E
SCCR/21/2
OriGINAL: English
DATE: August 4, 2010
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights
Twenty First Session
Geneva, November 8 to 12, 2010
Study on the Socioeconomic Dimension of the Unauthorized Use of
Signals – Part III:
Study on the Social and Economic Effects of the Proposed Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations
Document prepared by Professor Robert G. Picard, Ph.D., Principal Investigator,
Media Management and Transformation Centre, Jönköping International Business School, Sweden; Professor Guy Berger, Ph.D., School of Journalism and Media Studies,
Rhodes University, Johannesburg, South Africa; Fernand P. Alberto, LL.B., M.B.A.,
Broadcast Media Consultant, Manila, Philippines
The views and opinions expressed in this study are the responsibility of the authors. They are not intended to represent the views of any member states or the Secretariat of WIPO.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents i
Executive Summary 1
I. Introduction 2
II. Rationales for Protecting Signals 5
iii. Stakeholders Affected by the Proposed Treaty 6
Authors and Performers 7
Production Firms 8
Content Rights Holders and Licensers 9
Broadcasters/Cablecasters and Cable and Satellite System Operators 10
Audiences/Consumers/Users 11
States/Governments 12
Society 14
IV. Unauthorized Signal Use 15
Unauthorized Pre-Public Transmission Signal Uses 16
Unauthorized Use in the Terrestrial and Satellite Environment 16
Unauthorized Reception 16
Unauthorized Decryption 17
Unauthorized Retransmission 18
Unauthorized Fixation 19
Unauthorized Post-Fixation Use 19
Unauthorized Use in the Cable Environment 20
Unauthorized Connection 20
Unauthorized Decryption 21
Unauthorized Retransmission 21
Unauthorized Fixation 22
Unauthorized Post-Fixation Use 22
V. FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMICS OF BROADCASTING AND CABLECASTING 22
Broadcasting as a Public Good 23
The Challenge of Prices 24
Implications of Cost Structures of Different Types of Broadcasting 26
VI. ECONOMIC LOSSES IN UNAUTHORIZED USES OF SIGNALS 27
Broadcasting and Issues of Demand 28
VII. EFFECTS OF UNAUTHORIZED USES ON INVESTMENT 36
VIII. EFFECTS OF UNAUTHORIZED USES ON PROFITS 37
IX. ECONOMIC ISSUES OF SOCIAL WELFARE 37
X. EFFECTS OF RIGHTS AND LICENSES ON ABILITIES OF BROADCASTERS
AND CABLECASTERS TO EXPLOIT THEIR SIGNALS 42
Rights and Licenses in a Broadcast Stream 43
Right of Retransmission 44
Right of Fixation 45
Post-Fixation Rights 45
Protection in Relation to Signals Prior to Broadcast or Cablecast 46
Cases Illustrating the Impact of Unauthorized Use or Retransmission 46
How Signal Reception and Retransmission Outside an Intended Market or Audience Affects Rights and Licenses and Other Potential Uses 47
Benefits to Rights Holders if Broadcasters/Cablecasters are Able to Control Signal, Retransmission, and Post-Fixation Rights 49
XI. CONTRIBUTIONS OF UNLICENSED USE OF SIGNALS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 50
Exceptions in the Public Interest 51
Broadcasting and the Public Interest 51
Cases in which Public Interest Arguments are Seen by Some to Rise
above the Proposed Treaty’s Signal Protections 53
XII. ASSESSING OVERALL EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED TREATY 57
XIII. How Stakeholders are Affected by the Proposed Treaty 59
Authors and Performers, Production Firms, and Rights Holders/Licensers 59
Broadcasters (Terrestrial and Satellite) and Cablecasters and Cable/Satellite Operators 60
Audiences/Consumers/Users 60
States/Governments 60
Society 61
XIV. BALANCE OF BENEFITS ANALYSIS 70
XV. HOW BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES MIGHT EVOLVE OVER TIME 72
XVI. ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF SEEKING BENEFITS 74
XVII. CONCLUSIONS 76
ANNEX: ORGANIZATIONS/EXPERTS CONSULTED
Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Context of Broadcast and Cablecast Signal Creation and Use 3
Figure 2: Types and Means of Unauthorized Signal Use 14
Figure 3: Harms as Seen in an Analysis Tree 32
Figure 4: Broadcast and Cablecast Policy Typically Balances
Social Welfare Objectives 36
Table 1: Summary of Economic Losses in Different Situations 28
Table 2: Central Issues and Potential Effects of the Proposed Treaty
Relevant to Social Welfare Analysis 37
Table 3: Method and Data Types for Measuring Quantifiable Results 38
Table 4: Effects of the Treaty Articles on Stakeholders 57
Executive Summary
1 This report of the study on socioeconomic dimensions of unauthorized use of signals explores the types and conditions of unauthorized uses, the economic effects of the uses, the interests of stakeholders affected by the proposed treaty on protection of broadcast signals, and how they are affected by its provisions.
2 The report explains the rationale of the proposed treaty, how unauthorized uses of signals take place in the broadcasting (terrestrial and satellite) and the cable and cable satellite environments and the differences between unauthorized reception, unauthorized decryption, unauthorized retransmission (understood in this report as meaning a simultaneous transmission), and unauthorized fixation and post-fixation uses (including reproduction and distribution).
3 This report reviews the economics of broadcasting and identifies the economic effects of unauthorized uses, revealing how they affect company costs, cost recovery, demand for authorized uses, and revenues of companies. It shows that the locations of the unauthorized uses and whether free-to-air or paid signals are involved play significant roles in whether harm occurs and the extent of harm created by unauthorized uses.
4 The report delineates the rights within and related to the signal and the implications of these for authorized and unauthorized retransmissions and post-fixation uses of signals. It also identifies social benefits that may result from unauthorized uses and identifies some uses that some stakeholders argue are worthy of exceptions or limitations to protections.
5 The report then shows the extent to which the interests of stakeholders will be affected by provisions of the proposed treaty, and considers the distribution of benefits and detriments of proposed options in the treaty among the stakeholders and the equity of their distribution.
6 Through its assessment of the treaty, the report shows:
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that the primary benefits of the treaty accrue to broadcasters and cable and satellite operators;
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that large international broadcasters and domestic broadcasters and cablecasters disseminating sporting events, concerts, and movies can be expected to be greatest beneficiaries;
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that authors and performers, production firms, and rights holders/licensers will benefit from an additional layer of protection and enforcement that reinforces their rights under other treaties;
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that rights of fixation and post-fixation for broadcasters will not generally disadvantage content owners (authors, performers, and other rights holders) because they do not override rights provided elsewhere;
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that domestic broadcasters and cablecasters, distribution systems and tax receipts will benefit, but to a degree that cannot be projected;
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that interests of audiences/consumers/users and society are protected only to the extent that contracting parties have or put in place legislation and regulatory measures that protect their interests;
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that the greatest benefits for broadcasters and various rights holders and licensers can be expected in upper middle and high income states;
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that some economic benefits are likely to occur in lower middle income states, but that benefits are unlikely to occur in low income states for many years due to other intervening factors;
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that the primary disadvantages of the treaty are the additional expenditures that states/governments will be required to incur to administer and enforce its provisions;
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that the administration/enforcement disadvantage will have the greatest impact on low and lower middle income states;
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that audiences/consumers/users and society will be somewhat disadvantaged by reduced access to some content;
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that the content disadvantage will have the greatest impact on low and lower middle income states.
7 The report concludes that the treaty:
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is likely to provide some positive benefits in terms of revenue for broadcasters and cablecasters and wealth generation and tax benefits for states, but to an extent that cannot now be clearly estimated;
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will provide some additional protection for existing investments in programming, but that it is impossible to project whether it will lead to increased investment;
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is likely to be easier to enforce than other IP treaties because it involves actions of broadcasters, cablecasters and others that are highly visible to authorities;
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will improve and streamline enforcement adjudication processes and procedures through its national treatment provisions.
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