Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Asian Wars/ Indo Pak War

Chinese economic collapse restarts avid nationalism – causes asian wars and Indian-Pakistan Wars

Emmot 8 ( Bill, The Australian, june 4-8, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/arts/power-rises-in-the-east/story-e6frg8px-1111116460128 ) ET

The plausibly pessimistic view begins with the risk that China will go through its Japanese-style adjustment to a lower investment economy in a rocky rather than a smoothly handled manner. (By Japanese-style, this means following Japan's example in the '70s, when Japan absorbed a currency revaluation and the aftermath of the oil shock by moving sharply up-market and becoming energy-efficient.) Recovery will eventually come and the Chinese growth story will resume, but only after a recession and asset price collapse, perhaps exacerbated by a recession in the US. Such a bruising experience will lead to public pressure for political reform, posing the biggest challenge to Communist Party rule since the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. But that pressure will again be violently rebuffed and the party will accentuate its nationalist credentials to retain its grip on power. Such a nationalist move would produce increased tension with Japan, a reduction in co-operation with the US over North Korea, and a spate of mutual truculence between China and India over their border disputes and over Chinese support for Pakistan and Bangladesh. Lord only knows what would happen if a terrorist attack on the US were to prompt a US invasion of Pakistan, since India would be tempted to cross Pakistan's southern border while the US was crossing from the west. In these awkward times, the deaths of Kim Jong-il and the Dalai Lama might occur, prompting China to install a new military government in North Korea, rejecting proposals for unification of the peninsula, and to use brutal methods to suppress an uprising by Buddhist monks in Tibet that would make the one in March look like a picnic. Pan-Asian institutions would be stillborn in this fractious environment, as would efforts at serious co-operation over global warming. Japan, becoming even more worried about North Korea and China, would finally revise its constitution to permit expanded military capabilities. Taiwan would be an ever-present source of worry over an imminent conflict between China, Japan and the US. There could even be a short, exploratory exchange of fire over that very issue. The warm glow of the 2008 Beijing Olympics would then be remembered only through a thick smog of tension.
Chinese reduction in growth devastates the economy, causes Taiwan War and ethnic conflict

Lewis 8 (Dan, news presenter and reporter for KOMO-TV, May 13, World Finance, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html ) ET

A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

Hollow Forces Adv. – A2: PMC’s Can Solve

Private contractors ditch out after less than a year, leaving Afghanistan in a state of dismay.

Engelhardt 9 (Tom, Fellow @ Nation Institute, teaching fellow @ berk, Jan 11-9, Tom Dispatch)

Often, in fact, only one of the preselected contractors puts in for the job and then -- if you need a hint as to what's really going on -- just happens to award subcontracts to some of the others. It's remarkable, too, how many former USAID officials have passed through the famed revolving door in Washington to become highly paid consultants to private contractors -- and vice versa. By January 2006, the Bush administration had co-opted USAID altogether. The once independent aid agency launched by President Kennedy in 1961 became a subsidiary of the State Department and a partner of the Pentagon. Oh, and keep in mind one more thing: While the private contractors may be in it for the duration, most employees and technical experts in Afghanistan stay on the job only six months to a year because it's considered such a "hardship post." As a result, projects tend not to last long and to be remarkably unrelated to those that came before or will come after. Contractors collect the big bucks whether or not the aid they contracted to deliver benefits Afghans, or even reaches them. These arrangements help explain why Afghanistan remains such a shambles

Geneva Conventions – Uniqueness – PMC’s Violate

PMC’s violate Geneva Convention law that bans mercenaries, despite differences in language.
SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__journal_of_international_law_and_politics/documents/documents/ecm_pro_058877.pdf)KM

This Section examines the existing international law on mercenaries to illustrate that there are “disturbing similarities” between some of today’s private contractors and “the 1960sstyle soldiers of fortune.”150 I use the existing international law on mercenaries to illustrate that the concerns that led to the development of this body of law closely resemble the concerns that I raised in Part III with respect to private contractors. Mercenaries, much like private contractors, threaten states’ monopoly on the use of force, prioritize the private good over the public good, and generally undermine democratic checks on war-making and the emergence of new democratic regimes. Just as private contractors today can be hired to prevent the emergence of a new democratic regime, the initial laws on mercenaries were developed to check the hiring of mercenaries by racist regimes resisting the decolonization movement in Africa.151 The OAU Convention, in particular, reflects the concern that mercenaries can undermine the emergence of new, democratic governments. Citing “the grave threat which the activities of mercenaries represent to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and harmonious development of Member States of OAU,”152 the OAU Convention determined to put an end to “the subversive activities of mercenaries in Africa.”153 The OAU specifically defines the mercenary as an individual aiming to overthrow the government or to undermine the independence or territorial integrity of a Member State, or to block the activities of an OAU recognized liberation movement.154 Furthermore, Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions appears designed to address the concern that mercenaries, just like private contractors, prioritize the private good over the public good. This concern is reflected in Protocol I’s definition of a “mercenary” as someone whose motivation to take part in the hostilities is “essentially . . . the desire for private gain and [who], in fact, is promised . . . material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces.”155 This provision reflects the intent to distinguish mercenaries from volunteers, who are not feared in the same way and to whom this condemnation does not extend.156 Protocol I’s definition of the term “mercenary” reflects a concern with the commodification of force and a fear of combatants who have allegiance only to profit (a private good), rather than the allegiance to the public good that national armed forces are traditionally assumed to espouse. Protocol I’s definition of “mercenary” also reflects the concern that mercenaries undermine states’ monopoly on the use of force by defining a mercenary as a combatant, a person who “is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict.”157 Protocol I is clear that it is targeting mercenaries who take a “direct part in the hostilities.”158 Most importantly, Protocol I also emphasizes that a mercenary must not be officially attached to a state—namely, that the mercenary cannot be a member of a Party’s armed forces or sent on official duty by a state not Party to the conflict.159