Kantin filosofia kevät 2006

P 094

under question has been already brought to such completion

that it requires only a few finishing touches to correct and

perfect it. For the objects under consideration must already

be known fairly completely before it can be possible to pre-

scribe the rules according to which a science of them is to

be obtained.

General logic is either pure or applied. In the former we

abstract from all empirical conditions under which our under-

standing is exercised, i.e. from the influence of the senses, the

play of imagination, the laws of memory, the force of habit,

inclination, etc. , and so from all sources of prejudice, indeed

from all causes from which this or that knowledge may arise

or seem to arise. For they concern the understanding only in

so far as it is being employed under certain circumstances,

and to become acquainted with these circumstances experi-

ence is required. Pure general logic has to do, therefore, only

with principles a priori, and is a canon of understanding and

of reason, but only in respect of what is formal in their em-

ployment, be the content what it may, empirical or tran-

scendental. General logic is called applied, when it is directed

to the rules of the employment of understanding under the

subjective empirical conditions dealt with by psychology.

Applied logic has therefore empirical principles, although it

is still indeed in so far general that it refers to the employ-

ment of the understanding without regard to difference in the

objects. Consequently it is neither a canon of the under-

standing in general nor an organon of special sciences, but

merely a cathartic of the common understanding.

In general logic, therefore, that part which is to constitute

the pure doctrine of reason must be entirely separated from

that which constitutes applied (though always still general)

logic. The former alone is, properly speaking, a science,

though indeed concise and dry, as the methodical exposition

of a doctrine of the elements of the understanding is bound

to be. There are therefore two rules which logicians must

always bear in mind, in dealing with pure general logic:

1. As general logic, it abstracts from all content of the

knowledge of understanding and from all differences in its

objects, and deals with nothing but the mere form of

thought.

2. As pure logic, it has nothing to do with empirical prin-

ciples, and does not, as has sometimes been supposed, borrow

anything from psychology, which therefore has no influence

whatever on the canon of the understanding. Pure logic is a

body of demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be

certain entirely a priori.

What I call applied logic (contrary to the usual meaning

of this title, according to which it should contain certain

exercises for which pure logic gives the rules) is a representa-

tion of the understanding and of the rules of its necessary

employment in concreto, that is, under the accidental sub-

jective conditions which may hinder or help its application,

and which are all given only empirically. It treats of attention,

its impediments and consequences, of the source of error, of

the state of doubt, hesitation, and conviction, etc. Pure general

logic stands to it in the same relation as pure ethics, which

contains only the necessary moral laws of a free will in general,

stands to the doctrine of the virtues strictly so called -- the

doctrine which considers these laws under the limitations of

the feelings, inclinations, and passions to which men are

more or less subject. Such a doctrine can never furnish a

true and demonstrated science, because, like applied logic,

it depends on empirical and psychological principles.

3 The same function which gives unity to the various repre-

sentations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere syn-

thesis of various representations in an intuition; and this

unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure con-

cept of the understanding.

4 Tästä ei englanninnosta ollut saatavillani. Mutta jatkon voi ymmärtää ilman tätä lainausta.

5 Kantin näkemystä on hyvä verrata John Locken empiristiseen käsitykseen yksinkertaisista ideoista kaiken tiedon lähteenä: . (Vrt. John Locke An Essay concerning Human Understanding Locke: ECHU Bk. 2 Ch. 2 Sec. 1 Para. 2/2 np. 119 dp. 144 : 1. The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are simple, and some complex. Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed. For though the sight and touch often take in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas; as a man sees at once motion and colour; the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax; yet the simple ideas, thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses: The coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind, as the smell and whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of sugar, and smell of a rose. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man, than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.

6 THE manifold of representations can be given in an intuition which is purely sensible, that is, nothing but receptivity; and the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our faculty of representation, without being anything more than the mode in which the subject is affected. But the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguishit from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all combination -- be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts -- is an act of the understanding. To this act the general title 'synthesis' may be assigned, as indicating that we cannot represent to ourselves anything as combined in the object which we have not ourselves previously combined, and that of all representations combination is the only one which cannot be given through objects. Being an act of the self-activity of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject itself. It will easily be observed that this action is originally one and is equipollent for all combination, and that is dissolution, namely, analysis, which appears to be its opposite, yet always presupposes it. For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot dissolve, since only as having been combined by the understanding can anything that allows of analysis be given to the faculty of representation. But the concept of combination includes, besides the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the manifold. Combination is representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise out of the combination. On the contrary, it is what, by adding itself to the representation of the manifold, first makes possible the concept of the combination. This unity, which precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is not the category of unity; for all categories are grounded in logical functions of judgment, and in these functions combination, and therefore unity of given concepts, is already thought. Thus the category already presupposes combination. We must therefore look yet higher for this unity (as qualitative), namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgment, and therefore of the possibility of the understanding, even as regards its logical employment.

7 For the manifold representations, which are given in an intuition,

would not be one and all my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. As my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. From this original combination many consequences follow.

8 This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject. That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in [i.e. throughout] these representations. In other words, the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity.

9 Vrt. Kantin esimerkki viivan kognitiosta: Tällainen kognitio vaatii, että piirrämme viivan ja lisäämme representoimamme viivan osat piirtämisen kestäessä toisiinsa. Pelkkä osien lisääminen toisiinsa ei kuitenkaan vielä riitä vaan nuo osat on yhdistettävä toisiinsa viivan käsitteessä. Piirtäjän toiminta johtaa kognitioon viivasta vain jos hän ymmärtää toimintansa viivan piirtämisenä.

10 I have never been able to accept the interpretation which

logicians give of judgment in general. It is, they declare,

the representation of a relation between two concepts. I do

not here dispute with them as to what is defective in this

interpretation -- that in any case it applies only to categorical,

not to hypothetical and disjunctive judgments (the two latter

containing a relation not of concepts but of judgments), an

oversight from which many troublesome consequences have

followed. I need only point out that the definition does not

determine in what the asserted relation consists.

But if I investigate more precisely the relation of the given

modes of knowledge in any judgment, and distinguish it,

as belonging to the understanding, from the relation accord-

ing to laws of the reproductive imagination, which has

only subjective validity, I find that a judgment is nothing

but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are

brought to the objective unity of apperception. This is what

is intended by the copula 'is'. It is employed to distinguish

the objective unity of given representations from the sub-

jective. It indicates their relation to original apperception,

and its necessary unity. It holds good even if the judgment

is itself empirical, and therefore contingent[.]

11 For the

manifold representations, which are given in an intuition,

would not be one and all my representations, if they did

not all belong to one self-consciousness. As my representa-

tions (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they

must conform to the condition under which alone they can

stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because

otherwise they would not all without exception belong to

me.