Verbatim Mac

Consult Japan CP

Prior to enactment of the affirmative plan, the United States federal government should consult the government of Japan on . The United States federal government will then reject or enact the plan, in part or in whole, based on the recommendations of the government of Japan.

The counterplan is mutually exclusive. Action cannot be taken both with the consultation and without it. A legitimate plan must be both immediate and certain; neither is true in the world of the counterplan.

The counterplan is net beneficial. Genuine consultation is crucial to the Japanese – US alliance.

The Daily Yomiuri 10 (6/20/10, The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), “Talks Needed to Boost Japan-US Alliance”, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9604571746&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9604571749&cisb=22_T9604571748&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=145202&docNo=1, AKL)

Japan and the United States should continually hold strategic dialogues. How can the two nations realize stability on the Korean Peninsula and persuade China to act responsibly as a major power politically and economically? How should Japan and the United States cooperate with each other and other nations to tackle such issues as global warming, the war on terrorism and disarmament? By deepening discussions on such issues and by Japan playing more active roles in the international community, the nation could build an even stronger alliance with the United States. Security is the core of the bilateral alliance. North Korea has been developing nuclear missiles and sank a South Korean patrol vessel in March. China has rapidy been building up and modernizing its military. The Chinese Navy is expanding its operations to wider areas, causing friction with neighboring nations. Japan cannot be so optimistic about its security environmert. Fully preparing for emergencies through close cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces in peacetime will ultimately serve as a deterrence against such emergencies. The alliance sometimes is compared to riding a bicycle. The inertia of a bicycle will carry it forward, but unless we pedal, the bike will eventually slow down and fall. To maintain the alliance, it is vital for the two nations to set common goals and work hard together to achieve them It is also indispensable to make ceaseless efforts to settle pending Issues one by one. It is not enough to merely chant. -The Japan-U S alliance is the foundation of Japan's diplomacy.

Climate is crucial to the alliance

Commission on the Future of the Alliance 16 Commission on the Future of the Alliance, Feb 2016 (In 2013 the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) established a bilateral commission of distinguished policymakers and scholars to develop a strategic vision for the alliance.) The U.S.-Japan Alliance to 2030: Power and Principle http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/US-Japan-Commission-Full-Report.pdf

Climate Change, the Environment, and Energy Climate change and environmental degradation remain major concerns for both the United States and Japan. Poor and deteriorating air and water quality in China has put pressure on the government to take serious remedial action. The potential social and economic effects of climate change are substantial, particularly in heavily populated coastal areas. Climate change may also lead to the destruction of millions of acres of arable land and increase the frequency and severity of natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific and globally, requiring greater investments in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Through 2030 environmental issues will offer a powerful incentive for international cooperation, offsetting some of the many issues in the region that cause competition, mistrust, and even conflict. There are encouraging signs recently of U.S. and Chinese initiatives to curb greenhouse gas emissions, but they may not be sufficient to avoid major climate change impacts.

Loss of allied faith in US assurance causes nuclear proliferation and collapse of the US alliance system
Santoro and Warden 15

(David and John K., David Santoro is a senior fellow for nuclear policy at the Pacific Forum, a Research associate and Stanton nuclear security fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Ph.D in International Relations, John Warden is a Strategic Analyst, a Senior Fellow at the Pacific Forum, the editor-in-chief of the Georgetown Security Studies Review, B.A. in political science and government from Northwestern, M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown, Spring 2015, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf, Accessed: 7.13.16)VW

U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.

Japan will say yes . Japan is seeking to improve relations with China– involvement in decisions regarding China’s rise must include Japan to facilitate better relations

Hughes 16 (Christopher Hughes, Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies, 4/28/16, Japan’s Resentful Realism and Balancing China’s Rise, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/04/28/cjip.pow004.full#sec-1, AKL)

Might Japan’s international strategy shift radically, or indeed is it already beginning a radical shift in response to China’s rise? How might such a shift exert impact, long-term, on Sino–Japanese security relations, and US-led attempts to ‘rebalance’ the regional security order? Might Japanese ‘Revisionist’ governments even actively and overtly balance against China? Japan clearly maintains a fundamental interest in the rise of China, possible associated disturbances in the overall international system and East Asian regional order and, most especially, the prospect of US unipolarity being displaced by a new multipolarity, or even China’s eventual challenge for hegemonic dominance.1 Japan’s vital interest in these developments is, of course, intensified all the more by its close geographical proximity to China, and interdependence of political, economic, and security interests; and by its position in the post-war period as essentially a status quo power supportive of the continuation of the US-led international order, and bound to the US by an ever-deepening alliance relationship. The expectation should be that any shifts in the US-led international and regional systems in which Japan has been so firmly embedded, and as precipitated by China, should pose questions about the precipitation of a similar counter-reaction from Japan. The more radical the impact of China on the regional order, the more proportionately radical Japan’s response might be. Japan may choose to channel its response via the US–Japan alliance, and this may bolster the US security presence in the Asia-Pacific. Alternatively, if Chinese hegemony is truly perceived as on the cards, then this might be considered as necessitating Japan’s initiation of a counter-hegemonic strategy, either in conjunction with or separate from the USA—all with potential ramifications for stability as the two largest East Asian states contend over the shape of the regional security order. Thus far, however, Japan’s reaction to China’s rise has been regarded—so the public argument goes for the majority of Japanese and US policymakers and commentators—as highly restrained, and as demonstrating no fundamental change in Japanese international strategy.2Japanese policymakers, such as current Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, even as they work to revise national security strategies and military capabilities to guard against China’s rise—most notably the Abe government’s passing in September 2015 of extensive legislation to overturn the 60-year-old ban on the exercise of collective self-defence to expand the range of military support for the US–Japan alliance—utilize language to describe such strategy as a ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ (sekkyoku-teki heiwashugi), so to stress essential continuity with the demilitarized post-war past rather than change. Abe has argued in National Diet policy speeches that ‘the peaceful rise of China offers a great opportunity for Japan as well as for the international community. Under the principle of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” (senryaku-teki gokei kankei), we will further strengthen the trend of improving relations’.3 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) maintains the official position that, despite various bilateral ‘differences’, especially over territorial and maritime security, ‘Stable Japan-China relations are essential not only to the citizens of both countries, but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as whole. Accordingly, based on the concept of the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests”, the Government of Japan will promote the development of Japan-China relations from a broad perspective through continued dialogues and cooperation at various levels.’4 Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2013 stressed that, even in response to China’s perceived attempts to change the status quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, ‘Japan will urge China to exercise self-restraint and will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner without escalation’, so claiming that it would not be the power to break the status quo.5 Meanwhile, US–Japan alliance managers and insiders flatly reiterate the mantra that Japan remains a disciplined partner in any hedging strategy towards China.