Xi DA 2NC/1NR Overview Overview: DA Outweighs and Turn the Case
1. CCP collapse causes nuclear war—that’s Yee and Story—political disintegration destabilizes the region and makes nuclear weapons use likely. It happens FASTER than the aff because the link is perception based—the aff makes it look like XI successfully achieved parity with the US which allows him to force through political reforms—that’s a lot quicker than the aff’s ability to integrate a BIT with China and solve warming. Default to faster t/f — we can always adapt to the changes of global warming over time but you should vote to live to fight another day 2. Turns BIT cooperation—CCP instability makes a solid relationship with the US impossible—XI will also sell out the US to make himself look better. Which means cooperation on solar and wind would be impossible
AT: Uniqueness 1. No reforms now – our 1NC Pei evidence says Xi’s rivals will frustrate moves to consolidate his power—only an external shock can break the political stalemate
2. Despite Xi’s power he can’t get his reforms through in the status quo
Pei 05/06/16 (Minxin Pei, is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, May 6, 2016 8:13 pm, Minxin Pei -- Two ways to break Beijing's political stalemate, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Two-ways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate?page=2)
Observers of the Chinese economy can be forgiven for their puzzlement over an apparent paradox. While China undoubtedly now has its most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, the country's economic policy appears to be defying the wishes of the new strongman, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Take, for example, the progress of radical structural reform, which is part of Xi's blueprint for an ambitious overhaul of the economy. Since its much heralded unveiling in late 2013, little structural reform has happened. Worse still, in recent months, the Chinese government has adopted policies obviously aimed at maintaining short-term growth at the expense of long-term structural reform. For instance, instead of forcing zombie companies into bankruptcy and channeling resources into consumption, Beijing has once again opened the credit spigot to fund fixed-asset investments -- mainly infrastructure -- and keep moribund companies, most of them state-owned, on life support. In the first quarter alone, according to the People's Bank of China, Chinese banks increased their loans by a mammoth 4.67 trillion yuan ($720 billion), a new record. The immediate impact of this monetary stimulus might have propped up the Chinese economy, as reflected in the recovery of gross domestic product. However, the long-term consequences will be ugly. China's debt-to-GDP ratio will increase, overcapacity will continue to plague the economy and the eventual cost of recapitalizing the financial system will explode. Behind this apparent disconnect between Xi's power and the difficulties he has encountered in executing his reform plan lies a political stalemate which, if prolonged, could produce even worse economic uncertainties and consequences. One manifestation of this stalemate -- bureaucratic paralysis -- is well-known. Xi's anti-corruption drive has frightened and alienated many Chinese officials. Denied what they consider legitimate rewards for toiling for the party, resentful bureaucrats have been on a work stoppage in the hope that deteriorating economic performance will force Xi to call off the anti-corruption campaign and return to business as usual.
3. No reforms coming now---Xi’s doubling down but can’t break the deadlock
Ignatius, 2016 David, Washington Post Writers Group, “A Rough New Year for Xi Jinping” 1/15 http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/01/15/a_rough_new_year_for_xi_jinping_129323.html
But Xi is off to a bad new year. The Chinese economy is slowing sharply, with actual GDP growth last year now estimated by U.S. analysts at several points below the official rate of 6.5 percent. The Chinese stock market has fallen 15 percent this year, and the value of its currency has slipped. Capital flight continues, probably at the $1 trillion annual rate estimated for the second half of last year. But China's economic woes are manageable compared with its domestic political difficulties. Xi's anti-corruption drive has accelerated into a full-blown purge. The campaign has rocked the Chinese intelligence service, toppled some senior military commanders and frightened Communist Party leaders around the country. Jittery party officials are lying low, avoiding decisions that might get them in trouble; the resulting paralysis makes other problems worse. "Xi is in an unprecedentedly powerful position. But because he has dismantled the tools of collective leadership that had been built up over decades, he owns this crisis," says Kurt Campbell, who was the Obama administration's top Asia expert until 2013. He worries that Xi will "double down" on his nationalistic push for greater power in Asia, which is one of the few themes that can unite the country. "To scale back shows weakness, which Xi can ill afford now," says Campbell. Chinese sometimes use historical parables to explain current domestic political issues. The talk recently among some members of the Chinese elite has been a comparison between Xi's tenure and that of Yongzheng, the emperor who ruled China from 1722 to 1735. Yongzheng waged a harsh campaign against bribery, but he came to be seen by many Chinese as a despot who had gained power illegitimately. "A lot of historical events of that period are repeating in China today, from power conspiracy to corruption, from a deteriorating economy to an external hostility threat," comments one Chinese observer in an email. Xi's political troubles illustrate the difficulty of trying to reform a one-party system from within. Much as Mikhail Gorbachev hoped in the 1980s that reforms could revitalize a decaying Soviet Communist Party, Xi began his presidency in 2013 by attacking Chinese party barons who had grown rich and comfortable on the spoils of China's economic boom. Many of Xi's rivals were proteges of former President Jiang Zemin, which meant that Xi made some powerful enemies. David Shambaugh, a China scholar at George Washington University, was an outlier when he argued last March that Xi's reform campaign would backfire. "Despite appearances, China's political system is badly broken, and nobody knows it better than the Communist Party itself," he wrote in The Wall Street Journal. "The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun." This political obituary may prove premature. But there's growing agreement among China analysts that Xi's crackdown has fueled dissent within the party and beyond, leading to further repression. Xi is a decisive strongman, so he may fare better than Gorbachev, but the structure underneath him is fragile. China's recent economic turmoil may be an inevitable result of the transition Xi is trying to steer. He wants to move China away from a debt-laden bubble economy, which depended on ever-growing exports, toward a more sustainable, consumer-driven model. His problem is that the Chinese system is bloated by inefficient, state-owned enterprises that survive on debt and subsidies. Xi has found it impossible, so far, to cut them loose. "It's no easy thing to reboot a $10 trillion economy," says a former American official who knows the top Chinese leaders well. "Xi is trying to do it all himself," at a time when "everything is changing at once." This month's financial rout showed the dangers for a China caught between a truly free market and continuing government control. An ill-conceived "circuit-breaker" that kicked in when the stock market fell 7 percent, and government orders to big investors not to sell, probably accelerated the sell-off and the flight of capital. Conflicting signals on whether the central bank wanted a stronger or weaker currency shook the market's confidence. Xi has been pressing the free-market accelerator at the same time he pumps the political brake. For a China halfway pregnant with reform, the past month's turbulence showed that these fundamental contradictions may not be sustainable.
AT: Link Extend Li and Xu 14 — Obtaining U.S. support would imply Uncle Sam’s recognition of China’s strength and power. Which will accelerate Xi’s Agenda
China acknowledges the fact that engagement with the US is the best way to serve its own interests and prevent an economic collapse, acting accordingly will boost Xi’s image
Heath 15 (Timothy R. Heath serves as a Senior International Defense Research Analyst with the RAND Corporation. He previously served as a senior analyst on China issues in the U.S. Pacific Command's China Strategic Focus Group. Mr. Heath has over fifteen years’ experience as a China specialist. He earned his M.A. in Asian Studies at the George Washington University and speaks fluent Mandarin. “Xi’s Bold Foreign Policy Agenda: Beijing’s Pursuit of Global Influence and the Growing Risk of Sino-U.S. Rivalry”, 3/19/15, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43674&cHash=cd89a67fc61159ee2f89cbd44f361102#.V4j1O8eQTZM) //ZB
Central Directives: The Focus on Reforming International Rules and Laws∂ Central directives remain critical to the Party’s exercise of political power. Directives are instructions provided through the Party’s network of cells and organizations to communicate the central leadership’s intentions regarding policy. Party officials at all levels then oversee its implementation through the articulation and enforcement of state policy. Mirroring patterns observed in domestic policy, the main theme of directives on foreign policy has focused on international structural reform to facilitate the nation’s continued rise. At a recent Politburo study session, President Xi provided directives to “actively take part in the formulation of international economic and trade rules” and for the country to “strive for the institutional right to global economic governance” (Xinhua, December 6, 2014). The focus on structural reform manifests in both economic and political dimensions.∂ As China’s economy moves toward a structure more like that of the United States and other developed nations, trade relations are growing less complementary and more competitive. Chinese economists assess that future growth will depend heavily on the degree of the Asia-Pacific region’s integration with China’s economy, as well as issues related to global economic governance and international trade rules (see, for example, the report by the State Council Development Research Center) (China Economic News, September 5, 2014). While the pursuit of sustained economic growth provides the principal driver, political and security concerns remain an important factor.∂ Beginning around 2012, China stepped up criticism of the U.S. alliance system in Asia while it increased efforts to establish and refine alternative security organizations, mechanisms and structures to complement China’s domination of the region’s economy. Reflecting the urgency of these structural reforms, Chinese officials now regard policy toward Asia as the priority direction (The Diplomat, December 22, 2014).∂ At the international level, China finds an entire network of norms, principles, alliances and frameworks that offer, at best, an ambivalent reception to China’s arrival as a great power. Chinese officials have accordingly stepped up efforts to shape global principles and norms to de-legitimize the ability of the United States to initiate military attacks without UN sanction. In initiating a debate on the meaning of the United Nations Charter, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that military attacks initiated without United Nations approval should be regarded as “illegal and illegitimate.” He described President Xi’s proposal on “building a new type of international relations” as an “important innovation and development” of the UN Charter (Xinhua, February 23).∂ The Quest for Political and Moral Authority∂ Because China regards protection of its growing array of economic, political and security interests as inseparably linked to reform of the international order, one of the most pressing tasks confronting its leaders is the accumulation of the political capital needed to push through the systemic and structural reforms that Beijing desires.∂ Chinese leaders have settled on a variety of means to bolster the nation’s international authority. They have indicated a willingness to increase the nation’s contributions on tough global problems, such as climate change and dispute mediation in Africa. China is also cultivating political support among developing countries and neighbors in Asia. But Chinese leaders have also promoted policies to position the country as a more moral and appealing alternative to the West, which Chinese media denigrate as corrupt, hypocritical and inept (Washington Post, March 2). Applied to foreign policy, this has meant a highly moralistic policy in which Chinese officials attempt to balance considerations of generosity, justice and fairness with economic considerations (Xinhua, October 24, 2014; Xinhua, November 30, 2014).∂ Implications: China Joins the Great Power Game∂ Development has long served as the primary focus of Chinese strategy and policy. Indeed, every major Central Committee gathering since 1997 has upheld the 15th Party Congress’ directive that “development remains the central task.” What is new in the Xi administration’s policy focus is the recognition that changes to the structure of the international economic and political order are now required to sustain development.∂ This carries important consequences for Chinese policy making. As China has grown powerful, its economic interests are gaining in strategic importance. While acknowledging that sovereignty and the political system are “more fundamental and more important” to the nation’s survival, one Chinese scholar argued that their place in the order of national strategic priorities should be pushed back due to a lack of pressing external threats. The greater danger, he observed, now stems from “political and social unrest generated by an economic recession” (Modern International Relations, January 2013).∂ This danger may have always been China’s most pressing, but with its economy more deeply integrated with the global economy than ever before, preventing recession increasingly requires China to exert greater influence on the international order and in countries in which its economic interests are substantial. Chinese leaders appear to recognize this imperative and are developing policies accordingly. The complexity of the situation is such, however, that the country most capable of facilitating China’s efforts in this regard is also a country that stands to lose considerably from such expansion—the United States. Small wonder, then, that the same Chinese scholar concluded that the contest over the rules of the international order will be the most important part of future Sino-U.S. relations in coming years.∂ In its focus on initiatives such as the New Silk Road, also known as the “one belt, one road,” and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Xi administration’s policies appear to have similarly prioritized the consolidation and protection of economic interests. The good news is that this development suggests the leadership will continue to have little appetite for military conflict. While crises over maritime and other disputes will continue to plague China’s relations with its neighbors, the risk of escalation to major war remains low. However, for both the United States and China, the imperative to sustain growth will put intense pressure on policy makers to secure and defend economic gains. Due to the fact that the two economies are growing less complementary and more similar in structure, trade relations will become more competitive than in the past. Moreover, because influencing the international order is increasingly essential to gaining the economic edge, this competition will unavoidably turn increasingly political. The danger remains that the search for economic leverage could spur political and military confrontation.∂ For years, the United States has pursued a strategy designed in part to “bind” China to the international order in a manner that reinforces, rather than subverts, U.S. authority. The hope has been to “bind China to existing international system of norms, rules, and institutions” and “shape its evolving interests and values through bilateral and multilateral engagement” (Washington Quarterly, Winter 2005/2006). Beijing’s policy shift shows it intends to play a different game. In choosing to selectively adopt and shape those aspects of the international order that serve its interests and circumvent those that do not, Beijing is demonstrating that it understands the rules of great power behavior more perceptively than Western strategists may have anticipated. Washington will need to grasp the dynamics of the evolving situation just as deeply to effectively manage an increasingly competitive relationship.
AT: CCP resilient / no impact extend our 1NC Phillips evidence—Xi’s reforms splinter party cohesion and cause political purges—that undermines political stability, guaranteeing collapse—their resilience evidence doesn’t assume the crisis caused by unprecedented anticorruption efforts—rigid control has been the backbone of CCP stability for decades
2. Low threshold for an internal link – CCP stability on the brink and anticorruption reform pushes it over the edge
Shambaugh, 2015, professor of international affairs and the director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (David, “The Coming Chinese Crackup”, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198)
On Thursday, the National People’s Congress convened in Beijing in what has become a familiar annual ritual. Some 3,000 “elected” delegates from all over the country—ranging from colorfully clad ethnic minorities to urbane billionaires—will meet for a week to discuss the state of the nation and to engage in the pretense of political participation. Some see this impressive gathering as a sign of the strength of the Chinese political system—but it masks serious weaknesses. Chinese politics has always had a theatrical veneer, with staged events like the congress intended to project the power and stability of the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP. Officials and citizens alike know that they are supposed to conform to these rituals, participating cheerfully and parroting back official slogans. This behavior is known in Chinese as biaotai, “declaring where one stands,” but it is little more than an act of symbolic compliance. Despite appearances, China’s political system is badly broken, and nobody knows it better than the Communist Party itself. China’s strongman leader, Xi Jinping, is hoping that a crackdown on dissent and corruption will shore up the party’s rule. He is determined to avoid becoming the Mikhail Gorbachev of China, presiding over the party’s collapse. But instead of being the antithesis of Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Xi may well wind up having the same effect. His despotism is severely stressing China’s system and society—and bringing it closer to a breaking point. Predicting the demise of authoritarian regimes is a risky business. Few Western experts forecast the collapse of the Soviet Union before it occurred in 1991; the CIA missed it entirely. The downfall of Eastern Europe’s communist states two years earlier was similarly scorned as the wishful thinking of anticommunists—until it happened. The post-Soviet “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan from 2003 to 2005, as well as the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, all burst forth unanticipated. China-watchers have been on high alert for telltale signs of regime decay and decline ever since the regime’s near-death experience in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Since then, several seasoned Sinologists have risked their professional reputations by asserting that the collapse of CCP rule was inevitable. Others were more cautious—myself included. But times change in China, and so must our analyses. The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun, I believe, and it has progressed further than many think. We don’t know what the pathway from now until the end will look like, of course. It will probably be highly unstable and unsettled. But until the system begins to unravel in some obvious way, those inside of it will play along—thus contributing to the facade of stability. Communist rule in China is unlikely to end quietly. A single event is unlikely to trigger a peaceful implosion of the regime. Its demise is likely to be protracted, messy and violent. I wouldn’t rule out the possibility that Mr. Xi will be deposed in a power struggle or coup d’état. With his aggressive anticorruption campaign—a focus of this week’s National People’s Congress—he is overplaying a weak hand and deeply aggravating key party, state, military and commercial constituencies.
3. We don’t have to win total CCP collapse to access the impact—increased military assertion causes regional instability
Brzezinski ’12 [Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS counselor and trustee and cochairs the CSIS Advisory Board, the Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University, cochair of the American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus, member of the International Advisory Board of the Atlantic Council, national security adviser to Jimmy Carter, was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power. Ebook.]
In the case of China, however, public disaffection is not likely to express itself through a massive quest for democracy but more likely either through social grievances or nationalistic passions. The government is more aware of the former and has been preparing for it. Official planners have even identified publicly and quite frankly the five major threats that in their view could produce mass incidents threatening social stability: (1) disparity between rich and poor, (2) urban unrest and discontent, (3) a culture of corruption, (4) unemployment, and (5) loss of social trust.4 The rise of nationalistic passions could prove more difficult to handle. It is already evident, even from officially controlled publications, that intense Chinese nationalism is on the rise. Though the regime in power still advocates caution in the definition of China’s standing and historical goals, by 2009 the more serious Chinese media became permeated by triumphalist assertions of China’s growing eminence, economic might, and its continued ascent to global preeminence. The potential for a sudden rise in populist passions also became evident in outbursts of demonstrative public anger over some relatively minor naval incidents with Japan near disputed islands. The issue of Taiwan could likewise at some point ignite belligerent public passions against America. Indeed, the paradox of China’s future is that an eventual evolution toward some aspects of democracy may be more feasible under an intelligent but assertive leadership that cautiously channels social pressures for more participation than under an enfeebled leadership that overindulges them. A weakened and gradually more mediocre regime could become tempted by the notion that political unity, as well as its own power, can best be preserved by a policy that embraces the more impatient and more extreme nationalistic definition of China’s future. If a leadership fearful of losing its grip on power and declining in vision were to support the nationalist surge, the result could be a disruption of the so far carefully calculated balance between the promotion of China’s domestic aspirations and prudent pursuit of China’s foreign policy interests. The foregoing could also precipitate a fundamental change in China’s structure of political power. The Chinese army (the People’s Liberation Army) is the only nationwide organization capable of asserting national control. It is also heavily involved in the direct management of major economic assets. In the event of a serious decline in the vitality of the existing political leadership and of a rise in populist emotions, the military would most likely assume effective control. Paradoxically, the likelihood of such an eventuality is enhanced by the deliberate politicization of the Chinese officer corps. In the top ranks party membership is 100%. And like the CCP itself, party members in the PLA see themselves as being above the state. In the event of a systemic crisis, for the Communist Party members in uniform the assumption of power would thus be the normal thing to do. And political leadership would thus pass into the hands of a highly motivated, very nationalistic, well-organized, but internationally inexperienced leadership. An intensely nationalist and militaristic China would generate its own self-isolation. It would dissipate the global admiration for China’s modernization and could stimulate residual anti-Chinese public sentiments within the United States, perhaps even with some latent racist overtones. It would be likely to give rise to political pressures for an overly anti-China coalition with whatever Asian nations had become increasingly fearful of Beijing’s ambitions. It could transform China’s immediate geopolitical neighborhood, currently inclined toward a partnership with the economically successful giant next door, into eager supplicants for external reassurance (preferably from America) against what they would construe as an ominously nationalistic and aggressively aroused China. Since the United States has been militarily deployed on the basis of treaty commitments in Japan and South Korea for several decades, how Beijing conducts itself in its immediate neighborhood will impact directly the overall American-Chinese relationship. Broadly speaking, the current strategic goals of the rising but still cautiously deliberate China appear to be driven by the following six major objectives:
4. Their defense doesn’t assume the lack of civilian control over the PLA—makes miscalc and escalation likely
Scobell 9 (Dr. Andrew, Professor of International Affairs and Director of the China Certificate Program – Texas A&M University, “Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China’s Peaceful Rise?”, Parameters, Summer, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/09summer/scobell.pdf)
The actions suggest a lack of civilian control, although after the fact they have been explained as acts of deterrence. The reins of civilian control over the PLA seem to be quite loose. At the very least there is poor communication and coordination with key civilian entities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The result appears to be a roguish PLA that makes crisis management all the more difficult and heightens the potential for worrisome misunderstandings and misperceptions. While these explanations may help one to make sense of the words and deeds of the Chinese military, they do not provide much relief or re assurance. First, the risk of miscalculation between the United States and China may be higher than many assume. It is dangerous for American policymakers and analysts to consider US resolve in isolation. This strategy presumes that China’s perception of the strength of US resolve in and of itself will be enough to deter Beijing from military action.50 The logic is flawed. For China, US resolve on the question of Taiwan is viewed as lim ited, especially in comparison to other issues, and smaller than China’s own unshakeable resolve. For Chinese analysts, accurately assessing US resolve is tricky. While Beijing can have a high degree of confidence in its own degree of resolve, it is much harder to judge Washington’s. Second, once a crisis or confrontation develops, the potential for unintended escalation is significant. The militaries of the United States and China continue to think about and plan for a possible conflict over Tai wan. This does not mean that a war is inevitable, but it does mean that in a crisis, escalation might be rapid and difficult to control.51 At least there is improved communication between the two militaries; a hotline linking the Pentagon with the Central Military Commission was established in early 2008.
5. Even if there’s not a total collapse, the process generated by reform causes regional instability
Tessman 09 (Brock F. Tessman, Assistant Professor of International Affairs in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia, Faculty Associate at both the Center for International Trade and Security and the Globis Center at the University of Georgia, Asian Security 5.3 The Evolution of Chinese Foreign Policy: New Incentives with Slowing Growth, p. InformaWorld)
While a stable, fully democratized China may be less likely to adopt a confrontational foreign policy agenda, today's PRC is, at best, in the very early stages of liberalization. For many pessimists, it is precisely the process of democratization that will lead to conflict between China and the rest of the system. The problem, according to Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, is an imbalance between challenges posed by political participation of the masses and the inadequacy of democratic institutions that govern that participation.23 Under pressure to garner votes, leaders (and rival political elite) have incentives to use nationalist rhetoric and militaristic means to cultivate mass appeal or to distract the public from unpopular developments at home. The opportunities for China are abundant: confronting Japan on its war record in China; pressuring Taiwan when it comes to reincorporation to the PRC; making bold claims to control of undersea oil and natural gas resources in the China Sea; challenging American influence in regions like Latin America; fostering a crisis with one of its smaller neighbors (as it has done in the past) like Vietnam; or citing the US financial system as the culprit behind the economic slowdown hitting Chinese factories. From an American perspective, the start-and-stop process of democratization might actually highlight the sheer size of the social, cultural, and political gulf between the PRC and the United States. If a crisis were to develop between the PRC and one of its democratic neighbors, the visibility of China's democratic shortcomings might actually lead the American public to push Washington hard when it comes to countering Chinese policies. In summary, the existing literature on political liberalization suggests that the transition from autocracy to democracy can actually be a rocky one.
6. Aggressive PLA factions will provoke adventurist war in Asia
Krawitz 3 (Howard, Senior Foreign Service Officer and Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow – Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, “Modernizing China's Military: A High-Stakes Gamble?”, Strategic Forum, 204, December, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF204/sf204.htm)
The aftereffects of major changes in the historic social contract remain a large and potentially dangerous unknown. Conceivably, substantive change could create conditions leading to political competition between civilian and military authorities or wrangling over limited resources. It might promote within the PLA itself a rise in divisive issues similar to those now plaguing Chinese society in general as a result of two decades of uneven economic reform: intensified urban-rural distinctions, rifts between haves and have-nots, and increasing divisions between the educated and uneducated, the privileged and unprivileged. For the PLA parent entity, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), modernization represents a double-edged sword. It promises the party a more effective mechanism for maintaining domestic primacy and enhancing international prestige. Conversely, the modernization process could equally well create a military increasingly unwilling to be seen as a tool for enforcing party dicta or policing internal security--in effect, working against party interests. The PLA could evolve into a national military with loyalties to the state as a whole rather than to one specific political element within the state (the CCP), as is the case today. Or the PLA itself could even develop into a distinct political element, brokering power and seeking organizational advantage at other political entities' expense. Changes wrought through PLA attempts to carry out a revolution in military affairs have potentially far-reaching implications for the Asia-Pacific region and especially for U.S. security interests. A more professional PLA could become a safer, less insular military that is cognizant of the need for disciplined action and measured responses, bound by well-understood rules of engagement and, overall, a more potent force for preserving regional stability. But a darker version of this picture also exists: the distinct possibility that enhanced capability and self-confidence will encourage the PLA to evolve into an aggressive, nationalistic entity fueled by a radical Chinese militarism that encourages risk-taking and adventurism, both in the region and in dealings with the United States. In a worst-case domestic scenario--unlikely but not inconceivable--PLA factions could end up vying for power. The resulting chaos could easily produce a dangerous state of instability, if not outright anarchy, that would threaten all of Asia.
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