Europeanization of turkish subnational administrations

CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: EUROPEANIZATION

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the key theoretical and conceptual contributions for the research inquiry and reveals how Europeanization is utilized throughout the research. It therefore attempts to provide an overview of this literature and its contribution to the research objectives. The primary aim is to investigate the extent to which Europeanization has changed the behaviour of subnational, local and regional administrations (hereafter, collectively, SNAs) in member (and candidate) states and mobilized their territorial interests within a broader political game across the EU arena. The concern is not to find out why Europeanization matters but instead to explore how and under what conditions it matters, focusing on the impact of Europeanization on the issue of subnational mobilisation in one applicant state.

The chapter proceeds in the following way; the first part sets out the major elements and background of the Europeanization literature as well as explaining the institutionalist sources of Europeanization. The second part determines the usage of Europeanization and considers both the formal and informal realm of EU governance with special reference to first and second generation Europeanization. The third part analyses the Europeanization in accession context in reference to the changing territorial politics. Finally, the chapter introduces the new research generation of Europeanization in Turkey and presents a periodization since the Helsinki Summit of 1999.

2. ORIGINS AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENTS

From a political science perspective, Ladrech’s (1994) work may be seen as a reference point for the Europeanization studies. After him, the literature has extended the scope and usage, thus it has become ‘an academic growth industry’ (Olsen, 2007: 68). Its meanings vary according to the theoretical perspective adopted and the subject area chosen (Quaglia et al., 2007: 406). Yet the plurality in the use of different approaches and methods leaves the field looking somewhat disorderly; it also casts doubt on the extent to which the term has genuinely added value to better-established approaches to understanding the construction and operation of the EU (Olsen, 2002; Bache & Jordan, 2006: 17).

In addressing the complexity in the field, Mair (2004: 338) observes that the concept of Europeanization remains poorly and confusingly defined. His observation is essential but, as Olsen (2002) reminds us, it does not really matter what Europeanization is, but whether and how it can be useful for appreciating the dynamics of the evolving European polity. By tracing different definitions and their usage in the respective research from 1981 to 2001, Featherstone (2003: 5) identified four broad classifications of areas covered: as an historical process; as a matter of cultural diffusion; as a process of institutional adaptation; and as the adaptation of policy and politics. For Bulmer (2007: 48), these areas suggest competing (temporal, sociological and institutional) research agendas. Bulmer and Burch (2000) as well as Bulmer and Lequesne (2005: 13) prefer a relatively straightforward classification for the impact of Europeanization, namely upon policy, polity and politics. Although the analytical separation among the three dimensions of domestic adaptation is worth emphasizing, in reality, European policies, processes and institutions tend to affect not only one but two or all three dimensions at the same time (Börzel, 2005: 49).

Regardless of which dimensions are taken and how Europeanization is defined, scholars generally agree on several points. These are crucial for this research in order to reflect the general understanding on the literature. At first, Europeanization impacts on member (and candidate) states and domestic change is brought about by EU membership (or the prospect of membership) (Bache, 2008: 15). In the context of EU enlargement, conditionality is considered the primary mechanism of Europeanization (Hughes et al., 2004: 164) and highlights ‘the asymmetrical relations between the EU and the applicant states’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). This underlines that candidate states are not able to upload their preferences or interests to shape EU policy-making (Sedelmeier, 2011). Considering Turkey’s candidacy status, it is difficult, albeit not impossible, to assess bottom-up (uploading) Europeanization³.

Second, the degree and direction of change is differential and so is the domestic impact of Europeanization (Cowles et al., 2001, Heritier & Knill, 2001; Knill & Lehmkul, 2002). Such a differential impact may be explained in terms of factors at both EU and national level (Kassim, 2005: 286). At the European level, developments do not always prescribe specific forms of institutional adaptation but leave considerable leeway to domestic actors and institutions. For the national level, European signals are interpreted and modified through domestic traditions, institutions, identities and resources in ways that limit the degree of convergence and homogenization (Olsen, 2002). In other words, pre-existing domestic structures and internal developments as intermediating variables are likely to have an important intermediating effect on external pressures (Bache & Marshall, 2004). This will be taken up in the next chapter.

Empirical cases justify the differential impact of European requirements on domestic policies (Heritier & Knill, 2001), polities (Bache et al., 2011) and politics (Ladrech, 2010). Cowles et al. (2001:1) conclude that Europeanization affects every country but domestic adaptation with national colours and national features continues to play a role in shaping outcomes⁴. As a result of a differential impact on the domestic arena, the responses and outcomes to the Europeanization process do not lead to any ‘harmonization’ but to ‘clustered convergence’ (Radaelli, 2004). The presence of intermediating factors explains the variations among member (and candidate) states. One may predictably expect responses to the effects or the outcomes of the Europeanization process to vary across member (and candidate) states⁵.

The differential impact is particularly the case in the context of the changing role and scope of SNAs in intergovernmental relations in the EU. EU cohesion policy is one of the biggest avenues for development funding and is seen as the major policy sphere because of its significant implications for the regional economic development of the member (and candidate) states (see Chapter 4). However, there is no prescription or template to implement the domains of regional policy and structural funds in a given national setting (discussed below). Accordingly, even if the EU triggers a process of regionalisation in general and subnational mobilisation in particular, the outcomes have been limited, shaped and/or designed by the intermediating factors at domestic—national and subnational—level.

The final consensus lies in the epistemological dimension. Given the lack of a single grand theory, the value of new institutionalism is essential in Europeanization research (Olsen, 2002). Scholars generally agree that the Europeanization literature is institutionalist by nature⁶. Bulmer (2007: 51) even went so far as to state that ‘an awareness of the new institutionalism is indispensable for understanding how Europeanization is theorized’. A brief description of the major approaches in new institutionalism is required at this point in order to make the rest of the discussion more comprehensible.

The Institutionalist Sources of Europeanization

Three variants of the new institutionalism, rational-choice, sociological and historical institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Hay, 2002: 12), are usually employed by the students of EU studies. The analytical tools of new institutionalism are important for analysing the impact of Europeanization on domestic politics in general and the creation of multi-level governance structure in particular. The foremost reason is that an institution-focused approach may provide a better understanding of the independent and intermediating variables of this research. As Checkel informs us (2001:20-21), institutions can be both intermediating and independent variables as in the case of sociological and historical institutionalism, or solely be an intermediating variable as in the case of rational choice institutionalism. Institutionalism is crucial when it comes to identifying the intermediating variables that constrain and facilitate the actors’ behaviour (Dobre, 2007:47). Yet this research holds the view that they not only shape the process and outcomes of political strategies but also exert an independent or intermediating influence on political outcomes (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 7).

For the rationalist strand, Europeanization is conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure offering some actors additional economic, legal and political resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals (Börzel, 2002; Sedelmeier, 2011). Actors are rational, goal-oriented and purposeful and thus they follow the cost-benefit calculation (i.e. the logic of consequentialism). Given that institutions are regarded as opportunity structures or veto points, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005:11-12) examine whether conditionality changes the domestic opportunity structure in favour of the domestic actors in candidate states. This is a good point, yet requires further explanations— specifically for the role of SNAs in this emerging opportunity structure and their relationships with the national and supranational levels.

The triad of integration theories, liberal/intergovernmentalist, supranationalist and MLG, what Börzel (2002:20-22) identifies as resource-dependency approaches, conceive of the EU as a new political opportunity structure. Each integration theory came up with diverse outcomes with regard to the role and state of SNAs in the EU integration process (Anderson, 1990; Bache, 1998). In the case of the liberal intergovernmentalist argument, Europeanization underpins the power of national governments vis-à-vis other domestic actors. Supranationalist claims exactly the opposite view that the EU opportunity structure weakens the role of member (and candidate) states and therefore domestic actors, namely SNAs, are able to bypass their respective governments by establishing direct relations with European institutions. In contending the long-established national versus supranational debate, multi-level governance literature does not expect either a withering away of the state, or its obstinate resilience (see Chapter 2).

In light of the above disagreements, Börzel (2002) maintains the idea that the rational-institutionalist or resource dependency approach by itself appears to be indeterminate as to which actors benefit most from the EU-induced redistribution of power resources. Some scholars therefore considered that how far domestic actors are able to exploit new opportunities depends on their previous resources and identities provided by domestic institutions (Cowles et al., 2001: 11). This leads one to add the organizational capacity of SNAs as an independent factor with origins in the ‘logic of consequentiality’ within the rational institutionalist strand (Bursens & Deforche, 2008). In attributing the organizational capacity as an independent variable, the research holds the view that the rational institutionalism in the sense of the pull effect of the EU opportunity structures are vital for designing the independent variables. However, considering the dependent variable of this research, that is, the mobilisation of Turkish SNAs across the EU arena, two important aspects of opportunity structures need to be emphasized.

For Princen and Kerremans (2008), the first is a structural aspect. This relates to the openness of a political system and the ease of access for political actors. The second concerns the receptivity of the political system to the claims of those political actors. Some scholars additionally examine that shifts to the EU are to be expected when political opportunities at the EU level are more favourable than those domestically (Della Porta & Kriesi, 1999: 17). As seen in the empirical analysis, the EU has indeed created opportunity structures and multiple-entry points for the mobilisation of Turkish SNAs (see Chapter 8). The key point here is that the use of opportunity structures depends on the organizational resources and capabilities that those groups have (Marks & McAdam, 1996: 112). These resources and capabilities determined in this research as push factors include the organizational capacity (i.e., financial capability, experts) and leadership (see Chapter 7). The creative and resourceful SNAs have had a chance to exploit these opportunities presented by the EU, as long as their organizational capacity permits them to do so. In short, opportunity structures are necessary but not a sufficient condition (Princen & Kerremans, 2008:1133). It should be weighted with the actors’ capacities to exploit the opportunities presented by the process of Europeanization.

Sociological variance conversely emphasizes that the response of domestic actors follows a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Sedelmeier, 2011). This logic implies that choices are made according to what is regarded as socially valuable and acceptable rather than a rational logic of consequence (March & Olsen, 1996:252; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 949). Socialization and learning are therefore significantly relevant for the EU cadre in domestic administrative systems because they are concerned with the realm of norms, ideas, discourse, organizational culture and the psychology of politics (Bulmer, 2007: 53). True, institutions may provide opportunities or incentives to actors or even affect their preferences and identities thus facilitating or inhibiting structural change. They, however, cannot bring about change on their own. This is done by actors and in that sense the crucial actor-related process is learning (Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004:318-320).

The impact of Europeanization on the subnational level is most visible in increased learning; either from their own experiences in the past or from the similar experiences of other SNAs⁷. The research argues that both (learning through time and space) are cases for Turkish SNAs. The pre-existing territorial network has a considerable impact on the transmission of institutional memory during the creation of RDAs (for the cases of Samsun and Izmir see Chapter 9). The greater cooperation with each other and the mushrooming of transnational networks and community initiatives in the international context have also led many SNAs to learn from the experience of other SNAs on the EU level (see Chapter 8). Besides, SNAs and European institutions have been increasingly interacting, and therefore the former have adopted new practices, rules, resources through a process of experimental learning, imitation, and diffusion (Olsen, 2001). In such circumstances, one may need to stress that the EU occasionally may be involved in this learning process but in other cases actors may share knowledge, experiences and best practices through international networks without any influence from the EU institutions. As Checkel (2001:26) remarks, social learning is more likely a case where there is a high density of interaction among actors. All in all, learning along with the pull effect of the EU opportunity structures and the push effect of certain organizational capacities, are seen as another independent variable for this research. It has also an impact on actors’ behaviour for the issue of subnational mobilisation. Yet learning, imitating and lesson-drawing have been largely neglected in the subnational mobilisation literature (see Chapter 4).

Bache (2008: 13-14) discusses that for each account (rational choice and sociological institutionalism) learning is seen to be a feature of change, but has a different meaning in each. Radaelli (2003:52) discerns between thin and thick forms of learning. While the former refers to the readjustment of actor strategies to allow them to achieve unchanged goals in a new context or ‘how to get around an obstacle by using a menu of well-known responses in various ingenious ways’, thick learning involves a modification of actors’ values and thus a reshaping of their preferences and goals (ibid: 38). As an example, Ertugal (2010: 106) observes that both thin and thick learning processes occurred during the creation of regional development agencies in Turkey. For her, thin learning based on rational calculations on the part of politicians in power has been accompanied by an ongoing process of thick learning from the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Development⁸. The empirical analysis also evidently confirms that learning in both a rational and sociological sense is a case for explaining the mobilisation of some Turkish SNAs towards the EU arena (see Chapters 7, 8 and 9).

Historical institutionalism seems to be an eclectic approach by utilizing both rational and sociological accounts in order to specify the relationship between institutions and actors (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Historical institutionalists are first interested in explaining outcome and then they proceed to explore alternative explanations for the outcomes they observed (Steinmo, 2001). The idea of path dependency is the central explanatory principle for the historical institutionalists, though they are also interested in the ideas that help to shape and to sustain the directions of policy (Peters, 2000:3). Historical institutionalism highlights that institutions over time become path dependent. They are also characterized by the stickiness of both institutional and policy arrangements where one may observe broad patterns of incremental change. This may be interrupted very occasionally by seismic events that trigger a critical juncture or punctuate the pre-existing equilibrium (Bulmer, 2007: 53). Accordingly, political developments and policy outcomes are regarded as being path dependent.

The path dependency here implies that SNAs in different national settings have faced diverse sets of opportunities and constraints because of the variety of institutional cultures (e.g., federal, devolved and centralized systems). Such differences clearly affect their behaviours across the EU arena and their engagement with the supranational institutions. Therefore, the EU activities of SNAs largely depend on the domestic institutions in which they are embedded. Although the EU offers similar political opportunity structures, powerful domestic actors in powerful states are more capable of exploring new European opportunities and avoiding additional constraints (Börzel, 2002: 4). For instance, constitutionally and administratively strong SNAs (i.e., German Länder) have better conditions than those SNAs entrenched in long statist state tradition such as Greece or Portugal.

Historical institutional scholars additionally point more directly at the temporal dynamics of change. This usage of historical institutionalism, however, does not target a counterpoint to the other two strands of new institutionalism, but highlights the potential significance of the temporal dimension in understanding institutional responses to the EU (Bache, 2008). In particular for the regional policy and structural fund regulations (management, appraisal, evaluation and monitoring), one may claim that there is a dynamic process involved. This suggests that not only does national context evolve, but also what is coming down from the EU level over the course of time (i.e. partnership principle, see Chapter 4). Accordingly, if Turkey were in this situation 20 years ago, it would have had different experiences. Similarly, if Turkey was the same, the EU would be different or EU policies, requirements and experiences dissimilar. One direct result is that the timing of accession states intersecting with the EU’s policies is crucial in explaining outcomes. This underlines the prominence of temporality (e.g. timing and tempo). Therefore, the research finds it useful to make a periodization about the impact of Europeanization on Turkey since the Helsinki Summit of 1999, in order to reveal how continuity and change has developed for the subject under examination (discussed below).

Summing up, this is not a study to theorize about institutions, which has been done successfully elsewhere⁹. The need is basically to reveal how to combine the theoretical concerns with the empirical analysis, which is what this thesis is aiming for. Accordingly, the research draws insights from both rationalist (opportunity structure) and sociological logics (social learning), and refers to the historical dimension when it is relevant. As Bache (2008:13) highlights, an appreciation of the new institutionalism is helpful in understanding the relationship between Europeanization and multi-level governance through EU cohesion policy. Likewise, a number of theoretically-informed studies of the Europeanization of candidate countries are generally set within the framework of institutionalist theory (Grabbe, 2001; 2003; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). As far as Europeanization is concerned in any empirical study, it is mostly employed with some type of institutional analysis. Scholars usually distinguish two institutional logics, the logic of consequentiality and of appropriateness, whilst applying an institutional account to Europeanization research (Cowles et al., 2001). The two logics need not be mutually exclusive, they may be seen as part of a synthetic theoretical framework for Europeanization (Börzel & Risse, 2003).

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