Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

Chapter 2: Theoretical approaches
This study may be described as a theoretically interpretative study (Andersen
1997). Although it is empirically founded, established theory and
generalisations are used to throw light on the empirical case selected for
analysis. During my work, the processes of theoretical and empirical
exploration have taken place simultaneously. It started off with a preliminary
enquiry into the Ethiopian federal system through secondary sources and an
initial investigation of federal theoretical perspectives. After data collections in
Ethiopia and a deeper understanding of the functioning of the Ethiopian federal
system, federal theory and practices were explored once again, with the aim of
finding specific perspectives that could provide tools for analysing the data
collected. Thus, there is no one-way relationship between theory and the
empirical case in my study, and the theoretical and empirical findings have
mutually nourished each other towards a better understanding of the political
system in Ethiopia. In this chapter, then, there will first be a brief exploration
of federal theory in general, followed by some specific aspects that are of
particular relevance for the study of the Ethiopian federal system will be looked
deeper into. The theoretical considerations will finally wind up in a model for
analysing the Ethiopian federal system.
Federalism and federation
In federal studies, it has become common to distinguish between federation and
federalism as two separate concepts, each describing different aspects of federal
theory. Federalism is defined as a value concept including ideological and
philosophical perspectives promoting the federal solution, while federation is
an empirical reality, a specific type of institutional arrangement (Burgess
1993a: 4; King 1982: 76; Watts 1998:119). There are, however, different views
on what a federal system is and what criteria should be used to distinguish
federations from other political systems. Preston King has therefore tried to
make a minimalist definition, including the core characteristics of a federal
political system:
Basically we propose that any federation should be regarded as an
institutional arrangement, taking form of a sovereign state, and
distinguished from other such states solely on the fact that its central
government incorporates regional units into its decision procedures on
some constitutionally entrenched basis. (King 1982:77)
Thus, the essence of a federation is that the territorially based regional units,
called states, provinces, regions, Länder, republics, or cantons, are represented
at the central level of government, and that this representation is
constitutionally guaranteed. This implies that the central government cannot
change the rights and responsibilities of the constituent units without changing
the constitution, and that constitutional amendments require consensus from

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all or the majority of the units. Following this, federalism as a normative
concept would focus on promoting the view that territorially based regional
units should be represented in the national legislature (King 1982: 75).
Federalism – a normative concept
Federalism as an ideology is not what we consider as an ideology in its
traditional sense, like socialism or liberalism, which provides answers to
questions of uman existence and aims of life, but more as a “programmatic
orientation” (Smith 1995a: 4). It could be a prescriptive guide for action
recommending and promoting the support for federation (Burgess 1993a: 8).
Generally, federalism is considered to advocate the values of “unity in
diversity” or “shared rule and self-rule” (Elazar 1987: 12) giving regional
interests some authority of their own, inside the frame of a wider unity.
Federalism is therefore often connected to the idea of diffused power structures.
But as King (1982) has shown, there is no necessary link between federalism
and decentralisation. There is however a long tradition of centralist federalism,
where federalists have argued for unification and integration of independent
power centres into larger unions (King 1982: 22). If independent power centres
are integrated into the same political framework, there would be fewer
instruments for waging independent wars, and finally this would contribute to
a more stable and peaceful world. This was the central idea of the first thinkers
behind the European Union. In addition to the peace argument, integration into
larger unions has been promoted to achieve the benefits of large-scale
economies and to become both economically and military stronger against
external powers.
What King defines as decentralist federalism has had little practical impact
on the organisation of political systems (King 1982:22). Advocates for this
type of federalism, like the Russian anarchists Bakunin and Kropotkin, put
forward a universal demand for unlimited decentralisation and the abolition of
strong central governments. A more pragmatic version of decentralist
federalism, however, was used when the German federal system was introduced
in 1949. After World War II, the Allies wanted to create a less powerful centre
in post-nazi-Germany, saw federalism as the solution their problem. Similar
developments have taken place in Spain from the 1980s (the system of
autonomous communities) and Britain in the 1990s (devolution of power to the
national parliaments and assemblies).
The most common way of defending the federal solution is to point to what
Prodhoun has called “the doctrine of balance” (quoted in Smith 1995a: 5). The
solution sought is a compromise between integration and diversification,
decentralisation and centralisation. The political system should be based on a
pact or a convenant, where each unit freely and voluntarily surrenders some
degree of autonomy to the central government in exchange for some
compensating advantage. Elazar (1987: 5) defines federalism as “a political
remedy for political diseases”, designed to prevent tyranny without preventing
governance.
Riker (1964: 13) pointed out that there is no causal relationship between
federalism and freedom. He describes the linkage between federalism and the

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guarantee for freedom as an “ideological fallacy”, and argues that writers of
federal constitutions have been more concerned with practical considerations of
expanding government rather than the ideological considerations of guarding
freedoms. This argument implies that federalism first of all reflects values and
interests of political leaders who seek to benefit from state building and
institutional reconstruction, rather than moral and philosophical virtues. To
understand the normative base for promoting federations, it is therefore
necessary to identify the distinct political uses of federalism (Burgess 1993b:
104). Who benefits from federalism and what interests are being defended or
promoted? What does each federalism seek to achieve? To answer these
questions, it is necessary to analyse the cultural and institutional settings of
each federal constitution and to understand the interests of the political elite.