Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

Federalism as a tool for expanding power or maintaining unity
The American Federalist Papers present federalism as a way of preventing
liberal democracy from degenerating into tyranny (Burgess 1993b:32).
Federalism allows a more sophisticated type of representation, both nation-
wide and territorially based, and this provides some separation of power and
thereby prevents the concentration of power in few hands. On the one hand, if
political leaders of the independent state governments have factious interests,
they are not able to spread their interests to other states. On the other hand, the
existence of strong independent state governments provides the bulwark for
individual liberties against any possible encroachment by the federal
government. Federalism is here promoted as a way of checking power and
could therefore be understood as a part of the general principle of checks and
balances in the American political system (Burgess 1993b:32).
Why are political elites willing to accept the federal bargain of checks and
balances? Riker claims that the desire to expand territorial control or the fear
of external military threat are always present when federalism is chosen as the
basis for building a political system (1964:13). The politicians who offer the
federal bargain have the desire to expand their territory and politicians who
accept the bargain are willing to give up some independence for the sake of
union in order to be protected from external enemies. Riker argues that the
American Constitution, which established the United States as a federal system,
had clear military motivations. The original thirteen colonies realised that in
order to expand the new country and centralise its power it was more efficient
to bargain than to conquer. The other states felt threatened by the centralising
powers and were willing to accept the bargain because they did not have the
capacity or the will to face military confrontations. Military considerations
were also present in the establishment of the modern Swiss federation, when the
liberal nationalist cantons wanted to expand their power and incorporated the
conservative Sonderbund cantons after a military confrontation had ended
(Riker 1964:35).
Riker’s thesis of federalism as a response to the desire for expansion and
military threat might give an explanation on why federal systems have been
chosen in situations where previously independent states sought together in a
wider union. In situations where originally unitary states have restructured to

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become federations, other explanations are needed. When unitary states choose
federalism as the normative base for political reconstruction, the threat of
disintegration and the need to maintin unity are often the major arguments.
Conflict management or accommodation of differences are perceived as
essential to prevent dissolution of the state, and here federalism offers a
solution.
Although federalism in its initial form (the American and Swiss models) was
not designed to regulate conflicts based on ethnicity or other identity
differences, it is today conceived as one of the better devices to mute conflicts
among groups and between the central state and sub-national communities.
Horowitz (1997), McGarry and O’Leary (1995), Coakley (2000), Hechter
(2000) and Ghai (2000) are among those who argue for federalism as an
appropriate method to accommodate difference in multicultural states.
Horowitz classifies federalism as one of the structural techniques in conflict
regulation. Together with electoral reform, federalism is the device to change
the institutional format in which conflicts occur, “altering the structure of
incentives for political actors without making any promises about ethnic
outcomes” (1997:121). The aim is to make it pay to co-operate across ethnic
boundaries. His prime example for this is Nigeria, where the change of federal
structures through altering the number and ethnic composition of the federal
units from the 1
st
to the 2
nd
republic has subdued conflicts among ethnic groups.
Hecter (2000:142-145) claims that to the degree that federalism increases self-
government, the demand for secession is correspondingly reduced. Federalism
is seen as a stabilising measure, because it meets the claims for autonomy by
concession instead of repression.
O’Leary and McGarry (1995:34) remind us, however, that federalism has
not solved conflicts in multiethnic states because minorities are still
outnumbered on the federal level. Examples from Nigeria, India and Canada
show that federalism has not solved conflicts based on differences, but has only
managed and regulated them. Kymlicka (1998) argues that federalism does not
prevent secession, but is rather a stepping stone for groups who are opting for
independence. Along with Trudeau (cited in Burgess 1993b:18), he argues that
the presence of regional autonomy in federal states increases the desire for
more autonomy, and this leads to instability and increased nationalism.
Examples from Canada and Spain, where boundaries are drawn along ethnic
or national lines, show that federalism has not eliminated the claims for
secession. In Spain, the federal system is asymmetrical: the historic nationalities
have gained more autonomy than the other regions. One of the implications of
an asymmetrical federal system is that the more autonomy a state gains, the
less influence it will have on central level. When this is the case, it will be less
tempting for a region to remain within the wider framework, and more
attractive to secede. Kymlicka concludes that “the more successful a
multinational federal system is in accommodating national minorities, the more
it will strengthen the sense that these minorities are separate peoples with
inherent rights to self-government, whose participation in the larger political
country is conditional and revocable” (1998: 140).
The institutional features of federations

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Although most writers on federal theory could agree on King’s minimalist
definition of federations, there are many different views on whether other
criteria than territorial representation with constitutional entrenchment should
be included when distinguishing federal states from others. Duchacek, in his
book from 1987, operates with a whole checklist of what federations are, with
the so-called ten yardsticks of federalism (Duchacek 1987: 207). They include
details on specific arrangements for sharing the powers and duties between the
central and regional governments, what areas that should be the responsibility
of the different levels of government, and the structure of courts. According to
his definition of federal systems, the right to secession cannot be a part of a
federal constitution because it undermines citizens’ loyalty to the central level of
governance. The problem with Duchacek’s yardsticks is that he excludes
systems that fulfil the criteria of King’s definition, because they have chosen
other institutional or practical solutions. As we shall see, the category of
federations include a great variety of political systems, and the constitutionally
entrenched regional representations can take various institutional forms.
Duchacek’s yardsticks must therefore be considered as a loose guide to what is
common in federal systems, rather than a definition of what federal systems
are.
Once again we can turn to King’s minimalist definition of federations. As
King has expressed it, the content of his definition means in practice that:
1. The basis of its representation is territorial.
2. This territorial representation has at least two tiers (local and regional
governments).
3. At a minimum the regional units are electorally and perhaps otherwise
incorporated into the decision making procedures at the national centre.
4. The basis of such regional representation at the centre cannot be easily
altered, as by resort to the bare majoritarian procedure which serves
normal purposes. (King 1982:143).