—Japanese prolif causes arms races in Asia – leads to nuclear war

Cimbala 15 (Stephen J. Cimbala professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine. “Nuclear Weapons and Anticipatory Attacks: Implications for Russia and the United States,” 16 March 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2015.998121)

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.6 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals, but short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially ‘strategic’ effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first-strike vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the 20th century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).7 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passé, on account of the emergence of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and its encouragement of information-based warfare.8 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.9 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare. For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto.10 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the present century have made several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states’ nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quo-oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions. These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the ‘first nuclear age’ roughly corresponding to the Cold War.11 Pessimists who predicted that some 30 or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the Cold War was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union—especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence ‘rationality’ according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war elsewhere.12 In addition, powers favoring nuclear containment in general may fall short of disagreement in specific political cases. As Patrick M. Morgan has noted, there is ‘insufficient agreement among states on how serious it (nuclear proliferation) is and on what to do about it’.13

2NC/1NR

1. The US and Japan are extremely close; they agree that China is abusive to their environment.

2. A BIT to China will show that the US will not stand up with Japn to forcefully enstrict environmental regulations. A BIT alone doesn’t solve.

3. Japan and China economies zero-sum; boost to China open-trade hurts japan and thus, alliance

4. The damage to the alliance and substantial increase in cooperation with China makes Japn distrust US security sphere in Asia

Any change in the US’s Asia posture triggers Japanese fears, causes military build-up

Anderson 16 [In “Anarchic threats and hegemonic assurances: Japan’s security production in the postwar era," on irap.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/05/26/irap.lcw005.full, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 16, Issue 2, 3/3/16. Nicholas Anderson received a B.A. in political science and international relations from the University of British Columbia and a M.A. in security studies from Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. He is pursuing his doctoral at Yale and is a visiting researcher at Georgetown University]

The second key variable shaping the context of decision for Japanese policymakers is the strength of commitment from their external, security-providing patron (Cha, 2000). Changes in commitment strength are operationalized here as US policies that either ameliorate or exacerbate abandonment fears among Japan’s ruling foreign policy elite. The sort of policies that have this effect are treaty commitments, changes in regional military personnel or spending, policy or doctrinal change, personal and public verbal assurances, and changes in regional partnerships and alliances. The US’s commitment is seen as critical because it allows Japan to forego military spending and to pursue other goals, such as economic development or domestic welfare spending. 3 Threats, assurances, and the production of security Thus, the primary factors shaping the context of security production in Japan are perceptions of external threat and the assurances of their patron. These are the independent variables of the argument that follows. In examining when Japan decides to provide more or less its own defense, we should expect the level of external threat to be positively related to its propensity to produce security. That is, an abundance of factors which are perceived as threatening by leading members of Japan’s foreign policy elite – such as territorial conflict, regional military buildups, or missile tests – should lead them to be more inclined to produce security. When these external threats subside, there should be less support for independent security production. We should expect the opposite to hold true for patron assurances: higher levels of US security commitment should result in lower levels of Japanese security production. That is, an abundance of US behaviors which ameliorate abandonment fears among Japan’s policymakers – such as firm alliance commitments, verbal assurances, and military spending – should lead to less support for security production. Yet when the United States decides to provide less certain guarantees, Japan should be incentivized to produce more of its own security. Finally, greater or lesser variation in either of these causal variables (threats; assurances) should lead to more or less variation in outcomes (security production). With the level of external threat being positively related to the propensity of Japan to produce security, and patron security commitments being negatively related to the propensity for it to do so, the combination of the two should lead to distinct patterns of behavior. For analytical purposes, these two independent variables can be conceived of as dichotomous: external threats can be seen as either ‘higher’ or ‘lower’, and patron security commitments either ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’. Obviously both variables are far more subtle and varied than these dichotomies allow, but this analytical simplification enables us to construct a highly useful and reasonably accurate explanatory typology. As can be seen above (see Fig. 1), this typology combines these two dichotomous independent variables to determine Japan’s net level of security, and the three resultant modes of behavior that follow from it. And the start and end dates of the empirical cases that will follow are determined by important shifts in one or both of these two key variables.

5. The probability of our impact is too high to not vote negative. High chance of miscalc from proliferation.

Proliferation causes Asian war—conflicts with China and North Korea, extinction

Beauchamp 16 [In “Trump’s comments on Japanese nukes are worrisome — even by Trump standards,” http://www.vox.com/2016/3/31/11339040/trump-nukes-japan-south-korea, 3/31/16. Z ack writes about all of the things that are not American things. He previously edited a section on political thought at ThinkProgress and, before that, contributed to The Dish]

For example, if either country does decide to build nuclear weapons, it will take that country some time to develop its program, and to build enough of an arsenal to serve as a reliable deterrent. During this time, adversaries such as China or even North Korea would have an incentive to try to disrupt that development to maintain their nuclear superiority. "You have a Trump presidency ... and he decides to pull out troops from Japan and South Korea, you have Japan and South Korea potentially racing to develop nuclear weapons without the benefit of US troops being there," Miller says. "That provides a lot of incentive for countries in the region like China or North Korea to try to stop that process." As Bell puts it, ominously, "We're talking about the remote possibility of an actual nuclear war between Japan and China." That possibility, it is worth stressing, is indeed extremely remote. The risk is not that, for example, China would simply launch a nuclear war against Japan, which would be far too dangerous and costly to be worth it. Rather, the risk is that, for example, China might try to bully or threaten Japan out of developing nuclear weapons, and that in a period of tension, this bullying could potentially spiral out of control into a full-blown conflict neither side actually wanted. And there are other risks. According to scholars, successful nuclear deterrence results in something called the stability/instability paradox: The fact that major wars are unlikely makes countries feel safer in engaging in small provocations against one another, knowing that nuclear deterrents make those small provocations unlikely to escalate to full-blown war. Consider, for instance, the South and East China Seas — areas where Japan, South Korea, and China have territorial disputes. If the former two powers are nuclear-armed, and unrestrained by the United States, the chances of low-level conflict could go up. "Certainly, we would be worried about these sort of lower-level, stability-instability paradox type things," Bell says. That's not an exhaustive list of things that could happen if Trump were elected and followed through on these policies. Since no one can really know what will happen, there's no sense in listing every single hypothetical possibility. These examples, rather, illustrate just how serious the ideas we're discussing are. It is very easy to detach ourselves from the potential consequences of a Trump presidency: to see his candidacy as clownish, and simply assume that his outlandish policy ideas would never be implemented. But Trump is the leading Republican candidate; it is time to take his ideas seriously. And nothing is more serious than nuclear weapons.

Accidents are likely and go global – outweighs intentional wars

Hayes 15 (Peter, Executive Director for the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, “Ending Nuclear Threat via a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone,” http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/ending-a-nuclear-threat-via-a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapons-free-zone/)

Deterrence, compellence, and reassurance are credible depending on the resolve and capability of the state projecting nuclear threat, and the ability of the threatened state to respond in kind or asymmetrically, to offset these threats. All three types of effects are almost always present in a nuclear threat made by one party to another; sometimes all three effects may be in play at the same time, either in the intention of the state projecting nuclear threat, or in the perception of the state that is the target of the threat, or in the perceptions of third parties. It is rare for the intentions and perceptions of these two or more affected states to be the same. Therein lies much of the risk of misperception, misunderstanding, and inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. This risk arising from miscalculation is compounded by the accidental risks of nuclear war because of technical or computer malfunctions, misinterpreted signals of an impending attack, problems in communication systems, problems in fail-safe and control systems, and cybernetic organizational feedbacks that could lead to loss-of-control of conventional and nuclear forces. 3. Nuclear Threat in Northeast Asia All states in the Northeast Asia region fall under the shadow of the threat of nuclear war. Sometimes, this threat is intended, manipulated, and calibrated, by a variety of signals—nuclear testing, delivery system testing, visible transiting deployments, forward deployment in host countries, declaratory doctrines, operational doctrines, political statements, propaganda statements, sharing via deliberate open line communications, or even what is not done or said at a particularly tense moment. Nuclear threat is one of the bases of interstate relations between the long-standing NWSs in this region, the United States, China, and Russia, forming a triangle of strategic nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance that operates continuously and generally; and sometimes becomes part of an immediate confrontation. Accordingly, these types of threat are termed general and immediate in western literature.[3] Thus, general and strategic nuclear deterrence may be said to operate to ensure that NWSs avoid actions that might suggest that they could involve nuclear weapons and intentions to use them—thereby creating a cautionary behavior that operates all the time.