The name of captain or master is given, according to the kind of vessel, to the person in charge of it. The first denomination is applied to those who govern vessels that navigate the high seas or ships of large dimensions and importance, although they be engaged in the coastwise trade. Masters are those who command smaller ships engaged exclusively in the coastwise trade. For the purposes of maritime commerce, the words "captain" and "master" have the same meaning; both being the chiefs or commanders of ships.
The shipowner is liable civilly for the loss suffered by those who contracted with the captain, in consequence of the misdemeanors and crimes committed by the latter or by the members of the crew.
It is therefore evident that, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Commerce in force, which are applicable to the instance case, the defendant Narciso Lauron, as the proprietor and owner of the craft of which Glicerio Ipil was the master and in which, through the fault and negligence of the latter and of the supercago Justo Solamo, there occurred the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to the plaintiff and were delivered to said master and supercargo, a theft which, on the other hand, as shown by the evidence, does not appear to have been committed by a person not belonging to the craft, should, for said loss or theft, be held civilly liable to the plaintiff, who executed with said defendant Lauron the contract for the transportation of the merchandise and money aforementioned between the port of Cebu and the town of Catmon, by means of the said craft.
Lopez v. Duruelo
When the mercantile codes speak of vessels, they refer solely and exclusively to merchant ships, as they do not include war ships furthermore, they almost always refer to craft which are not accessory to another as is the case of launches, lifeboats, etc.
Moreover, the mercantile laws, in making use of the words ship, vessels, boat, embarkation, etc., refer exclusively to those which are engaged in the transportation of passengers and freight from one port to another or from one place to another; in a word, they refer to merchant vessels and in no way can they or should they be understood as referring to pleasure craft, yachts, pontoons, health service and harbor police vessels, floating storehouses, warships or patrol vessels, coast guard vessels, fishing vessels, towboats, and other craft destined to other uses, such as for instance coast and geodetic survey, those engaged in scientific research and exploration, craft engaged in the loading and discharge of vessels from same to shore or docks, or in transhipment and those small craft which in harbors, along shore, bays, inlets, coves and anchorages are engaged in transporting passengers and baggage.
Standard Vacuum Oil.
It therefore appears that whenever merchandise is transported on the sea by virtue of a contract entered into between the shipper and the carrier, the merchandise is deemed transported at the risk and venture of the shipper, if the contrary is not stipulated, and all damages suffered by the merchandise during the transportation by reason of accident or force majeure shall be for the account and risk of the shipper, but the proof of these accidents is incumbent on the carrier.
Thus, same rule in NCC, where carrier is liable for loss unless it is able to prove loss through any of the exempting circumstances.
Here, the defense of fortuitous event is unavailing since it was held that the tugboat was unseaworthy.
Second-hand without being dry-docked; Incomplete equipment; Incompetent crew; No spare parts.
Yu Biao v. Ossorio
It is proven that the agents and employees, through whose negligence the explosion and fire in question occurred, were agents, employees, and mandatories of the defendant. Where the vessel is one of freight, a public concern or public utility, its owner or agent is liable for the tortious acts of his agents.
Rubiso v. Rivera
Art 573 of Code of Commerce provides that “Merchant vessels constitute property which may be acquired and transferred by any of the means recognized by law. The acquisition of a vessel must be included in a written instrument, which shall not produce any effect with regard to third persons if not recorded in the commercial registry.”
So that, pursuant to the above-quoted article, inscription in the commercial registry was indispensable, in order that said acquisition might affect, and produce consequences with respect to third persons.
Thus, if the transfer was not registered, the rights of the transferee may be defeated by a subsequent purchaser who is able to register his sale first.
“NO VESSEL, NO LIABILITY” - LIMITED LIABILITY
Luzon Stevedoring v. CA
It is clear that in case of collision of vessels, in order to avail of the benefits of Article 837 of the Code of Commerce the shipowner or agent must abandon the vessel. In such case the civil liability shall be limited to the value of the vessel with all the appurtenances and freight earned during the voyage. However, where the injury or average is due to the ship-owner's fault as in said case, the shipowner may not avail of his right to limited liability by abandoning the vessel.
We reiterate what We said in previous decisions that the real and hypothecary nature of the liability of the shipowner or agent is embodied in the provisions of the Maritime Law, Book III, Code of Commerce. 21 Articles 587, 590 and 837 of the same code are precisely intended to limit the liability of the shipowner or agent to the value of the vessel, its appurtenances and freightage earned in the voyage, provided that owner or agent abandons the vessel. Although it is not specifically provided for in Article 837 of the same code that in case of collision there should be such abandonment to enjoy such limited liability, said article on collision of vessels is a mere amplification of the provisions of Articles 587 and 590 of same code where abandonment of the vessel is a pre-condition. Even without said article, the parties may avail of the provisions of Articles 587 and 590 of same code in case of collision. This is the reason why Article 837 of the same code is considered a superfluity.
Hence the rule is that in case of collision there should be abandonment of the vessel by the shipowner or agent in order to enjoy the limited liability provided for under said Article 837. The exception to this rule is when the vessel is totally lost in which case there is no vessel to abandon so abandonment is not required. Because of such total loss the liability of the shipowner or agent for damages is extinguished. Nevertheless, the shipowner or agent is personally liable for claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act and for repairs of the vessel before its loss.
In case of illegal or tortious acts of the captain the liability of the shipowner and agent is subsidiary. In such instance the shipowner or agent may avail of the provisions of Article 837 of the Code by abandoning the vessel.
However, if the injury or damage is caused by the shipowner's fault as where he engages the services of an inexperienced and unlicensed captain or engineer [or where the vessel is unseaworthy], he cannot avail of the provisions of Article 837 of the Code by abandoning the vessel. He is personally liable for the damages arising thereby.
Chua Yek Hong v. IAC
The direct liability of the shipagent and shipowner is limited by their right of abandonment of the vessel and earned freight. This expresses the universal principle of limited liability under maritime law. The most fundamental effect of abandonment is the cessation of the responsibility of the ship agent/owner.
The real and hypothecary nature of the liability of the ship owner or agent embodied in the provisions of the Maritime Law, Book III, Code of Commerce, had its origin in the prevailing conditions of the maritime trade and sea voyages during the medieval ages, attended by innumerable hazards and perils. To offset against these adverse conditions and to encourage ship building and maritime commerce, it was deemed necessary to confine the liability of the owner or agent arising from the operation of a ship to the vessel, equipment, and freight, or insurance, if any, so that if the ship owner or agent abandoned the ship, equipment, and freight, his liability was extinguished.
The limited liability rule, however, is not without exceptions, namely: (1) where the injury or death to a passenger is due either to the fault of the ship owner, or to the concurring negligence of the ship owner and the captain; (2) where the vessel is insured; and (3) in workmen's compensation claims. In this case, there is nothing in the records to show that the loss of the cargo was due to the fault of the private respondent as shipowners, or to their concurrent negligence with the captain of the vessel.
Monarch Insurance v. CA
"No vessel, no liability," expresses in a nutshell the limited liability rule. The shipowner’s or agent’s liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction. The total destruction of the vessel extinguishes maritime liens because there is no longer any res to which it can attach. This doctrine is based on the real and hypothecary nature of maritime law which has its origin in the prevailing conditions of the maritime trade and sea voyages during the medieval ages, attended by innumerable hazards and perils. To offset against these adverse conditions and to encourage shipbuilding and maritime commerce it was deemed necessary to confine the liability of the owner or agent arising from the operation of a ship to the vessel, equipment, and freight, or insurance, if any.
Contrary to the petitioners’ theory that the limited liability rule has been rendered obsolete by the advances in modern technology which considerably lessen the risks involved in maritime trade, this Court continues to apply the said rule in appropriate cases. This is not to say, however, that the limited liability rule is without exceptions, namely: (1) where the injury or death to a passenger is due either to the fault of the shipowner, or to the concurring negligence of the shipowner and the captain;(2) where the vessel is insured; and (3) in workmen’s compensation claims.
We have categorically stated that Article 587 speaks only of situations where the fault or negligence is committed solely by the captain. In cases where the ship owner is likewise to be blamed, Article 587 does not apply. Such a situation will be covered by the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers.
However, in the subsequent case of Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ltd., this Court exculpated Aboitiz from fault and/or negligence while holding that the unseaworthiness of the M/V P. Aboitiz was only attributable to the negligence of its captain and crew. Thus,
"On this point, it should be stressed that unseaworthiness is not a fault that can be laid squarely on petitioner’s lap, absent a factual basis for such conclusion. The unseaworthiness found in some cases where the same has been ruled to exist is directly attributable to the vessel’s crew and captain, more so on the part of the latter since Article 612 of the Code of Commerce provides that among the inherent duties of a captain is to examine a vessel before sailing and to comply with the laws of navigation.”
On the matter of Aboitiz’ negligence, we adhere to our ruling in Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. Court of Appeals, that found Aboitiz, and the captain and crew of the M/V P. Aboitiz to have been concurrently negligent.
NOTE: this case ruled consistent with the NCC which provides that the carrier is presumed to be at fault and has the burden of proving that it exercised extraordinary diligence. In this case, such finding of fortuitous event cannot be made since the sinking occurred during seasonal weather which supports a finding of unseaworthiness.
PHILAMGEN v. CA
Limited liability rule did not apply in this case where it was found that the ship was unseaworthy which caused the accident. The vessel was top-heavy.
Vazquez v. CA
Under the circumstances, while, indeed, the typhoon was an inevitable occurrence, yet, having been kept posted on the course of the typhoon by weather bulletins at intervals of six hours, the captain and crew were well aware of the risk they were taking as they hopped from island to island from Romblon up to Tanguingui. They held frequent conferences, and oblivious of the utmost diligence required of very cautious persons, 9 they decided to take a calculated risk. In so doing, they failed to observe that extraordinary diligence required of them explicitly by law for the safety of the passengers transported by them with due regard for an circumstances 10 and unnecessarily exposed the vessel and passengers to the tragic mishap. They failed to overcome that presumption of fault or negligence that arises in cases of death or injuries to passengers.
With respect to private respondent's submission that the total loss of the vessel extinguished its liability pursuant to Article 587, the liability of a shipowner is limited to the value of the vessel or to the insurance thereon. Despite the total loss of the vessel therefore, its insurance answers for the damages that a shipowner or agent may be held liable for by reason of the death of its passengers.
Negros Navigation v. CA
The Limited liability of the shipowner does not apply in this case, despite the total loss of the ship because it is equally negligent in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for damages to the full extent.
Abotiz v. New India; Aboitiz v. CA
The exception to the limited liability doctrine applies when the damage is due to the fault of the shipowner or to the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the captain. Where the shipowner fails to overcome the presumption of negligence, the doctrine of limited liability cannot be applied.
In New India, the Court declared that Aboitiz failed to discharge its burden of showing that it exercised extraordinary diligence in the transport of the goods it had on board in order to invoke the limited liability doctrine. Thus, the Court rejected Aboitiz’s argument that the award of damages to respondent therein should be limited to its pro rata share in the insurance proceeds from the sinking of M/V P. Aboitiz.
PERSONS in MARITIME LAW
Far Eastern Shipping v. CA
In the absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the presumption of fault attaches to a moving vessel which collides with a fixed object and makes a prima facie case of fault against the vessel. [This is allusion – where a moving vessel collides with a fixed object]
A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. In a broad sense, the term "pilot" includes both (1) those whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out of ports, or in particular waters and (2) those entrusted with the navigation of vessels on the high seas. However, the term "pilot" is more generally understood as a person taken on board at a particular place for the purpose of conducting a ship through a river, road or channel, or from a port.
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 prescribes the rules for compulsory pilotage in the covered pilotage districts
The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino [pilot] is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. His unconcerned lethargy as master of the ship in the face of troublous exigence constitutes negligence.
Where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to permit him to navigate it, if the master observes that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the duty of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the master, exercising that reasonable vigilance which the master of a ship should exercise, observed, or should have observed, that the pilot was so navigating the vessel that she was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and there was in the exercise of reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for the master to intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the master should have acted accordingly. The master of a vessel must exercise a degree of vigilance commensurate with the circumstances.
Since the colliding vessel is prima facie responsible, the burden of proof is upon the party claiming benefit of the exemption from liability. It must be shown affirmatively that the pilot was at fault, and that there was no fault on the part of the officers or crew, which might have been conducive to the damage. The fact that the law compelled the master to take the pilot does not exonerate the vessel from liability. The parties who suffer are entitled to have their remedy against the vessel that occasioned the damage, and are not under necessity to look to the pilot from whom redress is not always had for compensation. The owners of the vessel are responsible to the injured party for the acts of the pilot, and they must be left to recover the amount as well as they can against him. It cannot be maintained that the circumstance of having a pilot on board, and acting in conformity to his directions operate as a discharge of responsibility of the owners. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owner are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. Where the pilot of a vessel is not a compulsory one in the sense that the owner or master of the vessel are bound to accept him, but is employed voluntarily, the owners of the vessel are, all the more, liable for his negligent act.
National Steel Corporation v. CA
Because the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the shipowner's obligations are governed by the foregoing provisions of the Code of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a general rule, places the prima facie presumption of negligence on a common carrier. In an action against a private carrier for loss of, or injury to, cargo, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the carrier was negligent or unseaworthy, and the fact that the goods were lost or damaged while in the carrier's custody does not put the burden of proof on the carrier.
A stevedore company engaged in discharging cargo has the duty to load the cargo in a prudent manner, and it is liable for injury to, or loss of, cargo caused by its negligence and where the officers and members and crew of the vessel do nothing and have no responsibility in the discharge of cargo by stevedores the vessel is not liable for loss of, or damage to, the cargo caused by the negligence of the stevedores
The Court defined demurrage in its strict sense as the compensation provided for in the contract of affreightment for the detention of the vessel beyond the laytime or that period of time agreed on for loading and unloading of cargo. It is given to compensate the shipowner for the nonuse of the vessel.
Switzerland General Insurance Company v. Ramirez
Considering the relationship of the parties, respondent Citadel Lines, Inc. cannot be considered as a "mere agent" under the civil law on agency as distinguished from a ship agent, within the context of the Code of Commerce.
A ship agent, according to Article 586 of the Code of Commerce, is the person
entrusted with the provisioning of a vessel or
who represents her in the port in which she happens to be.
The Code of Commerce provides, among others, that the ship agent shall also be liable for the indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which the vessel carried; but he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her equipments and the freightage he may have earned during the voyage.
The insolvency of Oyama Lines has no bearing on the instant case insofar as the liability of Citadel Lines, Inc. is concerned. The law does does not make the liability of the ship agent dependent upon the solvency or insolvency of the ship owner.
Sweet Lines v. CA
ART. 698. In case of interruption of a voyage already begun, the passengers shall only be obliged to pay the fare in proportion to the distance covered, without right to recover damages if the interruption is due to fortuitous event or force majeure, but with a right to indemnity, if the interruption should have been caused by the captain exclusively. If the interruption should be caused by the disability of the vessel, and the passenger should agree to wait for her repairs, he may not be required to pay any increased fare of passage, but his living expenses during the delay shall be for his own account.
There was no fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented the vessel from fulfilling its undertaking of taking private respondents to Catbalogan. In the first place, mechanical defects in the carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that exempts the carrier from responsibility.
The voyage to Catbalogan was "interrupted" by the captain upon instruction of management. The "interruption" was not due to fortuitous event or for majeure nor to disability of the vessel. Having been caused by the captain upon instruction of management, the passengers' right to indemnity is evident. The owner of a vessel and the ship agent shall be civilly liable for the acts of the captain.
Inter-Orient Martime Enterprises v. NLRC
The captain of a vessel is a confidential and managerial employee within the meaning of the above doctrine. A master or captain, for purposes of maritime commerce, is one who has command of a vessel. A captain commonly performs three (3) distinct roles: (1) he is a general agent of the shipowner; (2) he is also commander and technical director of the vessel; and (3) he is a representative of the country under whose flag he navigates.
To the captain is committed the governance, care and management of the vessel. Clearly, the captain is vested with both management and fiduciary functions.
More importantly, a ship's captain must be accorded a reasonable measure of discretionary authority to decide what the safety of the ship and of its crew and cargo specifically requires on a stipulated ocean voyage. The captain is held responsible, and properly so, for such safety. He is right there on the vessel, in command of it and (it must be presumed) knowledgeable as to the specific requirements of seaworthiness and the particular risks and perils of the voyage he is to embark upon. The applicable principle is that the captain has control of all departments of service in the vessel, and reasonable discretion as to its navigation. It is the right and duty of the captain, in the exercise of sound discretion and in good faith, to do all things with respect to the vessel and its equipment and conduct of the voyage which are reasonably necessary for the protection and preservation of the interests under his charge, whether those be of the shipowners, charterers, cargo owners or of underwriters.
It is a basic principle of admiralty law that in navigating a merchantman, the master must be left free to exercise his own best judgment. The requirements of safe navigation compel us to reject any suggestion that the judgment and discretion of the captain of a vessel may be confined within a straitjacket, even in this age of electronic communications. Indeed, if the ship captain is convinced, as a reasonably prudent and competent mariner acting in good faith that the shipowner's or ship agent's instructions (insisted upon by radio or telefax from their offices thousands of miles away) will result, in the very specific circumstances facing him, in imposing unacceptable risks of loss or serious danger to ship or crew, he cannot casually seek absolution from his responsibility, if a marine casualty occurs, in such instructions.
Tabacalera Insurance v. North Front Shipping Services
A "charter-party" is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or use; a contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or a part of her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight . . . Contract of affreightment may either be time charter, wherein the vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the charter-party provides for the hire of the vessel only, either for a determinate period of time or for a single or consecutive voyage, the ship owner to supply the ship's store, pay for the wages of the master of the crew, and defray the expenses for the maintenance of the ship.
Upon the other hand, the term "common or public carrier" is defined in Art. 1732 of the Civil Code. The definition extends to carriers either by land, air or water which hold themselves out as ready to engage in carrying goods or transporting passengers or both for compensation as a public employment and not as a casual occupation.
It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the shin only, as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter.
