Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

Party officials in Tigray are eager to
describe the close relationship between the people and the party: “When the
TPLF established itself among the Tigrayan people, it was like mixing milk and
water. If you try to separate them from each other, you will end up pouring out
the whole liquid” (Interview of Ato Alem, party official in central zone, Tigray,
August 2000). The relationship between the TPLF and the population,
however, seems to be equivocal. On the one hand, people are aware of the
control and reprisal capabilities of the party and find it hard to oppose its
policies. This was observed during the elections in May 2000. An expression by
a peasant woman, dependent on food-for-work programmes arranged by the
local administration illustrates this: “If I don’t vote on Election Day, they [the
TPLF] will come and ask me and even take me out of my house.... The
candidates are not elected to alleviate my problems. They are elected to be
crowned [as kings] (Interview, name kept confidential, May 2000). On the
other hand, the Tigrayan people see the TPLF as their own party, which has
brought peace and development to the region. This combination of fear and
loyalty makes people unwilling to criticise the party (Aalen 2000a). My
experiences with conducting interviews in Tigray were therefore entirely
different from those in the southern region where people tended to be more
31
The only opposition party that has attempted to run for elections in Tigray in the post Derg
period is the EDUP. It has not been successful in gaining popular support. People’s resistance
against the EDUP is mainly due to the party’s links to the former nobility and the prehistory
of violent clashes between the TPLF and the EDUP in the struggle for regional hegemony in
the 1970s (Aalen 2000a: 83).
32
Associations for women, youths and farmers were established during TPLF’s mobilisation
against Mengistu. Later, these organisations also spread to the rest of the country. Today,
these are formally independent from the TPLF/EPRDF, but are still perceived as organs for the
ruling party (Wright 2000: 42).

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outspoken because the links between the population and the governing party
are not that close.
Despite the equivocal relationship between the TPLF and the people, my
informants among the ordinary people generally viewed the TPLF as the
legitimate ruler of Tigray. Unlike in the southern region where the party in
power is seen as a mere instrument of the TPLF/EPRDF, the TPLF is seen as the
genuine leadership. Both ordinary people and party representatives at all levels
were eager to express how Tigray was more successful than other federal units
in implementing federalism and gaining regional autonomy. They argued that
the experiences from the armed struggle had made the politicians and
bureaucrats in the region more committed and efficient, and less prone to
corruption than in other regional states (Interviews with individuals in Mekelle,
Wukro and Axum, July 2000).
The TPLF has the upper hand in governing the daily affairs not only in the
regional state of Tigray, but also at federal level. This should imply that the
regional government in Tigray and the federal government in Addis Ababa
essentially have shared interests. As mentioned earlier, the TPLF is considered
as the senior partner in the EPRDF coalition and the dominant force in the
central government. Although the TPLF does not hold the majority of the
ministerial posts in the central cabinet, the most important posts, including the
Prime Minister, are held by members of the TPLF central committee.
33
The
Prime Minister has extensive powers in the central government, and the other
ministers are accountable to him. In addition to the formal positions of TPLF
members, TPLF party ideologists play a crucial, but informal role in developing
the EPRDF’s policies and plans and as advisors to the government.
34
The TPLF
is also a major actor in the economic sphere of Ethiopia. Regionally based
TPLF-owned enterprises have business interests and networks in many parts of
the country (Vestal 1999: appendix). In addition to this, many observers
describe what they call the “Tigrayanisation” of the general power structures in
Ethiopia. This implies that people with a Tigrayan background are consistently
employed in important positions in the state machinery, in the economy and in
public services (Abbink 1995: 156).
Due to the strong presence of TPLF members or affiliates at all levels of
society in Ethiopia, it is reasonable to believe that the regional government in
Tigray does not face any large obstacles in safeguarding its interests at federal
level. Generally, it was not possible to trace any serious disagreements between
the regional and central TPLF during my data collection. But the absence of
central-regional conflicts within the TPLF might be an expression of party
discipline rather than genuine harmony.
35
Other analysts claimed that it has
33
At the time of my data collection (2000), the TPLF had the Prime Minister (Meles Zenawi),
the minister of foreign affairs (Seyoum Mesfin), and the minister of internal affairs (Bitew
Belay).
34
Among the most important party ideologists are Sebhat Nega, Seye Abraha, Alemseged
Gebreamlak, Abai Seyoum and Tewolde Woldemariam. All of these joined the TPLF early,
and at the time of my data collection, they were all part of TPLF’s inner circles (Interview of a
Tigrayan academic, name kept confidential, June 2000).
35
The internal split in the TPLP that came to the surface in March 2001 is a strong indication
that the relationship between the regionally based and the centrally based TPLF leaders is not
as harmonious as it appeared during my data collection.

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been possible to observe tension between the regional government in Tigray
and the central government in Addis Ababa (Interview Gunter Schröder, June
2000). The TPLF in Tigray sees Ethiopian problems through Tigrayan lenses,
while the TPLF in Addis Ababa is forced to have a wider, national perspective
on their policies to be able to stay in power. This was evident when the grants
from the federal government were changed from earmarked subsidies to needy
areas to unconditional grants allocated by formula in 1995. Because of this
change, Tigray was not able to benefit from the grants as much as they had
done in the previous period, and serious discussions between regional and
central TPLF followed. I was not able to confirm these statements during my
interviews with officials in the regional administration in Tigray. But some
officials expressed dissatisfaction with the current financial arrangement of the
federation, particularly the fact that all agreements with foreign donors had to
go through the federal government (Interview Chekol Kidane, July 2000).
The TPLF’s strong regional and federal position is a stark contrast to the
position of the southern EPRDF partner, the SEPDF, which is disempowered at
both regional and federal level. The descriptions above have illustrated that
federal-regional relations in Ethiopia are heavily influenced by party structures.
It is not only the party structures per se that matter, i.e. its centralised
structures, but also the specific interests of the party in power. Since the ruling