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- HEGEL ON THE FORMAL LOGIC’S PRINCIPLES OF IDENTITY AND CONTRADICTION ŞTEFAN-DOMINIC GEORGESCU, Ph.D
- WAR SYMBOLISM IN HEMINGWAY’S WORKS ARGENTINA VELEA
- Introducing Hemingway’s Short Stories: Symbols and Symbolism
- RUMÄNIENDEUTSCH – STATUS UND BESONDERHEITEN ALS REGIONALSPRACHE Dr. MARIA ILEANA MOISE
- Schlüsselwörter
- Schrift- und Schulsprache
- Aussprachebesonderheiten
- STANDARDDEUTSCH RUMÄNIENDEUTSCH RUMÄNISCH 1
| LITERATUR
[1] Henckmann, W., (1998), Max Scheler, C. H. Beck, München, S. 71. [2] Lieber, H.J., „Bemerkungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers“ in Paul Good, Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen der Philosophie, S. 228. [3] Rombach, H., (1980), Phänomenologie des gegenwärtigen Bewusstseins, Karl Alber, Freiburg/München, S. 126-127. [4] Scheler, M., (1980), Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft, in Gesammelte Werke, Band. 8, Francke Verlag, Bern und München, S. 9. [5] Scheler, M., (1947), Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, München, S. 46. [6] Scheler, M., (1966), Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus in Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 2, Francke Verlag, Bern, p. 309. HEGEL ON THE FORMAL LOGIC’S PRINCIPLES OF IDENTITY AND CONTRADICTION ŞTEFAN-DOMINIC GEORGESCU, Ph.D The Academy of Economic Studies Abstract. The author tries to determine the role of the principles of identity and contradiction within Hegel’s logic. The main idea is that those principles are considered from the viewpoint of speculative thinking, not from that of abstract understanding. Considered as such, they prove to be extremely important within the development of absolute idea inasmuch as they are not reduced to their formal meaning, as reflexive understanding would have done. Key words: contradiction, opposition, identity, principles of logic, essence, subjecivity. Although, according to Hegel, classical formal logic is a part of the doctrine of concept – its forms being dealt upon within the chapter on subjectivity – its principles are debated upon in the first section of the doctrine of essence, within the second chapter1. Thus, the second chapter of the section Das Wesen als Reflexion in ihm selbst, which is entitled Die Wesenheiten oder die Reflexionsbestimmungen, firstly refers to identity and here, in a note, Hegel deals with the principle of identity. In the same chapter, the third part refers to contradiction and here one refers to the law of excluded middle and that of contradiction. One previously notices that Hegel dos not speak about non-contradiction, but contradiction. The fourth principle of traditional logic shows up within the third chapter of the same section, entitled Der Grund. One might have expected Hegel to include the discussion about these principles in the chapter regarding classical formal logic; on the contrary, he did not even save a place for these principles within the doctrine of concept, but in the doctrine of essence; i. e., not in the subjective, but in the objective logic. In other words, Hegel took identity, contradiction, excluded middle and sufficient reason as being principles of not of subjective idea, but of the objective one. An explanation would be that these principles belong par excellence to the abstract understanding2 (by understanding Hegel means that hybrid faculty of thinking that includes understanding as such, the power of judgment and formal reason) and that they do not belong even to common thinking. Thus, referring to common thinking, he says that no consciousness thinks, represents things or speaks according to this law3. This means that neither concept, nor representation or language ever make appeal to this law and, least of all, objective reality. If fact, this statement is a bit exaggerated: identity is a principle that ordinary speech assumes, but also logic and natural sciences. What Hegel meant is that neither of them can be reduced to the tautologies allowed by this principle. The formula A=A, which renders the principle of identity, is no more than a tautology leading to no consequences unless one accepts the differentiation of moments1. Perhaps Hegel is referring to Fichte’s attempt to establish this abstract identity as a primary sentence of philosophy, starting with which to deduce the entire world. To Fichte, this principle has both logic, and ontological and epistemological nature, being the ground of things both regarding their being, thought and knowledge2. But Fichte cannot explain how this principle starts moving or, if it does, he is forced to make appeal to other things, i. e. not mere identity that would have just left the things buried in tautology. First of all, the principle of identity is limited by its own formula. Thus, the sentence “A is identical to A” brings about a double relation between two things that should be different. This means that the very meaning of the sentence utters something that denied its form, i. e. the fact that A is identical to A, although the structure of sentence assumes a difference3. This means that the very language states that setting up an identity assumes a difference4.Now, Hegel seems a bit exaggerated in interpreting formal logic. He does not differentiate between expressing an identity and predication as such. Of course, the structure of a sentence is S-P, where the predicate must utter something different from the subject, and the special form of essence is that of reflection, i. e. judgment (of course, there is some specificity of Hegelian interpretation of this concept, but for now we do not pay attention to this matter). In other words, Hegel refers to identity within the doctrine of essence, stating that one can express identity only by means of difference, i. e. by using the form of reflection, and never as such. This renders the principle of identity universal, but absolutely empty. Now, had Hegel uttered a difference between predication and identity assertion, he would have probably accepted the principle of formal identity (or would have been obliged to do so). But he does not do that, and not because it is wrong, but because it is futile: one cannot deduce anything out of it. In other words, the mere assertion of formal identity does not encompass the principle of dialectical movement, i. e. of difference (Hegel grounded his critique of Fichte’s philosophy on this idea). It follows that, although some philosophers have reproached Hegel he mistakenly took identity for predication5, this distinction would have brought nothing to the discussion on identity, precisely because Hegel does not try to set up a logic of formal determinations, but one that renders the movement of the concept, i. e. a development of determinations from one another6; for such a logic this principle could just issue a formal, universal, but still useless truth7. Hegel opposes this formal abstract identity with a concrete one, an identity for which the identical finds itself allover the variety of possible manifestations1. Moreover, there is another issue regarding this formal identity. Within the doctrine of essence, the form of reflection assumes the relation between appearance and essence. Which means that the statement “A is identical to A” or “A=A” merely sets up the identity of the subject with itself, from the statement “A is B”. But the subject is merely an appearance, and the substance is the predicate. Which meant that, in the case of the appearance, the subject is rendered by means of the determination of the predicate, and not by its own. Thus, considered as such, the subject seems to have content; in fact, the subject loses its own determination and it remains an empty form. Thus, the principle of identity merely asserts the identity with itself of a subject as an empty form, without content. This is so because this empty form would receive content only from a predicate that is different from it, i. e. by means of difference; but this is not the case, since the subject is related only with itself. Which means that “A=A” or “A is identical to A” seems to have a content – in the case of the doctrine of essence the subjects gets its content from the predicate (its essence). This identity with itself of the empty form is considered, in contemporary logic, by the principle of linear substitution. Perhaps Hegel did not have in mind this principle, since the logic of understanding had not yet taken the contemporary symbolic form. But mainly, in a succession of symbols that set up a correct formula, for instance {[(A&B)V(A&C)→(BVC)]→(AVBVC)}, linear substitution assumes each symbol is a formal identity; to get contents, each symbol mus be replaced with the same thing, i. e. with the same constant everywhere (A, B, and C are taken as symbols for propositional variables in first order logic). Regarding the principle of identity, one finds here merely the forcing of a difference. In other words, Hegel does not refer to a temporal succession of occurrences of a symbol. Therefore, one does not speak about “A=A” being uttered in time, the occurrences being at least temporarily differentiated. All the same, one could never refer to the differences of position within a formula. Thus, the possible objection that two occurrences would merely be instances of the same entity leads to no conclusion, since either the principle utters nothing, because it simply asserts A’s identity with itself, or it utters something, and then there must be a difference between the two occurrences2. At the same time, one can say that the two instances differ in meaning, but not in reference. This means that between the two one makes a difference, therefore there is a unity in difference3. In fact, Hegel’s thesis is that mere formal identity pertains only to pure being4 which, in itself, is identical to nothingness5. The very judgment form of reflection – according to Hegel – points towards the same idea. Thus, being is reduced to appearance within the doctrine of essence, while truth belongs to essence, which takes now the place of the predicate. Thus, within the structure S-P, S is appearance, pure being. From a logical-speculative viewpoint, S is the formal identity with itself asserted by the principle of identity, but this identity is empty, it is nothing. Thus, considered as such, S is appearance and non-identical with itself, since concrete identity is established not in relation with itself, but by difference from another. Now, if S is merely appearance, it cannot be different from another, since it lacks a determination by means of which to differ from another. But it cannot by identical with itself, since it has no determination by means of which it can be identical with itself. This leads to falling back to the Hegelian concept of passing, concept that pertains to the theory of being, i. e. the immediate and sudden passing of being into nothingness and vice versa. In fact, formal principle of identity states that this sudden passing of being into nothingness – by the very fact that in “A=A” one asserts the immediate passing of A, as being (empty form), in A as nothingness (absence of determination)1 or by the fact that A is rendered not by means of a determination (it has no determination, since the predicate is missing, and A’s determination is given by the predicate), but by the absence of all determinations, thus by nothingness. The principle of contradiction is dealt upon, at first, as a continuation of the discussion regarding the principle of identity, but also in a remark at the third paragraph of the chapter entitled Der Widerspruch, from the section Die Wesenheiten oder die Reflexionsbestimmungen; in this second case, the title of this remark is Satz des Widerspruchs. In the first situation, Hegel says that this is a mere reformulation of the principle of identity2. He says that the expression of this principle is “A cannot be, at the same time, A and non-A”. now, taking into account that, within the doctrine of essence, the usual logical form is that of reflection, this means that the principle of identity is better determined. As we have already seen, the principle of identity, having the form “A=A” merely simulated the form of sentence and only seemed to have contents. Now we don not speak only about A being rendered as identical to itself, but this appearance of A is asserted by the fact that its difference from non-A is also rendered. This means that the principle of contradiction is just a clarification of that of identity, meaning that A, as appearance, is now rendered by means of an essential determination, i. e. by the non-identity between A and non-A. espressed as a judgment, the subject S, as appearance (mere assertion of A’s identity with itself, i. e. subject which represents the immediate unity expressed by “A=A”, lacking own determination), is determined by the non-identity of A and non-A, which should have the place of the predicate or essential determination. Hegel states: “… die Identität als die reine Bewegung der Reflexion die einfache Negativität ist…”3, meaning that A is reflected in non-A, thus A determined as empty identity with itself is reflected within A’s non-identity with non-A. This means that non-A shows up only in order to disappear4. Therefore, the subject of the judgment, as identity with itself, as appearance, is rendered not by a predicate, but by denying a negation, meaning by the lack of a determination. Once again, the form of judgment is simulated, since the different determination on had to render A by, i. e. the determination of the predicate, is denied. Thus, there is no substantial predicate, but the predicated is suppressed by denying it. Therefore, A is not rendered by something different from itself, but only by means of denying a determination. In an usual judgment, A is rendered by the determination of P, which is different. In stating the principle of contradiction, S is rendered by denying a determination, i. e. denying non-A (Which should have been P, the different). We deal again with a return to the principle of identity, since one asserts that A, as a subject, is not rendered by a predicate that determines it, but by means of denying any different determination (general denial of all non-A). Hegel says: “… der Satz des Wiederspruchs… enthält in seinem Ausdrucke nicht nur die leere, einfache Gleicheit mit sich, sondern nicht allein dar Andere derselben überhaupt, sondern sogar die absolute Ungleicheit, der Widerspruch an sich”1. This means that identity is rendered as mere difference from another. Thus, on the one side, identity is rendered as the principle of identity as mere identity, as immediate unity with itself; but identity proves to be non-identity with itself, since A has no determination by means of which to be identical with itself (in fact, at the level of appearance, identity and non-identity are the same, since they suddenly pass into each other, as in the above-mentioned case of being and nothingness). This non-identity with itself is now denied by the principle of contradiction, by which one states that A cannot be rendered by a determination that is different from itself. Thus, A cannot be rendered by a non-A. Therefore, A is again denied the possibility to have a determination; the result is the denial of the form of judgment, i. e. the possibility to determine A (as appearance) by an essence (a predicate that is said of A, i. e. a determination that is different from A). Thus one falls back in the form of being, of immediate passing from being (identity) to nothingness (non-identity), and the form of reflection (of judgment) is lost by the very utterance of the principle of contradiction. In fact, the very assertion of A by means of another should be asserted (this is what the form of reflection does, stating the assertion of the subject S by a determination that is different from its own, the latter being left at the level of appearance). Thus, if the subject does not have own determination or if the subject is not rendered by its own determination, this means that it can and must de rendered by something different, by the predicate. In an abstract manner this would be “A must be non-A”, which allows A, as a subject, to be rendered by the predicate whose determination denies the appearance of A (i. e. formal identity, which was just a passage of A’s identity into non-identity, so a sudden passage like that from being to nothingness) and sets up its essence. Briefly, if A is an empty form (as one noticed in the case of the principle of identity), it cannot deny non-A precisely because negation is determination, and A has no determination. The role to deny belongs to the determination of the predicate (which is essence and power, power being, essentially, the capacity to deny, to determine). A denies that A to be rendered by something else than its own formal identity (identity that falls down into itself, since it is also non-identity, i. e. appearance; A simulates not only its determination; in fact, A is disappearing, it is the absence of all power, it cannot persist, it suddenly appears and disappears, just like being into nothingness and vice versa), meaning it forbids the use of judgment form of reflection and it falls back into immediateness of being. The result would be that one must accept only identical sentences, that simulate the form of judgment at the linguistic level, but which merely express “… that abstract identity, … usually considered as the most useless and boring operation”1. Beside all these, Hegel also speaks about the principle of contradiction before referring to the determination of ground. All reflection’s determinations are expressed by means of a principle (identity, contradiction, excluded middle)2. Now, contradiction was mentioned just to be rejected; it follows that Hegel has been speaking about non-contradiction so far; i. e. to the principal of traditional formal logic. Now he refers to a universal principle3 that represents the form by means of which one can render truth at the level of reflection, i. e. the principle of contradiction4. Now, if the form of reflection is judgement and the discussion about contradiction follows that about opposition (der Gegensatz), then we notice a precise determination of reflexive thought. Opposition is the unity of identity and difference5. This means that opposition is the very nature of judgment, which considers as united the immediate identity of the subject and the determination or difference rendered by the predicate. Opposition is the authentic form of reflection, determined as contradiction (der Wiederspruch). One must notice that Hegel makes no ontological difference between contradiction and opposition just because he is only interested in the determinations of thought, not in those of reality (therefore, not antithetic, but dialectic ones). Thus, he is not interested in opposition as such, but in its principle. It seems only fair to say that Hegel mixes up opposition and contradiction6 and places opposition at the level of thought when it should be placed at the level of reality. But this error is somehow acceptable, as Hegel distinguishes them and refers to opposition without any appeal to contradiction. Besides, when he means opposition, he gives some examples taken from Mathematics (+a as opposed to -a), and not from logic (he does not mean contradiction of judgments, which will be traded in a different chapter); probably he would have avoided confusion, had he rendered examples from Physics (opposition of forces). Anyway, he seems not to refer to real opposition, but to its determination, i. e. relation between positive and negative, applicable at all levels. Now, contradiction is a high form of opposition or the principle that stands behind all oppositions. This means that opposition and contradiction are not mistaken for each other, but that contradiction is the true concept of opposition. An explanation of all this would be that opposition can be thought upon only by means of contradiction7. From all these it follows that Hegel differentiates the principle o contradiction from that of non-contradiction. The second one is derived from identity, and the first one is the main form of all determinations of essence. Now, reflexive understanding rejects the universality of contradiction just because it does not notice the role of negation within the development of logical idea8. This means that reflexive understanding makes appeal only to abstract identity that Hegel rejects. There are two consequences: reflexive understanding can no longer explain the logical movement from one determination to another and can no longer display the manner in which determinations evolve from one another1. Then, the forms of understanding are fixed and have only external relations. To be more precise, within the formula (A&B)→(AVB), for instance, ste symbols stand for formal identities, which do not modify their essence (they do not have an essence, they reject the form of judgment) and which keep their identity all along the formula. Thus, understanding is compelled to establish only external relations between formal identities. The second consequence is that placing contradiction only at the level of subjective reflaction, which becomes unable to notice the nature of things2. This means that the form of reflexive thought is that of judgment; but this form is not suitable for reality and relies only on identity. Thus, no matter how thought would strive to utter „S is P” – and it would be compelled to do so, since judgment is its own form – it would always come back to „S is S”. thus, the only possible philosophy would be that of Parmenides and would stick to contemplation of being ans assertion of its identity. Besides, a theory of being prom the point of view if understanding merely renders various forms of this identity (symbolic logic or algebra) using the symbol of equality. This is again a return to the level of being which Hegel strived su pass over by means of essence. The result is that reflexive understanding could not care less about the essence of its concepts (either the symbols of mathematical logic, or determinated concepts), but it cares about the way they function.
[2] Hegel, G. W. F., (1969), Werke in zwanzig Bänden. 6. Wissenschaft der Logik. II. Die objective Logik, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1975, p. 41. [3] Hegel, G. W. F., The Encyclopedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, loc. cit. [4] Hibben, J.G., (2000), Hegel’s Logic: An Essay in Interpretation, Batoche Books Limited, Ontario, Canada, p. 81. [5] Lécrivain A. (coord.), (1983), Introduction à la lecture de la Sicence de la Logique de Hegel. II. La doctrine de l’essence, Aubier Montaigne, Paris, p. 62. See also Wissenschaft der Logik, loc. cit. [6] Surdu, A., (2000), Antitetică, dialectică negativă şi enantiologie la Platon [Plato on Anthitetic, Dialectic, and Enantiology], în Gândirea speculativă [Speculative Thinking], Ed. Paideia, Bucureşti. [7] Surdu, A., (2002), Elemente de antitetică speculativă la Fichte [Elements of Speculative Antithetics in Fichte’s Philosophy], in Filosofia modernă [Modern Philosophy], Ed. Paideia, Bucharest. [8] Which means that nothingness is asserted, meaning the form of the sentence is simulated. See also Lécrivain A. (1983), (coord.), Introduction à la lecture de la Sicence de la Logique de Hegel. II. La doctrine de l’essence, Aubier Montaigne, Paris, p. 63. WAR SYMBOLISM IN HEMINGWAY’S WORKS
Facultatea de Relaţii Economice Internaţionale, Universitatea Creştină “Dimitrie Cantemir”
As a writer, Hemingway is assigned an important place among the representatives of “The Lost Generation,” along with Faulkner, Fitzgerald, John Dos Passos and Sinclair Lewis. The concern of these writers, including Ernest Hemingway, was to show the loss caused by the First World War in the social, moral and psychological spheres of human life. The generation deserved for a long time the adjective that Gertrude Stein applied to it. The reasons, as Malcolm Cowley argues, are not difficult to find: “it was lost, first of all, because it was uprooted, schooled away and almost wrenched away from its attachment to any region or tradition, […] because its training had prepared it for another world than existed after the war, […]. It was lost because it tried to live in exile.[…] because it accepted no older guides to conduct and because it had formed a false picture of society and the writer’s place in it”1. The new writers formed a “literary generation” that “belonged to a period of transition from values already fixed to values that had to be created”2. The history of the 1920s is a convincing demonstration of the value of an avant garde with members engaged in major and most serious occupations, reformulations of principles and forms, demonstrating “the advantages of an aesthetic and a moral release from nineteenth- century constraints”.3 Hemingway, has agreed to the longings and frustrations that are typical of these writers, but his work is distinctly different from theirs in its philosophy of life. His works should be read and interpreted in the light of his famous “iceberg theory.” In Death in the Afternoon, Hemingway outlines his “theory of omission” or “iceberg principle.” He states: “If a writer of a prose knows enough about what he is writing about he may omit things that he knows and the reader if the writer is writing truly enough, will have a feeling of those things as strongly as though the writer had stated them. The dignity of movement of an ice-berg is due to only one-eighth being above water. The writer who omits things because he does not know them only makes hollow places in his writing”1. This statement throws light on the symbolic implications of art. Hemingway makes use of physical action to provide an interpretation of the nature of man’s existence in a world with its disillusionment, where his heroes are in a perpetual struggle which ends only in death. In a world of pain and failure, the individual tries to assert himself with dignity for his existence. In his commentary on the existential struggle found in Hemingway’s fiction Charles Child Walcutt has observed that: “the conflict between the individual needs and social demands is matched by the contest between feeling man and unfeeling universe, and between the spirit of the individual and his biological limitations”2. Written in a simple but unconventional style, with the problems of war, violence, and death as its main themes, evidencing a metaphysical interest in man and his relation to nature, Hemingway’s works present a symbolic interpretation of life. This metaphysical concern about the nature of the individual’s existence in relation to the world made Hemingway imagine his heroes as alienated individuals struggling with life, facing hardships with courage, endurance and will as their only weapons. The Hemingway hero is a lonely individual, wounded either physically or emotionally. His behavior is an example of courage and as Philip Young argues, “he offers up and exemplifies certain principles of, courage and endurance in a life of tension and pain which make a man a man”3. In spite of all hardships, violence, struggle and suffering he is not pessimistic. Although he is sometimes frustrated, he does not admit defeat. He prefers death to humiliation, stoical endurance to submission: these are the virtues of the Hemingway hero. Hemingway’s fiction reveals as Goodman shows “the general drama of human pain” in which the author has “used the novel form in order to pose symbolic questions about life”4. The trials and sufferings undergone by his protagonists are symbolic of man’s difficult situations in which he does not know what to do in this world. The war, as a major symbol of the destructive change in cultural attitudes, is responsible for the tragedies of the human spirit. The war was disillusioning and disastrous in its consequences. It was worse for those who did not die. They were confused over their future. Introducing Hemingway’s Short Stories: Symbols and Symbolism Many of the modernists refer to modern which as Robert W. Lewis argues, suggests “a strong and conscious break with traditional forms and techniques of expression,5” including the belief, which according to C. Hugh Holman, “we create the world in the act of perceiving it”. Modern is associated with themes of alienation, loss and despair, with a world seen through the emptiness of old ways of thinking, as experienced by the writers who wrote about it. In a meaningless world, as Robert W. Lewis argues, a “lonely impulse” is “sufficient reason to act fatalistically, even when one knows that an impulse, an instinctive, […] is outside the world of reason entirely”1. As the modern highlights the unconscious over the self-conscious, and is concerned with the new psychology and mythology of Freud and C.G. Young, the reasons, the rational and ordered thought are illusory. Works of literature can lead us to see deeply into and beyond things through the use of symbols which are usually objects, characters or even actions. The characteristics of a symbol are usually related to the abstractions it represents. An idea related to an area of major concern in the work, can also be a symbol. A literary symbol as an object, character or action that is both part of the story in a literary work, can be seen, touched, smelled, heard, tasted, encountered, or experienced by people in the story, poem or play, suggesting abstract meaning beyond itself. The image and meaning of a symbol conveys far more than mere words. Ernest Hemingway proves this by his effective use of symbolism in his works to explore the disillusionment and the determination of individuals against the background of a merciless environment. The Nick Adams Stories as Bryant Mangum argues, “chronicle the movement of the code hero from a condition of innocence, a kind of pre-Adamic state during which he is unaware of his mortality, into a condition of experience or knowledge”2. The stories which best suggest this movement are Indian Camp and Big Two-Hearted River. Both of these stories follow the process of bringing Nick to the lowest level of initiation into life in the presence of death, in this way demonstrating the earliest stage in the formation of the Hemingway code and clearly illustrating the iceberg theory, despite the apparent simplicity of their story lines. Following the Hemingway hero throughout the short stories and starting from the earliest example of Nick Adams, to the later portrayals, such as that of Francis Macomber, one can see and realize, as Bryant Mangum explains, “the step-by-step development of Hemingway’s code for living in the modern wasteland, as well as the refinement of his aesthetic theories”. With Francis Macomber the code hero finally reaches the point of full initiation to which he has been moving since the early Nick Adams stories. In his first form, as in Indian Camp, the hero becomes aware of the central dilemma of life: to face his own mortality. Once he accepts, as Bryant Mangum argues, “this call to adventure,” the pursuit of experiences begins, revealing, at least symbolically, “the truth that in life, death is always present”3. The hero’s task is to accept it with patience and courage when suffering. Death is seen and called by various names like nada or nothingness, as imagined by those who are close to it like the old man who comes every night in the cafe in A Clean, Well –Lighted Place. The code hero is the one to grasp the thing itself. This is the case of Francis Macomber for whom the cycle is complete, the initiation is accomplished as he embraces death without fear.
On the way back, “Nick trailed his hand in the water. It felt warm in the sharp chill of the morning”1, a typical representation of the symbol of death and life. Nick denies the lesson he has learned: “In the early morning on the lake sitting in the stern of the boat with his father rowing, he felt quite sure that he would never die” (301). The surface of the story, the events of that morning whose focal point has been life on the bottom bunk and death above, has suggested the iceberg, which is the human condition as it is closely inserted into the birth-death phases of the seasonal cycle. Light and dark in Indian Camp symbolizes racial prejudice as well as the personal growth of the protagonist. The narrative highlights a world of Indian oppression and religious opinions that causes the Indians losing of self- respect, reducing them to the role of dark ignorant stereotypes. On the other hand, the white men seem to live in a sort of utopia full of light and understanding. The concept of the lighter skinned white man holding supremacy over the darker skinned Indian is present throughout the entire narrative. Dark symbolizes Nick’s lack of awareness as he begins his journey on an unknowing night, while the light symbolizes the new understanding gained by Nick. As Nick and his father arrive at the shore, “Uncle George was smoking a cigar” which burns like a faint beacon in a sea of darkness, the light in the darkness symbolizing understanding with the decadent world of the white men. Another example of Hemingway’s symbolism refers to an Indian carrying a lantern who leads the way to the Indian camp and as they reach the logging road the Indian blows out the lantern. The logging road metaphorically represents the progress of white men. As the Indian reaches the road, he no longer needs a light. He is not in the dark now. The Indian has reached the world of his oppressor where a greater gleaming is available to him. The lantern is no longer necessary. The light of lanterns guides the group to the birthing shanty. As Nick and his father arrive, the Indian “men had moved off up the road to sit in the dark” and hide from the light of the lanterns and the white man’s knowledge to save lives. The Indians wait in the shadow while Nick’s father prepares to perform the operation. The metaphoric usage of light and dark heightens the clash of two opposing cultures. This symbolism also strengthens Nick’s own personal growth as a person.
The story begins with a description of the setting. There were long hills, a train station, a bar and a beaded curtain. From the beginning to the end, Hemingway uses the various aspects of the setting as symbols to reveal things about the American, Jig, and them as a couple. The broad setting of “Hills Like White Elephants,” as Judith Ortiz Cofer explains, “is eastern Spain, about a third of the way from Barcelona to Madrid and the specific setting, a hot day at a rural train station, a junction where two lines meet in the middle of nowhere”1. Hemingway uses the actual train station, an important part of the setting, as a symbol. The author tells us “the station was between two lines of rails in the sun”2. This train station, between Barcelona and Madrid, symbolizes the decision that must be made and which can change the direction of their lives. The railway brings another significance: the wanderings across Europe undertaken by Jig and the American and their luggage which is covered with labels “from all the hotels where they had spent nights”, which is a proof of the directionless journey or wandering that is shaping their lives. By creating a sense of isolation, the story focuses us on the two people and their problem. There are other people in the bar, but we see no one else except the waitress, the other people are just there, like the chairs and the tables. The location includes only a railway junction: no town or city is indicated, which increases the sense of isolation. Using a train station as location also creates a sense of transience, no roots, no home no ties. Placing the story at a junction suggest that the characters are facing a decision about the direction in which they should go. The distant hills in “Hills Like White Elephants” are actual objects in the story, visible to the characters and are prominent, as they are included in the title and discussed several times in the story. They seem to convey a sense of longing for that which is distant and unattainable, “all the things you’ve waited so long for,” as Jig puts it3. Meanings in the first sentence of the previous paragraph is in the plural. “Symbols, as Judith points out, usually convey a cluster of possible meanings; they are rich, suggestive and evocative”4. The readers do not reduce them to a single, definite meaning. The verb suggests compared to symbolizes “conveys better the sense of a symbol’s openness, inclusivity and plurality”. Conventional and traditional symbols, according to Judith Ortiz Cofer, “bring into a literary work the clusters of meaning they already possess outside the work”. In the setting of Hemingway’s story there is no reference made to white elephants, “They are the imaginative half of a simile”. In the story, Jig is looking at the line of hills, white in the sun and says “They look like white elephants”1. She is talking about physical appearance: “the hills are rounded and lumpy (not with sharp peaks and points),” as Judith argues, so they could be compared to the bodies of elephants. Jig says later, “They don’t really look like white elephants. I just meant the coloring of their skin through the trees”(404), but for most of the readers the visual image of their shape is clear. The phrase is repeated three times in the story, as well as being the title of the story. White elephants have taken on, as Judith Ortiz Cofer argues, “traditional symbolic significance in Eastern cultures and, to some extent, Western societies”2. Through repeated references and as a result the prominence of the title phrase, a certain traditional symbolic significance is carried into “Hills Like White Elephants.” As the story implies, Jig unlike the man, has seen white elephants: “They look like white elephants” she said. “I’ve never seen one, “the man drank his beer. “No, you wouldn’t have.”3. If she has seen them, she probably knows that they are both rare and venerated and figuratively, a burdensome or useless possession. The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition for white elephant, all current when Hemingway was writing: a. A rare albino variety of elephant which is highly venerated in some Asian countries. b. fig. A burdensome or costly possession (from the story that the kings of Siam were accustomed to make a present of one of these animals to countries who had rendered themselves obnoxious, in order to ruin the recipient by the cost of the maintenance). Also, an object, scheme, etc., considered to be without use or value. As Jig and the American have a very short conversation which goes from “all the things you’ve waited so long for” to “white elephants” to the operation: the “simple operation” that is “not really an operation at all” the reader is left to decide what the operation is. In this light, as Judith Ortiz Cofer argues, her use of white elephant suggests “a contrast […] between pregnancy and new life as, on the one hand, a highly valued treasure and, on the other hand, a burden or an object without value”4. As the story implies, if Jig stays pregnant, she may be similar to a burden and unwanted possession for the man. As compared to Jig’s dilemma in “Hills Like White Elephants,” the symbols in “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” are stronger and more meaningful. Hemingway uses two different animals to symbolize the type of person Harry wishes he were and the type of person he has actually become. The leopard is seen only in the epigraph at the opening of the story, but its presence is extremely important to the rest of the story. Hemingway uses the leopard to represent what Harry would like to be, someone with strength, courage and passion. The reader is told the legend of the leopard carcass found at the top of Kilimanjaro and it is a mystery why he went there. The leopard, as Jerianne Wright argues, was seeking the summit, known as “The House of God”1. In this story the leopard symbolizes qualities such as grace, speed, strength, courage and dignity. The leopard pounces with purpose, with lightning speed, and with accuracy. Hemingway uses the hyena to symbolize Harry because like the hyena he is a lazy scavenger that takes the easy road in life. He lives by rich women and has been too lazy to follow his dream of being a writer: “He had destroyed his talent by not using it, by betrayals of himself and what he believed in by drinking so much that he blunted the edge of his perceptions, by laziness, by sloth, and by snobbery, by pride and by prejudice, by hook and by crook”2. This symbol also demonstrates a theme in the story of living without passion. The mountain represents the afterlife, a place of inspiration that Harry can go, to achieve the characteristics of the leopard. Through his delirious visions, the reader finds out that Harry could never be associated with the qualities of the leopard. Harry has never been able to exercise his talent because he was too afraid to try. He realizes that, if he died, he “would not have to fail at trying to write them either”3, and therefore does not fight against death. “He merely awaits death,” as Jerianne Wright argues, “expecting to gain from it the spiritual enlightenment that others must work hard for.” This quality of laziness can be seen in his vision of his trip to Kilimanjaro, to the “House of God.” Unlike the leopard, who made the hard and tiring climb in search of the mountain’s summit, Harry takes a helicopter ride to the top. The hyena that circles his campsite is waiting for him to die. He has lived off the riches of his wife, calling his love for her “the lie he made his bread and butter by”4. Harry lies crippled on a cot while his wife goes “to kill a piece of meat”5. The microcosm of the camp is an extension of the real world in which Harry picks up the leftovers of others, just as the hyenas live off the leftovers of the better hunters. The hyena in the story is always associated with Harry’s death. When Harry faces the realization of his death, it comes “ with a rush; not as a rush of water nor of wind; but of a sudden evil-smelling emptiness and the odd thing was that the hyena slipped lightly along the edge of it”6, and the death actually occurs, it is the hyena that announces it with “a strange, human, almost crying sound”7. The hyena is associated with Harry’s psychological state, as Jerianne Wright argues, “it is a symbol of his psychological death that has occurred because of his inability to act decisively for himself”1. The physical death is simply the last step in this process. The two animals represent conflicting personality traits. Harry, in the end, dies as he lives, as a hyena scavenging the leopard’s leftovers on his path to Kilimanjaro. A Clean, Well-Lighted Place ,which comes four years after A Farewell to Arms, shows Hemingway’s attitudes towards the central dilemma of initiation shifting, which is more in line with the “wise- man” characters such as Count Mippipopolous in The Sun Also Rises and Count Greffi in A Farewell to Arms. The dilemma focuses on the necessity of living life fully and stoically with the permanent acceptance of death. What is new in this story is Hemingway’s perspective which is in the process of changing. It is closing time in a café. “Everyone had left[…] except an old man who sat in the shadow the leaves of the tree made against the electric light”2. The old man comes there every night and the week before he had tried to commit suicide. The young waiter denies the old man’s last drink, as he wanted to close the bar and go home. Actually, the young waiter has no sympathy for the old man, while the old waiter sympathizes with the old man, understanding how important it is for him to be accepted in a clean, well-lit café, which is open as late as possible, for those who might need it. The shift in Hemingway’s perspective, as Bryant Mangum argues, is subtly suggested in the story’s dramatic structure, in which Hemingway often, and quite consciously, omits the dialogue guides, forcing the reader to decide whether the speaker is the young waiter or the old waiter. When the readers become aware of what Hemingway is doing in showing the two waiters’ very different attitudes, the dialogue guides are unnecessary. Their omission becomes part of the iceberg, as Bryant Mangum points out, “the part you can omit and it only strengthens your iceberg”3. The young waiter cannot understand the old man’s despair: “He has plenty of money,”4 the young waiter says. When asked by the old waiter the reason that the old man tried to commit suicide, the young waiter replies that it was “Nothing”5. This answer is full of irony. The young waiter does not understand the “nothingness” concept that is affirmed in the old waiter’s “Our nada who art in nada” monologue, which indicates his degree of sympathy for the old man who is “a good client” but “he’s lonely” and he is one of “ all those who need a light for the night”. Although he was drunk, when he left the café very late, he was “walking unsteadily but with dignity”. Through the old waiter who leads an honest life, Hemingway suggests that a life lived with an awareness of death, in other words with a recognition of nada, will have moments of despair. For Jake in The Sun Also Rises, Catherine in A Farewell to Arms, or the old man in the café, who experienced moments of loneliness, a light bulb at night, a dry place out of the rain, or a clean well-lighted café is the only possibility through which they can survive, they feel safe and protected in a troubled world. According to Bryant Mangum, in all the stories and novels published around 1933, the year of publication of “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place,” there is a distance between the code heroes and the thing itself, death. Death is very near to the heroes in such stories as “The Killers,” where Ole Anderson is waiting to be killed. This situation and other situations like this are viewed from the perspective of a Nick –like character, by one whose days are not numbered. The situation of Frederick Henry is different, he is watching death which happens to other people. In The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber, the code hero moves a step closer to death, as Bryant Mangum argues, when the code hero embraces death, that is for him “the end of the story”(6). As the title of the story suggests every moment lived in fear was not actually life at all. Only in overcoming the fear of death did he escape the insisting presence of Margot and actually have a life of his own, although its duration was only a few seconds. The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber, as Bryant Mangum argues, “can be viewed thematically as the last phase of the initiation of the code hero,” a phase which is also experienced in The Snows of Kilimanjaro and to a certain extent, in For Whom the Bell Tolls and The Old Man and the Sea. Big Two-Hearted River is symbolically a story of the construction of a value system after all the traditional values which someone was taught as a child have been burned away. This lonely process must be undertaken in solitude, a good explanation for the fact that in this long, two-part story, there is only one character. Having set up his camp by the river, Nick crawls inside his tent to place some things at the head of the bed. The light which came through the brown canvas and the smell of the canvas created a mysterious and homelike atmosphere in the tent. “Now”, as Frank Scafella argues, “things were done. There had been this to do […]. He had made his camp. He was settled. Nothing could touch him.[…] Now he was hungry”1. Nick is still touched by “the light” and “the canvas smell.” The mystery, the feeling of happiness that he is at home settled, his “growing hunger,” all these touch Nick. The idea, “Nothing could touch him,”2comes to Nick when he feels “settled,” at “home,” “in the good place,” and beyond “the need for thinking,” “the need to write”3. As Frank Scafella argues, “these needs cannot touch him in his tent at the river”. However, in the good place at the river the idea, “Nothing could touch him,” as Frank Scaffella points out, “touches Nick in thought beyond need. So the double significance of ‘nothing ,’at once an absence and a presence”) in Nick’s thinking means that “nothing” is “something” that Nick is free to enter. REFERENCES [1] Cowley, M., (1969), Exile’s Return. New York. The Viking Press. [2] Goodman, W.R., (1968), A Manual of American Literature. New Delhi: Doaba House. [3] Hemingway, E., (2004), The Essential Hemingway. London. Arrow Books. [4] Holman C. H., (1980), A Handbook to Literature. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. [5] Lewis, W. R., (1992), A Farewell to Arms. The War of the Worlds. New York,. [6] Mangum, B., (1982), Critical Survey of Short Fiction. Salem Press, 1621-28. [7] Scafella, F., (1990), Hemingway: Essays of Reassessment. U.S.A. [8] Schakel P., and Ridl J., (2005), Approaching Literature in the 21st Century. Fiction Poetry Drama. New York. [9] Walcutt, C.C., (1974), American Literary Naturalism- A Divided Stream. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. [10] Wright, J., (2001), Hemingway’s Use of Animals as Psychological Symbols. Los Angeles. Amazon. Com. Monday November 12. [11] Young, P., (1966), ‘Ernest Hemingway,’ Seven Modern American Novelists,-An Introduction. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.
Facultatea de Relaţii Economice Internaţionale, Universitatea Creştină „Dimitrie Cantemir”, Bucureşti Abstract: Von der Herkunft, Einwanderungszeit, Niederlassungsorte der Ahnen der deutschen Bevölkerung aus Rumänien ausgehend erarbeitet der Beitrag die Einflüsse des Rumänischen und österreichischen Deutsch auf die „Hochsprache“ (Schrift- und Schulsprache) der Rumäniendeutschen im Bereich der Aussprache, Wortbildung, Lexik und Grammatik. Schlüsselwörter: Rumäniendeutsche, Schrift-und Schulsprache, Phonemsystem- und Intonationssystem, Lexik, Grammatik, Wortbildung. R 5 umäniendeutsche ist eine Sammelbezeichnung für die regional getrennt lebenden deutschsprachigen Minderheiten aus Rumänien. Gemeint sind unterschiedliche Gruppen: a. Sachsen (Siebenbürger Sachsen), b. Zipser, c. Donauschwaben (Banater und Sathmarer Schwaben), d. Landler, e. Bukowinadeutsche, f. Bessarabiendeutsche, g. Dobrudschadeutsche, h. Regatdeutsche, die aus unterschiedlichen Gegenden des heutigen Deutschland, Österreich, Luxenburg stammen, sich zu unterschiedlichen Epochen, aus verschiedenen Gründen, in unterschiedlichen Gegenden des heutigen Rumänien ansiedelten (s. Tabelle im Anhang). 
       
1 2 
3 4 6 7 8 Abb. 1 Karte von Rumänien mit Ansiedlungszeiten der deutschen Stämme Schrift- und Schulsprache für die deutsche Bevölkerung aus Rumänien war seit altersher nicht die Mundart, sondern das Hochdeutsche, allerdings stark regional gefärbt. Die Mundart war vor allem auf die privaten Sprachdomänen und die Kommunikation im Alltag beschränkt. Obwohl den im Laufe der Jahrhunderte erfolgten Änderungen in der deutschen Hochsprache auch von den hiesigen Volksdeutschen Rechnung getragen wurde, übten die bis heute aktiv im Gebrauch gesprochenen Mundarten, das Rumänische und auch andere Sprachen der nationalen Minderheiten aus Rumänien (z.B. das Ungarische) auf das Rumäniendeutsche einen großen Einfluss. Das hier gesprochene Deutsch (Hochdeutsch) ist zwar nicht dialektal durchsetzt, aber „akzentuell starkt gefärbt“. Auch in Deutschland oder Österreich lebende Volksdeutsche erkennen sich leicht an ihrer Aussprache. Werden die Aussprachebesonderheiten des Rumäniendeutschen analysiert, so müssen folgende erwähnt werden: a. im Bereich der Segmentalia: Vokale: - übermäßig weite Kieferöffnung bei der Artikulation des „a“ und „ä“ - Realisierung des „ö“ ohne klar bemerkbare Lippenrundung - Bildung der Vokale mit stark nach hinten gezogener Zunge - dunklere Klangfarbe bei der Realisierung der Vokale - fehlender fester Einsatz, stattdessen „liason“ der Vokale mit dem vorangehenden Konsonanten; - geringe Differenzierung zwischen langen und kurzen Vokalen
Konsonanten:
Konsonanten am Silben- und Wortende - weiche Realisierung der stimmlosen Konsonanten - ungenügende Aspiration der stimmlosen Verschlusslaute - Realisierung der „r“-Laute - kein Reibe- und vokalisiertes „r“ - volle Realisierung der Endung –“ig“, d. h. als [g] - das „dicke l“ Der Vergleich der Vokal- und Konsonantensysteme des Standarddeutschen und Rumäniendeutschen ergibt folgendes Schema: VOKALPHONEME
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