Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

Particularly the two last points of King’s elaboration, how regional units are
incorporated into the central government and the procedures for altering
regional representation, are important for how federal systems are organised in
practice. Most, but not all, federal states organise regional representation in a
bicameral system, while the procedures for altering regional representation are
strictly submitted to the rule of law. Within these frames, however, there are
various institutional solutions.
Regional representation on central level
Although bicameralism is “the natural ally of federalism” (Sharman 1987: 96),
regional entrenchment is not necessarily done through a bicameral system, but
could also be arranged in a unicameral way. This has happened in the federal
systems of Pakistan and Yugoslavia. As King has pointed out, it is not the
actual institutional arrangement which is important, but the fact that regional
interests are represented and have a real say in central decision making.
Nevertheless, most federations have chosen a bicameral system as the most
suitable in combining regional and central representation. The first or lower

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chamber would normally fill the function of representing the interests of the
federation as a whole and serve as a power base for the central government.
The second or upper chamber serves a as representative institutions for the
constituent units of the federation.
Second chambers would serve different purposes, according to what kind of
federalism and federal tradition the federal system is based on (Sharman
1987:85). In the United States, where federalism is basically a tool for
separating and checking power, the Senate (or second chamber) is used for
checking the power of the national government as such, by the states in
general. In federal systems with a parliamentary tradition or where federalism
is used to maintain unity, the second chamber is in place to ensure that all legal
action of the national government need the consult of the residents of smaller
regions as it does for more populous regions. In the various federal systems, the
representatives in the second chambers have different ways of being appointed
and are therefore representing different kinds of regional interests. They could
be delegates from the state executives as in Germany, elected by the state
legislatures as in Switzerland or directly elected by the people, as in the modern
American federation (Sharman 1987:84).
There is a dilemma connected to the representation of regional units on the
central level in federal states (King 1993). Should priority be given to equal
representation of regions as such or equal representation of its citizens? When
each state has an equal number of representatives in the second chamber, it
means that small states have the same vote as larger and more populous states.
As a consequence of this, the individual vote of each citizen in the various states
is given unequal weight and it might seem unfair that smaller states should
have more representatives per citizen than the larger ones. When federations
have decided to give regions the number of representatives according to a
number of citizens in each state, it means that smaller states have much fewer
votes in the second chambers than the more populous ones. Smaller states
might then feel powerless and secluded. In the United States, priority is given to
equal representation of states, and thus the less populated state of Alaska has
as many representatives as the much more populous New York. In Germany,
Canada and Switzerland there is unequal representation of the constituent
units, giving more votes to the larger than the smaller states. A completely
proportionate representation is still hard to achieve, so a compromise is sought
to correct the most apparent imbalances. In Canada, for example, the large
province of Québec has six times as many representatives as the tiny Prince
Edward Island, but still the vote of each citizen in Prince Edward Island is given
17 per cent more weight than in Québec (King 1993:100).