Zero Days Negative mi 7

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1nc china modernization

Modernization won’t turn violent despite nationalism

Dyer 9 [Gwynne, BA in History from Memorial University of Newfoundland in 1963; an MA in Military History from Rice University, Houston, Texas, in 1966; and a PhD in Military and Middle Eastern History at King's College London, Jakarta Post, Mar 29, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/03/12/china-unlikely-engage-military-confrontation.html] //khirn

Given America's monopoly or huge technological lead in key areas like stealth bombers, aircraft carriers, long-range sensors, satellite surveillance and even infantry body armor, Goss's warning is misleading and self-serving. China cannot project a serious military force even 200 miles (km) from home, while American forces utterly dominate China's ocean frontiers, many thousands of miles (kilometers) from the United States. But the drumbeat of warnings about China's ""military build-up"" continues. Just the other week U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was worrying again about the expansion of the Chinese navy, which is finally building some amphibious landing ships half a century after Beijing's confrontation with the non-Communist regime on the island of Taiwan began. And Senator Richard Lugar, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that if the European Union ends its embargo on arms sales to China, the U.S. would stop military technology sales to Europe. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that the major U.S. defense review planned for this year will concentrate on the rising ""threat"" from China, or that this year for the first time the joint U.S.-Japanese defense policy statement named China as a ""security concern"", or that the Taiwan government urged the ""military encirclement"" of China to prevent any ""foreign adventures"" by Beijing. It comes as no surprise -- but it still makes no sense. China's defense budget this year is 247.7 billion yuan: Around US$30 billion at the official exchange rate. There are those in Washington who will say that it's more like $60 billion in purchasing power, but then there used to be ""experts"" who annually produced hugely inflated and frightening estimates of the Soviet defense budget. Such people will always exist: to justify a big U.S. defense budget, you need a big threat. It's true that 247.7 billion yuan buys an awful lot of warm bodies in military uniform in the low-wage Chinese economy, but it doesn't actually buy much more in the way of high-tech military systems. It's also true that the Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years: This year it's up by 12.6 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing, and it's about what you have to spend in order to convert what used to be a glorified peasant militia into a modern military force. It would be astonishing if China chose NOT to modernize its armed forces as the rest of the economy modernizes, and the end result is not going to be a military machine that towers above all others. If you project the current growth rates of military spending in China and the United States into the future, China's defense budget catches up with the United States about the same time that its Gross Domestic Product does, in the late 2030s or the early 2040s. As to China's strategic intentions, the record of the past is reassuring in several respects. China has almost never been militarily expansionist beyond the traditional boundaries of the Middle Kingdom (which do include Tibet in the view of most Chinese), and its border clashes with India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the first decades of Communist rule generally ended with a voluntary Chinese withdrawal from the disputed territories. The same moderation has usually applied in nuclear matters. The CIA frets that China could have a hundred nuclear missiles targeted on the United States by 2015, but that is actually evidence of China's great restraint. The first Chinese nuclear weapons test was forty years ago, and by now China could have thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on the U.S. if it wanted. (The United States DOES have thousands of nuclear warheads that can strike Chinese targets.) The Beijing regime is obsessed with economic stability, because it fears that a severe downturn would trigger social and political upheaval. The last thing it wants is a military confrontation with its biggest trading partner, the United States. It will go on playing the nationalist card over Taiwan to curry domestic political favor, but there is no massive military build-up and no plausible threat of impending war in East Asia.

Modernization is insulated from US policy

Holslag 9 [Jonathan, degree in political science @ Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Washington Quarterly, “Embracing Chiense Global Security Ambitions,” July 2009, http://www.twq.com/09july/docs/09jul_Holslag.pdf] //khirn

China increasingly acknowledges that its free ride is over, and that it will have to invest more in the protection of its economic interests. The debate about how to protect foreign interests with military means is only starting to take place. Ma Xiaojun of the International Institute of Strategic Studies of the Central Party School summarizes this predicament very clearly: it is the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens, and China is now confronted with a dilemma between its principle of non-interference and the interests that derive from its national development. Experts and officials invoke four main arguments in favor of a more proactive security policy. First, the economic competition from developed nations has compelled China to look for investment opportunities in unstable parts of the world, particularly in oil drilling and contract labor in sub-Sahara African and South Asia. Second, China is no longer expected to stand aloof when violence erupts. Given its status as an aspiring great power, while national governments with which it does business automatically ask for military aid and the international community requests mediation or sanctions, keeping a low profilethe traditional maxim of China’s diplomacy is no longer tenable. Third, Beijing recognizes that passing the buck to regional organizations or other powers is not an option. During a roundtable in Beijing in 2007, a group of senior military officers concluded that not only are these players incapable of delivering, but relying on other countries with their own interests would be strategically irresponsible. Finally, Chinese experts reckon that China should not rely on the United States or other regional powers for its security. While coordination is desirable, it cannot take for granted that these actors would refrain from containing China in the future. China, therefore, is modifying its posture on foreign security challenges. In a 2007 report from the Development Research Center of the State Council, two senior researchers of the State Council’s study department categorized non-traditional threats as a strategic economic challenge and pleaded for including a series of new measures in the national security strategy, according to China’s position as an ‘‘influential world power.’’ After the lethal attack on a Chinese oil facility in Ethiopia in April 2007, China Daily asserted: ‘‘China needs to consider new channels to protect overseas interests.’’ The article stressed that: China must break through traditional diplomatic thinking ... Only to rely on the traditional mode of high-level political contacts, only ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’ or the principle of self-restraint are insufficient to protect ourselves or to safeguard overseas economic interests and development.’’ In a July 2008 Xinhua article, experts went beyond this idea of self-defense, emphasizing that cooperation on asymmetric threats is also desirable for China’s international prestige but cannot be taken for granted. ‘‘Self-restraint does not work anymore,’’ it concluded, ‘‘China should develop its capabilities faster and show that while it becomes stronger, it does not threaten others, but rather contributes to a stable world.’’

Zero risk of China rise impacts

Beauchamp 13 [Zach. Editor of TP Ideas, Reporter for ThinkProgress. Masters IR from London School of Economics. “China has not replaced America — and it never will,” The Week, 2/13/14] //khirn

Many people seem to think it's simply a matter of when, not if, China takes the reins of world leadership. How, they think, can America's 314 million people permanently outproduce a population that outnumbers the U.S. by over a billion people? This facile assumption is wrong. China is not replacing the United States as the global hegemon. And it never will. China faces too many internal problems and regional rivals to ever make a real play for global leadership. And even if Beijing could take the global leadership mantle soon, it wouldn't. China wants to play inside the existing global order's rules, not change them. Start with the obvious military point: The Chinese military has nothing like the global reach of its American rival's. China only has one aircraft carrier, a refitted Russian vessel. The U.S. has 10, plus nine marine mini-carriers. China's first homemade carrier is slated for completion in 2018, by which time the U.S. will have yet another modern carrier, and be well on its way to finishing another. The idea that China will be able to compete on a global scale in the short to medium term is absurd. Even in East Asia, it's not so easy for China. In 2012, Center for Strategic and International Studies experts Anthony Cordesman and Nicholas Yarosh looked at the data on Chinese and Taiwanese military strength. They found that while China's relative naval strength was growing, Taiwan had actually improved the balance of air power in its favor between 2005 and 2012 — just as China's economic growth rate, and hence influx of new resources to spend on its military, was peaking. China's equipment is often outdated, and its training regimes can be comically bad. A major part of its strategic missile force patrols on horseback because it doesn't have helicopters. This isn't to deny China's military is getting stronger. It is. And one day, this might require the United States to rethink its strategic posture in East Asia. But Chinese hard power is nowhere close to replacing, or even thinking about challenging, American military hegemony. And look at China's geopolitical neighborhood. As a result of historical enmity and massive power disparities, Beijing would have a tough time convincing Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that its military buildup is anything but threatening. Consequently, the smaller East Asian states are likely to get over their mutual disagreements and stick it out together in the American-led alliance system for the foreseeable future. To the north and west, China is bordered by Russia and India. China fought each of them as recently as the 1960s, and both are likely to be threatened by any serious Chinese military buildup. Unlike the United States, bordered by oceans and two friendly states, China is surrounded by enemies and rivals. Projecting power globally is hard when you've got to worry about defending your own turf. But what happens when China's GDP passes America's? Well, for one thing, we're not really sure when that will be. Realizing that current growth rates were economically and ecologically unsustainable, the Chinese government cut off the investment spigot that fueled its extraordinary 10 percent average annual growth. Today, China's growth rate is about half of what it was in 2007. One analysis suggests China's GDP may not surpass America's until the 2100s. Moreover, China's GDP per capita is a long way off from matching Western standards. In 2012, the World Bank assessed China's at $6,009; the United States' was $57,749. The per-person measure of wealth matters in that it reflects the government's capacity to pay for things that make its citizens happy and healthy. That's where China's internal headaches begin. The Chinese government has staked its domestic political legitimacy on delivering rapid, massive improvements in quality of life for its citizens. As growth slows, domestic political dissent may rise. Moreover, growth's worst side effect to date — an unprecedented ecological crisis — is also a source of massive discontent. China has 20 of the world's 30 most polluted cities; environmental cleanup costs may hoover up 3 percent of China's GDP. That's throwing 30 percent of its yearly average growth (during the pre-2013 boom years!) down the drain. The mass death and poisoning that follow as severe pollution's handmaidens threaten the very foundations of the Communist Party's power. American University China scholar Judith Shapiro writes that environmental protests — which sometimes "shut down" huge cities — are "so severe and so central to the manner in which China will 'rise' that it is no exaggeration to say that they cannot be separated from its national identity and the government's ability to provide for the Chinese people." That's hardly the only threat to the Chinese economy. China's financial system bears a disturbing resemblance to pre-crisis Wall Street. Its much-vaunted attempt to move away from an unsustainable export-based economy, according to Minxin Pei, may break on the rocks of massive corruption and other economic problems. After listing a slew of related problems, Pei suggests we need to start envisioning a world of "declining Chinese strength and rising probability of an unexpected democratic transition in the coming two decades." But even if this economic gloom and doom is wrong, and China really is destined for a prosperous future, there's one simple reason China will never displace America as global leader: It doesn't want to. Chinese foreign policy, to date, has been characterized by a sort of realist incrementalism. China has displayed no interest in taking over America's role as protector of the global commons; that's altogether too altruistic a task. Instead, China is content to let the United States and its allies keep the sea lanes open and free ride off of their efforts. A powerful China, in other words, would most likely to be happy to pursue its own interests inside the existing global order rather than supplanting it. In 2003, Harvard's Iain Alastair Johnston analyzed data about Chinese hostility to the global status quo across five dimensions: participation in international institutions, compliance with international norms, twisting the rules that govern global institutions, making the transformation of global political power into a clear policy goal, and acting militarily on that objective. He found that China was "more integrated into and more cooperative within international institutions than ever before," and that there was "murky" evidence at best of intent to challenge the United States outside of them. Johnston reassessed parts of his argument in 2013 and concluded that not much had changed.

Turn: Chinese modernization good; solves war and security

Tuosheng 2014 (Zhang; Tuosheng is the Director of Research and Senior Fellow at the China Foundation for International Strategic Studies. “Impact of Chinese Military Development on Regional and Global Security,” May 8, 2014, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/impact-of-chinese-military-development-on-regional-and-global-security/#sthash.dUPF2IPd.dpuf ) //JRW

Impact on regional and global security First, Chinese military development has played a very positive role in the maintenance of global peace and security. For years, along with increased military capabilities, China has undertaken major responsibility in, and made great contribution to international peacekeeping, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. It has also become increasingly positive towards and made contribution to naval escort, sea-lane protection, anti-terror cooperation, prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear security, all of which have been welcomed by the international community. Second, China has also played a positive role in enhancing security in its neighborhood. In East Asia, the Chinese military has helped to decrease the possibility of conflict outbreak in two traditional hot spots: Taiwan Straits and the Korean Peninsula. In Central Asia, China has, through political and military cooperation, contained the challenges of three types of extremist forces, contributed to regional security and stability. In West Asia, China has given important support to the prevention of and combat of terrorist forces. Besides, the Chinese military has also taken an active part in disaster relief and medical assistance in the neighborhood, which is also welcomed by the relevant countries.

2nc china modernization

Modernization won’t cause war

Swaine 11 [Michael, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of the new book America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, Enough Tough Talk on China, The National Interest, September 26, 2011, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/enough-tough-talk-china-5934?page=1] //khirn

These days it is fashionable for pundits to point out the supposedly disastrous consequences for the United States that will result from China’s efforts to modernize its military. The latest variant of this argument was presented by Aaron Friedberg in The New York Times on September 4 and in his new book, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. The basic facts about China’s military buildup have been well known for years and are hardly disputed: Beijing is gradually acquiring the capability to interdict and possibly destroy U.S. ships and bases operating near China’s coastline, primarily using missiles, submarines, cyber warfare and ground-based satellite blinders. It’s also true that this development puts at risk Washington’s position as the predominant maritime power in that critical region. That is a legitimate issue that requires far more serious consideration than it has thus far received from most U.S. policy makers. The question is: what does China intend to do with its growing capabilities and how should Washington respond? Self-proclaimed realists such as Friedberg offer a relatively simple solution: The White House must recognize China’s buildup as an intended effort to eject the United States from Asia, convince the American public (and its allies) of the dire threat to hearth and home that it presents and, with public support in hand, plow untold additional defense dollars into maintaining an unambiguously superior military posture in the Western Pacific. Only then will Beijing give up its determined plans for regional dominance. In reality, there is little if any hard evidence to indicate that China’s strategic intent is to establish itself, in Friedberg’s words, as “Asia’s dominant power by eroding the credibility of America’s security guarantees, hollowing out its alliances, and eventually easing it out of the region.” If this is Beijing’s goal, the Pentagon has yet to discover it—and presumably not for lack of trying. The recently published annual Department of Defense report on the Chinese military asserts that Beijing’s ultimate military intentions in Asia and elsewhere are unknown. And privately, DoD analysts will acknowledge that the PLA is not currently acquiring the kinds of capabilities that would be required to project substantial power far from its shores and eject the United States from Asia. When confronted with such information, proponents of the “China is out to displace us” theory counter that Beijing’s strategy is so stealthy as to avoid detection, and that in any event, it is the so-called realist “logic” of China’s situation that demands such a strategy. According to this logic, Beijing has no choice but to seek to eject the United States from Asia to ensure its own security. So much for free will and the growing imperative both countries face to work together to solve worsening global problems, such as climate change. China’s strategic mindset is quintessentially defensive, largely reactive, and focused first and foremost on deterring Taiwan’s independence and defending the Chinese mainland, not on establishing itself as Asia’s next hegemon. Although it is not inconceivable that China might adopt more ambitious, far-flung military objectives in the future—perhaps including an attempt to become the preeminent Asian military power—such goals remain ill-defined, undetermined and subject to much debate in Beijing. This suggests that China’s future strategic orientation is susceptible to outside influence, not fixed in stone.

Chinese nuclear posture is stable

Alagappa 9 [Muthiah Alagappa, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center PhD, International Affairs, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2009, “The Long Shadow,” p.517-518] //khirn

The caution induced by nuclear weapons, their leveling effect, the strategic insurance they provide to cope with unanticipated contingencies, and general deterrence postures inform and circumscribe interaction among the major powers, reduce their anxieties, and constrain the role of force in their interaction. This enables major powers to take a long view and focus on other national priorities. Nuclear weapons feature primarily in deterrence and insurance roles. These roles are not necessarily threatening to other parties. Modernization of nuclear arsenals and the development of additional capabilities have proceeded at a moderate pace; they have produced responses but not intense strategic competition. The net effect has been stabilizing. The stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons in the Sino-American, Russo-American, and Sino-Indian dyads were discussed in Chapter 17. Here I will limit myself to making some additional points. Continuing deterrence dominance underlies China’s measured response to the U.S. emphasis on offensive strategies and its development of strategic missile defense. Perceiving these as undermining the robustness of its strategic deterrent force, China seeks to strengthen the survivability of its retaliatory force and is attempting to develop capabilities that would threaten American space-based surveillance and communications facilities in the event of hostilities. However, these efforts are not presented as a direct challenge to or competition with the United States. Beijing has deliberately sought to downplay the modernization of its nuclear force. This is not simply deception, but a serious effort to develop a strong deterrent force without entering into a strategic competition with the United States, which it cannot win due to the huge imbalance in military capabilities and technological imitations. Strategic competition will also divert attention and resources away from the more urgent modernization goals. A strong Chinese strategic deterrent force blunts the military advantage of the United States, induces caution in that country, and constrains its military option in the event of hostilities. Although Russia’s response to the U.S. development of offensive and strategic defense capabilities has been more vocal, it lacks specifics. Moscow also does not appear to have allocated significantly more resources to its nuclear force.

Modernization’s stable---it’ll stay within NFU and de-mated force structure

Lewis 9 [Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, Former executive director of the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Ph.D. in policy studies (international security and economic policy) from the University of Maryland, April 2009, “Chinese Nuclear Posture and Force Modernization,” in Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, eds. Hansell and Potter, online: http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op15/op15.pdf] //khirn

Although such increases are within China’s economic and industrial capabilities, especially if China were to deploy as many as five new ballistic missile submarines, it is also possible that China’s modernization will occur within the general parameters of its overall force posture, characterized by keeping warheads in storage and a restrictive nuclear no-first-use declaratory policy. China’s nuclear arsenal also stands out from the other nuclear powers not merely due to its small size, but also because China keeps its nuclear forces off alert and under the strictures of a no-first use pledge. By all indications, Chinese nuclear warheads are not normally mated to their missiles. Robert Walpole, then national intelligence officer for strategic and nuclear programs at the CIA, stated in 1998 that “China keeps its missiles unfueled and without warheads mated.”20 The warheads are stored at nearby, but separate, bases. Press reports of Chinese mobile ballistic missile exercises published by the state-run Xinhua News Agency indicate that nuclear warheads would be mated in the fi eld to mobile ballistic missiles before launch, similar to the procedure used by Soviet Mobile Technical Rocket Bases (PRTB, in Russian) stationed in East Germany and elsewhere during the Cold War.21 Anecdotal evidence from public descriptions of Chinese exercises and doctrinal materials suggest that Chinese forces expend considerable effort training to conduct retaliatory missions in the harsh environment after a nuclear strike. One Chinese textbook that is used to train cadres is forthright about the difficulty of maintaining a survivable retaliatory capability under a no-first-use doctrine. “According to our principle of no first-use of nuclear weapons,” the text Zhanyi Xue (Operational Studies) warns future commanders, “the nuclear retaliation campaign of the Second Artillery will be conducted under the circumstances when [the] enemy has launched a nuclear attack on us. … The personnel, position equipment, weapons equipment, command telecommunication system and the roads and bridges in the battlefi eld will be seriously hurt and damaged.”22 Whether Chinese leaders will change these features of their nuclear posture is difficult to predict. Western analysts have long predicted, for example, that China would eventually move away from a no-first-use posture—yet China’s political leaders continue to appear committed to the policy. In part, the judgment that China would dump no-first-use has been based on voluminous criticisms of no-first-use in Chinese military writings. The considerable ink spilled in Chinese military publications complaining about “no-first-use” is probably the best evidence that the policy remains in place.23 Dissatisfaction among some Second Artillery commanders with no-first-use might also explain the growing deployments of conventionally armed ballistic missiles, which are presumably subject to less doctrinal interference from senior leaders and Chinese nuclear weapons scientists.

Modernization is inherently slow and stable---it’s guided by their doctrine which rejects any offensive role for nuclear weapons---there’s no chance modernization turns offensive

Yuan 9 [Jing-Dong, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and associate professor of international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2009, “China and the Nuclear-Free World,” in Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, eds. Hansell and Potter, online: http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op15/op15.pdf] //khirn

China has long maintained that its nuclear weapons development is largely driven by the need to respond to nuclear coercion and blackmail. The role of nuclear weapons, in this context, is purely defensive and retaliatory, rather than war-fighting, as some western analysts suggest.19 Indeed, in the early years, China even rejected the concept of deterrence, regarding it as an attempt by the superpowers to compel others with the threat of nuclear weapons. This probably explains the glacial pace with which China introduced, modified, and modernized its small-size nuclear arsenals over the past four decades. Mainly guided by the principle that nuclear weapons will only be used (but used in a rather indiscriminate way) if China is attacked with nuclear weapons by others, nuclear weapons in China’s defense strategy serve political rather than military purposes.20 PLA analysts emphasize that the terms “nuclear strategy” and “nuclear doctrine” are rarely used in Chinese strategic discourse; instead, a more commonly used term refers to “nuclear policy,” which in turn is governed by the country’s national strategy. Hence, the deployment and use of nuclear weapons are strictly under the “supreme command” of the Communist Party and its Central Military Commission. Nuclear weapons are for strategic deterrence only; no tactical or operational utility is entertained. If and when China is under a nuclear strike, regardless of the size and the yield, it warrants strategic responses and retaliation.21 Chinese leaders and military strategists consider the role for nuclear weapons as one of defensive nuclear deterrence (ziwei fangyu de heweishe). Specifically, the country’s nuclear doctrine and force modernization have been informed and guided by three general principles: effectiveness (youxiaoxing), sufficiency (zugou), and counter-deterrence (fanweishe).22 China’s 2006 Defense White Paper emphasizes the importance of developing land-based strategic capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, but provides no specifics on the existing arsenal, the structure of the Second Artillery Corps (China’s strategic nuclear force) order of battle, or the projected size of the nuclear force. It indicates only that China will continue to maintain and build a lean and effective nuclear force. While Chinese analysts acknowledge that deterrence underpins China’s nuclear doctrine, it is more in the sense of preventing nuclear coercion by the superpower(s) without being coercive itself, and hence it is counter-coercion or counter-deterrence. Rather than build a large nuclear arsenal as resources and relevant technologies have become available, a path pursued by the superpowers during the Cold War, China has kept the size of its nuclear weapons modest, compatible with a nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrence.23 According to Chinese analysts, nuclear weapons’ role in China’s defense doctrine and posture is limited and is reinforced by the NFU position, a limited nuclear arsenal, and support of nuclear disarmament.

Reject hyperbole—the US has accounted for Chinese buildup

Ross 9 [Robert, professor of political science at Boston College, The National Interest, “Myth”, 9/1, http://nationalinterest.org/greatdebate/dragons/myth-3819] //khirn

Yet China does not pose a threat to America's vital security interests today, tomorrow or at any time in the near future. Neither alarm nor exaggerated assessments of contemporary China's relative capabilities and the impact of Chinese defense modernization on U.S. security interests in East Asia is needed because, despite China's military advances, it has not developed the necessary technologies to constitute a grave threat. Beijing's strategic advances do not require a major change in Washington's defense or regional security policy, or in U.S. policy toward China. Rather, ongoing American confidence in its capabilities and in the strength of its regional partnerships allows the United States to enjoy both extensive military and diplomatic cooperation with China while it consolidates its regional security interests. The China threat is simply vastly overrated. AMERICA'S VITAL security interests, including in East Asia, are all in the maritime regions. With superior maritime power, the United States can not only dominate regional sea-lanes but also guarantee a favorable balance of power that prevents the emergence of a regional hegemon. And despite China's military advances and its challenge to America's ability to project its power in the region, the United States can be confident in its ability to retain maritime dominance well into the twenty-first century. East Asia possesses plentiful offshore assets that enable the United States to maintain a robust military presence, to contend with a rising China and to maintain a favorable balance of power. The U.S. alliance with Japan and its close strategic partnership with Singapore provide Washington with key naval and air facilities essential to regional power projection. The United States also has developed strategic cooperation with Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Each country possesses significant port facilities that can contribute to U.S. capabilities during periods of heightened tension, whether it be over Taiwan or North Korea. The United States developed and sustained its strategic partnerships with East Asia's maritime countries and maintained the balance of power both during and after the cold war because of its overwhelming naval superiority. America's power-projection capability has assured U.S. strategic partners that they can depend on the United States to deter another great power from attacking them; and, should war ensue, that they would incur minimal costs. This American security guarantee is as robust and credible as ever. The critical factor in assessing the modernization of the PLA's military forces is thus whether China is on the verge of challenging U.S. deterrence and developing war-winning capabilities to such a degree that East Asia's maritime countries would question the value of their strategic alignment with the United States. But, though China's capabilities are increasing, in no way do they challenge U.S. supremacy. America's maritime security is based not only on its superior surface fleet, which enables it to project airpower into distant regions, but also on its subsurface ships, which provide secure "stealth" platforms for retaliatory strikes, and its advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) capabilities. In each of these areas, China is far from successfully posing any kind of serious immediate challenge. CHINA IS buying and building a better maritime capability. However, the net effect of China's naval advances on U.S. maritime superiority is negligible. Since the early 1990s-especially later in the decade as the Taiwan conflict escalated and following the 1996 U.S.-China Taiwan Strait confrontation-Beijing focused its maritime-acquisitions program primarily on the purchase of modern submarines to contribute to an access-denial capability that could limit U.S. operations in a Taiwan contingency. It purchased twelve Kilo-class submarines from Russia and it has developed its own Song-class and Yuan-class models. These highly capable diesel submarines are difficult to detect. In addition, China complemented its submarine capability with a coastal deployment of Russian Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft and over one thousand five hundred Russian surface-to-air missiles. The combined effect of these deployments has been greater Chinese ability to target an American aircraft carrier and an improved ability to deny U.S. ships and aircraft access to Chinese coastal waters. Indeed, American power-projection capabilities in East Asia are more vulnerable now than at any time since the end of the cold war. We can no longer guarantee the security of a carrier. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy is acutely aware of Chinese advances and is responding with measures to minimize the vulnerability of aircraft carriers. Due to better funding, improved technologies and peacetime surveillance of Chinese submarines, the American carrier strike group's ability to track them and the U.S. Navy's antisubmarine capabilities are constantly improving. The U.S. strike group's counter-electronic-warfare capabilities can also interfere with the PLA Navy's reconnaissance ability. Improved Chinese capabilities complicate U.S. naval operations and require greater caution in operating an aircraft carrier near the Chinese coast, particularly in the case of a conflict over Taiwan. A carrier strike force may well have to follow a less direct route into the area and maintain a greater distance from China's coast to reduce its vulnerability to Chinese capabilities. But such complications to U.S. operations do not significantly degrade Washington's ability to project superior power into maritime theaters. The United States still possesses the only power-projection capability in East Asia.

1nc hegemony

Cyber-attacks don’t threaten military

Lewis 02 (James Andrew Lewis is the Director and Senior Fellow of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Center for Strategic and International Studies: “Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats:” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/021101_risks_of_cyberterror.pdf) KalM

Cyber attacks are often presented as a threat to military forces and the Internet has major implications for espionage and warfare. Information warfare covers a range of activities of which cyber attacks may be the least important. While information operations and information superiority have become critical elements in successful military operations, no nation has placed its military forces in a position where they are dependent on computer networks that are vulnerable to outside attack. This greatly limits the effectiveness of cyber weapons (code sent over computer networks). The many reports of military computer networks being hacked usually do not explain whether these networks are used for critical military functions. It is indicative, however, that despite regular reports of tens of thousands of network attacks every year on the Department of Defense, there has been no degradation of U.S. military capabilities.

Nukes are airgapped and resilient to hacking

Reed 12 [John, national security reporter for Foreign Policy “Keeping nukes safe from cyber attack,” September 25, 2012, Foreign Policy, complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/25/keeping_nukes_safe_from_cyber_attack] //khirn

"Our ability to keep our networks assured and protected and not vulnerable is really important, it's something we have looked at hard," Maj. Gen. William Chambers, head of Air Force Global Strike Command's nuclear deterrence shop, told Killer Apps during a Sept. 18 interview. "It's something that we build into all of our new nuclear weapons systems so that they remain cyber-secure." Global Strike Command manages U.S. land-based nuclear ICBMs and air-launched nuclear cruise missiles and bombs. Protecting what are arguably the nation's most important military assets from cyber attack, and avoiding the terrifying scenario of an enemy feeding incorrect information into the nuclear command-and-control networks "seized" Air Force officials after they lost contact with a field of 50 Minuteman III ICBMs at FE Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming for an hour in late 2010, according to Chambers. "It's really important. It's a problem that about a year ago we were seized with. We have done some pretty comprehensive studies of the cyber-state of our ICBM force. We are confident in it," said Chambers. "There was an issue: we had a temporary interruption in our ability to monitor one of our missile squadrons back in the fall of 2010. That produced a need to take a comprehensive look at the entire system. It took a year to do that study, and we're confident that the system is good, but as we upgrade it, modernize it, integrate it, we've got to really pay attention to" protecting nuclear command-and-control information. While Chambers didn't go into specifics of how Global Strike Command will protect its nuclear command-and-control networks from cyber attack, he did say that it is working to harden its networks against intrusion and the manipulation of nuclear command-and-control information and to increase backup communications abilities. Chambers added that the Minuteman III ICBM command systems, designed in the 1960s and 1970s, are incredibly robust. "ICBM-wise we have a very secure system." A Boeing official later told Killer Apps that while it is looking at upgrading the ancient technology used in parts of the Minuteman command networks, that technology is safe from hacking. Boeing is on contract with the Air Force to maintain the 1970s-vintage Minuteman III fleet and is helping the service keep the missiles in service through the 2030s. "Our C2 [command-and-control] system for Minuteman is a very old system. There's a network called the HICS [hardened intersite cable system] network, and it's [made of] copper wire, and it's limited in bandwidth," said Peggy Morse, director of Boeing's strategic missiles systems programs, told Killer Apps on Sept. 18. While it's old, "it's very secure," she added. Still, "as we look at different C2 systems and ways to move data about in the field, information assurance is a big deal there, and the security requirements are going to drive the solutions that we look at," said Morse. The company is also working to modernize the actual cryptographic devices used to encrypt and decipher launch codes for nuclear missiles.

Russia and China can’t cyberattack the US – they only use it to crack down on their own populations

Rid 12 [Thomas, reader in war studies at King's College London, is author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" and co-author of "Cyber-Weapons.", March/April 2012, “Think Again: Cyberwar”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=full] //khirn

"The West Is Falling Behind Russia and China." Yes, but not how you think. Russia and China are busy sharpening their cyberweapons and are already well steeped in using them. The Russian military clandestinely crippled Estonia's economy in 2007 and Georgia's government and banks in 2008. The People's Liberation Army's numerous Chinese cyberwarriors have long inserted "logic bombs" and "trapdoors" into America's critical infrastructure, lying dormant and ready to wreak havoc on the country's grid and bourse in case of a crisis. Both countries have access to technology, cash, and talent -- and have more room for malicious maneuvers than law-abiding Western democracies poised to fight cyberwar with one hand tied behind their backs. Or so the alarmists tell us. Reality looks quite different. Stuxnet, by far the most sophisticated cyberattack on record, was most likely a U.S.-Israeli operation. Yes, Russia and China have demonstrated significant skills in cyberespionage, but the fierceness of Eastern cyberwarriors and their coded weaponry is almost certainly overrated. When it comes to military-grade offensive attacks, America and Israel seem to be well ahead of the curve. Ironically, it's a different kind of cybersecurity that Russia and China may be more worried about. Why is it that those countries, along with such beacons of liberal democracy as Uzbekistan, have suggested that the United Nations establish an "international code of conduct" for cybersecurity? Cyberespionage was elegantly ignored in the suggested wording for the convention, as virtual break-ins at the Pentagon and Google remain a favorite official and corporate pastime of both countries. But what Western democracies see as constitutionally protected free speech in cyberspace, Moscow and Beijing regard as a new threat to their ability to control their citizens. Cybersecurity has a broader meaning in non-democracies: For them, the worst-case scenario is not collapsing power plants, but collapsing political power.b The social media-fueled Arab Spring has provided dictators with a case study in the need to patrol cyberspace not only for subversive code, but also for subversive ideas. The fall of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi surely sent shivers down the spines of officials in Russia and China. No wonder the two countries asked for a code of conduct that helps combat activities that use communications technologies -- "including networks" (read: social networks) -- to undermine "political, economic and social stability." So Russia and China are ahead of the United States, but mostly in defining cybersecurity as the fight against subversive behavior. This is the true cyberwar they are fighting.

Meaningful attacks are infeasible

Clark 12 [Paul, MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” 4/28/2012, American Military University] //khirn

The Department of Homeland Security worries that our critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) may be exposed, both directly and indirectly, to multiple threats because of CIKR reliance on the global cyber infrastructure, an infrastructure that is under routine cyberattack by a “spectrum of malicious actors” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). CIKR in the extremely large and complex U.S. economy spans multiple sectors including agricultural, finance and banking, dams and water resources, public health and emergency services, military and defense, transportation and shipping, and energy (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). The disruption and destruction of public and private infrastructure is part of warfare, without this infrastructure conflict cannot be sustained (Geers 2011). Cyber-attacks are desirable because they are considered to be a relatively “low cost and long range” weapon (Lewis 2010), but prior to the creation of Stuxnet, the first cyber-weapon, the ability to disrupt and destroy critical infrastructure through cyber-attack was theoretical. The movement of an offensive cyber-weapon from conceptual to actual has forced the United States to question whether offensive cyber-attacks are a significant threat that are able to disrupt or destroy CIKR to the level that national security is seriously degraded. It is important to understand the risk posed to national security by cyber-attacks to ensure that government responses are appropriate to the threat and balance security with privacy and civil liberty concerns. The risk posed to CIKR from cyber-attack can be evaluated by measuring the threat from cyber-attack against the vulnerability of a CIKR target and the consequences of CIKR disruption. As the only known cyber-weapon, Stuxnet has been thoroughly analyzed and used as a model for predicting future cyber-weapons. The U.S. electrical grid, a key component in the CIKR energy sector, is a target that has been analyzed for vulnerabilities and the consequences of disruption predicted – the electrical grid has been used in multiple attack scenarios including a classified scenario provided to the U.S. Congress in 2012 (Rohde 2012). Stuxnet will serve as the weapon and the U.S. electrical grid will serve as the target in this risk analysis that concludes that there is a low risk of disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure from a an offensive cyber-weapon because of the complexity of the attack path, the limited capability of non-state adversaries to develop cyber-weapons, and the existence of multiple methods of mitigating the cyber-attacks. To evaluate the threat posed by a Stuxnet-like cyber-weapon, the complexity of the weapon, the available attack vectors for the weapon, and the resilience of the weapon must be understood. The complexity – how difficult and expensive it was to create the weapon – identifies the relative cost and availability of the weapon; inexpensive and simple to build will be more prevalent than expensive and difficult to build. Attack vectors are the available methods of attack; the larger the number, the more severe the threat. For example, attack vectors for a cyberweapon may be email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, websites, and infected USB devices or compact discs. Finally, the resilience of the weapon determines its availability and affects its usefulness. A useful weapon is one that is resistant to disruption (resilient) and is therefore available and reliable. These concepts are seen in the AK-47 assault rifle – a simple, inexpensive, reliable and effective weapon – and carry over to information technology structures (Weitz 2012). The evaluation of Stuxnet identified malware that is “unusually complex and large” and required code written in multiple languages (Chen 2010) in order to complete a variety of specific functions contained in a “vast array” of components – it is one of the most complex threats ever analyzed by Symantec (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). To be successful, Stuxnet required a high level of technical knowledge across multiple disciplines, a laboratory with the target equipment configured for testing, and a foreign intelligence capability to collect information on the target network and attack vectors (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The malware also needed careful monitoring and maintenance because it could be easily disrupted; as a result Stuxnet was developed with a high degree of configurability and was upgraded multiple times in less than one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Once introduced into the network, the cyber-weapon then had to utilize four known vulnerabilities and four unknown vulnerabilities, known as zero-day exploits, in order to install itself and propagate across the target network (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Zero-day exploits are incredibly difficult to find and fewer than twelve out of the 12,000,000 pieces of malware discovered each year utilize zero-day exploits and this rarity makes them valuable, zero-days can fetch $50,000 to $500,000 each on the black market (Zetter 2011). The use of four rare exploits in a single piece of malware is “unprecedented” (Chen 2010). Along with the use of four unpublished exploits, Stuxnet also used the “first ever” programmable logic controller rootkit, a Windows rootkit, antivirus evasion techniques, intricate process injection routines, and other complex interfaces (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) all wrapped up in “layers of encryption like Russian nesting dolls” (Zetter 2011) – including custom encryption algorithms (Karnouskos 2011). As the malware spread across the now-infected network it had to utilize additional vulnerabilities in proprietary Siemens industrial control software (ICS) and hardware used to control the equipment it was designed to sabotage. Some of these ICS vulnerabilities were published but some were unknown and required such a high degree of inside knowledge that there was speculation that a Siemens employee had been involved in the malware design (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The unprecedented technical complexity of the Stuxnet cyber-weapon, along with the extensive technical and financial resources and foreign intelligence capabilities required for its development and deployment, indicates that the malware was likely developed by a nation-state (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Stuxnet had very limited attack vectors. When a computer system is connected to the public Internet a host of attack vectors are available to the cyber-attacker (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Web browser and browser plug-in vulnerabilities, cross-site scripting attacks, compromised email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, operating system and other application vulnerabilities are all vectors for the introduction of malware into an Internetconnected computer system. Networks that are not connected to the public internet are “air gapped,” a technical colloquialism to identify a physical separation between networks. Physical separation from the public Internet is a common safeguard for sensitive networks including classified U.S. government networks. If the target network is air gapped, infection can only occur through physical means – an infected disk or USB device that must be physically introduced into a possibly access controlled environment and connected to the air gapped network. The first step of the Stuxnet cyber-attack was to initially infect the target networks, a difficult task given the probable disconnected and well secured nature of the Iranian nuclear facilities. Stuxnet was introduced via a USB device to the target network, a method that suggests that the attackers were familiar with the configuration of the network and knew it was not connected to the public Internet (Chen 2010). This assessment is supported by two rare features in Stuxnet – having all necessary functionality for industrial sabotage fully embedded in the malware executable along with the ability to self-propagate and upgrade through a peer-to-peer method (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Developing an understanding of the target network configuration was a significant and daunting task based on Symantec’s assessment that Stuxnet repeatedly targeted a total of five different organizations over nearly one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) with physical introduction via USB drive being the only available attack vector. The final factor in assessing the threat of a cyber-weapon is the resilience of the weapon. There are two primary factors that make Stuxnet non-resilient: the complexity of the weapon and the complexity of the target. Stuxnet was highly customized for sabotaging specific industrial systems (Karnouskos 2011) and needed a large number of very complex components and routines in order to increase its chance of success (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). The malware required eight vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system to succeed and therefore would have failed if those vulnerabilities had been properly patched; four of the eight vulnerabilities were known to Microsoft and subject to elimination (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Stuxnet also required that two drivers be installed and required two stolen security certificates for installation (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011); driver installation would have failed if the stolen certificates had been revoked and marked as invalid. Finally, the configuration of systems is ever-changing as components are upgraded or replaced. There is no guarantee that the network that was mapped for vulnerabilities had not changed in the months, or years, it took to craft Stuxnet and successfully infect the target network. Had specific components of the target hardware changed – the targeted Siemens software or programmable logic controller – the attack would have failed. Threats are less of a threat when identified; this is why zero-day exploits are so valuable. Stuxnet went to great lengths to hide its existence from the target and utilized multiple rootkits, data manipulation routines, and virus avoidance techniques to stay undetected. The malware’s actions occurred only in memory to avoid leaving traces on disk, it masked its activities by running under legal programs, employed layers of encryption and code obfuscation, and uninstalled itself after a set period of time, all efforts to avoid detection because its authors knew that detection meant failure. As a result of the complexity of the malware, the changeable nature of the target network, and the chance of discovery, Stuxnet is not a resilient system. It is a fragile weapon that required an investment of time and money to constantly monitor, reconfigure, test and deploy over the course of a year. There is concern, with Stuxnet developed and available publicly, that the world is on the brink of a storm of highly sophisticated Stuxnet-derived cyber-weapons which can be used by hackers, organized criminals and terrorists (Chen 2010). As former counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke describes it, there is concern that the technical brilliance of the United States “has created millions of potential monsters all over the world” (Rosenbaum 2012). Hyperbole aside, technical knowledge spreads. The techniques behind cyber-attacks are “constantly evolving and making use of lessons learned over time” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002) and the publication of the Stuxnet code may make it easier to copy the weapon (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). However, this is something of a zero-sum game because knowledge works both ways and cyber-security techniques are also evolving, and “understanding attack techniques more clearly is the first step toward increasing security” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, intrusion detection and malware signatures are expanded and updated, and monitoring and analysis processes and methodologies are expanded and honed. Once the element of surprise is lost, weapons and tactics are less useful, this is the core of the argument that “uniquely surprising” stratagems like Stuxnet are single-use, like Pearl Harbor and the Trojan Horse, the “very success [of these attacks] precludes their repetition” (Mueller 2012). This paradigm has already been seen in the “son of Stuxnet” malware – named Duqu by its discoverers – that is based on the same modular code platform that created Stuxnet (Ragan 2011). With the techniques used by Stuxnet now known, other variants such as Duqu are being discovered and countered by security researchers (Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security 2011). It is obvious that the effort required to create, deploy, and maintain Stuxnet and its variants is massive and it is not clear that the rewards are worth the risk and effort. Given the location of initial infection and the number of infected systems in Iran (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) it is believed that Iranian nuclear facilities were the target of the Stuxnet weapon. A significant amount of money and effort was invested in creating Stuxnet but yet the expected result – assuming that this was an attack that expected to damage production – was minimal at best. Iran claimed that Stuxnet caused only minor damage, probably at the Natanz enrichment facility, the Russian contractor Atomstroyeksport reported that no damage had occurred at the Bushehr facility, and an unidentified “senior diplomat” suggested that Iran was forced to shut down its centrifuge facility “for a few days” (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Even the most optimistic estimates believe that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was only delayed by months, or perhaps years (Rosenbaum 2012). The actual damage done by Stuxnet is not clear (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010) and the primary damage appears to be to a higher number than average replacement of centrifuges at the Iran enrichment facility (Zetter 2011). Different targets may produce different results. The Iranian nuclear facility was a difficult target with limited attack vectors because of its isolation from the public Internet and restricted access to its facilities. What is the probability of a successful attack against the U.S. electrical grid and what are the potential consequences should this critical infrastructure be disrupted or destroyed? An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are “a high priority target for military and insurgents” and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has “increased vulnerability across the board” (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been “honed over many years of practical application” now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary and specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the electrical grid is also enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010; as a result the public and private sector are working together in an “unprecedented effort” to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).

1nc russian modernization

Europe contains Russian aggression

Bandow 12 [Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, “Op Ed: NATO and Libya: It’s Time To Retire a Fading Alliance,” 1/2/2012, http://feb17.info/editorials/op-ed-nato-and-libya-its-time-to-retire-a-fading-alliance] //khirn

The Cold War required an extraordinary defense commitment from the U.S. But no longer. Europe still matters, but it faces no genuine military threat. Whatever happens politically in Moscow, there will be no Red Army pouring armored divisions through Germany’s Fulda Gap. Washington has much to worry about, but Europe is not on the list. Of course, the Europeans still have geopolitical concerns. Civil wars in the Balkans and Libya threatened refugee flows and economic disruption. However, the Europeans are capable of handling such issues. Potentially more dangerous is the situation in Eastern Europe and beyond, most notably Georgia and Ukraine. But not dangerous to America. The U.S. has survived most of its history with these lands successively part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Nor is there any evidence that Russia wants to forcibly reincorporate its “lost” territories into a renewed Soviet empire. Rather, Moscow appears to have retrogressed to a “great power” like Imperial Russia. The new Russia is concerned about international respect and border security. Threaten that, and war might result, as Georgia learned in 2008.

No impact because Russian elites know US strength will return

Kuchins 11 [Andrew, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., “Reset expectations: Russian assessments of U.S. power,” http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_kuchins_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf] //khirn

Like the U.S.-Russia relationship, Russian elite perceptions of U.S. power and role in the world have experienced great volatility in the past 20 years. How durable is the current Russian perception that not only is the United States less threatening but is pursuing policies far more accommodating to Russian interests? And because we are entering a new Russian (and American) presidential cycle in the coming year, to what extent does possible de facto leadership change in Moscow matter? There is no definitive answer to this question, but from reviewing the last ten years or so since Vladimir Putin first became the Russian president, my conclusion is that U.S. policies will be a far more important factor in effecting Russian leader and elite views of the United States than who the next Russian president is. The Russian perspective on U.S. power and role in the world did not change during the last two years because Dmitri Medvedev replaced Vladimir Putin as president of Russia. The Russian perspective changed because of the impact of the global economic crisis and changes in Obama administration policies of greatest interest to Moscow. Russian elites are unsure about the durability of U.S. power capacity, but they have seen the United States renew itself in the wake of global foreign and economic setbacks in, for example, the 1980s. Russians are as aware as anybody of the current fiscal challenges of the United States and the questions about whether the U.S. political system will be capable of managing to resolve them. They are also watching closely the political commitment of the United States to stabilize Afghanistan. If the United States manages progress on these domestic and foreign policy fronts and, more important, continues to pursue a pragmatic set of policies that accommodate some of Russia’s core interests, then the current trend toward a more positive assessment of U.S. power and growing cooperation on a wide variety of issues will continue. In other words, we are the critical independent variable.