Europeanization of turkish subnational administrations

EUROPEANIZATION RESEARCH IN CANDIDATE STATES

The impact of Europeanization on applicant states has become a vibrant developing field of study¹². Several empirical studies have revealed that through the accession process, the EU has started to govern beyond its territory in accordance with the compliance for the EU requirements in terms of political, legal and administrative domains¹³ (Grabbe, 2001; Brusis, 2002; Bruzst, 2005; 2008; O’Dwyer, 2006). A number of studies have traditionally utilized the conditionality literature (coercive mechanism) to examine the direct and indirect effects of Europeanization, though some criticize the insufficient nature of the conditionality principles (Hughes et al., 2004).

Those researchers have exclusively concentrated on downward causation for two main reasons. Firstly, the asymmetrical nature of conditionality provides the EU more coercive routes of influence in the domestic policy-making processes of applicant states than in the EU-15 members. Secondly, but closely related to the first point, the applicant states have little impact on uploading capacity and therefore downloading is a common practice during the adaptation process (Sedelmeier, 2011). As Börzel (2010) posits, process and outcomes of Europeanization in applicant states (now the incumbent members) are different compared to the EU-15 because candidates must be Europeanized as a condition not a consequence of membership. This not only mitigates the domestic impact of the EU but also highlights the importance of historical trajectories and the peculiarity of the accession process.

The principle of conditionality is usually associated with a rational-choice institutionalism. As Bruzst (2008: 615) states, the EU sets the rules governing its structural fund policies, attaches positive and negative sanctions to these rules, and plays an active role in creating conditions that could improve the chances of participating regional and national players to successfully play a role in the framework of the structural fund programmes. The candidate states are therefore required to comply with the acquis on regional policy. While the members play a critical role at the beginning of the policy-making process and have a chance to intervene in every possible stage of this process, it is an irreversible and non-negotiable process for candidates because of the nature of asymmetrical relations (Diez et al., 2005). Therefore, Turkey, like other accession countries, has to download the EU’s demands.

Evidence from the experiences of previous applicant states has suggested that financial assistance, institutional ties and the membership prospect are major incentives for the EU to induce reforms in the candidate states. There is also rich literature identifying different causal mechanisms by which the EU instigates changes to the territorial structures and relations in candidate states. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005: 8-10) mainly focus on three mechanisms: external incentives, social learning and lesson-drawing. These mechanisms may be seen as the pull effect of the EU, which are associated with both a rationalist and sociological logic of institutionalism. Grabbe (2003: 312-317) alternatively offers an encompassing example of the Europeanization mechanisms by identifying five conditionality instruments: gatekeeping; benchmarking and monitoring; provision of legislative and institutional templates; aid and technical assistance; and advice and twinning. Not surprisingly, those approaches for analysing the causality between the Europeanization process and changes in candidate states differ with regard to the theoretical perspectives on which they are based, but also with regard to the type of domestic change they are focusing on. Such mechanisms range from conditionality based on a rational choice institutionalism to learning and lesson-drawing based on sociological assumptions.

Europeanization of Territorial Politics in Candidate States

For regional policy and institutional change on subnational levels of the candidate states, the analysis of the possible factors usually begins with the role played by EU regional policy and its financial incentives (Baun & Marek, 2008; Bache et al., 2011). Europeanization is usually conceived as an independent variable in regional policy relating to financial instruments. This means that the EU regional policy affects and challenges well-established structures within the domestic systems of governance. It additionally plays an important role in the administrative reform and devolution processes as well as improves the institutional capacity at the subnational levels within the candidate states¹⁴. In this context, some scholars have evaluated the entire transformation in territorial politics and relations in applicant states under the heading of multi-level governance (see Chapter 2). This has been largely seen as an outcome of the Europeanized regional policy process (Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004; Baun & Marek, 2008; Brusis, 2010; Bache et al., 2011).

The connection between Europeanization and the creation of multi-level governance has become more apparent in the accession rounds of CEECs. To conform to EU regional policy, they have reconstructed their regional levels in conformity with the EU’s statistical standard for administrative units (NUTS)¹⁵ and created Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) corresponding to each NUTS II level (Bailey & De Propis, 2004; Brusis, 2002). In seeing these developments within the new entrants and applicant states, a burgeoning literature has clustered around a general explanation of the transformative powers of EU membership conditionality and on examination of what has been changing in the regional policy of accession countries as a result of Europeanization (Grabbe, 2001; 2003; Hughes et al., 2004; Brusis, 2010). Consequently, the creation of the multi-level governance structure in member as well as in candidate states is largely derived from the domestic effects of Europeanization (Gualini, 2004; Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004).

Scholars have analysed two different aspects of Europeanization of polity dimensions (or domestic change) exclusively within the context of EU regional policy: the changing dynamics of intergovernmental relations between regional and national level through economic, social and political actors (Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004; Bache et al., 2011); and the interplay between subnational and supranational actors in the form of subnational mobilisation (Hooghe, 1996). Both aspects are the complementary features of the MLG thesis in a given territorial context (see Chapter 2). What the notion of MLG in this research implies is that subnational, national and supranational authorities interact with each other in two ways: first, across different levels of government (vertical dimension); and second, with other relevant actors within the same level (horizontal dimension) (Benz & Eberlein, 1999; Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004).

The recent agenda of reforms in Turkish governance includes horizontal change in administrative space as well as vertical change (for instance see Okçu et al., 2006; 2008; Ertugal, 2010; Bafoil & Kaya, 2009). Although the horizontal dimension is a complementary feature of the MLG thesis, this research is less concerned with the change in the ‘horizontal dimension’¹⁶ than it is in explaining the change in the vertical dimension. On the vertical dimension of MLG, a distinction between ‘vertical changes within the national jurisdiction’ and ‘vertical changes beyond the national jurisdiction’ may be proposed. This is a key aspect of this doctoral research and thus the understanding of Europeanization on the ‘redirection and reorientation of SNAs’ activities not only towards national institutions but also towards supranational institutions, politics and/or policy-making’ (McCauley, 2011:1020).

Vertical changes within the national jurisdiction

This dimension suggests a shift from the top-down hierarchical model to a mode of interactive decision-making process involving different actors from the horizontal and vertical levels, including non-state actors. The creation of RDAs and a shift from a traditional sectoralist and centralized regional policy to implementation of modern Western approaches of multi-level governance and endogenous regional development seemed to be a consequence of the Europeanization process (see Chapter 6). Needless to say that there is no specific template for regional governance in the EU. It only provides increased resources through redistribution and a new set of rules and procedures for the formulation and implementation of development policies. This offers much more flexibility in the practice of regional governance than the Europeanization hypothesis’s assumption of convergence would suggest. As a result of the template-free characteristic, a differentiated effect of Europeanization on this specific policy sphere depends strongly on the domestic context.

In addition to institutional changes at the subnational level, funds, a new set of rules, and procedures for the formulation and implementation of regional development policies are redistributed through the lower territorial level by the EU’s pre-accession fund programs. The redistributive policy of the EU has not only brought about a growing awareness through the EU projects, but it has also caused a number of SNAs to adjust their organizational settings (e.g. creating an EU unit or recruiting EU experts) in order to exploit EU opportunities (see Chapter 7).

Vertical changes beyond the national jurisdictions

Beyond conditionality, the pressure to establish effective institutional frameworks and strategic objectives that facilitate engagement in the EU has shaped the behaviour of SNAs both during the accession process and after their respective nation states have become members of the EU (Moore, 2008b: 213). It is because the adaption to the EU’s regional policy and its related structural funds presents new opportunities and access points for SNAs to interact directly with the EU institutions. This comes close to ‘subnational mobilisation’ at the European level (Hooghe, 1996). Here, the effect of Europeanization is rather indirect because the EU only creates opportunity structures in terms of informational, strategic and ideational spheres. It is entirely dependent on the organizational capacity (i.e. finance, experts and leadership) of a given SNA to exploit these opportunities. There are also several national/subnational intermediating factors, which facilitate or obstruct subnational mobilisation (see Chapter 2).

Taken together, the focus on the direct and indirect effect of Europeanization is observable at subnational level. While the vertical changes within the national jurisdiction suits first generation Europeanization (see Chapters 6 and 7), vertical changes beyond the national jurisdiction may be considered within the second generation Europeanization (see Chapters 8 and 9). However, each change within or beyond the national jurisdiction has usually resulted from EU requirements under regional policy and structural fund regulations, bringing about changes in territorial politics in many member (and candidate) states. The new territorial politics is captured by the proponents of the multi-level governance approach, which forms the discussion in the next chapter.

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