Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention which provides that the passenger, in successive carriage, can only take action against the carrier who performed the carriage during which the accident or delay occurred, applies only when there is an accident or delay.
Here, the damage consists of the refusal to transport despite confirmed tickets. Further, under the contract of carriage, it is expressly provided that the carriage is to be regarded as a single operation. Therefore, KLM, which issued the tickets, is liable for the failure of Aer Lingus to transport the passengers, which KLM had in effect guaranteed.
Pan American World Airways v. IAC
The passenger is bound by the stipulations limiting liability for lost baggage at the back of the ticket, which provided for $20/kilo, unless the passenger declares a higher value and pays an additional charge.
Warsaw Convention limiting liability of carriers for loss of baggage are valid.
PanAm v. Rapadas
Where the ticket provides that a Notice that the Warsaw convention applies in case of death or injury to passengers and/or loss or damage to baggage or cargo, then the liability limitations under Warsaw apply.
The Baggage check maybe incorporated into the Passenger Ticket.
In either case, there must be notice that Warsaw applies otherwise, the liability limitations under Warsaw do not apply.
Warsaw Convention applies to international Carriage:
Place of departure and destination are within the territories of two State Parties (one-way tickets); or
Place of departure and destination within territory of one State party but with an agreed stopping place at another State [w/not a State party] (round-trip tickets)
Lack of time to declare higher value and pay additional charges will not exclude the application of liability limitations.
Northwest v. Cuenca
Warsaw covers the liability of a carrier for death/injury to passengers, loss/damage to luggage or delay in the transportation of persons/baggage.
Warsaw however does not regulate or exclude the carrier’s liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier. In this case, carrier liable for rudely compelling Cuenca to transfer from his confirmed and paid first class seat to tourist.
Warsaw does not apply in case of bad faith attributable to the employees.
Alitalia v. IAC
Where a passenger suffers a special specie of injury as a result of the breach of the contract of carriage, the compensation for the injury cannot be restricted to that prescribed by Warsaw for delay in the transport of baggage.
Injury here was the failure to attend the conference to deliver her speech which was a great honor to the passenger.
Warsaw liability limits do not apply where it is shown that the damage was done with willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or employee acting within the scope of his employment.
PAL v. CA
NOTE: Weird Case
This case, which cited a marine case, said that if the destination of transport is the Philippines, then the Warsaw liability limitations do not apply. In such case, the NCC on common carriers applies to regulate the liability of the carrier for lost luggage.
Lufthansa v. IAC
The carrier waived the applicability of the Warsaw convention when it offered to pay a higher amount than that provided by Warsaw and by failing to object to the presentation of evidence on the actual amount of the lost luggage.
Luna v. CA
The RTC dismissed the case because the passengers failed to file a prior claim within the prescribed period under Warsaw.
In reinstating the case, the SC said that Warsaw does not exclusively enumerate the instances where a carrier may be held liable. Thus, the prior claim would apply only to claims covered by Warsaw and the carrier may still be held liable for a special specie of injury.
Failure to deliver the luggage at the designated time and place does not automatically amount to willful misconduct, which requires a showing that the acts complained of were done with intent to evade the law or were in persistent disregard of one’s rights.
Santos v. Northwest Orient Airlines
Article 28(1) of Warsaw refers to Jurisdiction where an action for damages may be brought:
Residence/domicile of Carrier [place of incorporation]
Jurisdiction in the international sense, Warsaw, must be established in accordance with the four choices. Thereafter, the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established according to domestic law.
Only after jurisdiction is established will the question of venue arise, which is controlled by domestic law.
The place of destination is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage, as represented by the ticket.
Where the ticket is round-trip, the place of departure and the place of destination is the same place, and any intermediate place where the carriage is broken is merely considered as a stopping place.
An allegation of willful misconduct will not exclude operation of Warsaw, the only provision that does not apply is the provision of liability limitation.
Mapa v. CA
There is no international carriage where the place of departure and the place of destination are all within the territory of the US, a single State party and where there is no agreed stopping place in the territory of another state.
PAL v. CA
Liability limitations in Warsaw do not apply where carrier accepts baggage w/out baggage checks having been delivered or no notice of Warsaw application.
Cathay Pacific Airways v. CA
Here, there was gross negligence and discourtesy where despite the baggage’s being late, the carrier’s representative were discourteous, indifferent, impatient, rude and insulting.
Here, the passenger suffered a special specie of injury entitling him to an award of moral and exemplary damages.
The liability limitations in Warsaw do not apply where the damage/injury caused to the passenger was a result of willful misconduct on the part of the carrier’s employees.
Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. CA
Liability limitations in Warsaw do not apply here because the baggage was lost twice which underscores the wanton negligence and lack of care on the part of the carrier which amounts to fraud or bad faith.
Case of default equivalent to willful misconduct.
United Airlines v. Uy
Under the first cause of action, which is based on Tort for the humiliating treatment the passenger received from the carrier’s employees, such cause of action prescribes in Four (4) years.
The travaux preparatories of the Warsaw Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum. This therefore forecloses the application of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to let local laws determine whether an action had been commenced within the two (2)-year period, and within our jurisdiction an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint. Since it is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the two (2)-year time frame his second cause of action must be barred.
An extrajudicial demand will not toll the running of the prescriptive period.
Nonetheless, it cannot be doubted that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey his loss to petitioner, even employed the services of two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims, and that the filing of the action itself was delayed because of petitioner's evasion. Court said that the passenger pursued his claim zealously.
Air France v. CA
The carrier is not in breach, nor guilty of bad faith, where it refuses to shorten the itinerary of the passenger and change his flight schedule where the tickets are stamped “non-endorsable.”
Lufthansa v. CA
Article 30 of Warsaw which provides that in successive carriage, an action may be brought only against the carrier which performed the carriage causing the injury, applies only when there is an accident or delay.
Here, the injury was caused by the bumping-off of the passenger with a confirmed ticket. This is not delay but bad faith. Bumping-off forecloses the right of the passenger to be transported while delay is a mere suspension or postponement of the transport.
The carriage in this case should be regarded as a continuous carriage and not independent contracts with several carriers. The ticket issued by Lufthansa provides that the carriage to be performed should be regarded as a single operation.
British Airways v. CA
Liability limitations in Warsaw and ticket are subject to waiver. Here, such application was waived when the carrier allowed the passenger, without objection, to testify on the contents of the baggage and even cross-examined the passenger.
In an action based on breach of contract of carriage for loss of baggage, the passenger may only sue the principal carrier and not the carrier who actually undertook the carriage and caused the loss.
However, the principal carrier may file a third party claim against the intermediate carrier to determine who is ultimately liable for the loss.
American Airlines v. CA
The contract of carriage between the private respondent and Singapore Airlines although performed by different carriers under a series of airline tickets, including that issued by the petitioner, constitutes a single operation. Members of the IATA are under a general pool partnership agreement wherein they act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets to contracted passengers to boost ticket sales worldwide and at the same time provide passengers easy access to airlines which are otherwise inaccessible in some parts of the world. Booking and reservation among airline members are allowed even by telephone and it has become an accepted practice among them. A member airline which enters into a contract of carriage consisting of a series of trips to be performed by different carriers is authorized to receive the fare for the whole trip and through the required process of interline settlement of accounts by way of the IATA clearing house an airline is duly compensated for the segment of the trip serviced.
Thus, when the petitioner accepted the unused portion of the conjunction tickets, entered it in the IATA clearing house and undertook to transport the private respondent over the route covered by the unused portion of the conjunction tickets, i.e., Geneva to New York, the petitioner tacitly recognized its commitment under the IATA pool arrangement to act as agent of the principal contracting airline, Singapore Airlines, as to the segment of the trip the petitioner agreed to undertake. As such, the petitioner thereby assumed the obligation to take the place of the carrier originally designated in the original conjunction ticket. The petitioner's argument that it is not a designated carrier in the original conjunction tickets and that it issued its own ticket is not decisive of its liability. The new ticket was simply a replacement for the unused portion of the conjunction ticket, both tickets being for the same amount of US$2,760 and having the same points of departure and destination. By constituting itself as an agent of the principal carrier the petitioner's undertaking should be taken as part of a single operation under the contract of carriage executed by the private respondent and Singapore Airlines in Manila.
China Airlines v. Chiok
It is significant to note that the contract of air transportation was between petitioner and respondent, with the former endorsing to PAL the Hong Kong-to-Manila segment of the journey. Such contract of carriage has always been treated in this jurisdiction as a single operation.
Article 15 of IATA-Recommended Practice similarly provides: "Carriage to be performed by several successive carriers under one ticket, or under a ticket and any conjunction ticket issued therewith, is regarded as a single operation."
In American Airlines v. Court of Appeals, we have noted that under a general pool partnership agreement, the ticket-issuing airline is the principal in a contract of carriage, while the endorsee-airline is the agent.
Likewise, as the principal in the contract of carriage, the petitioner in British Airways v. Court of Appeals was held liable, even when the breach of contract had occurred, not on its own flight, but on that of another airline. The Decision followed our ruling in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, in which we had held that the obligation of the ticket-issuing airline remained and did not cease, regardless of the fact that another airline had undertaken to carry the passengers to one of their destinations.
Savellano v. Northwest Airlines
A claim for alleged lost items from the baggage cannot prosper because of the failure to give timely notice of the loss.
Federal Express Corporation v. American Home Assurance
In this jurisdiction, the filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefor actually constitutes a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for loss of or damage to the goods. The shipper or consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition. If it fails to do so, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in favor of the former. The aforementioned requirement is a reasonable condition precedent; it does not constitute a limitation of action.
The requirement of giving notice of loss of or injury to the goods is not an empty formalism. The fundamental reasons for such a stipulation are (1) to inform the carrier that the cargo has been damaged, and that it is being charged with liability therefor; and (2) to give it an opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury. “This protects the carrier by affording it an opportunity to make an investigation of a claim while the matter is fresh and easily investigated so as to safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims.”
When an airway bill -- or any contract of carriage for that matter -- has a stipulation that requires a notice of claim for loss of or damage to goods shipped and the stipulation is not complied with, its enforcement can be prevented and the liability cannot be imposed on the carrier. To stress, notice is a condition precedent, and the carrier is not liable if notice is not given in accordance with the stipulation. Failure to comply with such a stipulation bars recovery for the loss or damage suffered.
Philippine Airlines v. Savillo
Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provides for liability on the part of a carrier for “damages occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage or goods.” Article 24 excludes other remedies by further providing that “(1) in the cases covered by articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.” Therefore, a claim covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer be recovered under local law, if the statute of limitations of two years has already lapsed.
Nevertheless, this Court notes that jurisprudence in the Philippines and the United States also recognizes that the Warsaw Convention does not “exclusively regulate” the relationship between passenger and carrier on an international flight. This Court finds that the present case is substantially similar to cases in which the damages sought were considered to be outside the coverage of the Warsaw Convention. Examples of causes not covered are:
humiliation suffered at the hands of the airline’s employees.
“bumping off” itself, rather than the incidental damages due to the delay, fall outside the Warsaw Convention and do not prescribe in two years.
In the Petition at bar, private respondent’s Complaint alleged that both PAL and Singapore Airlines were guilty of gross negligence, which resulted in his being subjected to “humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, serious anxiety, fear and distress.” The emotional harm suffered by the private respondent as a result of having been unreasonably and unjustly prevented from boarding the plane should be distinguished from the actual damages which resulted from the same incident. Under the Civil Code provisions on tort, such emotional harm gives rise to compensation where gross negligence or malice is proven.
Lhuiller v. British Airways
The allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude the case from the realm of the Warsaw Convention.
In Bloom v. Alaska Airlines,the passenger brought nine causes of action against the airline in the state court, arising from a confrontation with the flight attendant during an international flight to Mexico. The United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) held that the “Warsaw Convention governs actions arising from international air travel and provides the exclusive remedy for conduct which falls within its provisions.” It further held that the said Convention “created no exception for an injury suffered as a result of intentional conduct”which in that case involved a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
It is thus settled that allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the course of the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
Warsaw rules on jurisdiction apply. Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction here.
CODE OF COMMERCE
REGISTRATION
Lita Enterprises v. IAC
the parties herein operated under an arrangement, commonly known as the "kabit system", whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government . Abuse of this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. The "kabit system" has been identified as one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the government transportation offices.
Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the "kabit system" is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them. Where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other.
Lim v. CA
One of the primary factors considered in the granting of a certificate of public convenience for the business of public transportation is the financial capacity of the holder of the license, so that liabilities arising from accidents may be duly compensated. The kabit system renders illusory such purpose and, worse, may still be availed of by the grantee to escape civil liability caused by a negligent use of a vehicle owned by another and operated under his license.
It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public.
Kabit does not apply here. The Case is for damages against a truck owner which bumped the jeep operating under a kabit. The kabit owner can recover against the truck owner even if the jeep is operating under a kabit.
Tamayo v. Aquino
The action instituted in this case is for breach of contract against the registered owner who in turn filed a third-party complaint against the unregistered transferee.
In such instance, the liability of the registered owner and the transferee is not solidary liability, as in the case of tort against both.
Under such facts, the registered owner’s liability is direct but the transferee as the operator and the person responsible for the death should be made responsible to the registered owner.
In operating the truck without transfer thereof having been approved by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of the registered owner and should be responsible to him (the registered owner), for any damages that he may cause the latter by his negligence.
The procedure to make the transferee responsible is through another action or in this case through a third-party complaint. If both were impleaded, through a cross-claim.
Perez v. Gutierrez
A franchise is personal in nature any transfer or lease thereof should be submitted for approval of the Public Service Commission, so that the latter may take proper safeguards to protect the interest of the public. It follows that if the property covered by the franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding on the Public Service Commission and, in contemplation of law, the grantee continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation to the Commission and to the public for the consequences incident to the operation of the vehicle, one of them being the collision under consideration.
Juaniza v. Jose
Rosalia Arroyo [common-law wife], who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused by its operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.
MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Caldo
Regardless of who the actual owner of a vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicles as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident to its operation, so that, in contemplation of law, such owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered merely as his agent.
Jereos v. CA
The registered owner or operator has the right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused.
The right to be indemnified being recognized, recovery by the registered owner or operator may be made in any form-either by a cross-claim, third-party complaint, or an independent action. The result is the same.
