Europeanization of turkish subnational administrations

8.5. CONCLUSION

The present chapter empirically focused on Turkish SNAs’ activities beyond the national setting and across the EU arena by using horizontal and vertical channels (i.e., the last two stages of the subnational mobilisation framework). Although the EU did not provide an institutional channel for Turkish SNAs’ claims and interests as in the case of SNAs from member states, by the Helsinki Summit of 1999, it has opened the different access points, which a creative SNA can exploit. Such a passive leverage and indirect effect for the subnational claims and interests is essential. For instance, recent years have witnessed a burgeoning in the number and range of horizontal activities between Turkish SNAs and their counterparts in the wider EU arena in terms of sister city agreements, reciprocal visits and twinning projects. Being a horizontal platform for SNAs, the EU has led a number of Turkish local and regional actors to integrate with their opposite numbers in other EU member states. Such interactions with their counterparts have enabled them to Europeanize their organizational logics by disseminating ideas, norms, best practices and ways of doing things. However, this largely depends on the particular SNA’s willingness to continue their transnational partnerships. In many cases, these partnerships were obsolete after the finalization of certain EU programs. This hinders the learning process and brings about discontinuity in terms of Europeanization of the subnational level.

With regard to the European activities of SNAs, each of them has created its own European networks, twinning arrangements and relevant transnational activities. They have also decided autonomously whether to participate in interregional organizations and to establish their own offices beyond Turkish territory. The research claims that these are bottom-up efforts and depend entirely on the organizational capacities of those SNAs that take on board the mobilisation issues. Motivation behind their engagement through horizontal and vertical channels has similarities with their counterparts from the EU countries. These activities usually include seeking funds, lobbying, networking and sharing best practices. What is different with other SNAs from different EU countries is that certain SNAs consider that their mobilisation across the EU arena may reduce prejudice against Turkish membership and support its EU bid. It is also important to emphasize here that although a number of SNAs see the EU mostly as an instrumental way, almost none of them chose to build a strategy or prepare a concrete project for pursuing their interests in the EU arena. Their visits to Brussels have therefore remained symbolic rather than systematic and strategic. This derives from the traditional form of interest mediation at home depending on personal and party political links, which sharply contrasts with that of EU logic.

Central administrations have seemed to be extremely careful about direct relations between SNAs and Brussels. Despite Ankara’s support for the external activities of SNAs in the EU, the main considerations are to ensure that these activities do not comprise any separatist or political facilities. What is required from SNAs is to have coordination with the centre about their activities in the outside world. Such a strict position has gradually softened to a situation whereby today while such contacts are not actively encouraged, neither are they systematically obstructed (except for the relations with the CoR). Apart from a few exceptional cases, the majority of SNAs prefer to act together with the national institutions in their dealings with the EU matters outside the national setting. Although this contradicts with the concept of Europe of Regions suggested by some supranationalist scholars, one may argue that the receptiveness of certain EU institutions, the EU Parliament, the CoR, and to some extent the EU Commission, has fuelled the enthusiasm of opposition municipalities, whose behaviour contrasts sharply with that of the central government. Furthermore, the excessive tutelage in terms of administrative and economic spheres on the opposition SNAs at home may stimulate their interests outside the national jurisdiction and cause them to engage with the EU institutions. This is closely related to the quality of intergovernmental relations, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

Overall, the national context provides limited flexibility for the external activities of Turkish SNAs and the national government acts as a strong gatekeeper. There is also a political climate between Turkey and the EU, which may affect the behaviour of different SNAs. Such an atmosphere also goes hand in hand with the insignificant pull effect of the EU accession process because of the centralization of fund mechanisms. Yet, as laid out in chapter two, the existence of EU competences in the area of regional policy, and the deliberate funding and promotion of regional representation by the Commission, are not the only explanations for the different levels of subnational mobilisation in the EU arena. In other words, SNAs tend to mobilize across the EU arena not because of the competences of the EU (i.e. pulling effect), but because of their own competences and incentives vis-à-vis national governments (i.e. pushing effect of organizational capacity). Accordingly, a top-down understanding may miss the empirical reality because SNAs may themselves, and from the bottom-up, actively seek to change and succeed in changing those dynamics in ways which facilitate mobilisation. The research claims that both the top-down understanding of Europeanization and MLG has been unable to fully explain why and under what conditions this mobilisation may take place. What the research offers is that both approaches will be more valuable if weighted with the domestic lens. This is also an example of second generation Europeanization. Taking the bottom-up perspective, the next chapter builds on the importance of subnational contexts by offering an in-depth analysis of three selected case cities.