Gap851 Final Report Main Body

Mr Johan Klokow

b. 1945

Current position: Senior Consultant Rock Engineering, Gold Fields

Qualifications:

BSc

B Compt

Pr Eng

Experience:

Johan has worked for Gold Fields for the past 33 years on a wide variety of mines and projects, largely on deep gold mines, but also open pit mines and base metal mines.

Interviewers note: JK is probably the senior industry practitioner that has had the greatest involvement with rock-related research over the past three decades.

Date of interview: 18 August 2004

STATUS REPORT

1. Familiarity with rock-related research work sponsored by SIMRAC and the Collaborative Programs

1.1 JK has read many research reports. The work that has had the greatest impact on his work deals with support, seismicity, and mine layouts. He found it difficult to single out specific reports owing to the large number that have been produced.

1.2 JK has attended many workshops and conferences. The papers presented at ISRM-type conferences were at a high level. He missed the annual SIMRAC Symposium, which provided an excellent overview of the projects. Apparently, this Symposium had been discontinued because of poor support.

1.3 JK has not given much information personally to researchers, but has facilitated access to Gold Fields personnel and operations.

1.4 Research projects have been hosted on Gold Fields mines, and feedback and benefits have been derived. An outstanding example is the VCR geotechnical areas project, which was initiated by Gold Fields and provided very valuable results, which are still being used.

1.5 N/A

1.6 JK was the Gold Fields champion for the VCR project, and was the Gold Fields representative on the Technical Management Committees of the DeepMine and FutureMine Programmes.

1.7 JK has implemented research knowledge and technology.

• 
  JK has arranged training programs, for example the 5-day course “Rock Engineering for Senior Management”, prepared, and presented by CSIR staff.
  
• 
  Modes of operation have been changed, for example, mine layouts have changed from strike to dip pillars.
  
• 
  The guidelines published in the Handbook on Rock Engineering Practice (SIMRAC, 1999) were used extensively when drafting the Codes of Practice.
  

1.8 JK has only made small contributions to research work. He has co-authored several research papers, where his role was advisory rather than directly involved with data collection, analysis, and interpretation.

1.9 JK has contributed to the definition of almost all the rock-related research work carried out over the last three decades in SA. He served on the SIMRAC Gold and Platinum Rock Engineering Advisory Group (GAPREAG) since its inception. Prior to this he served on the COM Rock Engineering Advisory Panel.

1.10 JK has evaluated many research proposals, and been an enthusiastic supporter of research work.

1.11 JK has evaluated many research findings and products, too numerous to list. He rates the quality of many of the projects as “satisfactory or better and useful in some form”.

JK has participated in the development of the rock engineering discipline over the last three decades (of all active rock engineering practitioners, perhaps only Dave Ortlepp has a longer view). JK says that this long-term view enables him to recognize vast increases in knowledge and understanding that are not seen by younger practitioners. In the early 1970’s very little information was available to rock engineers. JK also commented that people are often extremely impatient and expect to see results within months, while it may be years before the effect of a new strategy (e.g. backfilling, layouts) is unequivocally manifested.

1.12 JK suggests the following ways to improve the research program:

1. 
   JK suggests that the proposal reviews be carried out far more rigorously. The proposed work plan should be scrutinized by a panel of experts. Too often demands are made by people with limited understanding of the practicalities of doing research work and limited knowledge of past work on the problem or related work.
   
2. 
   JK finds the present progress review to be superficial. He urges that SIMRAC revert to the system where members of the SIMRAC Steering Committees attend the internal progress reviews held by research agencies such as Miningtek where concepts, data and findings were debated and discussed in detail.
   
3. 
   JK suggests that greater use be made of external independent review of final reports. The pool of rock engineering researchers and experts in SA is relatively small. Usually the local experts on a topic are the persons commissioned to do the work, and the nominated reviewers lack the expertise to critically review the work. In cases where there are competent local reviewers available, their ability to make unbiased, objective criticism is hampered by fierce competition between organizations.
   
4. 
   JK regards lack of focus to be the biggest shortcoming of the SIMRAC program. Projects are not scoped to address particular problems on individual mines, but rather address many regions and often both the gold and platinum sector. Consequently, no single problem is ever conclusively solved and mines are rarely able to identify any tangible benefit that SIMRAC research has made to their operations. In contrast, the DeepMine work was far more focused and consequently more effective. JK attributes this to the SIMRAC tripartite committee system, where each party wants to derive some benefit from every project. In the COM system there was more give and take between parties. It was recognized and accepted that some projects would only benefit certain companies or individual mines, but there was a gentleman’s agreement that in the long run everyone should benefit. JK maintains that it would be far better to have one problem completely solved, than have partial solutions to many problems.
   
5. 
   A second shortcoming that JK identified was the existence of political agendas. He suspects that sometimes research projects are proposed and scoped in such a way that it is aimed at justifying certain practices rather than addressing a real research need.
   

2.1 JK strongly agreed that research work has given him knowledge and tools to do his job better. Many examples have already been noted above.

2.2 JK agreed that research work improved safety in the SA mining industry. By way of example, he described safety in tunnels. At one time, many fatalities occurred in tunnels that were wrongly positioned. Research work has produced a better understanding of the factors that affect the stability of tunnels, and mistakes are only rarely made these days.

JK said that the statistics on rockfall and rockburst injuries are far too generic and cannot be used to diagnose problems. The MP13 form that the Inspectorate requires following a rock-related incident is often not filled in properly as mine operators try to avoid giving any hint that there might have been any shortcoming in their practice.

JK recommended that surveys be conducted to assess the extent to which research findings are implemented. He commented that often research projects are too narrowly scoped and do not consider related processes which may affect implementation. For example, recommendations to improve the stability of gully hangingwalls my be valid from a rock engineering perspective, but interfere with other processes such as face cleaning.

2.3 JK agreed that research work had improved safety on mines in the Gold Fields group. By way of example, he cited the dramatic decrease in the number of incidents where rockbursts caused multiple fatalities.

2.4 JK described the work carried out by SIMRAC as follows:

1. 
   Some of it is academic, and should be so.
   
2. 
   Some of it is practice-oriented, and should be so.
   
3. 
   All of it is safety enhancing rather than safety-focused. The link is not always direct. The thrusts (Rockbursts and Rockfalls) are safety-focused, but not necessarily all the projects.
   
4. 
   None of it is productivity focused, and it should not be according to the SIMRAC mandate
   
5. 
   Our mining is not very sophisticated, neither is much of the research.
   

2.5 JK disagreed that knowledge and technology is effectively transferred to practitioners. He said that the blame lies with both mining companies and researchers (see discussion under 2.6 below).

2.6 JK said that the implementation of research results and products was generally poor, with a few exceptions. There are several reasons for this:

1. 
   Many practitioners want recipes and prescriptions. Research often only supplies the knowledge required to get to a solution. Many lack either the academic training or the intellectual ability (or both) to apply the knowledge to their particular situation.
   
2. 
   SIMRAC has arranged seminars, workshops and product launches, but perhaps greater success could be achieved through training programmes such as the DeepMine Schools. Here the researchers developed and presented training programmes complete with worked examples to show the application of the new knowledge. Delegates could perhaps be awarded “professional development points” for participation.
   

2.7 JK thought that the SIMRAC rock-related research has been generally quite successful in generating knowledge, though perhaps it has not been as cost-effective as it could have been. The expectations of delivery and impact were not met.

2.8 JK elaborated on the points he had made under section 1.12, reiterating that he believed SIMRAC’s biggest failing was lack of focus. The unfortunate result of the tripartite committee system was that all parties strove to ensure that they gained benefit from each project. As a result much of the research was very generic in nature, no one was satisfied.

Researchers were often blamed for failing to produce useful results. JK said that industry and SIMRAC committee members should take a longer-term view and not seek to gain maximum advantage out of every project. The membership of the committees also tends to be quite changeable.

JK proposed that SIMRAC solicit projects on a mine by mine basis, as many of the most pressing problems are unique to individual mines or parts of mines. Here he mentioned the smectite layer encountered at Beatrix #4 Shaft as an example. In some cases it may be possible to adapt or customize the solution to similar situations elsewhere. He said that he thought that SIMRAC’s new funding system might facilitate this. COMRO had been able to focus on mine specific problems, and had consequently been more effective.

The workshops held by SIMRAC to identify research needs were not very effective. JK proposed that SIMRAC appoint a competent team to do this. For example, Gold Fields contracted Turgis Technologies, an independent consulting firm, to develop a technology strategy. A Turgis team comprised of people with a range of skills and experience visited the various mines to find what the most pressing problems were. Common and unique issues emerged. A second round of discussions were then held with each mine during which the problems were better articulated. They found that this process produced real commitment and participation from mine personnel when solving problems.

FORESIGHT REPORT

3/4 JK predicted that the following changes would affect the SA mining industry during the next decade:

1. 
   The fate of the industry will be governed by economics i.e. commodity prices, exchange rates, etc.
   
2. 
   The technical capabilities of the mining groups have deteriorated significantly, and this is likely to continue, especially if the profitability of mines worsens.
   
3. 
   The platinum industry is rapidly expanding and will continue to grow. As a result, not enough attention is being given to many issues.
   
4. 
   It is not possible to mine gold at greater depths at current prices. A sustained gold price of at least R100,000/kg is necessary for significant capital expenditure.
   
5. 
   Health issues will become more prominent (relative to safety).
   
6. 
   There will be a swing away from self-regulation through codes of practice to external regulation. This will reduce the amount of choice for mine operators.
   

5. JK identified the following strategies to reduce rock-burst risk

Reduce risk by (i) reducing the exposure of workers, (ii) reducing the occurrence of events.

1. 
   This can only be achieved by examining the mining process systematically and identifying opportunities to reduce exposure or occurrence. For example, centralized blasting can narrow the time window during which seismicity is raised. The technology has been available for years but is not generally implemented.
   
2. 
   It is critical to reduce exposure times in danger zones. JK estimates that 80% of rockfall accidents in gold mines can be related to problems encountered during the cleaning process. Either support could not be properly installed because cleaning had not been properly done, or support had been damaged or ripped out during cleaning. Often facebursts can be attributed to face geometries that have come about in an attempt to solve a cleaning problem.
   
3. 
   Water-jet cleaning has the potential to remove people from the danger zone, but creates other problems that are not always recognized. For example, people sometimes attempt to “bar” the hangingwall with water jets. Education and training is needed.
   
4. 
   Changes in culture, and mind-sets are required. Legislation and the attitude of society are important factors.
   

6. JK commented as follows on the list of factors that could improve rock-related safety.

1. 
   Better training of in-stope workers is very important. Workers often feel that they have no option but to take risks if they are to get the job done.
   
2. 
   Hazardous structures should not only be detected ahead of mining, but above mining (in hangingwall). This aspect is often neglected, but perhaps even more important, especially for the Ventersdorp Contact Reef. We generally have a better knowledge of the footwall because of crosscuts and ore-passes.
   
3. 
   Greater mechanization is very important, though it may not be viable.
   
4. 
   Support systems are good already.
   
5. 
   Better supervision is important. This does not imply more supervisors, but better quality supervisors able to recognize problems and take action effectively. Planning is a huge issue. Bottlenecks in the production cycle are not identified, resulting in a “pressure cooker” situation where there is no time to give attention to safety issues. Supervisors are trained well enough to recognize and avoid problems in the system.
   
6. 
   The ability to predict rockbursts is seen as the least important factor on the list. Much effort has gone into this with little success. It will probably take a long time to develop a reliable technique, and the remaining lifetime of the deep level mining industry is about 15 years.
   
7. 
   External enforcement of regulations will not have much impact.
   
8. 
   The development of better stress modeling techniques was rated more highly than rockburst prediction. There should be a component of academic research, and this is the type of research that should be conducted.
   
9. 
   The better implementation of existing knowledge and technology is important. JK is concerned that there is an element missing in the R, D & I chain. We need to define up front what the success factors will be and the time it will take before an impact can be measured. The mining industry focuses on the short term and lacks patience and perseverance. We need marathon runners! For example, it took 10 years or more for the benefits of backfill to be manifested. It takes years to change a layout from strike to dip pillars. In contrast, the implementation of preconditioning was successful because a marked improvement in conditions is visible within weeks or even days.
   

7. Need for rock-related research.

7.1 JK agrees that rock-related research work should continue to be carried out.

7.2 JK strongly urges a greater focus of the research effort, addressing specific problems rather than generic issues.

7.3 JK believes that SA’s competence base is a “mixed bag”. Some are very good, other mediocre.

7.4 Capacity is also a “mixed bag”. JK noted that several experienced researchers are approaching retirement age, and several others have also recently been lost due to retirement, emigration, or leaving mining

7.5 JK agrees that we have the necessary facilities to conduct the required work.

7,6 JK believes that implementation and research are both important, and that we should not focus on only one.

7.7 JK strongly disagrees with the proposition that research work should be abandoned.

7.8 JK agrees that stricter (external) enforcement of regulations and (internal) enforcement of codes of practice could have a greater impact on safety than more research in the short-term, but strongly believes that research is the engine for improvement.