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. Each variable was given equal weight (33.3 per cent each). In
1998, the formula was changed, in order to give the more populous regions a
larger share of the grants. Share of population was weighted 60
per cent, socio-
economic development 25 per cent and revenue capacity 15 per cent (Fenta
Mandefro 1998: 47). In addition, the composition of the socio-economic index
was altered to make it more transparent. The last revision of the formula took
place in 2000, when a new poverty index was added in order to increase the
promotion of the financial base for the poorer regions. The weight of the
population share was reduced to 55 per cent, the socio-economic development
index counted for 20 per cent, revenue collection capacity remained on the
same level as previously, while the new poverty index was weighted 10 per cent
(House of the Federation 2000.
In a poor country like Ethiopia with a generally
low level of socio-economic
development, it is natural that the regional governments lack resources. But as
we have seen, it is not only the lack of socio-economic development that makes
the regional financial base so weak. The constitution has assigned the most
lucrative revenue sources to the federal government. This means that although
the regions might improve their resource base in
the future due to increased
development efforts, the major income sources in the country will remain in the
hands of the federal government as long as the constitution in not altered. The
federal government’s privileged position reduces regional autonomy, but could
also be used deliberately by the federal government to reduce the economic
gaps between the units in the federation. The current distribution of federal
subsidies appears
to promote equity of the units, but is promoted at the cost of
regional autonomy. Whether this will lead to empowerment of the poorer
regions or a continued reliance on the federal government in the longer run
remains to be seen.
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