Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Afghanistan Instability

The use of contractors co-opt local police and destroy stability locally.

Jora 8 (Ulrike, PHD Economic Geography @ U of Aachen, Swisspiece, pg 32) ET

Especially the inability of the Afghan government to regulate PSCs and hold them accountable was interpreted as a weakness of the government (specifically the MoI) during focus group discussions:145 • “PSCs show lack of respect toward local security forces, and do not collaborate with them.” • “PSCs are able to wear similar uniforms to the ANA and ANP, drive around in unmarked cares, and ignore traffic rules, without being told to do so otherwise by the Afghan government.” The worst allegation was that PSC staff wearing ANA and ANP uniforms were committing criminal acts such as robberies. • The ability of PSCs to block roads at will and limit access to important facilities such as hospitals is perceived as a major problem: “They tell you not to go here, or not to go there, they block the road – who are they to do this?” • Ignoring the authority of local police and lacking respect of traffic laws and inappropriate driving styles, such as not stopping at intersections, using one-way roads in the wrong direction, driving too fast and pushing people to the side of roads. A DynCorp guard was also once seen slapping an Afghan Minister. During focus group discussions the implication of a weak government versus strong PSCs was debated. As noted earlier, there are fears among those interviewed that strongmen who are able to “preserve” their “personal army” in form of, or through PSCs may at one point challenge the government and re-ignite civil war.146 In addition, some considered PSCs as a potential threat to the state: “We saw how a small riot [May 2006] shocked the government, we saw how unarmed people shocked the government and the police was not able to control them and had to call in the national army. If the police cannot control an unarmed mob, how could they control an armed one? If anybody can buy the service of PSCs, what if people who want to overthrow the government hire them? What happens then? Who is going to take responsibility?”147
PMCs steal the best operatives away from local Afganistan police and military

Jordan 2010 (Bryant, http://defensetech.org/2010/06/18/big-bucks-lure-crack-afghan-troops-to-private-security-firms/ , date accessed: 6/28/2010) AJK

Private security companies working under Defense Department contracts in Afghanistan are siphoning off some of the best and brightest from that country’s security and police forces, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee says. That’s the finding of a committee investigation into private security contractors in Afghanistan. The reason the Afghans are taking the contract jobs is simple — money. “Many of them are recruited by higher-paying private security firms,” Levin said in a statement released during Gen. David Petraeus’ testimony to the committee. Levin said he is concerned that the U.S.‘s own contracting practices may be harming the war effort by luring away from the Afghan forces that are expected to take over the fight many of its best people.

Hollow Forces Adv. – I/L – Afghan Police Key

The Afghan police is key to stability in Afghanistan after the scheduled pullout.
Simao 6/20 (Paul, Jun 20, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65J1M520100620?type=politicsNews)KFC

"That absolutely has not been decided," Gates said. President Barack Obama decided in December to send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan as part of a revised strategy that focuses on securing Kandahar, the Taliban's birthplace, to try to turn the tide in the nearly nine-year-old war. Obama also announced the July 2011 date for the gradual withdrawal of troops. Transferring responsibility for security to Afghan troops in certain parts of the country is one of the linchpins of the Obama strategy. But doubts remain that Afghan troops will be able to assert control if given broader authority next year -- recent reports have suggested that Kabul's army is poorly trained and suffers high rates of desertion. Some top military officials have said privately that they doubt they will really know if the war strategy is working or not until next summer, around the time Obama plans to begin a troop withdrawal, conditions permitting. White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel told ABC's "This Week" program that the July 2011 drawdown date was "firm," adding that Washington was seeing signs that the Afghan government was making headway on security. "We are now at that point in Afghanistan, and in fact for the first time in eight years, nine years, they're actually meeting their police recruitment requirements as well as their army recruitment requirements," he said in an interview aired on Sunday. Gates said he was confident that Afghan troops would be ready to take over primary responsibility for security in some parts of Afghanistan.

Hollow Forces Adv. – I/L – Afghan Army Key

The lack of an army cripples Afghanistan

Jora 8 (Ulrike, PHD Economic Geography @ U of Aachen, Swisspiece, pg 37) ET

First, the reported difficulty to clearly distinguish between different security actors in Afghanistan creates a sense of vulnerability among those interviewed, as to whom they are dealing with. This was enhanced by perceptions that local strongmen were using PSCs as a front in order to stay in power and legitimise keeping their militia. The latter was even considered as potentially threatening to the weak Afghan state, including fears of renewed conflict. Second, even though Afghans who participated in this study acknowledged that internationals and wealthy businessmen needed protection in Afghanistan, there is perceived resentment against security becoming a commodity of the rich. Furthermore, many focus group participants felt that PSCs had a negative impact on the security in the neighbourhoods they worked in, due to bad behaviour of PSC staff, their heavy armament and the increased exposure to insurgency attacks and criminal gangs. Third, the perceived high cost of private security was also criticized as diverting needed reconstruction funds back to the countries needing PSCs to begin with. Even though it was acknowledged that PSCs could make a positive contribution to unemployment by providing jobs for low-skilled labour and previous militia fighters, the Afghans who participated in this study felt that PSCs could improve on salaries paid, hiring practises, quality of training and supervision of staff.

Use of contractors and lack of an army destroys stability

Januzzi 2 (Charles, prof of human culture @ U of Fukai, Mail Archive, oct 1, 2) ET

In Afghanistan, the plan is for up to 150 U. S. Special Forces troops to begin training Afghan recruits, then to turn the effort over to private U. S. contractors. Defense officials have said for months that only by having an army of its own can Afghanistan hope to create the stability that is critical if the country is to avoid remaining a haven for terrorists. DefSec. Rumsfeld has said he might seek money from Congress and other foreign govts to finance the army. Some basic training of several hundred Afghan recruits is already underway, led by British & German members of the international security force there. But thousands of other potential Afghan soldiers have yet to be tapped, and international financial support for building Afghanistan's army has been slim.
The lack of having one military incites conflict in Afghanistan

Barakat 8 (Dep of politics, NYU, University of New York, Nov 8 P. 24) ET

From this history, it is apparent that Afghan men are loathe to permit the presence of outside forces or actors intent upon influencing the qawm. This dynamic is most evident in the anti-Soviet jihad. The response to the Taliban was weaker only because of the war-weariness of the Mujahidin and the support the movement received from ethnic Pashtuns, Hizb-e Islami defectors and existing movements such as Harakat-e Enqelab which, like the Taliban, was rooted in a conservative network of mullahs. The only recent conflict which fails to meet this pattern is, potentially, the internal conflict which raged in Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996. This conflict reflects another historical dynamic of conflict in Afghanistan, an exceptionally sensitive perception of threat which is most commonly applied to other tribal and ethnic groups. The victorious Mujahidin groups entered into conflict out of concern that another group would take the reigns and attempt to subjugate all others. While this threat perception was also driven by ‘warlords’’ pursuit of power and wealth, the individual soldiers were motivated by fear of repression by another faction. As such, threat does not require any inciting gesture but is provoked in Afghans simply by the presence of multiple sources of power and authority.

Making afghan police more effective solves the impact

Jones 8 (Seth, prof- security studies @ Georgetown, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 Spring 8) ET

In sum, improving essential services and the effectiveness of the Afghan police in rural areas of the country could have a stabilizing affect over the long run. Together they would likely undermine the Taliban’s support base and increase the government’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force within Afghanistan. So would greater efforts to counter insurgent ideology in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most Afghans are not asking for much. They crave security and a reason for hope, and perhaps something to make their difficult lives a bit better. After thirty years of near-constant war, they certainly deserve it.