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(14 July 1934).
494. P. M. H. Bell, France and Britain 1900-1940 (London: Longman, 1996): 182. 495 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54-1, F. 97-1. At the same time, both Foreign Minister of Romania Titulescu and Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia Yetvich declared that they agreed with Laval on the need for an alliance treaty between France and Turkey similar to that concluded between France and Yugoslavia. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri A. IV-6, D. 54, F. 100-3 496 Ayın Tarihi 10 (September 1934): 115-6. 497 Cumhuriyet, (28 and 29 November 1934). 498 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-16-b, D. 65, F. 5-17 499 Pierre Milza, Mussolini (Paris, Fayard, 1999): 650-54. 500 Martin Clark, Modern Italy (London: Longman, 1996): 281. According to the Italian diplomats in Ankara, the French-Italian agreement prevented Turkey from playing off France and Italy against each other. ASMAE, Busta 15/1 Turchia 1935, (16 August 1935). 501 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 4367/950/67, f. 212. 502 PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67, f. 102. 503 PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67, f. 102. 504 Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932-1939, 1ere Série (1932-1935) Vol. IX (Paris: Imprie Nationale: 1980): 572-73. 505 PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67, f. 103. 506 PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67, f. 103 507 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 2051/950/67, f. 210 508 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 215 509 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 215 510 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5366/950/67, f. 224 511 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 221. 512 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 221. 513 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 216 and R 5366/950/67, f. 225 514 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 216 and R 5366/950/67, f. 225 515 Spasov, “Les Projets d’un Pacte…,“ 12 516 ASMAE, Busta 11/1, 7.12.1934. Lojacano argued that the Soviet Union, as a Black Sea power, provoked the Turks into objecting to the fortification of Leros. According to the Turkish Archives, Mussolini found it indispensable for Italy to have a base in the Black Sea. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, d. 54-1, F.90-1 517 ASMAE, Busta 15/1 Turchia 1935 (16 August 1935). In fact, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras thought that if an entente was concluded between Italy and Yugoslavia, the Balkan Entente would not carry any weight and Turkey would be isolated. Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932-1939, 1ere Série (1932-1935) Vol. IX (Paris: Imprie Nationale: 1980), 424-25. 518 See R. Mallet, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism: 1935-1940 (London: Frank Cass, 1998). 519 Michaelis, “Italy’s Mediterranean Strategy…,” 49. 520 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara, (1 November 1935). 521 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara, (1 November 1935). 522 BCA, 59.89.19, (15 November 1935),. 523 Wight, Power Politics…, 524 BCA, 266.798.6 “Interior Ministry to Prime Ministry,” (24 September 1935),. 525 BCA, 266.798.7 “Turkish Legation (Abyssinia to Foreign Ministry,” (27 September 1935). 526 Kazım Karabekir, İngiltere, İtalya ve Habeş Harbi, (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995). Originally published in 1935. 527 BCA 266.798.8 “Turkish Legation (Ethopia) to Foreign Ministry,” (1 October 1935),. 528 BCA 68.451.8 “General Staff to Interior Ministry,” (15 November 1935),. 529 BCA 68.451.8 “Interior Ministry to Prime Ministry,” (6 January 1935),. 530 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 42. 531 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 62. 532 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 75-94.. 533 Published memoirs of naval officers mention an interesting contingency planning ordered by Chief of Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak regarding Rhodes. The late Admiral Büyüktuğrul recalls when and how he received an order to form and train a regiment to be employed for capturing Rhodes in anticipation of proliferation of the Second World War to Turkey’s vicinity. The order came on 15 November 1940, just three days after the Italian fleet was put out of action by the British aircraft. However, the plan was subsequently shelved, when Chief of Staff changed his mind about capturing the island of Rhodes as quickly as he had come up with it. Afif Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu II…, 434. 534 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 95-96) 536 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…,128. 537 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 174. 538 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 163-194 539 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara, (8 March 1936). 540 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara, (8 March 1936). 541 BCA 238.606.7 “Interior Ministry to Prime Ministry” (4 September 1935). 542 Tan, (14 February 1936). 543 Tan., (5 November 1935). 544 Krastjo Mancev, “Le Conflit Italo-Ethiopien et l’Entente Balkanique”, Etudes Balkaniques 21, (1986): 50. 545 This convention ensured reciprocal military aid between Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia in the case of aggression against any party. Mancev, “Le Conflit Italo-Ethiopien…,” 53. For Romania’s opinion on the military evolution of Turkey, see Dimitru Preda, “Romanian Diplomatic Documents on the Political-Military Evolution of Turkey During Atatürk (1923-1938)” in XIX. International Colloquium of Military History (İstanbul: Acta, 1993), 163-186. 546 Preda, “Romanian Diplomatic Documents…” 547 Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations…, 198 and 201. 548 Romania’s Diplomatic Relations…, 202. Greek delegate had not received authority to sign the statement. 549 Rebecca Haynes, Romanian Policy towards Germany, 1936-1940 (NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000): 6. 550 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (9 April 1936). 551 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (9 April 1936). 552 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (9 April 1936). 553 PRO FO 371/ 19168 J 9177/1/1, f. 194 554 PRO FO 371/ 19168 J 9177/1/1, 195. Britain, in fact, confined itself to giving only military assurances to Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia. 555 Ayın Tarihi 24 (October 1935): 79-80, and PRO FO 37119034, E 6600/1213/44, f. 83 556 Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…, 161. 557 PRO FO 371/ 19034 E 6600/1213/44, f. 48 558 PRO FO 371/ 20093 E 2583/2583/44, f. 254 559 PRO FO 371/ 20093 E 2583/2583/44, 255-56 560 ASMAE, Busta 19/1 Turchia 1936 (11 January 1936). 561 ASMAE, Busta 19/1 Turchia 1936, (3 September 1936). In fact, in 1936, Mussolini stated that Italy had to be strong and armed in order to revise old treaties and impose its rules on the world 562 Cited in Ayın Tarihi 27 (March 1936): 45. 563 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Bucharest, (1 May 1936). 564 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Bucharest, (1 May 1936). 565 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-18-b, D. 74, F. 1-21 566 PRO FO 371/ 20072, E 269/26/44, f. 146 567 The Soviet Union was the first country which replied to the Turkish demand. 568 Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932-1939, Vol. II, 501. 569 Spasov, “Les Projets d’un Pacte…,“ 15. 570 Holbraad, Middle Powers…, 213. 571 In an October speech in Milan Cathedral, Mussolini declared that the July agreements (1936) between Italy and Germany had resolved all the problems between the two countries. Ayın Tarihi 36 (October 1936): 245-47. On 11 July the Fascist leader gave his approval to an Austro-German agreement which made the Anschluss a foregone conclusion. Michaelis, “Italy’s Mediterranean Srategy…,” 53. 572 Cumhuriyet, (22 September 1936). 573 Brock Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy: 1934-1942,” Middle Eastern Studies 31/3 (July 1995): 485-489. 574 Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…, 114-153. 575 Between 1922 and 1934, the Italian navy built 119 new units that totaled 244,500 tons, including seven heavy cruisers, 12 light cruisers, 12 scouts, 28 destroyers, six torpedo boats, 15 ocean-going submarines and 39 medium submarines. Rimanelli, Italy between Europe and the Mediterranean…, 543. 576 PRO FO 371/17966, E6915/3652/44 (15 November 1934). 577 SHM, Carton 1BB7/169 Compte Rendu De Rensignements (Turquie) No. 8 (8 July 1934). 578 ASMAE, Busta 13/6 Turchia 1934 (18 May 1934). 579 PRO FO371/19040, E3039/3039/44 (10 May 1935). 580 Clare M. Scammell, “The Royal Navy and the Strategic Origins of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935,” Journal of Strategic Studies 20/2 (June 1997): 92-118 581 Michael Simpson, “Superhighway to the World Wide Web: The Mediterranean in British Imperial Strategy,” in Hattendorf (ed.), 57 582 Koçak, Türk-Alman İlişkileri…, 188-189. 583 PRO FO 371 20860 E2918/188/44 (14 May 1937). 584 PRO FO 371 17966 E6915/3652/44 (11 November 1934) 585 SHM, Carton 1BB7/169 Compte Rendu De Rensignements (Turquie) No. 4, (18 April 1934) and No. 6 (4 May 1934). 586 PRO FO 371 17964 E7047/2462/44 (23 November 1934) 587 Özgüldür, Türk-Alman İlişkileri…, 89. 588 Kaymaklı, Havacılık Tarihinde…, 224 589 The primacy of airpower was also challenged by the naval officers on the basis of cost-effectiveness. The argument was that navy would provide better security than the air force for the same initial and operating costs See Mithat Işın, “Deniz, Hava ve Kara Silahlarının Teşekkülleri İktisadi Bakımından Mukayese ve Tetkiki,“ Deniz Mecmuası 47(338) (October 1935): 832-839. 590 PRO FO 371/20865, E3007/528/44 (2 June 1937). 591 Metel, Türk Denizaltıcılık…, 58-75. 592 SHM, Carton 1BB2/91, Bulletin de Rensignements, No. 491 (1-15 April 1936): D-18. 593 Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…, 146-154. Johannes Glasneck, Türkiye’de Faşist Alman Propogandası, A. Gelen (trans.) (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, n.d.p.): 65. 594 Metel, Türk Denizaltıcılık…, 56-57. 595 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (10 March 1937). 596 McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and New…,” 84. 597 McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and New…,” 110-112. 599 PRO FO 371 20029 E5702/1373/44 (9 September 1936). 600 Interview with Captain Bargut, (13 April 2001). Captain Bargut served as the communications officer on board Zafer during the Turkish fleet’s Malta visit in 1936. For these destroyers see, Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II (New York: Crescent Books, 1998): 250-253; Cem Gürdeniz (ed.), Cumhuriyet Donanması- Fleet of the Republic: 1923-2000 (İstanbul: Seyir Hidrografi ve Oşinografi Daire Başkanlığı, 2000): 21. 601 Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu I…, 327 602 BCA 77.66.11 “Government Decree,” (19 July 1937),. 603 BCA 48.307.20 Başvekalet [Prime Ministy] to Milli Müdafaa Vekaleti [Ministry of National Defence], (13 August 1937),. 604 Among the first to have noticed the Spanish vessels in the port of Istanbul were German naval instructors of the Naval War Academy. Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu I…, 383. 605 BCA 78.77.14 “Government Decree No. 7344,” (24 August 1934).. 606 BCA 78.77.15 “Government Decree No. 7345,” (9 September 1937),. 607 Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu I…, 393. 608 Brock Millman, The Ill-Made Alliance: Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1934-1940 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University, 1998): 92-93. 609 See Hasan Rıza Soyak, Atatürk’ten Hatıralar, Vol. II (n.p.p.: Yapı Kredi Bankası Yayınları, 1973): 657-682 610 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, AIV-6, D-54, F102-63 (12 September 1937); Metel, Atatürk ve Donanma…, 150-151; Büyüktuğrul, Büyük Atamız…, 161. 611 The naval policy advocated by President Atatürk during the Nyon Conference might be taken as a sign of consistency in his thinking. A British diplomatic document quoted him to as having said earlier: “Turkey would do her best to stay out of any future war, but if she did have to go to it would be on the side which held the command of the sea.” PRO FO 371 16987 E6297/6297/44 (21 October 1933). 612 BCA 73.23.19 “Government Decree No. 6254,” (25 March 1937). 613 PRO FO 371/20861, E1578/315/44, Minute, (12 March 1937). 614 Spasov, “Le Projets d’un Pacte…,” 18. 615 Spasov, “Le Projets d’un Pacte…,” 18. The proposition was made after the suspension of guarantees given by Britain to Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia and the cancellation of economic sanctions against Italy. 616 Spasov, “Le Projets d’un Pacte…,” 16. In January 1937, London signed a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Italy. By this agreement, Britain accepted that the Mediterranean was of vital interest to Italy. John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975): 200. 617 In January and March 1937, Belgrade respectively signed pacts with Sofia and Rome. 618 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 210 619 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (19 May 1937). 620 Felix Gilbert, “Ciano and his Ambassadors,” in,The Diplomats 1919-1939, Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994): 529. 621 PRO FO 371/20072, E269/26/44 (13 January 1936). 622 ir Vice-Marshal Arthur S. Gould Lee, Special Duties: Reminiscences of a Royal Air Force Staff Officer in the Balkans, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Sampson Low, [1946]): 8-10. See also Gary Leiser “The Turkish Air Force, 1939-1945: the Rise of a Minor Power, Middle Eastern Studies 26/3 (July 1990): 383-395. It should be added that the Turkish General Staff had approached the German Air Force for assistance before it turned to Britain. However, Herman Göering did not respond favourably to the Turkish request, as Germany could not afford to spare precious resources for purposes other than the quick revival of German air power. Glasneck, Türkiye’de Faşist Alman…, 78. 623 Ernest Andrade Jr., “The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Negotiations, 1922-1936,” Military Affairs 48/3 (July 1984): 113-120; Richard W. Fanning, Peace and Disarmament: Naval Rivalry and Arms Control, 1922-1933 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995): 155. 624 Dick Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989): 104-105 and 127-128. In the post-Washington Treaty naval negotiations, the British position revolved around the classification of cruisers. In British naval understanding, “Washington standard types,” armed with eight-inch guns, constituted an offensive class of cruisers while the six-inch gun cruisers were, for all intents and purposes, of a defensive type. In support of this proposed distinction between offensive and defensive types, British naval experts argued that an eight-inch gun provided an offensive quality that was two-and-a-half times that of a six-inch-gun. Indeed, for the British, cruisers lighter than 10,000 tons and armed with six-inch-guns were ideal weapons for trade defence and the protection of imperial communications since they were cheaper to build and maintain than the Washington standard types. Affordability was an important consideration as Britain needed a large number of such cruisers for its imperial requirements. On the other hand, the United States was contemplating an extensive building program involving eight-inch-gun cruisers. For the British, such a building program presented the risk of rendering their six-inch-gun cruisers obsolete and resulting in a deterioration of British naval strength relative to that of the United States. Richardson argues that “in reality, the whole British case had devolved from the intention of the Sea Lords to control the size of cruisers in an attempt to improve Britain’s maritime position.” 625 However, cost estimates showed that an 8,000-ton eight-inch-gun cruiser required an extra 445,000 pounds sterling to build and 29,000 pounds sterling more every year to maintain than a 6,000 ton six-inch gun cruiser. Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament…, 172-173. 626 PRO FO 371/20865, E1399/528/44 (4 March 1937). 627 PRO 371/21929 E1193/135/44 (16 February 1938). Ankara also sought to acquire new units from Germany. Particularly due to the British reluctance, Turkey asked Germany to build a 10,000-ton cruiser by 1942. However, Berlin turned down the Turkish request, as the German shipbuilders were fully booked with the orders for the German Navy. Glasneck, Türkiye’de Faşist Alman…, 73. 628 PRO ADM 116/4198 M02082/38 (12 March 1938). 629 PRO ADM 116/4198 M02082/38 (12 March 1938). 630 PRO FO371/21918 E2274/67/44 (14 April 1938). 631 See Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy… 632 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 1, Ankara, (1 November 1934). 633 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 10, Ankara, (27 August 1938). 634 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 10, Ankara, (27 August 1938). 635 Dilek Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean: Opportunities and Limits for Middle Power Activism in the 1930s,” Journal of Contemporary History 40/3, (July 2005): 442. 636 NARA, RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 1, Ankara, (1 November 1934). Yüklə 0,71 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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