F I r s t d r a f t

Whether Ankara had reason to fear an Italian attack has remained a contested issue to this day. The conventional Turkish account does not rule out Turkey’s becoming a victim of Italian aggression. The minority view, however, argues that the Turkish fears of Italian aggression were exacerbated by an unnecessarily alarmist Turkish Consul at Bari, who witnessed the departure of the Italian fleet for the Adriatic. On the other hand, Turkish Ambassador in Albania, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, who was asked by Ankara to confirm the Consul’s conclusions, argued that the Consul had completely misread the Italian intentions and regarded an Anatolian rather than an Abyssinia campaign as imminent, despite clear indications otherwise. In his memoirs, Karaosmanoğlu grants that Yugoslav Ambassador in Tirana, pointing to Mussolini’s unpredictable behavior, concurred with Turkish consul’s view.⁴⁷⁹ Interestingly, the late Admiral Afif Büyüktuğrul in his seminal work on Turkish naval history adheres to this minority view espoused by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu.⁴⁸⁰

However, the Turks were alone in their uneasiness regarding Italian policy in the Mediterranean. In February 1935, the British Ambassador in Turkey wrote “the Turks habitually exaggerated this [Italian] danger.”⁴⁸¹ The gulf between Turkish and British assessments on the Italian aims, however, was soon to narrow down. In the summer of 1935, Turkey monitored with concern intensified Italian naval activity on and off the Dodecanese. The Italian navy was preparing for an overseas campaign whose target could not as yet be identified. The Turkish fleet was dispersed to its designated forward areas in the Marmara Sea in anticipation of an Italian landing in Turkey.⁴⁸²

A few documents available in Republic archives indicate that Turkish diplomats had forewarned Ankara regarding Italian intentions on Abyssinia. For instance, a report to the Foreign Ministry by the Turkish Ambassador in Rome identified Abyssinia as the most likely target for Italian military action. However, the ambassador concluded that although Italy was not ready to launch a military campaign, Mussolini would sure act as soon as a favourable domestic and international setting emerged.⁴⁸³

A year before the Italian attack on Abyssinia, Turkey had intensified its diplomatic efforts to promote a pact in the Mediterranean. In May 1934, when Aras was in Paris on an official visit, French Foreign Minister Louis Bartou asked him about considering consolidation of the Balkan Entente by means of a Mediterranean pact.⁴⁸⁴ Turkey welcomed Bartou’s proposal, as did other Balkan countries. Although the idea of a Mediterranean pact came originally from the French, the Turks enthusiastically picked up the idea. In 1930, even before Bartou’s proposal, Suad Darvaz, theTurkish Ambassador in Moscow, had told French Ambassador, M. de Beaumarchais, that Turkey was interested in the development of a “Mediterranean Locarno” project.⁴⁸⁵ In fact, when Counselor M. Franzoni of the Italian Embassy in Paris visited the French Foreign Ministry, the French officials gave him the impression that Turkey desired to participate in any entente consolidating peace.⁴⁸⁶

In other words, Ankara had long been in favor of a Mediterranean pact which would include Mediterranean countries like Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, France and Spain. Since the Mediterranean pact was to guarantee naval frontiers against any naval or air attack in the Mediterranean, Britain, the most important naval power, should also be part of such a pact. In June 1934, Turkish interest in a Mediterranean pact was manifested by various articles in the Turkish press. For instance, Cumhuriyet reported that representatives from Turkey, Greece, Britain, and France were engaged in talks in Geneva on the formation of a defensive Mediterranean entente.⁴⁸⁷

Again, in June 1934, in a meeting between France and the Little Entente countries, a decision was taken for the creation of a Mediterranean entente which would include France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria. France would also work towards the participation of Italy.⁴⁸⁸ However, not all countries were as eager as Turkey to join a Mediterranean entente. By the end of June, the Turkish press contained reports that Britain and Italy had already decided to stay out of a possible Mediterranean entente.⁴⁸⁹

Again in 1934, the Turkish Ambassador in Rome, Hüseyin Ragıp, asked Mussolini’s opinion on Italy’s possible participation in a Mediterranean entente. He responded by focusing on two points: First, he questioned how effective this entente would be if Britain was not a member. Then, concerning the Mediterranean as a security issue, Mussolini said that Italy had already concluded treaties with Turkey and Greece, and Italy might consider extending the scope of these treaties in case of need.⁴⁹⁰ Moreover, Athens was as lukewarm as Rome towards the idea of a Mediterranean pact. A foreign press summary in Turkish reported that the Greeks did not believe in French initiative on such an issue or in the Little Entente.⁴⁹¹ For them, a Mediterranean pact could not be concluded without the support of two great Mediterranean powers, Britain and Italy. Greece might join the pact only if it included all Mediterranean countries.⁴⁹²

Moreover, in October 1934, the death of Louis Bartou, the French Foreign Minister and the initiator of a Mediterranean pact, affected the development of regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. For instance, just before his death, Bartou had decided to make an official visit to Rome to discuss directly with Mussolini questions pending between the two countries. At this meeting, it was expected that Mussolini would promise to respect the independence of Austria and not to make revisionist demands on its neighbour, namely Yugoslavia.⁴⁹³ But on 9 October 1934, Barthou, who had formerly welcomed King Alexander of Yugoslavia to Marseilles in pursuit of this alliance, also became a victim of the Croatian Nationalists who had assassinated the King.⁴⁹⁴

After Barthou’s death, French policy towards Italy became more ambiguous. Pierre Laval, who replaced Barthou, focused on bilateral relations with other Mediterranean countries rather than regional cooperation. In November 1934, Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu asked a French Foreign Ministry official whether France would either work towards a Mediterranean pact or sign a treaty of alliance with Turkey. The French diplomat approved the latter option.⁴⁹⁵ Although Ankara did not oppose a rapprochement between France and Turkey per se, it preferred multilateral cooperation to a bilateral treaty. The general conviction in Turkey was that a pact would serve Turkish interests better in spite of a change in French regional policy.⁴⁹⁶ It was also reported that the Turkish Foreign Ministry aimed to enhance the relations between Turkey and France. But since Turkey’s main interest was the creation of a Mediterranean pact, the essential point is that this relationship had to be completed by a Mediterranean entente.⁴⁹⁷

In January 1935, Laval, who had observed Turkey’s insistence on a Mediterranean entente, assured the Turkish Ambassador in Paris that he would not spare any effort necessary to convince Mussolini to agree to such an entente.⁴⁹⁸ Again in January, Laval made an official visit to Rome. However, during his visit, instead of discussing Mediterranean cooperation, he struck a bilateral deal with the Italians. Laval agreed to give up French economic interests in Abyssinia in exchange for Italian solidarity against any German action in Austria. He also agreed to cede to Italy some territories from Libya, the south of Tunisia, Chad and Eritrea. On his part, Mussolini promised eventually to renounce his revisionist demands over Yugoslavia.⁴⁹⁹

To put it differently, the French were persuaded to turn a blind eye in Africa, in return for other promises of support in Europe from Italy.⁵⁰⁰ In April, Britain endorsed at Stresa the Rome agreements between Italy and France. Even though Mussolini was unsuccessful in imposing his Four-Power Pact on Europe, the Rome agreements seemed like the start of a ‘Three-Power Pact’ between Italy, France, and Britain.

Above all, France, as a “half-ally” of Italy became less eager for the formation of a Mediterranean pact. In fact, Tevfik Rüştü Aras told the British Ambassador in Turkey, James Morga, “Now that Italy is a half-ally of France, she can not possibly pretend - unless she is insincere - that any Mediterranean power constitutes a danger to her”.⁵⁰¹ Once Italy came to a bilateral agreement with France, it had no incentive to accept the previous French proposal of a Mediterranean entente. On the contrary, Mussolini had an alternative proposal. In February, 1935, the Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade, Ali Haydar, told the British Ambassador, N. Henderson, that the Italian government had already made proposals to the governments of Greece and Turkey for a tripartite Mediterranean agreement.⁵⁰² It was more convenient for the fascist government to form a coalition with a few Mediterranean countries that they could easily control than to favor a Mediterranean entente that included great powers such as France.

Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Fulio Suvich, suggested to the Greek Ambassador in Rome in an explicit statement that it was desirable to exclude all other powers and to confine the agreement to Greece and Turkey.⁵⁰³ Furthermore, he added that the Turkish government was in favor of this principle. Turkish Foreign Minister Aras, however, expressed complete ignorance as to what Suvich was referring to. Moreover, the new Italian ambassador in Ankara, Carlo Galli, had convinced his government that Şükrü Kaya, who had been acting for Aras, was in favour of a tripartite pact between Italy, Greece, and Turkey that would exclude Yugoslavia and Romania. Şükrü Kaya admitted that he had discussed the general possibilities of a Mediterranean pact with M. Galli but denied absolutely that there had been any question of a tripartite agreement. ⁵⁰⁴

The Greek Ambassador in Rome had been instructed to reply to Suvich on behalf of both governments that no agreement was possible unless it included Romania and Yugoslavia, their partners in the Balkan Entente. Suvich objected, arguing that the latter was an Adriatic and the former a Black Sea country and consequently had nothing to do with the Mediterranean. But he later added that the proposal to include them merited consideration. Suvich also asked, if Yugoslavia and Romania were to be included, why Albania and Bulgaria should not be also. ⁵⁰⁵

In his report to London, the British Ambassador, Henderson, pointed out two interesting features of this affair: Suvich’s original insistence on the exclusion from the agreement of the other great powers and the subsequent expression of his willingness to consider the possibility of a pact which would include the other members of the Balkan Entente, though still excluding France and Britain.⁵⁰⁶ In the spring of 1935, the Italian Ambassador to Turkey, Galli, again proposed a tripartite pact between Italy, Turkey, and Greece to Turkish Foreign Minister Aras. In order to persuade Aras, he said that once a tripartite pact had been formed, the membership of Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria could follow. Aras would have liked to believe that Italy was ready to conclude such a pact with the four powers of the Balkan Entente. But the most crucial point for Ankara was that a Mediterranean pact must be guaranteed by Britain and France. The pact would be useless without these two powers.⁵⁰⁷

However, in August 1935, the British Secretary of State’s minute on Turkey pointed out the misapprehensions of Ankara, first about Britain’s reluctance under any circumstances to guarantee a “Mediterranean Locarno”, and, secondly, Mussolini’s idea of including Romania and Yugoslavia in this agreement.⁵⁰⁸ The minute emphasized the “exaggerated fears of Aras” about Italy and talked of his “pathetic attempts to protect his country”.⁵⁰⁹ The British Secretary of State affirmed that the Turkish Foreign Minister had the following concerns: that British naval power in the Mediterranean was decreasing and that of Italy increasing; the League was breaking up and if the system of collective security broke down, Turkey’s present alliances with the Soviet Union and the Balkan Entente’s powers might afford inadequate protection.⁵¹⁰

As a result, Turkish officials had been working towards a special Mediterranean pact that would guarantee Turkey’s integrity. From the British Secretary of State’s minute, it is possible to conclude that Turkish Foreign Minister Aras had tried to give the impression to the British that Italy seemed ready to conclude a pact with the four powers of the Balkan Entente. But at the same time, Italy’s unsecured signature was not sufficient and for that reason a Mediterranean pact must be guaranteed by Britain and France. The Turkish Foreign Ministry thought that Britain and France respectively must guarantee Italy and the Balkan Entente against aggression.

Therefore, Turkish officials tried to convince the British of the urgency of forming a pact in the Mediterranean. According to them, the formation of a Mediterranean pact was a naval affair and, as such, of particular concern to Britain. The British Ambassador to Turkey Percy Loraine wrote to London that Turkish Foreign Minister Aras wanted him to understand that the French government would favor such a scheme. ⁵¹¹ Aras had already spoken to Loraine of the danger that Turkey felt of the Mediterranean becoming a Latin lake. In fact he raised the issue explicitly by asking: “Might not this come about if France joined the proposed pact and England was not associated?”⁵¹²

The conversation between the Turkish Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador to Turkey reflects quite well a typical reaction of a middle power like Turkey. Ankara was making attempts to be a mediator between the great powers to prevent any regional instability. As in the first half of the 1930s, Turkey was attempting to guarantee stability in the region not by having recourse to force but by forming coalitions with other countries. However, as a middle power, it was aware from the onset that it had limited physical and military assets. In addition to this, by the mid-1930s, Turkey was faced with the increasing aggression of individual great powers in the region. As a result, it had to cooperate not only with like-minded states but also with status quo great powers such as Britain.

By 1935, Turkish political leadership was already convinced that Britain would be a determinant factor in preventing any aggression in the Mediterranean. At the same time, Ankara knew that the British factor alone could not prevent the Italian threat to the region from increasing. For that reason, Turkey insisted on pushing for the formation of regional pacts in cooperation with its neighbors. When Mussolini seemed likely to agree to incorporate Romania and Yugoslavia into a possible alliance with Italy, Turkey, and Greece, Aras suggested that the Italian proposal of alliance with these five countries ought to be replaced by a Mediterranean Locarno. ⁵¹³

At the same time, the Turkish Foreign Minister questioned Rome’s sincerity in including the whole Balkan Entente in a Mediterranean multilateral non-aggression pact. Aras was suspicious that this volte face was inspired by Italy’s desire, in the event of Abyssinian war, “to guard Italy’s Eastern flank and to ensure that the Straits should remain open as a source of supplies”.⁵¹⁴ In this case, the speedy conclusion of the pact might have the effect of facilitating and encouraging Italy’s hostile designs on Abyssinia. Rome, in fact, would have recourse to such a tactic in order to take the region under its control.

In order to achieve this goal, Italy also intended to gain access to the Black Sea region through the Straits. For this purpose, Rome aimed at concluding a separate pact with the Black Sea powers, Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Italian Ambassador in Turkey, Galli, in his conversation with Aras in the spring of 1935, said that the best solution would be the conclusion of a Mediterranean pact between Italy, Turkey, and the Soviet Union.⁵¹⁵ By promoting a pact between Italy, the Soviet Union, and Turkey, Rome sought influence in the Black Sea region at the expense of other regional powers such as Romania.

The Italians were already able to reach the Black Sea through the Straits by their presence in the Dodecanese. Yet they thought that the international status of the Straits could not in itself secure Italy’s access to the Black Sea.⁵¹⁶ The best way to gain access was to come to a regional agreement with Turkey and the Soviet Union. Consequently, it was not a coincidence that at the time (May 1935) when France signed a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, the Italian Ambassador to Turkey was discussing with the Turkish Foreign Minister the possibility of forming a tripartite pact which would include the Soviet Union.

Italy’s main strategy was to form coalitions with different countries in the Mediterranean to divide the regional powers. Rome, therefore, embarked on efforts to prevent the conclusion of pacts initiated by regional powers. Mussolini had never welcomed the Balkan Entente. For him, it had been formed under the influence of France. He had insisted that Yugoslavia, an ally of France, make its policy clear towards Italy before joining any regional pact. Otherwise, the inclusion of Yugoslavia might bring an end to the Balkan Entente⁵¹⁷ Moreover; Rome had lobbied for a tripartite alliance between Italy, Turkey, and Greece in order to split the Balkan Entente.

Turkey was able to resist Italian attempts in the region by continuing to collaborate with its neighbours. Moreover, after the signing of the Balkan Entente, Ankara insisted on even expanding the scope of regional collaboration. Turkish political leadership was aware that it had to fight against the control of the region by a major power and work for the participation of as many countries as possible in regional collaboration. However, immediately after the signing of the Balkan Entente, Turkey had to alter its earlier strategy in the sense that it now welcomed regional efforts initiated by powers such as France, and sought support from Britain, too.

The attempt to create a Mediterranean pact formed a good example of such a policy. Even though the first initiative for a Mediterranean pact came from France, this initiative was mainly supported by Ankara. Here Ankara was in a dilemma as a middle power: Although Turkey was very supportive of such an initiative, it was aware that it had limited tangible sources compared to powers like France. It was difficult for Turkey to take the initiative in the Mediterranean as it had in the Balkans. Nevertheless, as a Mediterranean country, it felt responsible for contributing to peace in the Mediterranean.

9. THE MEDITERRANEAN – A REGION TOO FAR?
From the mid-1930s on, Ankara continued to take political initiatives in the Mediterranean, which was the great power playground of the time. In this process, the Italian policy in Abyssinia had a great impact on the Mediterranean policy of Turkey. From the summer to the fall of 1935, Italy had greatly increased its military strength in the Eastern Mediterranean. It concentrated its forces between the Adriatic, the Dodecanese Islands, and the Red Sea, and expanded the construction of the 1934-35 naval programme beyond its original scope.⁵¹⁸ The expansion of the Italian navy in the Eastern Mediterranean could be taken as a sign of Mussolini’s belief that the time was ripe for the total conquest of Abyssinia.⁵¹⁹ In fact, Italy, which had already secured the acquiescence of France and Britain regarding Italian interest in Abyssinia in the spring of 1935, invaded this country in October.

Immediately after the Italian occupation of Abyssinia, Aras became active during the discussions of the Council of the League of Nations in favour of the application of sanctions against Italy. Moreover, Turkey was elected to the Commission of the Five that was set up by the Council of the League of Nations to find a peaceful settlement of the Abyssinian question. The Committee was composed of Britain, France, Poland, Spain and Turkey. Aras also made a special trip to Paris to convince the French Foreign Minister Laval to join the British and the other powers in implementing sanctions. As for the British, they were prepared to give the Italians compensation in other directions if they abandoned their plans of conquest in Abyssinia. They had even suggested an international conference at which colonial questions could be discussed following the settlement of the Abyssinian adventure.⁵²⁰ Aras anxiously added:

“Do not forget that the British have provided only an opening, that when nations go into conference and when the door is opened for discussion, anything may result, and it is by no means out of the question that, if a colonial conference takes place, it may end in a shuffling about of frontiers, especially in Africa, with the ultimate result that Italy will obtain something substantial of its own in a region where no other interests would be disturbed”.⁵²¹

Turkey promptly decided to adhere to the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations on Italy during the Abyssinian War.⁵²² Wight uses the case of the Abyssinian Crisis and the issue of sanctions as an example of a status quo bias of minor powers in the international system. He argues:

“When sanctions were imposed on Italy in 1935-1936 to restrain its aggression against Abyssinia, the small powers showed a resolution and readiness for sacrifice, which do much to answer the argument that they can afford to champion international ideas because they do not have the responsibility of enforcing them. It was the great powers who destroyed the League system, by a combination of aggression and defections”.⁵²³

Turkish policy during the Abyssinian crisis did not fit the behaviour pattern Wight attributed to powers of lesser degrees. Ankara assumed a high-profile diplomatic role and indicated its ability and willingness to assume responsibility from the beginning. Commencing a diplomatic mission at Addis-Abbaba constituted an early indicator of Turkish diplomatic activism regarding the Abyssinian issue. Turkish Chargé D’Affaires, B. Nizamettin, had arrived in Addis-Abbaba in August 1935, just before the Italian attack. With his arrival Turkey was added to a handful of states, including Britain, France, the United States, Belgium and Greece, that had diplomatic representation in Abyssinia. During the war, the Turkish diplomatic mission served as a valuable source of information regarding Italian military activities in Abyssinia. As soon as he took up his post, Turkish Chargé D‘Affaires began to send in reports to Ankara that predicted the imminence of an Italian attack. Indeed, a private letter received by Turkish authorities specified even the date of a possible Italian attack as 21 September 1935.⁵²⁴

The reports of the Turkish Chargé D’Affaires indicate that Ankara was particularly interested in finding out what the British reaction would be in the case of an Italian attack on that country. In his report of 27 September, 1935, B. Nizamettin ruled out direct British intervention, unless London secured French military support. He also speculated that a British military involvement, if it were to occur, would come only in the form of supplying arms and ammunition to the Abyssinians. He also regarded it as possible that the British troops stationed in Sudan would be dispatched deep into Abyssinia in a race with the Italians for controlling strategically important terrain, such as Lake Tsana. In that case, he predicted an inevitable showdown between Italian and British troops advancing from opposite directions. The result would be a new Fashoda incident according to the Turkish Chargé D’Affaires.⁵²⁵ Such a situation would inherently carry the risk of escalation into a military conflict between Italy and Britain. General Kazım Karabekir, a veteran of the Turkish War of Independence, also predicted a military conflict to happen more or less along the lines described in the Turkish Chargé D’Affaires’ memorandum.⁵²⁶

In a subsequent message, Turkish Chargé D’Affaires described the military situation in Abyssinia and the state of Abyssinian defenses based on what he identified as a “secret report” he had been shown by Belgian officers. He pointed to the failure of their efforts over six and a half years to raise and train a modern force of six thousand troops. According to the report, a prolonged military campaign would cause food shortages among the Abyssinian troops who habitually wasted supplies and ammunition. The Italians might be able to persuade the Abyssinian troops and locals to surrender in exchange for food which was already in short supply. This, of course, would be contingent on the Italians ability to transport food and supplies in large quantities. Since desert warfare demanded long and arduous preparations and it was possible to make only modest advances (or progress), a possible Italian campaign would be difficult and costly. Taking control of the whole Abyssinia territory would demand patience.⁵²⁷

Once the Italian military campaign was underway, the Turkish General Staff wanted to have a first-hand assessment of the military situation on the ground. Observing a potential adversary in the field was a matter of utmost significance for the Turkish defense. In November 1935, the Turkish General Staff asked the Ministry of Interior to dispatch two war correspondents, one to the Italian army headquarters, and the other to the Abyssinian army headquarters. Stating that this was a matter more for the government than the military, Chief of Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak complained about dependence on foreign sources for information on the Italian-Abyssinian War. He also recommended that the correspondents should be selected from among reserve officers recently discharged from service. Only such correspondents would be able accurately to assess the military situation on the ground and inform the government accordingly. Pointing to the presence there of many foreign war correspondents accredited to the Italian and Abyssinia military authorities, Field Marshal Çakmak demanded prompt attention to his request, which he considered a vital issue for Turkey.⁵²⁸

Once again, it was evident that this was more of a matter of financial means than of will. Subsequent correspondence between the Interior Ministry and the Finance Ministry reveals how limited the Turkish budget was in 1935. Appropriating 28,360 TL to cover the expenses of two war correspondents became a serious challenge for the Finance Ministry. In view of the prohibitively high costs of keeping two correspondents in a war zone, Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya discussed the issue with Deputy Chief of Staff General Asım Gündüz who settled for only one correspondent to be accredited to the Italian military authorities. He also agreed to cut down substantively the provisions for wire charges on the grounds that “the correspondent is in fact not needed for the kind of news that will be wired and should be writing letters rather than wire reports.” He was convinced that 7,000 TL would be sufficient and asked that the matter be resolved urgently and swiftly.⁵²⁹

Meanwhile, the Venizelist coup in 1935 in Greece accentuated Turkish fears regarding the Italian aspirations that had already been outlined by Mussolini in his speech a year before (in March 1935). Aware of Venizelos’ opposition to the Balkan Entente, Ankara was worried that his return to power could result in Greece’s withdrawal from the Entente and propel Athens into the Italian orbit. Such a divergence in Greek foreign and security policy would most likely set the seal on Bulgaria’s orientation, again to the Italian orbit.⁵³⁰ Through Turkish Permanent Representative at the League of Nations Cemal Hüsnü Taray, Greek diplomats became aware of Ankara’s skepticism regarding the Great Powers’ (French and British) inclination towards the Italian position in the Abyssinian crisis.⁵³¹ During the crisis, Athens felt the consequences of its support for sanctions on Italy in the form of repeated violations of Greek territorial waters and airspace by Italian vessels and aircraft respectively. Literally, Italy tried to exert naval pressure on Greece particularly in the Aegean. The frequency of such Italian incursions infuriated Greek public opinion.⁵³²

Italian pressure on Greece also heightened Greek fears of Turkish motives in the Aegean. The major concern was that Turkey could be tempted to take advantage of Italian-Greek tension to take control of some of islands in the Aegean. Indeed, in the fall of 1935, there were reports of Turkish intention to seize the Greek Islands of Chios, Mytilene and Syra in the case of a war between Italy and Greece. Although these reports could not be confirmed, the Greek General Staff took them seriously, particularly after Tevfik Rüştü Aras’ comment that Ankara wished to re-acquire the Dodecanese.⁵³³ According to the British, this was the essence of Turkish policy during the Abyssinian crisis. Therefore, the only option for Greece seemed to be to avoid alienating Italy at any cost.⁵³⁴

Although Turkey also supported sanctions, compared to Greece it came under little, if any, pressure from Italy. Aras commented that “Italy’s distrust of Greece was greater than its distrust of Turkey”. ⁵³⁵ Sir Sidney Waterlow [British Ambassador] defined in a memorandum to the Foreign Office the relationship between Italy and Greece during the preceding years as having been essentially that of wolf and lamb.⁵³⁶

The British military and naval authorities who tried to assess Greek military capabilities in the event of an Italian attack as a result of Athens implementation of the sanctions concluded that Greece would be a liability rather than an asset in the Mediterranean naval situation. Therefore, the Greek request for material assistance to augment its armed forces did not receive priority treatment from London.⁵³⁷

The Greek policy during the Abyssinian crisis reflected a typical dilemma for a minor power, caught between two great powers. During this period Athens unsuccessfully sought a great power patron, namely Britain, to resist Italian power. Interestingly, included among the perceived sources of threat to Greece was Turkey, though this threat was remote compared to those from Albania and Bulgaria.⁵³⁸

In March 1936, the American Embassy in Ankara sent a dispatch to Washington on Turkey’s present international position in the light of war between Italy and Abyssinia. At the time, Turkey’s relations with Germany, England and the Soviet Union were of special importance according to the Americans. There was no planned rapprochement between Turkey and Germany. But certain factors, such as the economy and the emigration of some German citizens to Turkey, had contributed to this rapprochement.

American Chargé d’Affaires in Ankara, G. Howland Shaw, in his dispatch, argued that British and Turkish ideas concerning the freedom of the Mediterranean coincided. He emphasized that the Turks had stood openly by the British with respect to sanctions, the assurances to the British government in the event of Italian aggression and the several replies to Italian remonstrances. However, the self-centered attitude of France in the Abyssinian question was contrasted at Ankara with previous French declarations concerning the protection of small countries. ⁵³⁹

As far as Ankara’s relations with Moscow were concerned, both Turkey and the Soviet Union wished for peace in order to consolidate their revolution. In fact, Turkey desired first good relations with its neighbours and then with countries more distant from its frontiers. G. Howland Shaw wrote that Turkey definitely felt herself in danger in a world which was rearming and would make every sacrifice to maintain its means of defence in a state of efficiency.⁵⁴⁰ Under these conditions, the concern of the leaders of Turkey’s foreign policy had been aroused by Italy. The fear of Italy would always be in evidence at Ankara as long as the Dodecanese Islands were Italian possessions, according to the American diplomat.

Almost a year later, the issue began to have a visible impact on Turkish-Italian relations.

The foreign press monitored by the Interior Ministry included translations from Italian newspapers such as Il Giornali that carried out a feature article critical of the Turkish press stance in the Abyssinian crisis. Il Giornali argued that Turkey’s stand against Italy in the Abyssinia issue did not make any sense as Turkey had no interest or stake in Abyssinian territory. Moreover, according to the Italian paper, Turkey no longer considered itself representative of the Muslim world or a protector of its interests. Finally, Il Giornali reminded its readers of the relative positions of Turkey and Italy in the international power hierarchy dominated by the Great Powers.⁵⁴¹

From the beginning, Ankara opposed Italian policy towards Abyssinia. Until the Italian conquest of Abyssinia was complete, Turkey focused on strengthening existing regional pacts and encouraging the formation of new ones against Italian expansionism. During the Abyssinian crisis, the Turkish press carried reports and feature articles that emphasized Turkey’s military and naval strength in the Eastern Mediterranean. For instance, an interesting commentary in Tan argued that Turkey’s military and naval strength had to be taken into account more seriously than that of any other power of lesser degree in the event of war or quest for supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁵⁴² Again, according to the Turkish press, neighbouring countries had begun to consider Turkey’s contribution to international peace in the context of the Mediterranean conflict.⁵⁴³ In fact, Turkey promised Yugoslavia “unlimited assistance” in the case of an Italian attack on Belgrade.⁵⁴⁴ Belgrade considered the Turkish army as a force that could deter Bulgaria and stand fast against Italy. After a military delegation from Turkey had visited Romania and Yugoslavia in November 1935, a tripartite military conference was held in Belgrade between the three countries that resulted in the signing of a military convention.⁵⁴⁵

One consequence of the Abyssinian Crisis was the realization of the need for a strengthened Balkan Entente which subsequently became a fundamental policy objective of the Turkish government. Moreover, Bulgarian aspirations in Thrace were not considered dead by Ankara. On the other hand, Turkey had by no means given up hope of bringing Bulgaria into the Balkan Entente. American diplomats linked Ankara’s optimism to President Atatürk’s fondness for the country in which he had served as military attaché. But it was felt that watchfulness was in order.⁵⁴⁶ Moreover, the Italian attack on Abyssinia had already added fuel to the Balkan countries’ apprehensions regarding Italy. For instance, on 16 August 1935, Titulescu received from Belgrade a draft military convention proposing cooperation between Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey. A similar text was sent to Ankara though not to Athens. On 15 October 1935, Yugoslavia and Turkey joined Romania in its request that a committee be established to study the issue of sanctions against the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.⁵⁴⁷

On 11 March 1936, the representatives of the Balkan Entente declared that they would defend the application of all treaties including that of Locarno.⁵⁴⁸ Rebecca Haynes wrote that Titulescu had sent a message of support to France in the name of the Balkan Entente following the remilitarization of the Rhineland. Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece subsequently contacted the German government distancing themselves from Titulescu’s message.⁵⁴⁹

The American Ambassador to Turkey, J. V. A. MacMurray, reported to Washington that Shaw’s dispatch of March on the picture of Turkey’s international position was accurate but there had been some changes since then. . First of all, the Italian threat had become more concrete because of Italy’s military success in Abyssinia. A peace dictated by Italy and the inability of the powers to prevent aggression had definitely impressed Ankara.⁵⁵⁰

MacMurray pointed out Turkish concern about the developing Italian influence on Bulgaria. He made a comment on the remarks of Aras who stated to the Yugoslav press that Bulgaria would take no steps towards rearming without notifying its neighbours. According to MacMurray, this was more of a warning than a reflection of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ real convictions. The Turkish authorities also believed that the Germans were supplying arms and munitions for Bulgarian ports because they had inquired concerning the attitude Ankara might take towards the passage through the Straits of vessels loaded with arms and munitions.⁵⁵¹

Yet Turkey had no desire to commit herself in the present Western European crisis, according to the American diplomat. In fact, the Turkish government asked for the resignation of Turkish Minister in Berne Cemal Hüsnü Taray who was accused of committing Turkey without instruction to taking sides in a controversy among the great powers. At Geneva, Taray had backed Titulescu who stated that the Balkan and Little Ententes should align with France and Belgium in the present European crisis.⁵⁵²

Even after the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the Turkish Foreign Ministry still had in mind to bring forward a general Mediterranean settlement to include all riparian states and Britain on the basis of non-aggression and mutual guarantees, including settlement of the Italian-Abyssinian conflict.⁵⁵³ Contrary to Ankara’s desires, the British Foreign Office’s immediate objective was not to discuss the Mediterranean question in its broader aspects but to further the British-Italian détente in the Mediterranean. In December 1935, the British Foreign Office advised its embassy in Turkey to discourage the Turkish Foreign Ministry from embarking on so ambitious and comprehensive a scheme.⁵⁵⁴

Turkey’s dilemma as a middle power continued vis-à-vis the great powers even though Turkey hoped to gain more British support in the region. The greatest disappointment for Turkey was the growing disregard by these powers of multilateral organizations and initiatives. As a member of the League of Nations, Turkey endeavored to assist the League in its efforts, including the use of sanctions for the maintenance of peace under all circumstances as was argued by Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü.⁵⁵⁵ However, while the League imposed limited sanctions on Rome, the British and French Foreign Ministers were considering new concessions to Italy in Abyssinia. For instance, in December, Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval agreed to cede most of Abyssinia to Italy.⁵⁵⁶

Turkish political leadership felt uneasy about the way in which the great powers approached international security and questioned whether peace could be maintained in the existing regime of collective security. These powers were concerned with finding bilateral solutions to settle international issues, instead of counting on the authority of the League of Nations. In contrast to this, Ankara frequently emphasized that the greatest benefit they expected from the League was its pursuit of the principle of collective security. Concerning the Abyssinian issue, İnönü said: “If the idea of the mutual guarantee of nations for the maintenance of peace widens its scope so as to be applicable to all events, we are in favour of labouring to assure such an evolution.”⁵⁵⁷

Thus Ankara demanded more efficient efforts on the part of the League of Nations towards all nations. British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Percy Loraine, reported his informal conversation with the President of the Republic of Turkey concerning Abyssinia. Atatürk said that it had become necessary to consider seriously what the position would be supposing Italy won a complete victory. Then he continued: “Italian exultation over such a success would be all the more intense and arrogant because the success would have been won despite the League of Nations”.⁵⁵⁸ Finally he asked the following question:

“If the action taken by the states who had pronounced Italy an aggressor and were enforcing sanctions on her, had not proved efficacious to prevent Italy’s single-handed conquest of Abyssinia, was it to be expected that the action of those states through the League would be more energetic and more efficacious in preventing Mussolini’s next act of spoliation?”⁵⁵⁹

In this conversation, President Atatürk made several points: First, Ankara was against “inactivity” towards Italian “colonialist” policy in Abyssinia since Turkey itself had been a victim of colonialist policies in the very recent past.⁵⁶⁰ Secondly, the Turks could not disregard the invasion of a member of the League of Nations which they had expected to be more active and efficient. Thirdly, Mussolini’s action in Abyssinia might be the harbinger of future Italian actions in other territories if these were not stopped.⁵⁶¹ Finally, Atatürk’s conversation with the British ambassador aimed to give London the message that Britain should be more outspoken concerning Italian expansionism.

In March 1936, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras, in an interview in Paris-Midi, said that Turkey’s place in the Mediterranean had become even more important in the past three months, and this might create a basis for British-Italian rivalry.⁵⁶² Aras discussed two related issues. One was the sanctions implemented by the League against Italy. He argued that the sanctions would have an effect only some time in the future. The other issue was the increasing geopolitical significance of the Mediterranean region. Since the Turkish political leaders believed that efficient measures against aggression had not yet been taken, they had made all the efforts necessary to work for regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. But Ankara had seen that the conflicting interests of the Mediterranean powers prevented such cooperation.

Aware of its limitations, Turkey was forced to prioritize its objectives in a situation of increasing instability. Ankara’s disappointment at the failure of the League of Nations to ensure international security led Ankara to demand a revision of the status of the Straits. In fact, Ankara assumed that the four members of the League, Britain, France, Italy and Japan, would not, in fact, guarantee the security of the Straits, contrary to their decision at the Lausanne Conference. Thus, after the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the German occupation of the Rhine Demilitarized Zone, Turkey sought the revision of the status of the Straits status and consequently called for a meeting.

In May 1936, after Turkey’s request for the revision of the Straits status, the American Chargé d’Affaires in Bucharest, Frederick P. Hibbard, commented on Turkish-Romanian relations. On the one hand, he mentioned that the Romanian press talked about a feeling of gratification towards Turkey which had requested revision in a legal manner rather than resorting to treaty violation as Austria and Germany had done. On the other hand, Hibbard wrote that Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu was most indignant at Turkey’s request for the revision. Interestingly enough, he argued that Turkey had not consulted with its allies in the Balkan Entente prior to issuing the note to the League of Nations.⁵⁶³

According to the American diplomat, Titulescu also opposed Turkey’s request because of its timing. He argued that if Turkey’s claims were met, Hungary and Bulgaria would be encouraged to request revision of the military clauses of the Trianon and Neuilly Treaties.⁵⁶⁴ Moreover, the Romanian leader believed that if the request of these countries was made in the same manner as Turkey has made its request, Romania would find it difficult to refuse to consider this.

Whatever their original reservations might have been, in the end the Balkan Entente members preferred to present a common front in response to the Turkish demand as a manifestation of regional solidarity in the Balkans. They issued a joint communiqué supporting Turkey’s claims.⁵⁶⁵ But Turkey had to convince Britain, a mainly naval power, to bring about a change in the status of the Straits. At this point, Britain consented to the Turkish demand because of the rapidly deteriorating political situation in the Mediterranean. As a consequence of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, Turkey was seen to be a counterweight to Italian action and ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁵⁶⁶ Moreover, Turkish friendship with Britain would prevent Soviet-Turkish collaboration in the region.⁵⁶⁷

Finally, in June and July 1936, Turkey, Britain and the other signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne met at Montreux and decided to abolish the International Straits Commission. Furthermore, the Montreux Conference put the Straits under Turkish control by terminating the demilitarized status of the Straits. Italy was the only country which rejected the transfer of the rights of the Straits Commission to Turkey; as such a change would prevent Italy from having free passage through the Straits.⁵⁶⁸ As an excuse not to accept the Montreux Convention Rome used the imposition of sanctions.

It is important here to point out that at Montreux, Turkish officials were still making efforts to work for regional alliances. During the conference, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras and Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu had conversations with Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov on the possibility of forming a Black Sea pact, part and parcel of a wider Mediterranean pact. Even though Turkey did not completely agree with Romania and the Soviet Union concerning their rights in the Black Sea, Ankara fully supported the idea of a Black Sea pact for the security of the Straits.⁵⁶⁹

After taking the Straits under Turkish control, regional cooperation became even more significant for Turkey. Ankara continued to emphasize the importance attached to the formation of a Mediterranean pact. Turkish officials knew that the security of the Straits was closely related to the security of the Mediterranean which ought to be guaranteed by regional cooperation. Although Turkey, to some extent, had guaranteed its own security by taking the Straits under its control, it was quite aware that multilateral solutions were the only way to gain complete security. In other words, it was cognizant that the principle of pursuing a generalized strengthening of multilateral decision is in the middle powers’ interests since it helps to reduce the uneven control of great powers.

Moreover, systems where two or more great powers are involved in a mixture of cooperation and conflict relationships offers the chance for middle powers to follow multilateralism in foreign policy strategy.⁵⁷⁰ During the Montreux Conference and afterwards, Ankara again took the initiative in efforts for a regional entente in the midst of mixed conflict and cooperation between the great powers. In the atmosphere of 1936, when steps towards the Axis powers were being taken, Turkey aimed at convincing at least France and Britain to work for Mediterranean cooperation. During the Italian-German rapprochement in July, it was easier to convince France which felt the need to balance the influence of the Axis powers in the region.⁵⁷¹ In September, the Turkish press reported a conversation between Turkish Foreign Minister T. R. Aras and French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos in which the latter emphasized the significant place that Turkey occupied in the Eastern Mediterranean following the establishment of the new regime in the Straits.⁵⁷²


10. LIMITS OF ACTIVISM: FROM BRIDGING TO BALANCING
Until the mid-1930s, Turkish naval policy developed mostly as a function of institutional and domestic political considerations. Preoccupied with internal security and regime consolidation, the Turkish political and military elite devised a strategy for territorial defence that relied mostly on manpower. Turkey’s international isolation accentuated this introverted orientation. As Turkey had no allies to count on, until 1930 military strategy was shaped more or less in a diplomatic vacuum. However, after 1930, the international system began to have more weight than institutional or domestic factors. The changing international power configuration in Europe and the Mediterranean compelled Turkey to make major strategic adjustments.⁵⁷³ The process had been underway since 1930, and Turkey’s admission to the League of Nations in 1932 symbolized the end of its isolation or “outcast” status in the international system.

Politically, Turkey was clearly inclined towards cooperating with status quo powers. However, its economic dependence on Germany gradually increased. The adverse effects of the 1929 world economic crisis brought about German domination of Turkish external trade. The near monopoly status that Germany enjoyed in Turkey’s trade relations was formalized under the Clearing Agreement signed in August 1933. This pattern was subsequently repeated in Germany’s trade with other Balkan countries. The 1929 world economic crisis also added economic impetus to regional cooperation efforts in the Balkans. Ankara and Athens, in particular, promoted initiatives to this end. In February 1934, Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Entente to preserve the status quo in the Peninsula, which was moving towards economic domination by a revisionist Germany. The Entente was in essence directed against revisionism from within (Bulgaria) but not from powers external to the region.⁵⁷⁴

In March 1934, Mussolini’s speech on future Italian expansion into Asia and Africa had reinstated Italy to the status of “enemy number one” in Turkish threat assessments. The Italian threat was perceived to be greater in the mid-1930s than in the early 1920s due to the increased strength of the Italian navy.⁵⁷⁵ Turkey, on the other, had until 1934 adhered to the “naval holiday” with Greece in the Aegean and the Soviets in the Black Sea. After fours years without ordering any new units, Ankara decided to expand the Turkish Navy. The priority was again placed on submarines. The decision to first acquire submarines clearly points to the degree of continuity in Turkish strategic thinking that emphasized coastal defence as the main mission for the navy. For the Turks, “the defence of the Straits… was not a question of battleships, but rather of mines, guns and torpedoes.”⁵⁷⁶ The growing Italian naval and military strength in the Dodecanese increased Turkish sensitivity regarding the demilitarized status of the Straits. The new naval program would also include one or two cruisers, two destroyers and a hospital ship.⁵⁷⁷ The inclusion of cruisers was a long-awaited element of change in Turkish naval programs.

The Turkish economy was in no better shape than in the 1920s to finance armaments, particularly after the 1929 world economic crisis. The new Turkish naval policy called for four new submarines to be ordered immediately. As for financing the new effort, the government devised new sources of revenue in the form of a “national defence tax” on tobacco and spirits.⁵⁷⁸ However, without foreign credits, naval expansion had little chance of being realized. Britain was not interested in supporting Turkish naval expansion through government subsidies to private shipyards. France was not considered a politically reliable supplier due to disputes over the Ottoman debt and the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay). Thus, Turkey had to look elsewhere for naval units at affordable prices under favourable credit terms. In spite of the declared urgency of adding new submarines to the fleet, the new Turkish order was deferred. In April 1935, Foreign Minister Aras reiterated to the visiting British naval attaché the Turkish government’s changing view on the need for, and the utility of, a fleet:

“Turkey must increase her navy firstly to have a fleet in the proper sense of the word and secondly for the protection of her merchant vessels. A fleet [is] on sea what the infantry [are] on the land. It [is] the fleet and infantry which in the last resort decide wars. Undoubtedly the roles of submarines and of aircraft [have] become of great importance but on the sea a fleet [has] the last word.”⁵⁷⁹

Around the same time, Britain had its own problems with German naval power after Hitler’s rise to power in 1933. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 removed the Versailles restrictions on the German navy but limited its size to 35 percent of the British fleet.⁵⁸⁰ At the time, London still viewed Italy as a power which could be useful in checking Germany in Europe.⁵⁸¹ The Italian attack on Abyssinia in October 1935 compelled Britain to court new partners in the Mediterranean. When the League of Nations imposed sanctions on Italy, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia agreed to implement them. In return, Britain furnished guarantees to these three countries against any Italian threat during the implementation of the sanctions.

This turn of events reinforced the Turkish conviction of the need to rectify the defence gap caused by the demilitarized status of the Straits. The remilitarization of the Straits became a military imperative and, in the short term, Turkey’s foremost foreign policy objective. On 5 December, 1935, Turkish political and military leaders discussed with a German naval advisor the details of a new naval strategy and armaments program for the defence of the Straits. Ankara was more concerned about the defence of the Dardanelles than the Bosphorous. The emphasis on the former reflected the primacy of the Italian threat in determining Turkish strategy.⁵⁸²

Another new parameter in Turkish naval strategy was Greece’s significance as an ally. With the Balkan Pact of 1934, Turkey had made regional allies in the Peninsula. None was seen as strategically more crucial than Greece.⁵⁸³ As a result, keeping the sea lines of communication in the Northern Aegean open became an important objective in Turkish naval strategy.⁵⁸⁴ In compliance with the Turkish-Greek Naval Protocol of 1930, Ankara notified Athens of its intention to increase its submarine fleet to 10 units from four. Athens, in return, notified Ankara of its plans to order two new destroyers.⁵⁸⁵

The two capitals then made a joint request to London for financial assistance to acquire new units against the Italian threat. However, their joint plea for British credit was not received enthusiastically in London on two accounts. The lack of funds was a restraining factor. London was still reluctant to spend even on its own naval programs. The British were also the champions of worldwide disarmament. Viewed through the double prism of economics and disarmament, it would be difficult to justify financing the armament efforts of two foreign countries. In sum, British skepticism was expressed thus: “the prospect of a race between Italy and its nervous little neighbours conducted on borrowed money is a nightmare.”⁵⁸⁶

In 1936, Turkish diplomacy secured substantial revision of the status of the Turkish Straits, not by force or fait accompli but by negotiation. The Montreaux Convention on the Turkish Straits was signed on 20 July, 1936. The Convention terminated the demilitarized status of the Straits. Therefore, Turkey successfully achieved its number one priority in foreign policy and security. The gap that had been caused in its defences by the demilitarized status of the Straits had been filled. Now, Turkish attention was turned to acquiring military and naval instruments for defence. In this venture, Ankara again relied on the services of German naval officers, led by Admiral von Wülfing. The German naval advisors were asked to provide an opinion on the requirements for the defence of the Dardanelles. In the light of new requirements, a new naval program was to be launched.⁵⁸⁷

Aircraft retained its priority as a weapon in the defensive and offensive staff plans against Italy. An interesting indicator of the Turkish military’s pursuit of offensive capabilities was the acquisition of 36 Martin 139WT bomber aircraft from the United States. Reportedly, these aircraft were ordered as they offered the range and payload required to launch an air raid on mainland Italy from Turkish territory.⁵⁸⁸ For the defence of the Turkish mainland opposite the Dodecanese Islands, Turkey was to rely on its air force supported by mobile heavy artillery.⁵⁸⁹ According to British Admiralty assessments, the Turkish navy was also tasked with launching offensive raids from the Dardanelles or the Bosphorous with the cruisers included in the new naval program. These cruisers had to match the Italian eight-inch gun cruisers and the Soviet 7.1-inch gun cruisers in firepower and speed.⁵⁹⁰

Similarly, submarines, another weapon of choice for the Turkish General Staff, were among the first units to be ordered under the new naval program. Not surprisingly, the Turkish naval contract for four submarines in June 1936 went to German builders. Although the initial bid had been submitted by the Dutch Shipyard of I.v.S., the contract was signed with German shipbuilders as Germany finally rid itself of the Versailles restriction on submarine building. Under the contract, the first two boats were to be built in Germany and the last two in Turkey.⁵⁹¹

Certainly, this latest Turkish order was a consequence of German influence on the Turkish navy. However, several other factors worked in Germany’s favour in this order. German submarines were cheaper, for instance, than French submarines.⁵⁹² Also, Germany dominated Turkey’s economic relations after the 1933 Clearing Agreement. In particular, German demand for Turkish chrome increased in line with the requirements of its four-year armaments program. In a sense, the order for submarines offered Turkey a way to liquidate the surplus of 45 million TL accrued from its trade with Germany.⁵⁹³ In 1936, the Turkish navy made an unexpected acquisition of another I.v.S.-built submarine. The boat had originally been ordered for Spain which was not able to acquire her due to the Civil War. The submarine was therefore offered to the Turkish navy and commissioned as Gür in December 1936.⁵⁹⁴

According to an American assessment of Turkey’s international position after taking the Straits under its control, Turkey had been very much drawn into the European picture and its policy of being on friendly terms with everybody and tied to nobody had received several dents. The change was partly due to the European crisis, but some of it was the price Turkey was paying for raising the questions of the Straits and the Sanjak. As a result, British influence over Turkey was getting stronger. The report cited the visit of the Turkish fleet to Malta as an indication of this development.⁵⁹⁵

The Americans clearly had a point in linking the Turkish naval visit to its changing international position. After 1936, London displayed a more positive approach to Turkey as a status quo country. The change in British policy towards Turkey can also be understood in the context of a general change in the strategy of British foreign policy. After 1932, the foreign office bureaucracy tried to steer politicians in the direction of “old diplomacy” whose principal aim was to maintain a balance in continental Europe, in the Mediterranean and in the Far East. After the War, as the constellation of enemies that could threaten the Empire changed, so did the identity of potential allies and friends to protect the same. According to McKercher,
“Like the ‘Victorians’ before them, the interwar ‘Edwardians’ did not see a balance existing only in continental Europe. Rather, they saw several balances in those areas of globe judged vital to British and Imperial security. Though they gave expression to these multiple balances in terms of questions needing answers – the ‘Mediterranean question’, the ‘Chinese question’, and so on – they approached the issue of national security as one of meeting specific threats in particular parts of the world. Grand strategy thus entailed pursuing foreign and defence policies that considered a series of interlocking questions on a global scale.”⁵⁹⁶

Therefore, by 1932, civilian and military bureaucracy in Britain began to put pressure on the government to increase defence spending to meet emerging German and Japanese threats. The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC) set up under the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) came up with specific recommendations to bring British defences up to strength by 1939, the year the DRC identified as the one when war was most probable. The Sub-Committee recommendations were geared mainly towards making up for deficiencies and delays in the existing programs as a result of anticipation of a certain degree of success in international disarmament efforts. More importantly, the DRC’s work culminated in a new strategy for British foreign policy which remained in effect until Neville Chamberlain’s Premiership. This new strategy identified Germany as the “ultimate potential enemy” of Britain. Its immediate objective was to buy time by making the best possible use of political means to maintain a global equilibrium until British defences were brought up to strength.⁵⁹⁷

The new British mood was also reflected in Anglo-Turkish naval relations that culminated in the first overseas visit to Malta in November 1936.⁵⁹⁸ Although London tried to downplay the political significance of this unprecedented Turkish naval visit, Ankara’s intention was give a clear political message by dispatching to Malta all frontline units of the navy.⁵⁹⁹ Beyond its symbolic significance, the Malta visit pronounced the increasing openness of the Turkish military and naval forces to Britain. Normally at best reserved towards foreigners, the Turks were surprisingly accommodating to the British and allowed them to board and examine, in particular, two Turbine class destroyers, Zafer and Tinaztepe, built in Italy.⁶⁰⁰ The Italian-built destroyers of the visiting Turkish squadron were of great interest to British naval intelligence since the Italian navy included destroyers of the same class. This new policy of openness to the British stood in stark contrast to the earlier reserved attitude of Turkish naval authorities towards similar demands. For instance, back in1933, the Fleet Commander had denied the request of high-ranking Soviet military visitors to visit the battlecruiser Yavuz and have a look inside one of her main turrets.⁶⁰¹

After the first visit to foreign ports in 1936, Ankara seemed intent on continuing its naval activism. For instance, in July 1937, the government decided to send Turkish naval units to make port calls in Italy, Yugoslavia, Romania and the Soviet Union. The fleet would be divided into two groups, one to cruise in the Mediterranean and the other in the Black Sea. The planned visits would strain the naval budget as the Ministry of Finance had faced difficulties in gathering the requisite funds for these two simultaneous tours.⁶⁰² Very shortly, in fact, the government reversed its decision and cancelled visits to Italian and Yugoslav ports in the Mediterranean and the Romanian and the Soviet ports in the Black Sea.⁶⁰³

A quick succession of events had rendered such naval visits risky ventures in the submarine infested waters of the Mediterranean. Pirate submarine activity in the Mediterranean during the Spanish Civil War propelled Ankara more towards Britain and even France. Spanish vessels had, at best, been rare sights in Turkish waters before the Civil War. They began to make their appearances in Turkish ports after 1936.⁶⁰⁴ Less than a year later, in 1937 an unidentified submarine managed to sneak into the Straits and torpedo two Spanish vessels. After the attacks, the Council of Ministers held an extraordinary meeting at Dolmabahçe Palace on 24 August, 1937. Chief of Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak and Fleet Commander Admiral Şükrü Okan also attended the meeting. The meeting culminated in two decisions. First, the military/naval authorities were asked to establish whether the attack had taken place within Turkish territorial waters. Secondly, diplomatic notes were to be delivered to the League of Nations, to the foreign missions in Turkey and finally to the Non-Intervention Committee describing the incident and advising the rules of engagement with unidentified submarines in Turkish territorial.⁶⁰⁵

Two weeks later, the Government adopted a number of additional decisions and tougher measures regarding unidentified submarine activities in and around Turkish territorial waters. The Government instructed the General Staff and the Fleet Command to attack and destroy, as a rule, any unauthorized submarines that might be detected in the Sea of Marmara if they failed to comply with calls to surrender. The fleet was instructed to heighten its state of alertness and readiness for a surprise attack. The Customs Ministry’s boats were to be placed at the disposal of the General Staff for anti-submarine patrols. In addition to the above, the General Staff seem to have suggested laying nets across the Straits. However, this suggestion was not adopted by the Government on the grounds that it might be construed as declaration of war, which the current situation did not warrant.⁶⁰⁶

Reports of unidentified submarine activity continued to pour in. Periscopes of unidentified submarines were spotted several times in the Sea of Marmara in the summer of 1937. Shore-based observers reported submarine activity, once off Gallipoli and once off Darıca respectively. A third encounter was reported by the commanding officer of protected cruiser Hamidiye off the Prince’s Islands. The second and third sightings indicated unidentified submarine activity within the Sea of Marmara and indicated poor performance of Turkish submarine defences. Subsequently, Turkish navy submarine chasers and destroyers of were put on patrol in the Marmara Sea to hunt for submarines. On one such patrol, a submarine chaser claimed to have sighted a periscope and dropped depth charges in pursuit off Gallipoli.⁶⁰⁷

It soon became embarrassingly evident to Ankara that the Turkish navy did not have the necessary means to defend even Turkey’s own territorial waters against the submarine menace.⁶⁰⁸ Meanwhile, the Turkish government agreed to cooperate with other Mediterranean powers against pirate submarine activity. However, the extent of this cooperation became a divisive issue in the government. During the Nyon Conference in September1937, the Turkish leaders had sharply divided opinions on the scope and mode of Turkish participation in the campaign against pirate submarine activity. President Atatürk favoured a closer cooperation with Britain and France than İnönü was ready to accept. Chief of Staff Field Marshal Çakmak endorsed İnönü’s position on this issue. Atatürk and İnönü assessed the risks associated with such cooperation differently.⁶⁰⁹

President Atatürk gave serious and thorough consideration to responding positively to the British request for a Turkish destroyer to patrol with the British fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. He even discussed the issue with the Fleet Commander in İzmit. For him, naval cooperation with Britain and France would be a beneficial policy even though they might run the risk of losing one or two destroyers in the Mediterranean. Such cooperation was likely to be rewarded by British and French support against Italy.⁶¹⁰ Disagreement on this matter cost İnönü his premiership. However, in the end the guarded approach İnönü and Field Marshal Çakmak represented prevailed. In practice, Turkish contribution to the joint naval activity in the Mediterranean remained modest and did not include commitments beyond Turkish territorial waters.⁶¹¹ The Turkish port of Alaçatı (near İzmir) was designated as a supply and relief port for British and French fleets. A Turkish naval officer, Lieutenant Commander Safiyetin Dagada, who subsequently served as the head of the Commission, was appointed to the International Commission at Gibraltar as Turkey’s official representative.⁶¹²

The termination of the Nyon arrangement also marked the end of Turkish openness towards the British. After a brief period of openness with the British, the Turkish military reverted to their reserved attitude as soon as the crisis in the Mediterranean ceased to be vital.⁶¹³ Another explanation of the return to a reserved Turkish attitude may lie in London’s unrelenting efforts to keep Italy on its side for the sake of continental European power balance at the expense of Mediterranean security. It also reflected a choice on the issue of Turkey’s multilateral solutions to regional problems. In May 1936, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras had proposed that France present to the League of Nations its project for a Mediterranean pact of mutual assistance for July 1936.⁶¹⁴ Britain again avoided convening the League for a discussion of the French project. In the meantime, the situation in the Mediterranean took a very dramatic turn which resulted in the Nyon arrangement.

Later the French government sent a memorandum to London proposing a Mediterranean pact of mutual assistance which would include the Mediterranean as well as the Black Sea countries.⁶¹⁵ The French administration believed that such a pact would guarantee the security of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. But the British administration did not agree with the French. In October, British Foreign Office Under-Secretary R. Sergeant said to French Foreign Ministry Chargé d’Affaires R. Cambon that the security of the three Balkan countries could be disregarded if there was a possibility of settling British-Italian relations tête à tête.⁶¹⁶

British behaviour in the Mediterranean reveals the main difference at this time between middle power states and the great powers. While the former stressed the importance of multilateral solutions to international problems, the latter preferred bilateral ones. For London, it was more of a priority to be on good terms with Italy in the Mediterranean than to be involved in regional cooperation as, in this way; it could prevent Italy from getting closer to Germany. But Ankara aimed to preclude this kind of bilateral relation. It had not yet given up hope of forming a Mediterranean pact. At the first stage, Turkey made all the necessary efforts to persuade its neighbours and partners in the Balkan Entente. In October 1936, İnönü and Aras had talks with Yugoslav Prime Minister Stojadinovic in order to persuade him to work for a Mediterranean pact. In April 1937, the Turkish government repeated to Belgrade its desire to see the formation of such a pact. Turkey had already been frustrated by the reluctance of its neighbours.⁶¹⁷

This frustration prompted did Ankara to seek accommodation with the great powers, including Italy. After the Montreux Conference, Turkish diplomacy sought ways to secure Italian endorsement of the new regime of the Turkish Straits. Foreign diplomatic papers give the impression that Ankara and Rome might have established a tacit link between the Straits and the Abyssinian issues. The latter issue had eventually presented Turkey with a dilemma regarding the fate of its diplomatic mission in Addis Ababa. Maintaining a Turkish diplomatic mission there could add tension to the already strained Italian-Turkish relations. Withdrawing the mission would mean lending legitimacy to the Italian annexation. Ankara was helped by the “illness” of the Turkish Chargè d’Affaires in that country.

In September 1936, the news was leaked that Ankara would recall the head of its diplomatic mission for reasons of health and ask the British to undertake the protection of Turkish nationals and Turkish interests in Abyssinia. Reportedly, Tevfik Rüştü Aras knew that the Italians would certainly be satisfied with this turn of events. At any rate, if genuine, the Turkish Chargè D’Affaires’ poor health was a blessing in disguise as it allowed Turkey to justify the closure of its diplomatic mission on non-political grounds. Moreover, Ankara’s request to Britain to protect its nationals and interests in Abyssinia “removed the embarrassment of asking the Italians for an exequatur to establish a consular mission.”⁶¹⁸

In an American diplomatic dispatch of May 1937, reportedly Count Ciano commented that, in a conversation Turkish Foreign Minister Aras undertook to support at Geneva Italy’s claim to recognition of the annexation of Abyssinia, although Ciano was less clear as to what Italy would or would not do with respect to the Montreux Convention. In fact, when the Italian conquest had become clear, Turkey withdrew its diplomatic mission to Addis-Ababa. In analyzing the Turkish diplomacy of the time towards Italy, MacMurray wrote that the underlying distrust was barely concealed by a discreet and realistic diplomacy.⁶¹⁹

The year 1937 was a decisive one in many respects. In that year, Italy, having abandoned the League of Nations and signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, increased its solidarity with Germany and Japan.⁶²⁰ As international divisions became more clear-cut, Ankara gradually reoriented its foreign policy towards Britain, the principal status quo power. Anglo-Turkish rapprochement came about due to Turkey’s strategic value for Britain, not only in the Eastern Mediterranean but also in the Balkans. According to the Admiralty, Turkey could serve as a bulwark against Italian action and ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the Balkans, keeping Turkey out of the German orbit was crucial in preventing “the domino effect” which could result in German control of the Peninsula. The Admiralty suggested that Britain should not allow German domination of Turkish foreign trade to turn into political influence in Turkey.⁶²¹ In 1937, the Turkish General Staff hired Royal Air Force instructors to set up the AirForce War College. This was a clear challenge to the German instructors’ domination in Turkish staff training in place since 1926.⁶²²

The impact of rapprochement was more salient in naval matters. In 1937, Ankara decided to become a party to naval disarmament treaties, probably to enhance its status quo credentials. Anglo-Turkish discussions to this end revealed the contours of the Turkish naval expansion plans to the British. The discussions centered on the Turkish intention to build two cruisers (8,000 or 10,000-ton) with eight-inch guns. By including such cruisers under its new naval building program, Turkey risked involvement in “the cruiser controversy,” an issue that undermined the entire naval disarmament process and became a major preoccupation for Britain.⁶²³

The origins of “the cruiser controversy” can be traced as far back as February 1925 when the Admiralty came up with an outline disarmament proposal that called for revision of the cruiser classification and limitations agreed upon at Washington. Indeed, it was Britain who strongly advocated limits of 10,000 tons displacement and eight-inch gun caliber dimensions for cruisers. The cruisers that were built to these limitations were called “the Washington cruisers,” or “Washington standard type.” London argued subsequently that a distinction had to be made between the Washington standard types and smaller, less powerful cruisers armed with 6-inch-guns.⁶²⁴ In a similar frame of mind, British naval experts tried to dissuade their Turkish counterparts from building Washington Standard type cruisers under the new Turkish naval program on the grounds of the cost of building and maintenance.⁶²⁵

Other details of the new Turkish naval strategy and program also emerged from the discussions. In the new naval strategy, coastal defence retained its priority. The navy was tasked with (a) keeping coastwise communication from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean open; (b) cooperating with other services in preventing enemy landings from the Aegean islands; (c) making tip-and-run raids on enemy shipping. To perform these tasks, the Turkish navy would need two 10,000-ton cruisers mounted with eight-inch or bigger guns compatible with a speed of 35-knots. Speed was an essential requirement for the task of preventing enemy landings. In addition, the fleet would consist of eight destroyers and 20 submarines.⁶²⁶

Early in 1938, British Ambassador Percy Lorraine was convinced that Turkey was planning to seek British assistance in completing its naval and air armament programs.⁶²⁷ Subsequently, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras officially notified the British Embassy of its requirements under the second ten-year naval program of the Republic in February 1938. This program devised by the Turkish General Staff called for two ships (cruisers) of 10,000 tons, 12 destroyers of 1,200 tons and 30 submarines (15 coastal type and 15 medium type). This fleet would be divided into two groups, each with one cruiser, four destroyers and 12 submarines. Four destroyers and six submarines would be kept in reserve or undergoing maintenance. One group would be assigned to the Mediterranean and the other to the Black Sea.

The cruisers were indispensable elements as recent war games at the War Academy clearly demonstrated the need for them. The first cruiser was to be commissioned in 1942 and the second one by 1945. The Yavuz would serve as a stopgap until the second cruiser was commissioned. The Turkish navy also expected to build a 23,000-ton ship between 1950 and 1960. Four destroyers and 10 submarines would be built urgently in Britain. Four more destroyers would follow.⁶²⁸ Of course, Turkey would need credit on favourable terms to launch its second ten-year naval program. In response to informal Turkish inquiries, London hinted at its willingness to consider the Turkish naval building requirements, providing that no urgent deliveries were asked for. Moreover, London would prefer Turkey to consider 8,000 ton cruisers with 6.1 inch guns in lieu of 10,000 ton cruisers.⁶²⁹

Within a month, Britain had agreed to provide a six million pound sterling credit for Turkish armaments, including naval orders. The Admiralty viewed Turkish orders as of such vital importance that it stated its willingness to accept even a reasonable delay in its own armaments program.⁶³⁰ On the eve of the Second World War, Turkey was again able to find affordably priced naval arms, this time from a politically satisfied great power in Europe.

CONCLUSION
Subsequent to its admission as a legitimate member to the League of Nations, between 1932 and 1937, Turkey, with its activist policies, exhibited typical middle power diplomatic behaviour. Although typical middle power activism calls for an involvement in global issues beyond their immediate concern, middle power status may come after a country first earns regional prominence. On Turkey’s path to becoming a middle power, its regional initiatives in the Balkans played an important role.⁶³¹ For Ankara, the Balkan Entente was meant to serve, inter alia, as a step towards, or a building block for, a more comprehensive arrangement in the form of a Mediterranean Pact. It was probably not a coincidence that Turkish Foreign Minister Aras had talked for the first time about the Mediterranean project during the meeting of the Balkan Entente in October 1934. To his way of thinking, this pact should include France, Italy, the Balkan Entente and even the Soviet Union.

Turkish diplomatic leadership occasionally gave thought to, or at least voiced, policies that would imply involvement in global issues. For such policies, Turkish diplomacy enthusiastically hoped to rely on means of multilateral diplomacy, particularly within the framework of the League of Nations. For instance, in 1934, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras was so enthusiastic about Turkey’s election to the League Council that he said to an American diplomat in Turkey that he would work for some sort of universal arrangement which the United States could join, pointing out that the Kellogg Pact was not sufficiently strong to accomplish its purpose.⁶³²

As the world was gradually drifting into yet another major conflict, Ankara was busy contemplating ways to maintain international peace. In 1938, Turkish diplomats assumed that Turkey could best contribute to peace in two ways: First, it should avoid any situation likely to increase the tension between the opposing groups of major powers. Turkey was on its guard against becoming involved in any ideological front or other alignment of powers. It was not that the Turkish government had had no opportunities to identify its interests with those of stronger countries – on the contrary, it had received offers and inducements from various quarters- but the Turkish government was convinced that their aligning themselves with any group of powers would tend inevitably to embroil them in the situation and create new difficulties and dangers.⁶³³

Second of all, Turkey seized on any opportunity to exert a helpful influence in reconciling any of the antagonisms existing in various parts of Europe. The Turkish Republic had built up for itself a respect and prestige disproportionate to its rather meager material resources. This was due to its scrupulous observance of obligations, its renunciation of irredentism and its consistency in maintaining relations of good will and helpfulness with other countries. Aras added that even though his country was one of the smaller powers, it was actually in the position of being an influence for good.⁶³⁴

There is evidence to suggest that Turkish diplomats were aware that they were trying something different in the 1930s. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that Turkish statesmen or diplomats ever defined Turkey, at least openly, as being in an intermediate category. Nevertheless, it was recognized as such, for instance, by the British diplomats who identified Turkey as a “small great power.”⁶³⁵ Despite the Ottoman heritage, Turkish diplomacy had no great power pretensions or an inflated view of their country. On the other hand, they never shied away from asserting Turkey’s legal equality with others as a sovereign state. Yet, they saw their interests as being more identifiable with those of the minor powers in the international system. During a conversation with an American diplomat in 1934, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras suggested that those who lost must learn how to adapt themselves to the consequences of war- exactly as Turkey had done-because war was a terrible experience.⁶³⁶

After 1937, there was not much room for middle power activism in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Balkans or elsewhere. After Munich, the world began to resemble more and more Mussolini’s Four-Pact ideal. It was a great –power- managed world order where great powers compromised a minor power’s territorial integrity and existence without even consulting the minor power in question. Hence, on the eve of the Second World War, comparably placed states, Turkey’s natural partners, began to side with one or the other great power. There were not so many of them in the Mediterranean where Turkey attempted to act like a middle power by promoting multilateral arrangements for security. The Mediterranean once again turned into a stage for great power rivalry, limiting the scope for initiatives by others. In conclusion, the outbreak of war can be said to have prevented Turkey from consolidating its status as a middle power. As such, it remained a middle power in the making.