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In fact, it was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s reforms that compelled him to reconsider his view of Turkey.387 He then regarded the Turkey of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1930s as a compensation for what had been lost to Europe in the north and in the east as a result of the First World War. This compensation (or gain) resulted from Turkey’s detachment from the Arabic world, a process that was completed by the Turkish reforms which rid Turkey of Islamic culture and replaced it with European culture. This development changed Turkey into a member of the European civilization.388 He later wrote in his autobiography: “The most important step toward such a new understanding between Europe and the Near East has been accomplished by Modern Turkey, that recently under its leader Kemal Atatürk, embraced without any European pressure all the vital elements of Western civilization. This Turkish Revolution is paving the way for a complete reconciliation between Europe and the Near East.”389 Moreover, Coudenhove-Kalergi was now convinced that Turkey belonged integrally to Pan-Europe.390 Interestingly enough, it was the Greek Prime Minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, who persuaded him that Turkey under the rule of Kemal Atatürk had become an integral part of Western civilization and that, whatever the future of Pan-Europe, Turkey should be made a part of it. Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote: “He [Venizelos] assured me that Greece could only cooperate with our movement if Turkey were also included.”391 He also wrote that peace had been concluded between Turkey and Greece thanks to the two far-sighted and energetic statesmen, Atatürk and Venizelos. These two statesmen had concluded an alliance and hence laid the foundations of a Balkan union.392 According to Coudenhove-Kalergi, the only bright spot in the dark picture of continued European strife was the reconciliation between Greece and Turkey. He argued that while Franco-German reconciliation had stalled, the reconciliation between Greece and Turkey constituted a major success in the East in that respect. The old arch-enemies, Greece and Turkey, had consolidated their reconciliation which provided the core for the Balkan Entente.393 Later, he maintained his positive view on Turkey and Greece. For instance, he pointed out: “Since then I had often thought of the inspiring example Greece and Turkey had given their sister nations by securing national peace and prosperity at the price of a generous compromise. I thought of them now. I compared their attitude with that of France and Germany.”394 In this comparison, contrary to his views on Turkey and Greece, he was more pessimistic towards France and Germany. He said: “If France … recognizes that it cannot destroy Germany without putting itself in danger of annihilation, it must … resolutely take the path of reconciliation”.395 Meanwhile, the ‘warmth’ in Italian-Turkish relations was already drawing to an end as Italian and Turkish views of the Balkans and the Mediterranean evolved in increasingly divergent directions in the first half of the 1930s. To begin with, Turkish-Greek cooperation went out of Rome’s control. Ankara and Athens began to promote political and economic cooperation among the Balkan states to preserve the status quo rather than to serve as Italian proxies in the Peninsula. It was difficult to imagine that the Italians would approve such independent moves in the region, as Greek Prime Minister Venizelos confided to French diplomats in 1933.396 Italy’s financial limitations seriously undermined its pursuit of political, military and economic influence in Turkey. The World Economic Crisis in 1929 aggravated financial problems in Italy. In 1931, for instance, the Del Tirreno shipyard that was building the destoyers Zafer and Tınaztepe demanded an adjustment of the payment basis in view of changes in the exchange rates.397 These two destroyers would only be delivered after Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü’s visit to Rome in May 1932. In addition to the renewal of the Italian-Turkish Treaty of 1928, this visit culminated in a new 300 million Lira credit agreement between Italy and Turkey. However, Rome turned out to be unwilling or unable, or both, to release the cash portion of the credit. Related to the Turkish naval orders, the union of Italian shipyards requested the Italian Foreign Ministry to reserve one third of this credit against payments for the Turkish naval units constructed in Italian shipyards.398 It was suggested that another one third would be allocated for the additional Turkish naval units and naval aircraft under construction in Italy. The protracted negotiations on the conditions for the release of the credit frustrated both the Italians and the Turks. Italian diplomats in Turkey accused the Turkish government of acting with a ‘Balkan mentality’ in dealing with the great powers on economic issues. Haunted by the Ottoman debt experience, Ankara was extremely sensitive about the (particularly political) terms attached to foreign loans.399 Turkey then turned to Paris for fresh foreign loans in December 1932. This volte-face, the British argued, was aimed at playing off the great powers against each other. In practical terms, this tactic was expected to extract maximum benefits from France while exerting pressure on Italy.400 Rome interpreted this Turkish move as turning its back on old friends. Ankara should not have been so particular about the terms for credits from old friends.401 However, the sharp deterioration in Italian-Turkish relations resulted principally from their diverging policies in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Rome had never approved of Ankara’s policies promoting regional economic and political cooperation even though the Turkish efforts were geared towards preserving the status quo on the Peninsula. Italy’s supplying naval arms failed to bring Turkey into the Italian orbit to serve as a proxy to Rome’s revisionist policies in these two regions. Finally, Mussolini’s opposition to Turkey’s admission to the League of Nations revived the Turkish fear of Italy’s ulterior motives. By 1933, Italy had begun to appear as a potential threat to Turkey in the Aegean and the Mediterranean.402 The Italian connection with the Turkish navy was already in decline. The Italian naval arms suppliers began to face a number of bureaucratic troubles with their deliveries to Turkey. For instance, Turkish authorities insisted on charging customs fees on the ammunition and fire control devices for the Italian-built destroyers.403 The last Italian engineer assigned to help the Turkish navy put the Zafer (Turbine) class destroyers into operational status returned home in January 1934.404 His departure ended the Italian connection with the Turkish navy. Membership of the League of Nations, nevertheless, provided Turkey with a means to magnify its diplomatic voice in regional and international councils from the onset. First, a seat in the League as an international forum enabled Turkey to go beyond the limits of biletaral diplomacy in finding and working with other like-minded and comparably -placed states for common objectives. Secondly, its admission to the League on 18 July 1932 can be taken for all intents and purposes as a formal ending to its international “outcast” status. In other words, it clearly meant that Turkey had been endorsed unquestionably as a power committed to the international status quo.405 The significance of this endorsement was not missed by careful observers in Geneva. Reporting the occasion, Manley O. Hundson, commented: “It is notable that Turkey was not called upon to give any special ‘guarantee of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations,’ nor to accept any special regulations with respect to its armaments; the Assembly resolution merely recited that ‘it is established that the Turkish Republic fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 1 of the Covenant.’ This procedure is unlike that followed when Germany was admitted.”406 In addition to that, its Balkan neighbours, primarily Greece, continued to promote Turkey’s appointment to positions of influence within the League structure. Shortly after Turkey had been admitted to League membership, Greek Delegate Nicolas Politis was elected as the new Chairman of the Assembly in September 1932. Included among the delegates he nominated for the Agenda Committee was Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rüştü Aras. Upon approval of Politis’ nominations, Aras was then elected as its chair for the meetings. On his first appearance at Geneva, Aras was catapulted into a sort of executive post at the League Assembly due mostly to his nomination by Politis.407 Finally, in 1934, two years after it had been admitted to the League of Nations, Turkey was elected to succeed China on the League Council. Although this election was regarded as recognition of Turkey’s international prominence, most Turkish commentators were careful to emphasize that the League had made an exception to its established practices by allowing Turkey, a European country, to succeed China, an Asian country, on the Council. For them, to take the place of an Asian country on the Council was acceptable as long as it did not compromise Turkey’s European credentials.408
Balkan cooperation took root initially as a reaction to the emergence of revisionist powers, in particular Italy. Soon after the First World War, Italy was engaged in a series of aggressive moves in the region. Italian forces first bombarded Corfu in Greece and took over Fiume from the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Thus, Rome’s direct involvement in the Balkans prompted Turkey to seek ways of forming a Balkan entente. The idea was aired for the first time by a Turkish diplomat, Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur, in conversation with the Romanian Foreign Minister, I. G. Duca, in 1926.409 The idea itself may not have been original410 or may have had many fathers,411 yet probably no other Balkan state pursued it as vigorously and relentlessly as Turkey did in the interwar period. The World Economic Crisis in 1929 became a further stimulus for Turkey to take the lead in Balkan cooperation. The crisis was a drastic manifestation of a transitional period during which different forces were competing to control the terms of the new world order. Changes at global level reinforced Turkish activism and initiatives in the international arena. Furthermore, the inability of the European great powers to find solutions to the crisis gave Turkey more latitude in shaping Balkan diplomacy with its neighbours between 1930 and 1933 when the Balkan countries called for regional conferences to jointly overcome the economic and political effects of the crisis.
The Council of the League endorsed and backed Briand’s action. Moreover, it appointed a military commission to oversee the withdrawal of Greek troops from Bulgaria. Finally, a commission of inquiry was set up and it found Greece at fault. Then the Council decided that Greece had to pay an indemnity because its invasion of Bulgaria constituted a clear violation of the League Covenant. In effect, Greece was subjected to a punitive sanction. On the surface, the whole venture seemed to have been handled fairly smoothly and successfully under the League framework and the League was credited with having settled a border dispute between the two Balkan neighbours. However, O’Connor argues “there were no public threats; but behind the scenes there was talk of a naval demonstration and even the sanctions of Article 16 of the Covenant... Though hailed at the time as a victory for the League... the decisive action was more reminiscent of the Concert of Europe, for the Great Powers were united, none of their interests were at stake and the disputants were small nations.”412 Compared to the confrontation with Bulgaria, however, the great power aggression towards Greece left a deeper and much more lasting influence on Greek thinking about Italy between the two World Wars. What reinforced the lessons learned from the debacle with Bulgaria was the fact that Mussolini could get away with what he had done in and on Corfu. The whole venture “left Greece continually looking over her shoulder to make sure that her actions in no way disturbed the Italian state, particularly its bellicose leader”.413 At first, the situation on the ground, marked as it was by mutual suspicions and rivalries, did not look very promising for regional cooperation. During his visit to Sofia on 10 December 1930, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras stated that the formation of opposing camps was the pre-war method of conducting foreign relations. According to him, in the post-war period there was a need for new methods in the conduct of foreign relations. The new class of states wished to be on good terms with all, especially with their neighbours. This new class of states had been signing neutrality treaties which contributed to regional rapprochements. All these efforts, in fact, would facilitate general rapprochements. Aras’ “new class of states” and the behaviour he attributed to them are very much reminiscent of a “middlepowermanship” approach that defines middle powers primarily by their pursuit of multilateral solutions to international problems, their adherence to compromise positions in international disputes and last, but not least, their adherence to the notion of “good international citizenship” to guide their foreign policy.414 Nevertheless, some people, such as the Polish Minister in Bulgaria, interpreted the visit of Aras to Sofia as a further step in the creation of a revisionist group. The American Minister in Sofia, Henry W. Shoemaker, also wrote that the Italian Minister in Sofia was aware of Aras’s interest in a Greco-Bulgarian rapprochement. Later he pointed out that Aras could work in the interests of a Greco-Bulgarian understanding without having as an aim the creation of a revisionist bloc. According to the American Minister, Turkey was trying to prevent Serbian hegemony over the Southern-Slavs.415 Suspicion of Yugoslavia existed for a while among certain Balkan states such as Greece. When President Atatürk suggested that İstanbul become the center of an eventual Balkan Union, the comments of some Greek officials concentrated on the role of Yugoslavia. The most striking comment was made by the Greek Minister to Turkey, Mr. Polychroniadis. He stated that so long as Yugoslavia nourished imperialistic views and a desire for Balkan hegemony, it was not very likely to consent to any genuine rapprochement with the other Balkan states, which would be possible only on a basis of perfect equality. 416 Polychroniadis was not very positive about Romania either. He said: “Rumania is so hypnotized by her fear of the Bolsheviks that she can not think of anything else and shows a polite indifference towards the Balkan conference”.417 However, the Romanian diplomat Viorel Virgil Tilea, did not agree with the Greek Minister to Turkey, Mr. Polychroniadis. According to him, in 1930-31 Romanian Prime Minister, Maniu had improved the relations of his country with its neighbours. Tilea said: “He and his Foreign Minister must have their full share of credit for the Conference of Balkan states which Romania has just been attending in Athens.”418 Yet Yugoslavia was apprehensive about Romanian foreign policy and considered Romania the weak link in the Little Entente. The reason for such apprehensions was a possibility that Romania might extend its bilateral pact of friendship with Italy. But after Mussolini’s declaration of the Four Power Pact, the Little Entente states sought to strengthen their own alliance.419 Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Ministry had been actively supporting an early settlement between Bulgaria and Greece. The American Minister in Sofia, Shoemaker, interpreted Turkish activities as efforts geared towards creating something similar to the Little Entente in extreme South-eastern Europe between Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece. The British Minister in Sofia was also of the opinion that there were plans for creating a Turkish-Bulgarian-Greek group and welcomed such a development in Southeastern Europe.420 However in September 1933, when İsmet İnönu and Aras visited Sofia with the hope of persuading Bulgaria to become a party to the Greco-Turkish pact, they were disappointed with the Bulgarian approach. Bulgarian Prime Minister Mooshanoff made the Bulgarian revisionist demands quite open. He said that Bulgaria could not sign any pact which did not take into consideration the points that Bulgarian territory in Thrace was not ceded to Greece, that the Dobrudjan settlement of 1913 was not just to Bulgaria and that Bulgaria had a good case against Yugoslavia with reference to the Bulgarian minority in Macedonia.421 At the same time, Mooshanoff assured İnönü that Bulgaria had no design on Turkish territory and its revisionist demands at the expense of Greece would never be prosecuted in a manner to upset the peace. In return, Turkish officials assured the Bulgarian government that the Greco-Turkish pact was not directed against Bulgaria. Both sides also agreed to extend for a period of five years the Treaty of Neutrality signed between Bulgaria and Turkey.422 But the most interesting remark that the Bulgarian Prime Minister made to the Turkish officials was that Bulgarian policy must remain attached to the League of Nations and to the Four Power Pact.423 Mooshanoff’s declaration on the Four Power pact was in a sense a proof that the Bulgarians were thinking along the same lines as the Italians because this pact was initially proposed by Italy to other powers, primarily Britain, France and Germany. Also in 1933, Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu encouraged Aras to obtain from Jevtic a secret written assurance that Yugoslavia would not reach an agreement with Bulgaria without Turkey’s prior assent. According to Titulescu, all Balkan treaties were to have a similar clause, therefore covering Romanians too.424 The aim was to prevent a Bulgarian-Yugoslav agreement. Different from the Yugoslavs, the Romanians recommended a simultaneous agreement between Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece with or without Bulgarian participation. Titulescu found in Ankara similar distrust of Bulgaria since Inonu and Aras had recently returned from Sofia empty-handed.425 Meantime, in August 1933, American Charge d’Affaires G. Howland Shaw in İstanbul reported to Washington that the last three or four months had witnessed the revival of French prestige in Turkey. The debt settlement, the commercial agreement and the visit of Eduard Herriot were the major steps in this revival. Shaw also pointed out that France could have influence in Turkey if it approached Turkey from the basis of closer relations with the Soviet Union.426 In January 1934, when efforts towards concluding a Balkan pact intensified, the American Ambassador in Turkey, Robert P. Skinner, wrote that Italy did not want the domination of one of the Little Entente states in such a union. This in fact meant for Italy the domination of Yugoslavia. Skinner also emphasized that Turkey felt very strongly on the subject of the Balkan Pact and preferred to stay neutral rather than take sides in the revisionist and anti-revisionist camps. Moreover, he added that even though Turkey found revision of the postwar treaties dangerous for the moment, it would not oppose a later date revision as long as it was done with the full accord of the parties concerned. But for Turkey the Balkan Entente must come first.427 In February 1934, not withstanding combined Romanian, Turkish and Greek pressures, the Yugoslavs were still hesitant to leave the Bulgarians aside so long as the envisaged pact between the four Balkan states did not provide the security they sought. They considered such an agreement worth joining only if it provided Yugoslavia with Turkish military assistance. Lungu wrote that the Turkish army was the only Balkan army that the Yugoslavs respected. Since Titulescu was aware of the Yugoslav position, he tried to secure Turkish approval for a military convention to take place among the four states. King Alexander of Yugoslavia also wanted Titulescu to convince the Turks and the Greeks that the proposed pact should guarantee not only the maintenance of the existing Boundaries between the contracting parties and Bulgaria but also of all other Balkan countries. Although the Turks and the Greeks had been wary of getting entangled in the Italian-Yugoslav conflict, the desire to conclude the agreement prevailed and the Yugoslav request was granted.428 Turkish Diplomatic Activism In March 1933, Mussolini’s proposal of the Four-Power Pact propelled Turkey and its neighbours to move towards a Balkan entente. In the pact, the fascist leader proposed cooperation in Europe between Italy, Britain, France, and Germany in order to dictate the terms of the European peace. Mussolini’s initiative did not really surprise the Turkish leadership because the latter was already convinced that, despite intense rivalry among themselves, the great powers would collaborate when their interests required them to do so.429 The Four-Power Pact, however, ignored the demands and interests of the smaller states in shaping Balkan and Mediterranean politics. On the surface, Mussolini’s Four-Power Pact seemed in contradiction with his strategy vis-à-vis Turkey which he had outlined to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras during their visit to Rome in 1932. In Rome, Mussolini had told İnönü and Aras that Italy in general was against any kind of alliance system in the region and his country preferred to develop close collaboration with Turkey.430 Nevertheless, Turkish political leaders believed that the European powers had not given up their intention of dividing the Balkans into separate spheres of influence. 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