Verbatim Mac

Xi DA 1NC

1. Xi’s rivals will maintain a political stalemate to prevent Xi from engaging in his most radical policies. External shocks to the system break the stalemate.

Pei 05/06/16 (Minxin Pei, is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, May 6, 2016 8:13 pm, Minxin Pei -- Two ways to break Beijing's political stalemate, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Two-ways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate?page=2)

Perhaps the most unsettling development is the loss of personal security felt by the party's most senior leaders. Previously, they could count on the balancing among various factions to safeguard their personal security since the post-Tiananmen decision-making process was consensus-driven. But today, with the dismantling of the entire post-Tiananmen order, the personal security of most top leaders depends almost solely on their relations with the dominant leader. However upset they may feel about Xi's political supremacy, his rivals in Beijing have no direct means to undermine his authority, let alone conspire to unseat him. The party's strict rules on personal interaction and close surveillance of senior officials make it suicidal for plotters to meet and coordinate. The absence of a clear alternative who could act as the ringleader further complicates the calculations of Xi's foes. Most importantly, his rivals themselves belong to different warring factions and are thus hopelessly divided. The only recourse for Xi's competitors at the top is feigning compliance while subtly distancing themselves from his policies through silence and inaction. The most recent evidence is the very public failure of most of China's influential political figures, including Politburo members and a majority of provincial party chiefs, to embrace the designation of Xi as the new "core" of the party's leadership. This designation is no mere semantics. In the post-Mao era, when Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin received this official designation, it formalized their political supremacy. In the months ahead, as the crucial 19th party congress -- scheduled for the fall of 2017 -- approaches, this inchoate force can be expected to mount a series of actions to frustrate Xi's moves to further consolidate his power. Specifically, they are likely to vigorously oppose any attempts to stack the deck in the Politburo and its powerful standing committee or to revise the party's rules on age and term limits. Few alternatives Such political subterfuge cannot possibly fool Xi. But he has few options. He could go all out by putting another mega-tiger -- a very senior incumbent or retired official -- in jail on corruption charges. But this high-risk move could precipitate a complete breakdown of elite unity and even open political warfare with his enemies. At the same time, it is inconceivable for him to concede to their unspoken demands of sharing power and restoring collective leadership. Without an external shock of some kind, this systemic political stalemate is hard to break. At the moment, both Xi and his rivals have placed their hopes on what happens to the Chinese economy. Xi's political foes, meanwhile, are eager to see further erosion of his political capital as the result of continuing economic weakness. They calculate that if Xi's economic report card to the 19th party congress next year is deemed unsatisfactory, he will be less able to control the leadership succession process and even be forced to seek reconciliation with the bureaucracy.

2. Xi uses US engagement to display parity with the US – that allows him to accelerate his agenda

Li and Xu 14 (Cheng Li is senior fellow and director of the John L. Thornton China Center at The Brookings Institution, where Lucy Xu serves as a research assistant. He is also a director of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. Li focuses on the transformation of political leaders, generational change and technological development in China. “Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over the ‘New Type of Great Power Relations’”, 12/4/14, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/05-chinese-pessimism-american-cynicism-great-power-li-xu) //ZB

As China-watchers were quick to realize, President Obama did not even once mention the “New Type of Great Power Relations” on his recent trip to Beijing.∂ It has been widely noted that President Xi Jinping, however, repeatedly promoted the framework first at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July, and then at the summit with Obama in mid-November. After the summit, China’s official news agency reported that Xi and Obama “pledged to push forward a new type of major-country relations,” and that “[Obama] is willing to… lift the new type of major-country relationship between China and the U.S. to a higher level.” Xinhua implied that Obama not only accepts, but also actively supports, the “New Type” concept. In fact, the Obama administration has been cautiously staying away from it.∂ Why is China so keen on a “New Type of Great Power Relations” and on creating perceptions of endorsement by Obama? And why is the U.S. reluctant to adopt it? What are the reasons behind such contrasting views –– Chinese enthusiasm and American cynicism –– towards this seemingly benign concept?∂ When Xi Jinping defined the “New Type of Great Power Relations” in his meeting with Obama at Sunnylands last year, he described it in three points: 1) no conflict or confrontation, through emphasizing dialogue and treating each other’s strategic intentions objectively; 2) mutual respect, including for each other’s core interests and major concerns; and 3) mutually beneficial cooperation, by abandoning the zero-sum game mentality and advancing areas of mutual interest.∂ Embedded in the “New Type of Great Power Relations” is a nation’s hope for an international environment more conducive to its development. From the rise and fall of its many dynasties to its forced opening up to the West in the wake of the Opium Wars, China has always seen itself as a civilization deeply entangled and affected by history. Recognizing the historically recurring clashes between an existing great power and an emerging power, China looks to the “New Type” framework to avoid historical determinism and to seek a less-disruptive rise in an increasingly integrated world.∂ At the same time, China wants to be viewed as an equal. By using the term “Great Power” to primarily, if not solely, refer to China and the United States, China aims to elevate itself to a level playing field. Obtaining U.S. support of the concept would imply Uncle Sam’s recognition of China’s strength and power. This is what China’s official media sought to show when it suggested Obama’s support of the concept: parity and respect between the two countries.∂ Furthermore, Chinese leaders believe that the “New Type of Great Power Relations” enables the two powers to establish a new code of conduct in line with China’s interests. By emphasizing the respect of “core interests” as an element of the concept, China pushes its territorial claims to the forefront. This is China’s attempt at more clearly demarking where the United States and other neighboring countries need to toe the line. American adoption of the term would imply that the United States recognizes China’s “core interests.” This mutual respect of each other’s national interests is at the core of China’s aspirations.∂ The Chinese media avidly reporting on Obama and Xi’s joint endorsement of the concept suggests that there are also domestic reasons driving the “New Type of Great Power Relations.” Although the Chinese concept is an inherently U.S.-geared proposal, the domestic goals of such a concept should not be overlooked. From a Chinese perspective, the United States is the only superpower in today’s world that has the capacity to contain China’s rise. By strengthening China’s view of itself as a recognized and respected power, Xi Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under CCP leadership and gain political capital to consolidate his own power at home.

3. Xi’s agenda crushes CCP stability by angering other party members and attempting to consolidate military power.

Phillips 5/3 Tom Phillips, Beijing correspondent for the Guardian, “China's Xi Jinping denies House of Cards power struggle but attacks 'conspirators',” The Guardian, 3 May 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/04/china-xi-jinping-house-of-cards-attacks-conspirators

Xi Jinping has rejected claims that a “House of Cards power struggle” is raging at the pinnacle of Chinese politics, but claimed “conspirators” were attempting to undermine the Communist party from within. In a speech published in Beijing’s official newspaper this week, the Chinese president warned that the presence of “cabals and cliques” inside the party risked “compromising the political security of the party and the country”. “There are careerists and conspirators existing in our party and undermining the party’s governance,” Xi said, according to the People’s Daily transcript of his comments. “We should not bury our heads in the sand and spare these members but must make a resolute response to eliminate the problem and deter further violations.” The speech comes at a time of growing speculation over possible factional struggles within the 88 million-member Communist party that Xi has led since late 2012. As evidence of those rifts, experts point to recent moves by Xi to rein in the influential Communist Youth League, which is the power base of former president Hu Jintao and current prime minister Li Keqiang. This week it emerged that the Youth League’s budget had been slashed by more than 50% following a damning investigation into its activities by Xi’s anti-corruption agents. Experts also see Xi’s decision last month to take on the title of commander-in-chief of China’s joint battle command centre as a potential indicator of trouble at the top. Since coming to power Xi has amassed an unusual plethora of official titles including general secretary of the Communist party, president of the People’s Republic of China, chairman of the central military commission, leader of the national security commission and head of the leading group for overall reform. One academic has dubbed him the “chairman of everything”. Roderick MacFarquhar, a Harvard University expert in elite Communist party politics, said: “Xi Jinping’s donning of uniform and giving him his new military title is a warning to his colleagues that he has the army behind him. Whether he actually has or not, one doesn’t know. But that is his bulwark, as it was Mao’s.” However, MacFarquhar said the new title could be a sign of weakness rather than strength, noting that not even Mao Zedong had accumulated such a glut of titles. “Chairman Mao never needed titles. Everyone knew who was in charge,” he said. Xi has made a high-profile anti-corruption campaign one of his administration’s key missions, disciplining hundreds of thousands of officials, including top party and military figures. But experts say the war on corruption has generated discontent among officials, caused political [stalemate] paralysis and fuelled suspicions Xi is using the campaign as a pretext to purge his political enemies. In his recent speech, Xi denied those charges and vowed to “step up” the anti-corruption drive, according to Xinhua, China’s official news and propaganda agency. “We must make it clear that our party’s fight against corruption is not a snobbish affair that discriminates between different people, and it is not a House of Cards power struggle,” Xi said. Andrew Wedeman, a political scientist who is writing a book called Swatting Flies and Hunting Tigers: Xi Jinping’s War on Corruption, said continuing to pursue the campaign carried severe risks for China’s leader. “There is a certain point where the elite would want to wind this down because at the end of the day – as perhaps suggested by the revelations in the Panama Papers – there is enough guilt to go around among the leadership that if you really push this thing too far then an awful lot of people would be in trouble. “Given the extent of corruption, you can only push this thing so far without doing serious damage to the integrity and the unity of the party,” Wedeman added.

4. CCP collapse causes regional instability and nuclear war

Yee and Storey 13 Herbert - Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. Ian - Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality 2013 p. 15

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario—nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.