Diasporic cinema: turkish-german filmmakers with particular emphasis on generational differences

The Structure of the Turkish Press

Considering that “a study of content alone is not sufficient … to understand either the force that produced that content or the nature or extent of its effects” (Shoemaker and Rees 1996: 28), this sub-chapter examines the elements that shape the framework of the Turkish media. It is essential to evaluate the general structure and principles of the Turkish press given that every text is a product of a strongly connected net of social, cultural and historical determinants; and thus, each text has a certain meaning depending on the particular context in which it is produced. Exploring the principles of the Turkish press will provide a basis for understanding the political affiliations of the papers, and consequently, their specific ways of dealing with Turkish-German filmmakers and their films.
The specific socio-historical development and the resulting idiosyncratic structure of the Turkish press cannot be construed or analysed in isolation from the development of similar media in the rest of the world. Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that “media organisations reflect the differences between political systems, political philosophies, cultural traits and economic conditions” (Papathanassopoulos 2001: 505). In other words, even though “dominant academic literature suggests that there has been a process of convergence among global media systems and journalistic practices regardless of their parochial particularities” (Papathanassopoulos 2001: 505), national and cultural specificities shaping individual media structures in different countries still prove to be important. In this respect, the Turkish press should be evaluated both in terms of its unique characteristics and similarities with the historical development of media systems in the global context.
The Turkish press has never been truly independent; either economically or politically. This is mainly due to particular structures of ownership and legislative measurements that determine the context in which the Turkish press operates. In Turkey, as elsewhere in the world, newspapers evolved from individual enterprise over national and then international monopolies or oligopolies that are subjects to the rules of capitalist industrial regulations.¹³³ However, in either case, they heavily relied on the financial support of the state. The Babıali district where all newspapers and publishers have been based since the 19^th century – a location which also used to stand for the entire press until the 1990s – was at the heart of the political centre during the Ottoman Empire, indicating the sector’s financial dependency on government subsidies as well as the location’s convenience for government control and censorship (Tunç 2004). State subsidies also continued during the early years of the Turkish Republic (Erdoğan 2007: 27). This close relationship has determined the structure of the Turkish press since its birth and led to the government’s strong influence on, control of and interference in the newspapers, which have struggled to survive under harsh economic conditions. Even though the press originated and developed as a free enterprise rather than as a state-owned industry by virtue of local and vernacular Anatolian newspapers that were published by foreign subjects in the Ottoman Empire in their own languages, close surveillance has been deeply entrenched since those days. Subsequent governments have had the power to manipulate and use the press for their own benefit. The political and economic interventions of the governments have been justified by claiming that they are to protect the public, whereas in fact, the legislative measures have functioned as a censorship tool to silence the press when required.¹³⁴ There has therefore been an ongoing and intrinsic financial dependency upon the state and a resultant ideological conformity of the Turkish press with successive governments.¹³⁵
The tight state control over the press continued all the way through untill 1961, when the new constitution that was created following the 1960 leftist military coup guaranteed freedom of the press. However, it did not last long as the legal regulations were altered again in 1971, after the declaration of the military note which is better known as 12 Mart Muhtırası. In 1980, Turkey experienced a third military coup that also led to the establishment of the 1982 Constitution, which was in effect up until September 2010.¹³⁶ The regulations made regarding the media within the scope of this constitution were mostly seen as regressive since they resulted in a temporary or permanent closure of many newspapers, prosecution of hundreds of journalists, the destruction of many publications and stricter control mechanisms on the press. This new period also marked a structural change in the Turkish press: the traditional media ownership pattern, which was characterised by the existence of the managers/owners who were journalists themselves and had taken over the business from their journalist fathers, disappeared to be replaced by giant conglomerates directed by big bosses who were not media moguls but instead were from various industries (Finkel 2000; Tunç 2002 and 2004). This remarkable shift in the ownership structure of the industry was not only the outcome of the political turmoil but was also a product of the new economic policies employed by Turgut Özal’s government in the early 1980s, in line with the liberalisation and deregulation policies prevailing all around the world at the time.¹³⁷ In contrast to promoting liberalism in the economy, when it came to the freedom of the press, the right to information and freedom of speech, Özal and his government were known for their infamous policies of oppression which led to the elimination of the opposition and the resulting self-censorship implemented by the newspapers. Within the “clientelist and patrimonial relationship pattern between media and state” (Christensen 2007: 184), only those who did not challenge the official policies and discourses could secure grants from the government and so could continue publishing free from any enforcement by the government. The political conformism enhanced during this period has become one of the inherent characteristics of the mainstream Turkish press. That is, the newspapers have customarily acted in line with official state policies, approximating the dominant discourse, if not totally reproducing it.
The combination of globally dominant free-market policies, in the shape of deregulation and privitisation, together with the impact of advanced communication technologies, saw the rise in the 1990s of many private radio and television channels. This was a de facto violation of certain provisions of the 1982 Constitution, which stipulated that the state was the only authority able to establish radio or television institutions. As a result, the insufficiency of the 1982 Constitution to match modern needs was recognised, and consequently, an amendment, made in 1993, liberated the mass media industry from state monopoly (Darendeli 2007: 7). However, despite their seeming financial independence, the media in general and the press in particular remained under the control of the state by the enactment of several articles such as 3984 and 301, which made it possible to imprison many journalists for articulating their opinions on controversial matters as the latter presents a very vague definition of insulting Turkishness and the Turkish state (Turkish Penal Code-TCK 2004). In brief, the specific economic and political atmosphere of the 1980s paved the way for a media environment in which hundreds of private television and radio channels and newspapers mushroomed, but a real plurality of political opinion and an open discussion of alternative political views have yet to be achieved.¹³⁸

Despite undeniable evidence of the state’s suppression of the media in Turkey, the significance of the corporation should not be overlooked in order to fully comprehend the political economy of the Turkish press (Christensen 2007: 195-96). Today’s media industry in Turkey is an oligopoly in which a few giant media groups compete at the centre, exercise excessive power and demonstrate a high level of political influence. The newspapers constitute one leg of a vertically integrated industry, which has also expanded towards other business sectors such as energy, telecommunication, banking, insurance and finance, resulting in the formation of formidable conglomerates in the field.¹³⁹ The concentrated ownership structure and the expansive financial interests of the patrons suggest they have interests other than creating a democratic media environment. Power and business relations as such have an impact on the attitudes of newspapers towards issues that would influence or determine the success of their wider corporate businesses. This explains, for instance, why none of the newspapers examined here directly position themselves against Turkey’s membership in the EU. In sum, the economy-politics of the Turkish press is crucial to understanding its role in ideological reproduction.

In this respect, the Turkish press follows the same principles as other capitalist economic systems globally. Each paper also represents a particular ideological stance which determines how a particular event is presented in the news coverage. Accordingly, Nick Ludington identifies three main ideological trajectories among Turkish newspapers: 1) private-sector liberals that support pro-Western policies, and consequently, are pro-EU, of which the newspaper Radikal is given as an example, 2) nationalist Kemalist papers¹⁴⁰ such as the newspaper Cumhuriyet, and 3) political Islamist papers, notably the newspaper Zaman (cited in Kışlalı 2003: online). It should be noted that Cumhuriyet, despite being explicitly Kemalist – a concept which is described as a “discourse of nationalism” by Kahraman and Keyman (1998: 67), is subsumed under the category of leftist papers in general and in this study as well, underscoring the idiosyncrasy of the Turkish political context. Ludington’s classification remains rather exclusive and restrictive. In order to encompass a wider range of papers, additional categories should be identified. Thus, alongside the above mentioned quality papers, Milliyet, Hürriyet, Sabah, Bugün, Star and Akşam can be classified as mainstream with a more nationalist and populist overtone compared to Radikal. In addition, Birgün can be placed in the same category as a newspaper that describes itself as an independent quality paper with a popular approach. Moreover, Yeni Şafak, and Yeni Çağ can be subsumed under the category of conservative right-wing with a religious overtone.
The classification of the Turkish press in terms of its political stance is also tacitly assumed to have implications for the different papers’ attitudes towards the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), which have always been a strong political agent in the public realm. After all, the Turkish Republic was founded by a soldier-general – Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and ever since, even civilian governments have relied on the army to help them deal with national problems. When one takes into account the sensitive dynamics considering the Kurdish conflict in the country, the three military coups (1960, 1971 and 1980) that intervened with the democratic process and their direct consequences on the structure and functioning mechanism of the press, it becomes clear why the TSK plays an important role in the general power relations in Turkey. Accordingly, some newspapers like Cumhuriyet might perspicuously take side with the TSK by seeing themselves and the army as the advocates/upholders of the republic.¹⁴¹ By contrast, Zaman clearly opposes the existence of a strong military in so far as the military is conceived as the safeguard of secularism, and others like Milliyet and Hürriyet, which are mainstream papers with high circulation figures, appear to be more reluctant to publicly take sides. At this point, two more newspapers, namely Evrensel and Taraf, should be mentioned. The former has an explicit Kurdish framework whilst the latter does not have an ethnic affiliation but has galvanised attention via its controversial and provocative news stories about so-called taboo issues in Turkey. They are both well known for their strong dissidence with the nationalist and militarist system, and thus, can be considered to be marginal leftist and liberal respectively.¹⁴²
The two charts below, which are based on my readings of pertinent news items, reviews and commentaries, are not conclusive, but aim to present a compact yet informative classification of the Turkish press based on two relational axes that are central to the following analysis, and are devised to facilitate seeing/following the correlations between the papers’ ideology and their particular coverage of Turkish-German filmmakers and their films:
Attitude toward EU Accession in the Turkish Press

Pro .Evrensel .Taraf .Radikal .Hürriyet

Birgün Milliyet

Star

Akşam

.Zaman

Sceptical .Cumhuriyet .Yeni Çağ

Yeni Şafak

Against Political Position

Marginal Leftist Liberal Mainstream Mainstream Political Extreme

Leftist Liberal Nationalist Islamist Right-wing

Chart 1

Nationalist Tone in the Turkish Press

Strong .Cumhuriyet .Yeni Şafak

Yeni Çağ

.Akşam

Star

Hürriyet

Milliyet

Neutral .Radikal

Birgün

.Zaman

.Evrensel .Taraf

Weak Political Position

Marginal Leftist Liberal Mainstream Mainstream Political Extreme

Leftist Liberal Nationalist Islamist Right-wing

Chart 2

Having provided a brief survey of the structure of the Turkish media industry and the political affiliation of the most important newspapers, I will now analyse the reception of Turkish-German filmmakers in the Turkish press. The analysis will focus on two thematic frameworks in the news coverage: namely, the political debates about Turkey’s accession to the EU, and the issue of national belonging. Since the papers analysed reflect a broad spectrum of political views, the analysis will also strive to draw attention to the link between the ideological positions of the papers in question and the news frames they employ; that is, how they cover, thematise, discuss and emphasise certain issues regarding Turkish-German filmmakers.

Filmmakers or Diplomatic Ambassadors? The Role Assigned to Turkish-German Filmmakers in the Process of Turkey’s Accession to the European Union

It is widely known that migrant-sending peripheral countries hugely benefit from the economic contribution of their population abroad.¹⁴³ Yet Turkey’s relation with its diasporic subjects has moved beyond dependence on remittances only. Diasporas across the world have gained ever more significance in international affairs (Davies 2007: 62). Today what matters more is not the money diasporic subjects send to or invest back in their country of origin but the powerful role they play in terms of the representation of the country. In this context, “the conditions of the Turks in Germany take on added significance given the relationship of Turkey to the European Union (EU) ... which sensitises the border between Turkey and the EU, between the Germans and the Turks” (Halle 2008: 142). The presence of Turks at the heart of Europe, as the outsiders inside, changes the rules of the game for Turkey, since it can more confidently demand recognition and membership as a European country. Hereby Turks in diaspora, particularly those in Germany as it is one of the most important and powerful countries in the union, become strong political actors. The more Turkey is rejected by EU institutions, the more it needs and resorts to its successful diasporic subjects to be able to change the deep-rooted negative image which many Europeans have of it.

The relationship between Turkey and Europe has a very long and complicated history which cannot be sufficiently discussed within the scope of this chapter. In a nutshell, in 1963 Turkey and the then European Economic Community (ECC) signed the Association Agreement to initiate the process of Turkey’s eventual inclusion in the European Union (Gülmez 2008: 423).¹⁴⁴ Ever since, Turkey, which from the outset of the Turkish Republic wanted to appropriate Western values in the name of modernisation, has pursued its cautious official strategy in order to become a full member of the European Union.¹⁴⁵ The official attitude is considered to be “cautious” in so far as Turkey’s foreign policy seems to fluctuate between isolationism and openness based on principles such as “self-sufficiency”, “national security and independence”, and “modernisation”.¹⁴⁶ In accordance with this attitude, the ongoing discussions between Turkey and the EU seem to play an important role in the construction of the Turkish social fabric and the redefinition of Turkish national identity.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, integration into the EU has always had a symbolic meaning for Turkish people as it is regarded as the culmination of Atatürk’s vision to reach the level of contemporary civilisations.¹⁴⁸ The so-called “social engineering project” (Keyder 1997), advised and led by Atatürk in the early years of the Turkish Republic, can actually be formulated as “global modernity = European civilisation = Westernisation” (Kahraman and Keyman 1998: 72), underlining the foundational role the Westernisation principle played in the process.¹⁴⁹ In connection with the history of modernisation in Turkey, any incident regarding the relations between Turkey and the EU has occupied a significant place on the political agenda of the Turkish state, and more generally, in the Turkish public sphere. Hence the importance and the resulting high coverage of this issue in the Turkish press.
It is widely known that “a high level of concentration of Turkish migrants in various European countries contributed to overall negative feelings about Turkey and its candidacy to become a member of the EU” (McLaren 2007: 268). That is to say, the existing diasporic Turkish community in Europe, especially in Germany, which harbours the highest population of Turks, has had a considerable impact – seemingly very poor and negative – on the perception of Turkey and Turkish national identity.¹⁵⁰ “Mostly caused by the ways in which Turkish diasporic subjects have been perceived in the West, there are still strong popular stereotypes among the public of EU countries, claiming that Turkey does not politically, economically and culturally fit into the EU” (Kaya and Kentel 2004: 6). The common tendency to see the members of the Turkish diaspora as Turkey’s representatives demonstrates the widespread metonymic reading of the situation. In so far as “Turkey is seen through the prism of experience of Turkish diaspora” in Europe (Giddens et al. 2004: 29), the recent achievements of Turkish-German filmmakers, who are simultaneously Turkish and German, have come into prominence. This is not only because their hyphenated identities provide the means for newspapers to speculate about their national belonging, but also due to the increased recognition they get in an international context. This new generation of successful, commercially and critically acclaimed Turkish-German filmmakers provides Turkey with the opportunity to prove to the world and to Europe that the country and its people should not only be associated with problems. The numerous achievements of these filmmakers suggest that the negative image of Turks in the European public sphere should be replaced with more positive ones. Obviously, high-profile Turkish-German writers such as Feridun Zaimoğlu and Emine Sevgi Özdamar, and politicians like Cem Özdemir and Mehmet Yıldız also have a role to play in this shift in the perception of Turks in Europe.¹⁵¹ Nonetheless, cinema, especially when commercially successful, is a popular art form, and thus is particularly visible; hence, filmmakers prove to be more convenient for journalists to predicate their arguments on. These prominent filmmakers, as conspicuous media figures, are constructed as representatives of the entire Turkish nation in the Turkish press, and are expected to epitomise the concept of “Turkishness”. Therefore, in most cases, the newspapers appear to attribute a specific role to these filmmakers and assume they will act as spokespersons who can mediate between Turkey and Germany. These filmmakers are expected to articulate Turkey’s concerns during the membership negotiations with the EU. If they do not do so of their own free will, they are forced to reveal their opinions through the persistent interrogations of journalists, or their films and achievements are narrated via political discourses that deal with the issue of Turkish candidacy for the EU.
It is worth mentioning that most of these newspapers are only circulated in Turkey, which means all this emphasis on Turkey’s supposedly undeniable right to become an EU country merely targets a Turkish readership rather than reinforcing a political lobby that would create support for Turkey’s acceptance by the EU outside Turkey. All of these papers have websites allowing access from all around the world, but again almost all of them, Zaman being the exception, are only available in Turkish. Even though they are not accessible to a non-Turkish readership, the efforts of the newspapers make sense given that “national identity is often described as an entity that has no existence outside representation, but should be seen as a narrative of the self … the story we tell about the self to know who we are” (Mihelj et al. 2009: 59). In this context, Turkish-German filmmakers’ artfully narrated and embellished success stories allow the newspapers to reassure their readers that Turkey is worthy of securing membership in the EU. The newspapers constantly play on national sensitivity and at the same time national pride by narrating the nation to itself.
With regards to the press coverage of Turkish-German filmmakers in general, it is remarkable that, even though they have been making films since the early 1990s, there were hardly any news items about them until the mid-2000s.¹⁵² This changed in 2004 with Fatih Akın’s award-winning film Head-On, which marked a turning point for the international recognition of Turkish-German cinema. The impact of Akın’s extraordinary portrayal of a second generation Turkish-German couple within a commercially successful narrative was twofold. It not only sparked heated debates around the situation and identity of Turkish people in Germany, but also increased the visibility of these filmmakers, who used to work mostly undiscovered and uncharted until that moment. Consequently, as the most salient and commercially successful filmmaker, Fatih Akın, among all of his colleagues, has indisputably attracted the most extensive attention from the Turkish press. As Erdoğan puts it, “in fact, any mention of Turkish-German cinema is more likely to conjure up his name than that of other talented Turkish-German auteurs” (2009: 27). However, in the majority of cases, this is not merely due to his directorial merits or the artistic quality of his films, but rather to a combination of diverse factors; namely, his amusing personality, rhetorical skills, and the political messages he embeds in his public speeches and interviews. This, at the same time, indicates that in Turkey, Turkish-German filmmakers still do not have enough importance to generate news and for that reason they are mostly represented in relation to wider thematic frameworks such as Turkish-EU relations and identity politics. Accordingly, Akın has become the figure whom all journalists closely watch and follow whilst other Turkish-German filmmakers generally have had a comparatively low profile or have mostly been mentioned in relation to him. Owing to his celebrity status, Akın has almost single-handedly fuelled news items relating to Turkish-German cinema, especially any concerned with Turkey’s relationship with the EU.
It should be noted that the year 2004 also constitutes a particularly significant date in terms of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Having applied for full membership in the EU in 1987, Turkey was finally endorsed to officially begin the negotiation process subsequent to a decision made at the Brussels Summit in 2004.